Andrzej Nowak

THE CONCEPTION OF PANSLAVISM IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE GREAT EMIGRATION

In the course of its history, the idea of Slavdom as a certain entirety assumed various forms: cultural–scientific interests, political conceptions and historio-philosophic reflections. For Polish emigrés after the November Uprising, the most important was the political interpretation. The Uprising revealed with particular acuteness the problem of the eventual unity of the Slav world in the face of the obvious Polish–Russian divorce. Naturally, this was the central topic of debates conducted by the emigré supporters and opponents of Panslavism. The first and most known event in this field was caused by the national apostasy suggested by Adam Gurowski, motivated by the very idea of Panslavism (1834). The central core of the controversy concerning the Slavic idea were the Parisian lectures given by Adam Mickiewicz (1840–1844). Between these two events, and as if in their shadow, several other voices could be heard also dealing with the issue of Panslavism. In this essay, I would like to recall three such opinions which appear to be the most original and which express three different possibilities of a political interpretation of Panslavism: anti–German, conservative–monarchic and revolutionary.

All three must be considered against a special background which was created for them by the form of Slav unity, at times described in literature on the subject as “Polish Slavism”¹, dominating in emigré publicistics

(primarily in the democratic camp and especially in its branch inspired by Joachim Lelewel). On the threshold of the second decade of exile, two new initiatives connected with the emigre periodicals revealed the prime motives and premises of the Emigration, including its attitude towards Russia.

In 1838, an attempt at reviving the slogan of Slav solidarity was made by Hieronim Napoleon Bońkowski (1807–1886). This scholar (a graduate of Warsaw and Fribourg universities) and translator of Šafařík’s “Slav Antiquities”, kept his distance from strife rampant among the various emigre groups, and initiated a periodical under the programme–like title of “La Revue Slave”. Bońkowski cherished the ambition of creating a forum for Slav men of letters and scholars, of uprooting prevalent, mistaken conceptions about the Slavs and of informing Europe about their historical and literary life as well as their contemporary situation and aspirations. He defended the leading idea of his periodical in “Trzeci Maj” (Third May), a new publication of the monarchic camp. The political contents of “La Revue Slave”, however, were closest to the line represented, as regards the Slav issue, by the Lelewelian current. Let us add that Bońkowski was a translator of Lelewel’s works into French, and that he invited i.a. Seweryn Goszczyński, at that time a leading publicist of the democratic camp, to cooperate with his periodical.

The foremost tendency of “La Revue Slave” is defined by a conviction about the special mission of the Slavs. It was to be expressed by linking the forces of united Slav activity with the idea of winning independence and the creation of a new state of social coexistence for each of the Slav nations (although it is not quite clear what this novelty was to consist of). In this manner the author of an article entitled La tendence slave — possibly Goszczyński — saw a chance for conciliating the natural strivings of the two largest Slav nations. For the Russians, the Slav idea would denote social emancipation, for the Poles — above all, national liberation. For the remaining Slavonic peoples, the conception of a joint deed would produce a

PANSLAVISM AND GREAT EMIGRATION 31
guarantee of defending nationalities threatened by Turkey or Germany. The
authors of “La Revue Slave” accepted as obvious and unquestioned the
premise that the leading role in this triple emancipation of the Slavs would
be played by Poland.

Bońkowski tried to justify hopes that his assumption would be accepted
by the “unblinded Russians” and he referred to echoes of a recently dis­
covered military conspiracy involving gen. Theodore Geismar’s army lo­
cated in Lithuania. He also sketched an image of a growing conflict between
the Russian people on the one hand, and the rule of the Germanized
Romanov dynasty and the German bureaucracy on the other hand. In an
outline of the state of contemporary Russian culture, summed up in several
sentences, one of the very few such presentations prior to Mickiewicz’s
lectures, Bońkowski considered it suitable to stress the “striking paucity” of
Russian literature in comparison with its Polish, Czech or even Illyrian
counterparts. He immediately went on to explain this phenomenon by
referring to repression against national culture committed by the anti–Slav
government in St. Petersburg, and made mention of the baiting of Alexander
Pushkin and the death of another poet, Alexander Bestuzhev–Marlinski,
sentenced to military service in the Caucasus.

The contents of Polish democratic Slavism were presented in still more
distinct forms, restricted almost to an incessant repetition of several basic
slogans, by “Słowianin” (The Slav), a periodical issued in Paris from 1841
to 1843. Its private publisher, Captain Alfons Majewski, endowed it with a
historical and military profile. The political line of this publication was
concealed between articles dealing with the art of war and a future uprising,
and could be summed up in the motto of the periodical: “For Your Freedom
and Ours”. That what was at stake was the freedom of all Slavs. The
editor–in–chief regarded love of freedom as the sole prominent proof of
belonging to the Slav family. He perceived future Slavdom as an enormous
state, centralized around Poland, in which the Slavs “will be able to attain
greatness without much hardship and on the basis of fraternity, and will be
able to find paradise on Earth during their lifetime”.

5 See: A. Starzyński, Centralizacja Słowian (The Centralization of Slavs), “Słowianin”,
   fol. 1, Paris 1841, p. 16. On the subject of the periodical itself and its editors see: Z. Klarne­
   równa, op. cit., pp. 789; E. Kołodziejczyk, Prądy słowianofilskie wśród Emigracji
   Wielkiej 1830–1863 (Philo–Slav Currents among the Great Emigration 1830–1863), Kraków 1914,
   pp. 24–28; S. Kalembka, Prasa demokratyczna Wielkiej Emigracji. Dzieje i główne koncepcje
   polityczne, 1832–1863 (The Democratic Press of the Great Emigration. History and Prime Political
   Conceptions, 1832–1863), Toruń 1977, p. 78.
Password — Poland, countersign — Freedom: the conception of Slav­
ism contained in such a simple and truly soldierly formula could have been
retained in the 1840s only at the cost of neglecting all the more significant
problems which the acceptance of the idea of a Slavic community inevitably
introduced into Polish pro-independence thought, involved in a struggle
against Russia. The duplication of well-worn stereotypes ensured Majew­
ski’s periodical only 86 subscribers and an existence which did not go
beyond 4 issues6. “La Revue Slave” ceased coming out already after the first
issue. The time of uncomplicated belief in a close union of the strivings of
all Slav nations through the intermediary of Polish independence, and in the
mutually profitable opportunity for exploiting the former for the sake of the
latter, had come to an end at the close of the 1830s. The fear of the
manipulation which Russia could perform upon the idea of Slav unity,
enrooted already during years of the compromise propaganda in the con­
stitutional Kingdom of Poland, now began to act with a new force. The
optimistic visions of Polish Slavism, as Bońkowski himself noticed, came
face to face with the phantom of tsarist Panslavism7.

