Galia Chimiak

THE GROWTH OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS IN POLAND AND THEIR COOPERATION WITH POLISH AID

THE GROWTH OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS IN POLAND AND THEIR COOPERATION WITH POLISH AID

To my mom Mariya

Galia Chimiak

THE GROWTH OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS IN POLAND AND THEIR COOPERATION WITH POLISH AID

IFiS Publisher

Warsaw 2016

Recenzja wydawnicza
prof. dr hab. Jerzy Bartkowski

The monograph *The Growth of Non-Governmental Development Organizations in Poland and Their Cooperation with Polish Aid* by Galia Chimiak was reviewed by Jerzy Bartkowski

Projekt okładki/Cover design
Daniel Guszta

Redaktor/Editor
Barbara Gruszka

ISBN 978-83-7683-133-6

Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN
00-330 Warszawa, ul. Nowy Świat 72
Tel. (48) 22 6572897
e-mail: publish@ifispan.waw.pl
www.ifispan.waw.pl

Contents

Introduction

This book analyses the factors which determined the emergence of non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) in Poland and their impact on the appropriation of development norms and practices by the Polish aid system. These processes are related to the international appeal of the trade union and mass movement *Solidarity* in the 1980s and the participation of the country in the development assistance system dating back to the Cold War era. Indeed, the roots of modern-day development cooperation are in the early 1990s, when Polish civil society started to grow and institutionalize its activities, also with the support of foreign donors. The toppling of the previous regime likewise witnessed the increment of NGOs' activities related to the exchange of experience with other then post-communist societies. In 1992 Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* organized the first convoy of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. The first official Polish aid projects took place in 1998[1]. The engagement of societal actors in international cooperation and the involvement of the state in development assistance were taking place in a parallel fashion up to the end of the 1990s. It is the aim of this book to examine the synergistic effect of the cooperation between these two stakeholders, which was facilitated by the prospect of EU membership. The various roles Poland played

[1] G. Gruca. 2011. „History and Challenges of Polish Aid: The Polish Humanitarian Action Case" in K. Pędziwiatr et al. (eds.) *Current Challenges to Peacebuilding Efforts and Development Assistance*. Kraków, p. 36.

in development cooperation, from becoming a COMECON[2] member in 1949 through receiving Official Aid[3] after the toppling of communism in 1989 to becoming an emerging donor with EU accession in 2004 and finally joining the forum of established donors OECD-DAC[4] in 2013, are indicative of the complex history of the engagement of the country in this area. Yet, as this book will endeavour to demonstrate, the contemporary Polish aid has been shaped not only by geo-political circumstances. Polish aid has namely benefited from its cooperation with the already relatively well-developed NGDO sector, which willingly shared its hands-on experience and know-how in providing humanitarian aid, development cooperation, and global education with state institutions responsible for development assistance. Given that since the 1990s foreign public and private funders have supported Polish NGOs' cooperation with partners from the other post-communist states in Europe

[2] The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was an international economic organisation which functioned between 1949 and 1991. COMECON was established as an alternative to the American Marshall Plan, which was a prototype of modern development cooperation.

[3] According to the OECD definition, Official Aid is understood as "flows which meet conditions of eligibility for inclusion in Official Development Assistance (ODA), other than the fact that the recipients are on Part II of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of Aid Recipients" (accessed 27.04.2016 at https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1887). Unlike Part I of the list, which includes aid to „traditional" developing countries counted as ODA, for which there is a long-standing United Nations target of 0.7% of donors' national income, part II refers to aid to „more advanced" developing and Eastern European countries. Among other countries from Eastern Europe, Poland was on the list of part II from 1990 until 2004 (accessed 27.04.2016 at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm).

[4] Since the year of its establishment 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) has been the major international forum for bilateral providers of development co-operation to discuss and agree principles of priorities of development cooperation. The Committee's main objective is to "promote development co-operation and other policies so as to contribute to sustainable development" (http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/joining-the-development-assistance-committee.htm). Established by the major Western donors, the precursors of contemporary development cooperation, the DAC currently has 29 members. In 2013 the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined OECD DAC.

and Asia, the indirect influence of these donors on the current shape of Polish aid should likewise be acknowledged.