It has become common for historiography to envisage Panslavism as a
conception of the unification or rather the absorption of Slav nations by
tsarist Russia. At least two premises were necessary to develop this idea and
its dissemination on the Eastern European market of political projects, hopes
and anxieties. The first was the conviction that Russia had the political and
military ability to dominate and control all of Slavdom. The second was
produced by the assumption that the nations of southern and western
Slavdom were susceptible to the slogan of a unification performed by
Russia. At the end of the 1830s, the first of these two premises appeared to
be so close to its fulfillment as never before. From the Treaty of Adrianople
(1829) when Russia took up a position at the mouth of the Danube and
extended its co-protectorate over duchies lying on the Danube, and from
the Treaty of Unkiar–Skelessi (1833), when the tsar, under the pretences of
signing a peace and friendship convention with the Sultan, won actual
supremacy over the Bosphorus, almost every subsequent year demonstrated
the growing impact of Russian policy in the Balkans. The practically 6
million strong, and predominantly Orthodox Slav population of the Euro­
pean part of Turkey now found itself at a marching distance from the Russian
troops. The 1830s also brought increasingly clear-cut signs of a national
and, above all, a cultural awakening based on the Orthodox Church and Slav
traditions, counterpoised to the ruling patterns of the religion and culture of


http://rcin.org.pl
Islam. An analogous process was taking place among the Slav nations of the Austrian monarchy, albeit with even greater impetus and in a more mature form.

Quite possibly, the innermost roots of the conception of Slavic unity dated back to a quest for cultural identity conducted by part of the intellectual elite of nations which at the end of the Enlightenment era were forced to face the unifying models of an outside, Western civilization. The trend which was indicated in that search already by J.G. Herder pointed towards the origin and infancy of nations — towards the myth of an ancient Slav community. A hierarchy of evaluations created in the spiritual clime of Romanticism, and dealing with culture and its significance for national life, elevated this primary motif of philo-Slav interests. It was also this motif, perhaps the only one, which brought together the philo-Slavs of the first half of the nineteenth century, from Prague to Pressburg (Bratislava), in all three partition areas of former Poland and all the way up to Moscow and St. Petersburg.

For the Slavs of the Austrian monarchy, among whom the conception of disclosing a joint lineage of Slavic tradition had made greatest progress in the first decades of the century, the problem of the endangered and still unsteady feeling of cultural identity was, obviously, connected with a political handicap. In this configuration, the role of the foe was ascribed to the Germans — the German civil servant, teacher or university professor — regarded as the instrument of Habsburg rule and German cultural expansion. Regardless of whom this issue of double, cultural and political non-sovereignty indicated as the main enemy — a German or Turk — the positive anticipations of a considerable part of the intellectual leaders of the national renascence of southern and western Slavdom centred around Russian, envisaged as the only Slav power. Russia remained attractive either as a patron (and sometimes the source of financial support) of Slav studies, or as the main force in the eventual reconquista of Slav lands subjected to alien elements, and the core of their political unification into a power which would topple Turkey or entire Germany, and whose greatness would even equal that of Western Europe. A natural link which additionally bound a considerable part of the Balkan and Danube Slavs with Moscow was the unity of

---

the Orthodox tradition and rites. From this point of view, the tsar, conceived as a guardian of religion, a protector of philo-Slav interests and a political suzerain of united Slavdom, could prove to be not so much a symbol of a threat but, on the contrary, the only addressee of Pan-Slav aspirations.

The very term Panslavism came into being precisely over the Danube. It was used for the first time in the work of the Slovak philologist Jan Herkel (Elementa universalis linguae slavicae — 1816) in which it still lacked political references. Studies conducted in Prague, Buda and Bratislava into Slavonic “antiquities”, philological deliberations concerning the linguistic unity of the Slavs as well as the concept of their literary “compatibility” could not be upheld for long without a political interpretation. The Slovak poet Jan Kollar (1793–1852) ultimately endowed the historical, ethnographic and linguistic studies of his learned countrymen — Pavel Šafařík, Vatslav Hanka and Josif Dobrowski — with the dimension of a Pan-Slavic and, simultaneously, cultural–linguistic programme. A literary manifesto of this programme was the poem Slavy dčera (The Daughter of Fame), and its publicistic presentation was contained by Kollar in a dissertation about the “literary compatibility” of Slav nations (1835)⁹. Both works won a renown which was sufficiently extensive to resound with a disturbing echo among the Polish emigrés. We encounter direct and indirect traces of this fact i.a. in the speeches by Lelewel, the writings of the Polish Democratic Society, the press of the Catholic–liberal branch of the Emigration and, finally, in lectures given by Mickiewicz. The slogan of creating a single Slav literature, proposed by Kollar, and the retention of the languages of particular nationalities in the form of dialects of a single, Pan–Slav literary language, was regarded by Poles living in France as an introduction to a conception of melting national distinctness in a Slavonic pot, and as a first step towards a political merging of Slavs under the Romanov rule. The Polish reader of The Daughter of Fame discovered in Kollar’s poem a confirmation of his fears as regards the tendencies of a movement represented by the Slovak bard. He was unable to remain indifferent to the vision of a Slav paradise, portrayed by Kollar, in which the prime posts were to be held by the crowned grandsons of Catherine II and which excluded Polish national heroine —

Countess Emilia Plater for raising an armed hand against her Slav brethren in 1831.10

The growing tide of interest and reflections concerning the civilizational contents and political destiny of Slavdom at the end of the 1830s also included a rising number of signals indicating the “Pan–Slav threat”. The latter appeared to be much more real than was the case several years earlier when Mauryce Mochnacki warned against the Pan–Slav appetite of tsarist Russia and when Adam Gurowski for the first time transformed Panslavism into a construction of political thought. The acceptance by the tsar of the role of a new “Samopelk” or “Swiatopelk” seemed to be more probable both for the fervent supporters of such a solution and for its equally adamant opponents. Only a few of the emigres who perceived the contradiction between Pan–Slav ambitions and the principles of legitimism shared the belief that tsar Nicholas preferred and would keep the role of “the first Tory” in Europe, and of a watchful guarantor of the established political order in the eastern part of the Continent, and not that of its destroyer11.

Panslavism did not become an actual component of the policy pursued by Nicholas I. Nonetheless, and this is important from our viewpoint, it


11 See: “Narodowość”, part. III, n° 9: 17 March 1842, pp. 34–35. The literature dealing with the position of the Pan–Slav idea in the foreign policy of the Russian empire is extremely copious. The most important problem as regards the era of Nicholas I which is reflected in those studies and as times becomes a topic of controversies, is the relation between the programme-like legitimism of the tsar and the ideas, which reached him, of applying Slavism in a struggle for domination over Central–Eastern Europe. See i.a.: M. Bor Petrović, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, New York 1956, pp. 22–60; V. Riasanovskij, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia 1825–1855, Berkeley 1961, pp. 237–239; W. Śliwa, Rosja–Europa od końca XVIII w. do lat osiemdziesiątych XIX w. (Russia–Europe from the End of the Eighteenth Century up to the 1880s) in: Dziesięć wieków Europy. Studia z dziejów kontynentu (Ten Centuries of Europe. Studies from the History of the Continent), Warszawa 1983, pp. 335–337.
became a powerful projection of political imagination at the turn of the 1830s and, above all, the imagination of its potential victims. The most sensitive reaction to the “Pan-Slav threat”, next to the one of the Polish emigrés, was that of the liberal Hungarian and German public opinion. The latter was of special significance for Polish publicists in Paris and Brussels.

The number of direct information channels at the disposal of the emigrés concerning the situation in Eastern Europe, and even in Polish lands, was restricted; they were usually replaced by news provided by the German press. Periodicals of the democratic camp utilized this source together with publicists from the camp of Prince Czartoryski. Translations, summaries and presentations of information found in journals published in Leipzig, Augsburg and Cologne, appeared in almost every issue of “Demokrata Polski” (The Polish Democrat), “Trzeci Maj” or “Dziennik Narodowy” (The National Journal). At the turn of the 1830s, a considerable number of such publications concerned symptoms of the cultural–national rebirth of Germany’s Slav neighbours and the eventuality of a political expansion of this phenomenon. Special brochures, books and even whole periodicals such as “Jahrbücher für slavische Literatur, Kunst und Wissenschaft” featured this issue, and, in turn, were noted and commented on by the Polish emigrés.

In the eyes of the German liberal opinion, Panslavism denoted the threat of a domination by tsarist Russian and the unification of the forces of Slavdom under Russian banners. This possibility was depicted in various forms. The most conservative one was anonymously stressed by “Die Europäische Pentarchie”, published in Leipzig by the Russian agent Karl Eduard Goldmann. The basic message of this publication was a vision of tsarist Russia as the sole worthy protector of a Germany threatened by masonic intrigues and Jacobinism. “Die Europäische Pentarchie” also included an apology of tsarist policy in Poland as well as a programme for a completion of the Russification of this former protegée of the Russian rulers; both ideas much too clearly explained the way in which their author comprehended the care to be provided by Nicholas for Germany. “Die Europäische Pentarchie” and its provocative tone inspired a whole series of German replicas and produced among the liberals of the Rhineland an awareness and fear of the hazardous combination of tsardom and bellicose

---

PANSLAVISM AND GREAT EMIGRATION

Slavism. Unambiguous anti-German accents which frequently appeared in a transition from cultural to political Pan-Slavism, no longer provided material for a vision of a tsarist “guarantee” but of a destructive Slav invasion, westward bound under the slogan of revenge for historical servility and humility suffered “under German rule”. In this particular version, Pan-Slavism appeared to its pessimistic prophets as a new barbarity, a powerful force of cultural rétrogradation and, in a far-reaching historical perspective, as a consecutive embodiment of the struggle waged by the Orient—Asia — against the civilization of the West and against Europe as such. The German left-wing publicists of the 1840s stressed the reactionary nature of the Pan-Slav movement. This feature, supposedly inscribed into the very essence of Panславism, and based on a community of blood and the instinct of tribal hostility and vengeance, was presumably confirmed by the tsarist manipulation of the entire movement. A menace to culture, freedom and progress — this is the simplest summary of the German approach to the tsarist—Slav phantom of the 1840s.

What did Panslavism signify for Polish political thought? Let us enquire first of all what it could have signified? Apparently, it could have been precisely that what terrified the German left-wing publicists — a turn towards a Slavic, even tsarist Russia, in order to wage a struggle, above all, against German rulers. Exactly the same thought was presented in 1839 by the émigré author Michał Kubrakiewicz (ca 1797–1851). Similarly to Bonkowski, Kubrakiewicz remained rather on the margin of the division within the Great Emigration into camps and orientations. Owing to his Galician origin he differed from most of the émigrés. Having completed legal studies, Kubrakiewicz worked prior to the Uprising as a civil servant of the Habsburg monarchy. It is precisely here that one should seek the source of the exceptional trend of the geopolitical orientation of his thought compared to the political consciousness of his colleagues — refugees from the Kingdom of Poland and the Annexed Lands under Russian rule. The conviction that the Austrian state and the German element in general are much more dangerous and perfidious enemies for Poland than Russia, dated from his

---


14 An excellent example is the article by Fr. Engels: Germany and Panslavism, which was expanded later on by Karl Marx in his pamphlet entitled: Russia and Europe. See: K. Marx, La Russie et l’Europe, Premiere ed. integrale, Paris 1954.
Galician period\textsuperscript{15}. Kubrakiewicz devoted his political activity to attempts at introducing his reflections to the emigre circles. In the 1830s he tried to win the support of Prince Adam Czartoryski to whom he sent a copious correspondence containing arguments in favour of political realism and an anti-German rather than an anti-Russian stand\textsuperscript{16}.

Having failed in this domain, Kubrakiewicz decided to present his views publicly, and in 1839 he issued a brochure entitled \textit{Uwagi polityczne i religijne} (Political and Religious Remarks). In the history of emigre publicistics this is a manifesto of a distinctly anti-German tone. In contrast to almost all other emigres, Kubrakiewicz was interested in Polish borders from the reign of the Piast and not the Jagiellon dynasty. He was even inclined to condemn the union with Lithuania as a historical mistake committed by Poland which turned attention away from terrains in the West and guided onto a path of conflicts with fraternal Russia. The outcome of the fatal conflict could be enjoyed only by the Germans. Kubrakiewicz also led his reader to the conclusions that it was the Austrians and Germans “who had taken a much larger and more important part of former Poland”\textsuperscript{17}. He drew attention to the lesser intensification of the Russification conducted by the tsars (at any rate, up to the November Uprising) compared with the Germanization drive of the Prussian or Austrian monarchs.

Generally speaking, a rising anti-Polish line in the Russian partition area did not, according to Kubrakiewicz, alter this relation. The domination of the German element would be always more dangerous for Poland, owing to the former’s civilizational superiority and the consistent colonization methods employed by the Germans in Polish lands. “The tsar grasps our hands and legs. The Germans clasp our head and pockets”\textsuperscript{18}. Kubrakiewicz condemned political ignorance, blinded with hostility towards Russia, on par with the “injustice towards the labouring class”, committed by the Polish gentry, as one of the main causes for the loss of national independence. The third source of the historical misfortune which befell upon Poland was for the author of Political and religious remarks, Catholicism and in particular, the dependence of Polish politics upon the papacy\textsuperscript{19}.