This book seeks to answer questions regarding the circumstances conditioning the development of the internationally-oriented NGO sector in Poland and the impact these civil society organisations exerted on the priorities and modalities of Polish aid. These issues are so the more pertinent given that traditionally it has been NGOs that used to be the objects of socialisation in public institutions' effort to further policy transfer and norm appropriation[5], rather than the other way around. In the case of NGDOs in Poland, it is argued that NGDOs themselves played a seminal role in the appropriation of norms and practices in the area of development cooperation by the line ministry. This study traces the growth of the NGDO sector and its impact on official Polish aid policies while taking into account the dynamics of the relationship between these stakeholders.

The main research question[6] this study tackled has been formulated as follows: *Which factors determined the growth of NGDOs in Poland and what has been NGDOs' role in the evolution of the Polish aid system?* A number of supplementary questions have been developed and addressed in the separate chapters. The aim of the research is twofold. On the one hand, this study intends to analyse the dynamics of the relationship between various stakeholders engaged in development cooperation in Poland, with a focus on governmental and non-state actors. The impact of these stakeholders on the priorities of the Polish development cooperation programme and on the modalities of Polish aid would be discussed as well. The second research objective has been to analyse the impact of external factors on the growth of the NGDO sector as well as to unravel the mechanisms of involvement and personal motivations of individuals engaged in civic initiatives for global solidarity.

Given that NGDOs are hypothesized to represent the avant-garde with respect to both the non-governmental sector as such and the

---

[5] N.R. Smith. 2011. "Europeanisation Through Socialisation? The EU's Interaction With Civil Society Organisations in Armenia" in *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratisation*, Vol. 19, no 4.

[6] Given the lack of empirical study in this area, this research is exploratory in nature. Furthermore, in light of the qualitative characteristics of this research, the analysis does not rest on testing hypotheses, but aims to answer one central and a couple of auxiliary research questions. The latter are presented in the beginning of each chapter.

Polish development cooperation system, it is justified to study the incentives and motives that have led certain individuals to join or establish initiatives for global solidarity. These personal motives stand for the endogenous factors that impacted the growth of the NGDO sector in Poland. The exogenous factors include, *inter alia*, the dominance of the neoliberal agenda and its impact on the systemic transition in Poland, the evolution of Polish civil society, the external support it received, its cooperation with other stakeholders, notably the line ministry as well as global trends such as the dominance of external assistance for democratisation processes in countries receiving foreign aid in the beginning of the 1990s and the crisis of this mode of development cooperation following the war in Iraq.

So far there has not been any attempts at analysing the whole subsector of Polish NGOs engaged in development cooperation, democratisation assistance, humanitarian aid, and global education. As the overview of literature in the second and third chapters demonstrates, there are several analyses of particular aspects of the history of these organisations up to a certain moment. In 2002 Krzysztof Stanowski examined the cooperation of Polish NGOs with foreign partners during the first decade of the transition[7]. In 2003 Elżbieta Puchnarewicz edited a collection of papers dealing with NGOs' role in developing countries and Eastern Europe[8]. Paulina Pospieszna discussed *inter alia* the role of Polish NGOs engaged in democracy assistance to Ukraine and Belarus up to 2008[9]. Elżbieta Kaca addressed the role of Polish NGOs in democratisation processes in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia supported by Polish aid in between 2007 and 2010[10]. The role these organisations have played in social diplomacy has been studied

[7] K. Stanowski. 2002. "Z kart historii współpracy polskich organizacji pozarządowych w III RP a partnerami zagranicznymi" in G. Czubek (ed.). *Międzynarodowa działalność polskich organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa.

[8] E. Puchnarewicz (ed.). 2003. *Organizacje pozarządowe w krajach rozwijających się i Europie Wschodniej*. Warszawa.

[9] P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*. Pittsburgh.