\textsuperscript{16} See: S. Pigoń, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 240–242, 245–248; cf. also letters by Kubrakiewicz to Prince Czartoryski from the 1835–1846 period, stored in the collected correspondence of Prince Czartoryski in the Czartoryski Library in Cracow — MS 5478 and 5479, vol. II.

\textsuperscript{17} M. Kubrakiewicz, \textit{Uwagi polityczne i religijne} (Political and Religious Remarks), Bordeaux 1839, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 7–8.
Kubrakiewicz proposed a remedy for Poland’s ills appropriate to his diagnosis. In the domain of religion, he suggested a return to the simplicity of the old faith of the “Slav forefathers”; in politics — a reorientation of pro-independence hopes from an anti-Russian course to that of the Slavic idea. At that point, Kubrakiewicz conducted a sharp distinction within the image of Russia which only seemingly made his thought similar to the premises that formed the Lelewelian vision of Russian relations. He counterposed the Holstein-Gottorp dynasty, of German descent and spirit, the German bureaucracy and the German aristocracy, composed of the Benckendorff, Nesselrode and Adlerberg families with the Russians, a “nation just as repressed as we, the Poles”. Finally, Kubrakiewicz placed Pestel among the foremost Slav “saints”, between Kościuszko and Konarski.

The attitude represented by Kubrakiewicz differed basically from the interpretation known from Lelewelian publicistics and the stand of that part of emigré authors who performed a similar decision. From the point of view of Polish national interests, the author of Political and Religious Remarks regarded Russia in all forms as far better for Poland than the perspective of a consolidation of Austro-Prussian colonization. Kubrakiewicz expressed (rather vaguely) hopes for the awakening of the “real Slavic Russia”. He was, however, also inclined to depict existing tsarist Russia, still succumbing to “German influence”, as a lesser evil which must be chosen if one wishes to avoid the worst possible fate — the ultimate denationalization of the Polish population remaining under German rule. Against the backdrop of the systematic absolutism of both German monarchies, organized, according to Kubrakiewicz, into a perfect system of bureaucratic oppression, the “Political and Religious Remarks” stressed the non-systematic nature of the tsarist apparatus, paralysed, at least partially, by the Slav element, and thus more humane and, one could say, less dangerous. For even the most pro-Slav authors of appeals “to the other Russia”, such a comparison and hierarchization of enemies was unthinkable. Both they and an overwhelming majority of the Great Emigration considered tsarist Russia, in its then prevalent political form, as absolute evil which in no case could be relativized vis à vis other enemies and hazards. They did not intend to turn towards the Russian people in order to summon them to some sort of an all-Slav confrontation with the German oppressor; on the contrary, they planned to

19 Ibid., pp. 26–31.
20 Ibid., p. 40.
21 Ibid., pp. 7, 40.
22 Ibid., p. 21.

http://rcin.org.pl
launch an attack against tsardom itself which it was, therefore, convenient to present as a non-Slav system, created by an essentially foreign dynasty.

Soon, Kubrakiewicz became compared with Gurowski and accused of the fact that the publication of his brochure could have been used by the Paskiewicz administration in Warsaw in order to detract the attention of the Polish subjects and to direct their hostility against Berlin and Vienna.

In 1839, the option towards Slavonic Russia which was the outcome of a consistently anti-German attitude, appeared to the emigre milieu only as an individual deformation of the perspective of its author, and not as the foretaste of some more general turn of public opinion. It must be admitted that Kubrakiewicz was unable to explain in his brochure how this option was to be realized in praxis, and what activity would it demand from the Polish and Russian side. He expressed his views much more concretely in his letters to Prince Czartoryski. Here, he indicated i.a. the natural character of the French-Russian alliance and the fact that only within such an alliance would France be able to grant real assistance to the Polish cause. He also stressed that Poles should do everything to lead to the dissolution of the three partitioning powers; a particularly convenient measure for achieving this aim could be the instigation of a Slav-German antagonism. Kubrakiewicz proposed truly Machiavellian conceptions of using propaganda methods to set “real Russians” against the German bureaucracy and generals in the Russian empire. He also appealed to organize the defense of Polish nationality and language in both partitions. The challenge which his version of Slavism devised as support for a struggle waged against Prussia and Austria proved to be for the political thought of the Great Emigration more legible during the Galician disturbances of 1848 and in the light of a whole series of similarly oriented appeals. Next to the famous List szlachcica polskiego do księcia Metternicha (A Letter of a Polish Nobleman to Prince Metternich), the voice of the author of Political and Religious Remarks, at that time already a member of the Polish Democratic Society, was particularly audible.

At the beginning of the 1840s, several other meanings of pro-Russian political Slavism were presented to the Polish emigration by Wacław Jabłonowski, a young co-worker of “Trzeci Maj”. He comprised them into

---


24 Cf. letters by Kubrakiewicz to Czartoryski cited by S. P i g o ń, op. cit., pp. 245–248, as well as his letter to the same addressee in the Czartoryski Library, MS 5479, vol. II, pp. 1017–1020 (21 March 1846).
PANSLAVISM AND GREAT EMIGRATION

a single publication — the almost 300 pages long *La France et la Pologne.* *Le Slavianisme et la dynastie polonaise,* published at the end of 1842. This book, together with an accompanying series of author’s commentaries and explanations (in the form of open letters to the editors of French and emigré periodicals) produced a stormy reaction almost equal to that which was caused eight years earlier by Gurowski and his apostasy. Since then, *La France et la Pologne* has been regarded almost exclusively from the point of view of a scandal and ensuing reactions. On the other hand, it has almost disappeared from the history of emigré political thought and has been unjustly limited to a contribution to the history of the political life of the Polish emigrés. Actually, it is obligatory reading matter for defining the possible significance of Panslavism in the political imagination of the Great Emigration.

Jabłonowski shared the political principles of the Third May Insurrection–Monarchic Society. He proclaimed a ruthless struggle in the defense of the monarchic idea. Equally openly, however, he undermined the second pillar of the programme proposed by the camp of Prince Czartoryski — its Occidentalism and the conviction about the necessity of connecting a successful solution of the Polish issue with support provided by Western powers. Those two challenges determined the point of departure for the author of *La France et la Pologne.*

The first part of the book uses a series of historical examples in order to accuse the West and in particular France of ingratitude and being incapable of noticing the rank of Polish sacrifice and friendship. The second part of *La France et la Pologne* includes a thorough critique not only of the pro-French political orientation and hopes for Western assistance in the striving towards independence. Jabłonowski also condemned Polish fascination with French and, more broadly, Western cultural and ideological models — from sentimentalism to democratism and republicanism. He followed the well-trodden path of a conservative critique of the development of European civilization from the revolutionary crisis at the end of the eighteenth century. Along this route, he appeared to arrive at a spot from which there was no return to Europe but merely a forecast of doom, full of a curious variety of Schadenfreude. In his proclamation *Do emigracji polskiej* (*To the Polish Emigration*), issued in 1834, Jabłonowski even dared to assume that the fact that most of the former Commonwealth became a

Russian partition area saved Poland from a transformation “into some sort of a French or German peculiarity (...) which would have obliterated all traces of political and social forms that constitute and cradle the national spirit”26.

Jabłonowski was, however, separated from an integrally reactionary and anti-Occidental attitude by his recognition of liberalism, a form of a limited rather than an absolute monarchy, which he recognized as the best possible foundation for a political system (of course, he distinguished “true” liberalism from its “anti-social” and “order-disturbing” counterpart). Jabłonowski thus made it feasible to embark upon a dual interpretation of the third, most essential part of La France et la Pologne. This approach also signified the possibility of a dual confrontation of Slavism, which appears here as the crowning point of the entire declaration, with the political habits of the emigrés. In the first place, Jabłonowski presented Slavdom as a cultural and political counterpart or even an outright antagonist of Western Europe. Slavdom was supposed to be, as in the case of the Slavophile “retrospective utopia” created by Jabłonowski’s contemporaries, a realm of tradition free from all elements of Western decay which had begun to reveal themselves from the time of the French Revolution. In a controversy with Lelewelian Slavism, Jabłonowski tried to depict the idea of democracy as an eighteenth-century French import, and monarchism — as a fulfillment of an ideal of the political system, which corresponds best to the Slav spirit27.

He outlined the division between Slavdom and Europe more vividly than was required even by a confirmation of the native nature of conservative–monarchic ideals. Jabłonowski also traced the boundary between the West and the Slav world in a manner that was consistently provocative for the emigré public opinion (which, after all, always hovered between Slavism and Occidentalism); he simply identified this borderline with that between Asia and Europe. “The Slav tribe en masse originates from Asia, and owing to its nature, political strivings and commercial interests, belongs to the Asian system”28.

A maximum deepening of the European–Slav contrast disclosed its meaning on the last pages of La France et la Pologne. The author suggested that it was supposed to elevate the position of Poland, suspended between the two worlds. After all, Jabłonowski addressed his book to the French public opinion and not only to its Polish counterpart. He intended to show

the French the need to decisively support the Polish cause. Abandoned by
the West, the Poles could cease serving as a shield to the West and become
a sword in the hand of the ruler of a Slav empire.  

In order to justify such an argument, it was necessary, first of all, to win
the Poles themselves over to Slavism. The alternative, aimed at the West, is
accompanied by a second, more important one, addressed to the Poles and
explained by Jabłonowski in the Polish glosses to his French work. He
wished to “scientifically and theoretically throw light on two paths of
salvation” proposed to Poland. Those two options were: the acceptance of
the principles of a national monarchy, with the Czartoryski dynasty, which
signified a life or death struggle against Russia, with the support of France,
or the acceptance of the Pan–Slav idea of participation “in the grand
emancipation of the Slav family” under the Romanov dynasty. Jabłonowski
devoted decidedly more space and probably more heart to the second
eventuality. In its context, Slavism assumed the proportions of a fundamen-
tal re-evaluation of the political goals of Polish national aspirations. Jabło-
nowski began with an ascertainment of the decline of faith in independence,
both at home and in exile (where he observed its degeneration into various
“mysticisms” — the Catholic version proposed by a small group of future
resurrectionists, and the messianic version of Towiański and his follo-
wers). In this situation, he considered the supreme task to be the salvage
of nationality and the language which cocreates it, Catholic religion and
gentry liberalism. Jabłonowski decided to take into account a situation “in
which Poland could not be sovereign”. Slavism which entails a turn towards
Russia, appeared to him to be the most convenient solution. A vision of
Polish enthusiasm towards the tsarist appeal (which was supposed to call all
Slavs towards unity and a joint crusade against Germany and the decadent
West) concealed “blackmail” or a warning addressed to Europe. Jabło-
nowski’s writings formulated a more profound reflection concerning a
desireable way of implementing the Slav idea. Under the cover of a mena-
cing perspective of a Slav deluge, the author of La France et la Pologne
delineated a conception of Slavism as a measure for conciliation between
the Poles and Russia, and the imperial mission of tsardom. Similarly to
Kubrakiewicz, Jabłonowski assumed the necessity of freeing the Slav
movement from the manipulating impact of Austrian and “German–Mon-

29 Cf. i d e m, La France, p. 278.
30 See also: Do redaktora “Dziennika Narodowego” (“To the Editor of Dziennik Narodowy”),
Paris, March 1843, addendum to: i d e m, Do emigracji, p. 24.
31 See: ibid., pp. 4–16.

http://rcin.org.pl
golian" bureaucracy in Russia. This task was to be served by "Le Slave", a periodical which he planned to publish in Paris.

An earlier announcement informed that the periodical was to be issued in four languages: Polish, Russian, Czech and Bulgarian or Serbian. The project presented the principles upon which the ideal of the Slav union was to be founded: a guarantee of the uninhibited development of each Slav nation (the retention of religion, language and political and domestic customs "which would not threaten the interests of the Slav family"); the introduction of liberal institutions "based on natural foundations"; the centralization of governance under the Romanov dynasty "extracted from the German element which surrounds it" and, finally, the establishment of a capital of the union in Kiev\(^33\). Although on the level of a "warning" intended for the West, Poland was supposed to enthusiastically join the Russia of Nicholas I — as long as its ruler would raise the banner of Slav unity — Jabłonowski was conscious of the improbability of such sudden turnabouts. He wished, therefore, to suggest to his Polish readers a conciliation and a union with a Russia which would be clearly different from its image current in 1843.

Jabłonowski seemed to take into account the fulfillment of the Slav idea — and ultimately, through its intermediary, of the imperial ambitions harboured by Russia — only under the condition of a reform of the latter country. He deduced general hopes for change from the conviction that the Slav race in Russia will sooner or later rid itself of the "German–Mongolian" system. The imagination of the liberal monarchist was stirred in this direction by an anonymous publication by a Russian advocate of similar principles which appeared at the same time. Jabłonowski treated the opinions of Prince Peter Dolgorukov (the author of the brochure) as an expression of the strivings of the entire or at least a considerable part of the Russian aristocracy towards altering the political system of Russia in the direction of restricting absolutist rule; he perceived them as a chance for concord between Poles and Russians. "The Polish nation, its commercial well–being and all that which is closely connected with those matters i.e. liberal institutions, can exist under the Romanov dynasty but only as long as those institutions can be also introduced in Russia"\(^34\).  

\(^33\) See: Nowy dziennik "Le Slave" (The New periodical "Le Slave"), "Dziennik Narodowy", n° 101: 4 March 1843, pp. 405–406.  
\(^34\) W. Jabłonowski, Le livre, p. 437 (this is a review of a brochure entitled: Notice sur les principales familles de la Russie, published by Prince Dolgorukov under the pseudonym of Count d' Almagro, Paris 1843; see on this subject: W. Śliwowska, W kręgu poprzedników Hercena (Among the Predecessors of Herzen), Wrocław 1971, pp. 28–29).
In place of the bureaucratic system, contrary to Slavism and with a distinctly anti-Polish tendency, Jabłonowski saw in the eyes of his imagination the flourishing of Russian aristocratic liberalism. In such conditions, he suggested to the Polish reader, Poland could repeat the experiment of the Jagiellonian union at the price of resigning from independence-oriented policies directed against Russia. Jabłonowski constantly returned to the motif of a civilizing mission as a compensation for the dissolution of Polishness in a Great Slav empire. “That what for your fathers was Lithuania and the Jagiellons, today is Russia and the Romanovs(!) — it is up to you, the Poles, to make barbarians civilized, and despots — the monarchs of a civilized society”35.

In practice, however, Jabłonowski could only rely on a reform conducted by a tsar who would support the Slav idea. It was to the tsar that the third alternative concealed in his declaration was addressed: either a Russia paralyzed by the heretofore system (with an eternally raw Polish wound) or liberalization in “the Slav spirit” (above all, the abandonment of the anti-Polish line) which would offer the Romanovs the support of all Slav nations, an opportunity to achieve Russian political targets in the Balkans, and the ability to counterpoise the whole of Europe in case those goals would have to be protected36.

An historian of political thought who examines Jabłonowski’s proposals with the aid of a ready network of a typology concerning the meanings and interpretations of the Pan-Slav idea and its nineteenth-century evolution, will be able to classify the material from La France et la Pologne into several groups. The openness towards the Slavonic and pro-Russian option which organizes that material, discloses disappointment with the passive stand of the West towards the Polish issue. On the other hand, one can notice how the idea of a Slav community serves as a sui generis premise — a hope for changes within Russia that would lead towards such a disbanding of the tsarist system which would make it possible to justify a turn towards Moscow in categories of “political reason” and the national interest of the

35 *I d e m*, *Do emigracji polskiej*, p. 21.
36 Jabłonowski made a similar open appeal to the tsar in 1852, see: *W. Jabłonowski, Do Najjaśniejszego Cesarza Wszelkiej Ziemi Rosyjskiej Mikołaja I, Króla Polskiego (To His Majesty the Tsar of All Russia, Nicholas I, the King of Poland)*, published together with: *i d e m*, *Okólnik w imieniu Słowian przyjaciół Polski do starej i młodej emigracji (A Circular in the Name of Slav Friends of Poland to the Old and New Emigration)*, Brussels 1852, pp. 23–35. In 1848 Jabłonowski embarked upon an attempt to reach the tsar through the intermediary of Jakob Tolstoy, an agent of the Russian embassy in Paris (and, at the same time, an agent of the III Department), but failed. He subsequently received a traditional answer confirmed by the tsar himself and the chief of the secret police: a Polish emigre could only count on the mercy of the Highest, and not dream about making any sort of conditions or agreements while presenting a loyal declaration, see: *R e v o l u t i s y a 1 8 4 8 g o d a v o F r a n c y i. D o m i e s i e n i a Y. T o l s t o y a*, Leningrad 1926, pp. 93–95.
Poles themselves. Due to its anticipated merits for the foreign policy of the empire, Slavism was also supposed to stimulate domestic reform in Russia. “Political reasons” and interest in Russia, even shared by its rulers, were to become an instance to which this version of Slavism was to refer “scientifically and theoretically” in order to justify the necessity of changing the anti-Polish attitude. The intentional and inevitable blurring of the problem of Polish independence, and the whole complex of connected questions concerning its relation with Russia (starting with the frontiers) completes this special model of a Polish—Russian accord, a consensus without revolutions and capitulation, just as Jabłonowski wished to present it. The basic line of this reasoning and each of its features enumerated here as well as many of its weaknesses were repeated upon many occasions in nineteenth — and twentieth-century projects of a Polish turn towards Russia.

This model was developed the fullest some fifteen years after *La France et la Pologne* by Henryk Kamieński who also inserted it into the history of the political thought pursued by the democratic current of the Polish Great Emigration. A comparison of fragments of his *Rosja i Europa* (*Russia and Europe*) with *La France et la Pologne* can be even more interesting considering that both, albeit contrasting, spokesmen of the Slav and pro-Russian orientation shared a conception of depicting this option as a measure of propaganda pressure exerted upon Western political opinion, a specific type of “blackmail” which was supposed to make the governments of Western powers aware of the necessity of a serious treatment of the Polish issue by means of decisive support, in order to retain Poland within the European circle. As we recall, this concept — a Polish interpretation of Napoleon’s warning against the Cossack deluge — was popular in Polish publicistics addressed to the West also prior to Jabłonowski. In his version, however, it appeared for the first time as the motif of a whole book and as a political proposal (in whose case, as was later true for Kamieński, it was to play the role of an exit in case of a failure of the cherished Slav consensus) 37.

Returning to 1843, one could ponder which one of those concepts was more fantastic: the “intimidation” of the West by referring to a voluntary Polish participation in the tsarist—Slav war chariot, or the inherently contradictory conviction about a chance to win the tsarist system over to the idea of self-restriction and a domestic reform of the system in the name of Slavism.

which would act as a lever for the imperial mission. One thing appears to be certain: the most hopeless issue was to convince emigré opinion to accept the conception of Polish–Russian conciliation within the Romanov monarchy, even if the latter were to be as Slav as possible. Among the several possible interpretations of the Slav message of Jabłonowski’s book, and addressed to his Polish readers, the most legible was the idea that Slav brotherhood, combined with the tsarist system, signified national treason. In the course of the three years which passed between the edition of Kubrakiewicz’s *Political and Religious Remarks* and Jabłonowski’s declaration, Panslavism had been already universally recognized by the emigré milieus as the most dangerous tendency and one which most perfidiously undermined the pro-independence formation of all the political orientations in exile. For the reviewers of *La France et la Pologne*, Pan–Slav rhetorics remained, above all, a convenient and perilously comfortable measure for transmitting the thought about subjection to Russia. The monarchic, antirepublican and anti-democratic forays of Jabłonowski as well as his condemnation of Polish political traditions and civilizational ties with the West, defined his version of Slavism as an ideological choice in the full meaning of the word, and not merely as a project for political re-orientation. The only and certainly the most essential pattern of Panslavism which Jabłonowski had confirmed in the political opinion of the emigré left wing was composed of precisely those motifs: national capitulation towards Russia, anti-Occidentalism and a reactionary trend of thought as regards the political, social and cultural system.

The publicistics of the Third May Society was compelled to sever all ties with such a compromising adherent of monarchism, just as the democrats had to renounce Gurowski. “Dziennik Narodowy”, a periodical issued by the Catholic–liberal fronde within the camp of Prince Czartoryski, assaulted Jabłonowski’s pro-tsarist Slavism in a whole series of articles and minor notes. In “Zjednoczenie” (Unity) and a separately lithographed text, the new traitor was condemned by the shocked Antoni Ostrowski who already earlier had warned in a specially issued brochure against the threat concealed in the Pan–Slav ideology. Now Ostrowski found full confirmation

---

of his anxiety in the contents of La France et la Pologne. The press of the Polish Democratic Society and the Brussels-based Lelewelian center of Polish democracy also expressed their views. This was an excellent occasion for responding to the provocative meaning of Jabłonowski’s Slavism and, at the same time, for attacking the principles cultivated by the democrats’ opponent — the dynastic conception expounded by the adherents of Czartoryski. The polemic with Jabłonowski’s book was exploited in this way both by “Orzeł Biały” (White Eagle) and “Demokrata Polski”. An author of an article published in “Demokrata Polski” called Jabłonowski a new Gurowski, and treated the planned propaganda of unifying Slavs with the intermediary of “Le Slave” as an undertaking outright financed by the tsarist system and set up for its exclusive profit.

Lew Sawaszkiewicz who prepared for the Brussels-based “Orzeł Biały” a copious polemic with La France et la Pologne, transformed a condemnation of the monarchic version of Slavism into evidence for the exclusive correctness of democratic-republican Slavism. Adherence to the dynastic dogma and a struggle against democracy must, claimed Sawaszkiewicz, lead to joining the service of the “obermonarch” Nicholas. The republican traditions of Slavdom inspired Sawaszkiewicz to recall the Decembrists as the first nineteenth-century revivers of this current. The republican and freedom-oriented conceptions of Slavism were also recalled by Stanisław Worcell, the organized of a ceremony held in London to commemorate the execution of the five “Muscovite brethren” in 1826.

Both Sawaszkiewicz and Worcell, acclaimed representatives of that current of emigre political thought which from the name of its prime inspirator has been described as Lelewelian, responded to Panslavism with a call for a total battle to be waged by all Slavs against tsardom under the slogan “For your freedom and ours”. Lelewel addressed this call both to Poles and to other Slav nations endangered by Pan-Slav propaganda, as well
as to the Russians themselves. As a consistent spokesman of this stand, Lelewelian publicistics reduced the question of a Pan-Slav peril to the level of a pro-tsarist orientation which denoted both the tsarist system and dynasty, ejected outside the range of “true” Slavdom.

The philo-Slav part of the emigre left-wing shared a belief that only after dropping the tsarist burden would Russia be capable of regaining full participation in the ideological community of the Slav world, and in its future mission delineated by a democratic Poland. Would the Russian people, the most numerous among all Slavs and scattered in the largest terrain which constitutes a base for the most extensive state in the world, not prove to be the actual leader of Slavs in an era inaugurated by a revolution, the era of their own history?

Such a question and such a presentation of the issue in a situation when Russia played the role of the “gendarme” of all liberation movements in Europe and when Poland was universally regarded as a motor force for the whole revolutionary movement on the Continent, seems to be purely theoretical; it was relegated by the whole left wing of the Emigration beyond the margin of its political imagination. Only at the beginning of the 1850s would a combination of Slav unity, the role of the Slavs as a proletarian-race, a political and social revolution together with a conviction about the leading role of the Russian people, give rise to the conception of so-called Russian socialism, associated above all with the name of Alexander Herzen (at this time similar conclusions were also formulated by Adam Gurowski, by then already an emigre in America).

This thought was preceded in an astonishing way by an almost totally forgotten brochure by yet another post-November Uprising refugee — Ksawery Oranski, the author of Przyszłość Rosji (The Future of Russia). One could easily say that in the history of emigre publicistics this text is

---

41 See: J. Lelewel, Mowa na obchodzie (...) 29 XI 1841 roku (A Speech at a Ceremony... 29 November 1841); Mowa na żałobnym obchodzie... 14 II 1848 (A Speech at a Funeral Ceremony... 14 February 1848); Do Kongresu Słowiańskiego w Pradze (To the Slav Congress in Prague), On 30 May 1848 the two above listed speeches were added to this declaration — the first two texts in: idem, Polska, Dzieje, vol. 20, pp. 327–342, 536–548; the third text in: idem, Listy emigracyjne, ed. H. Więckowska, vol. 5, Wrocław 1956, pp. 202–203.

even more neglected than its author although this would be difficult to imagine.

We know that Ksawery Orański took part in the Uprising in Volhynia, that he was a member of the Society of Lithuanian and Rus’ Lands and that in exile he joined the ranks of the Polish Democratic Society. In 1836 he was an emissary of the Society in the Kingdom of Poland and Galicia. Apart from the fact that the following year he returned to France and settled down in Paris, there is no further information about his fate. Therefore, there is no data about the direct sources of inspiration for his extraordinary brochure.

Already its very title introduces us to the author’s cognitive stand. Orański showed no interest whatever in the past. With unique ease, he detached himself from the political reality of Europe in 1837. The present is considered only from the point of view of events which were to render it unrecognizable. The future, including Russia, is described with the certainty of a reliable witness who has no need to confirm his statements. Half of the text is devoted to constructing a belief about the inevitability and irreversibility of Russian expansion to the West. Orański noted that the government of the Russian empire would recognize its boundaries as secure only then when it wins domination over the Continent. To attain this goal, it will be satisfied with a permanent occupation of part of Germany. This perspective will be fulfilled when, threatened with revolution, the governments of Prussia and Austria will decide to turn for assistance to the armies of the tsar; the author depicts the helplessness of the other European powers in the face of a Russian invasion that will take place according to the above outlined scenario.

The second part of *The Future of Russia* convinces the reader that the plot sketched in the first fragment can be transformed, and is, into a version optimistic for all concerned, when history supplements its vision with a new factor: a revolution in Russia itself. Orański simply assumes the necessity of such a solution. Only the revolution will make it feasible to fully develop the enormous forces slumbering in the Russian people. Only the revolution will be an effective measure for the unification of all Slavs within a republican system. Just like some years later for Herzen and Bakunin, so for

---


44 See: X. Orański, *L’avenir de la Russie*, Paris 1838, pp. 3–8 (the text of the brochure was dated by the author as 15 November 1837).
Orański Slavdom was the “chosen people” of the future, a proletarian-race with no past, tradition or law. The future belongs to this race which is the only one capable of conducting a great political-ideological turnover of which the “increasingly bourgeois” West which is steadily sinking into the past, is no longer capable.

For Orański, the Slav revolution will be the outcome of accord between Russia and Poland. It will be also the most effective way of consolidating the brotherhood of the two nations, up to then divided. The revolution and the union of Slavs will be, however, realized, by Russia and its forces. Poland, on the other hand, can enjoy the role of the leader of internal life in the union. To do so, however, it must reject the false idea of independence, envisaged as political distinctness, and it must recognize that independence is simply “the possibility of development according to one’s own nature” which can be guaranteed only by if it takes place within a Slav republic created by a revolutionary Russia. Orański did not even deliberate at any length over this problem. His imagination was totally absorbed by an image of universal upheaval. “Slav unity will be the greatest event of the modern era, and its consequences will affect all traditions, civilizations, interests and desires of nations. The great turmoil caused by the approach of the Slav republic could be only a blessing for other states; that what at present appears to be a repulsive invasion, will turn into emancipation.”

The republic of the Slavs will be composed by all Slavic nations and, owing to their location, by Hungary, Greece and the Romanian duchies. Germany will become united on the ruins of Prussia and Austria, and so will Italy. Thanks to the revolution, Russia will absorb the accomplishments of the whole of European civilization which will be at the disposal of a civilizing mission in Asia, inaugurated already by the tsars. Orański even delimited the range of that mission, and the Asian sphere of influence of the new Russia. Into it he included above all China, leaving India for the British. In conclusion, he left no doubts that all those exotic divisions and possessions will be of only transitory significance; the revolution will topple all divisions and all dams for the sake of the unhampered development of all nations.

The unification of Slavdom in the course of revolutionary strife, the concord between Poles and Russia, and a joint civilizing mission in Asia — all these currents were already part of the democratic publicistics of the

---

48 See: ibid., pp. 10, 14–16.
Great Emigration, or were becoming such a component parallelly to Orański’s declarations. He was, however, the author of their original combination who endowed them with an entirely new sense. The decisive factor was the universalistic, not even non-European or non-Polish point of view concerning the revolution which brought together all the ideas contained in *The Future of Russia*. It was not solely the supra-national perspective which played the key role but also the overpowering permeation of Orański’s text with an obsession of the great turnover which appears even more important than the ideological contents for whose implementation it was to pave the way. Orański, therefore, did not begin with concrete problems of the contemporary political or social life of Europe, Russia or Poland were in this configuration almost *tabulae rasae* and that what was important was almost exclusively the force which any nation could contribute to the impetus of the universal revolution. In this manner, Orański arrived at the conception of Russia as potentially the greatest motor force of the universal turnover. In 1837, Russia seemed to have at its disposal the largest power on the Continent, certainly the greatest among the young race of Slavs. The principle of the politics of the future was revolution. Russia and revolution must, therefore, merge together and supply each other with force. Apparently, this is the way in which one can reconstruct the unusual line of reasoning contained in Orański’s brochure. From the moment of its appearance, *The Future of Russia* appeared to be so abstract and distant from reality, that the Polish emigrés could treat it at best as a curiosity. It also did not meet with any sort of resonance. Only several years later, did the satirical periodical “Pszonka” permit itself a brief mockery of the “philosophy” proposed by Orański. The meteor-like declaration of the author of *L’avenir de la Russie* did not introduce his idea of Russia as the country of the revolution into emigré discussions. It remained a whim, and, at the same time, an excellent illustration of a motif of fascination with Russia which rarely appeared on the left wing of European political thought; its rejection confirmed a certain unity and specificity of reflections about Russia and Slavdom pursued by the Great Emigration.

Every form of Panslavism which signified not only concord with Russia but also a voluntary subjugation of Poland, had to be unanimously rejected by the Polish independence-oriented thought in the middle of the nineteenth century; it was rebuffed both as a slogan calling for a struggle against Germany, as a conservative-monarchic utopia and as an extravagant revolutionary model. The most important problem which the “phantom of Pan-

slavism” suggested to the political imagination of the Polish emigrés was the question of a threatened national identity and the cultural–civilizational meaning of an orientation not only favourably inclined towards the tsarist system but towards a unity with Russia, a community established as an opposition to the West or even Europe itself. This common denominator linked all three Pan–Slav proposals of greatly different ideological origin which we have outlined — it was present in the statements made by Kubrakiewicz, it was a foremost element of the intellectual provocation proposed by Jabłonowski and it was part of Orański’s contradiction between young, revolutionary Slavdom and the musty, “bourgeois” West.

It was also this problem which described most vividly the specificity of the Polish reception of the Pan–Slav peril. From the Polish perspective, and in contrast to the German liberals or to the Slav nations of the Austrian monarchy, Panslavism did not assume the form of a dangerous invasion or imperial tsarist domination. That part of the Polish lands with which the overwhelming majority of the Great Emigration indentified itself (the Kingdom of Poland and the Annexed Lands) was, after all, already under Russian rule. The problem of Panslavism, therefore, had already taken on the form of a tangible threat of denationalization. The latter was created by an opportunity to exploit slogans of cultural “compatibility” and the rapprochement of Slav brethren leading up to a gradual obliteration of the national identity of the Polish subjects and, one could say, an ideological undermining of their resistance. In this configuration, the more dangerous symptoms of this temptation were not individual brochures published in exile but opinions supporting Panslavism which were heard at home, such as those of Wacław Aleksander Maciejowski, Henryk Rzewuski or Michał Grabowski.

Against the background of brutal Russification, references to a Slav community and appeals for a rapprochement of Slav-brethren always proved to be hazardous; in their complete, political version — as projects of a Pan–Slav union under the Russian aegis — they simply could not be adopted by the Polish political thought of the period. The proposals formulated by Kubrakiewicz, Jabłonowski and Orański could not become stimulus for more permanent change of the essentially Occidentalist and pro–European orientation of that thought. Nonetheless, they remain evidence of a...
constant presence of the “Slav temptation”. They also constitute an interesting although forgotten fragment of a more general, and not only Polish, history of Panslavism.

(Translated by Aleksandra Rodzińska-Chojnowska)