[10] E. Kaca. 2011. *Pomoc demokratyzacyjna w polskiej współpracy rozwojowej*. Warszawa.

by Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska[11] and Grażyna Czubek[12]. Karol Haratyk's work deals with Polish global civil society[13]. His research focused on representatives of the formal and informal civic sector. He distinguished between four types of (partially overlapping) global citizens' collectives: global citizens' imagined communities, global social movements, global civil society, and global citizens' crowds[14]. Think-tanks have published a couple of reports dealing with the participation of NGOs from the new EU member states in European development cooperation, humanitarian actions, and development education and awareness raising projects. There is a growing record of literature on global education in Poland. Some researchers, mostly pedagogues, but also NGDOs' employees are preparing publications on global education and NGOs' role in it[15]. Jędrzej Witkowski recently studied the civic dialogue between Polish NGDOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)[16].

Others focused on case studies of particular NGOs. Grzegorz Gruca[17] and Jędrzej Witkowski conducted such case studies. Witkowski's paper was based on the typology developed by David Korten. In his classic book David Korten distinguished between four generations of development-oriented NGOs, in accordance with the evolu-

---

11 See for example K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid and the Polish model of public diplomacy" in H. Allan, S. Gembická (eds.) *International Conference Booklet 10 years of Slovak Aid: A Vision Of Development Cooperation For A Changing World*, Bratislava.

12 G. Czubek (ed.). 2002. *Social Diplomacy. The Case of Poland. International activity of Polish NGOs and their dialogue with government*. Warsaw.

13 K. Haratyk. 2011. "Polskie globalne społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Negocjowania znaczenia oraz istnienia" in W. Misztal, A. Kościański (eds.) *Rozdroża praktyki i idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego*, Warszawa.

14 Ibid., pp. 95, 119.

15 For example, Magdalena Kuleta-Hulboj of the Faculty of Education at Warsaw University is preparing a publication based on her interviews with representatives of Polish NGOs engaged in global education (see M. Kuleta-Hulboj, M. Gontarska. 2015. *Edukacja globalna. Polskie konteksty i inspiracje*. Wrocław).

16 J. Witkowski. 2015. *Dialog obywatelski w polskiej polityce rozwojowej – studium uwarunkowań*. Manuscript of PhD thesis defended at *Uniwersytet Szkoła Wyższa Psychologii Społecznej* in Warsaw.

17 G. Gruca. 2011. "History and Challenges of Polish Aid: The Polish Humanitarian Action Case".

tion of the strategies these entities employed. The first generation of NGDOs, which role is one of a "doer", focuses on providing immediate assistance to individuals or families. The second generation cooperates with the local communities. Its role is one of a "mobilizer" and the time frame of these NGOs' interventions is limited by the project life. The third generation identified by Korten deals with the sustainable development of regions or nations and works with all relevant public and private actors. Their role is one of a "catalyst". The scope of activity of the last and fourth generation of NGOs is national or global. Their activities are not limited by time frame, and their role is defined as one of an "activist" or "educator"[18].

Strategies of Development-oriented NGOs: Four Generations[19]

	Generation			
	First	Second	Third	Fourth
	Relief and Welfare	Community Development	Sustainable systems development	People's Movements
Problem definition	shortage	local inertia	institutional and policy constraints	inadequate mobilising vision
Time frame	immediate	project life	10 to 20 years	indefinite future
Scope	individual or family	neighbour-hood or village	region or nation	national or global
Chief actors	NGO	NGO + community	all relevant public and private institutions	loosely defined networks of people and organisations
NGO Role	doer	mobilizer	catalyst	activist/ educator
Management orientation	logistics management	project management	strategic management	coalescing and energising self-managing networks
Development education	starving children	community self-help	constraining policies and institutions	spaceship Earth

[18] D. Korten. 1990. *Getting to the 21st century: voluntary action and the global agenda*. USA.

[19] Ibid., p. 117.

According to Witkowski, the *Polish Humanitarian Action* belonged to the second generation described by Korten, i.e. to NGOs-mobilizers[20]. However, a couple of years have passed since this analysis was made. Furthermore, the nature of interventions undertaken by the *Polish Humanitarian Action* has been constantly evolving. The organisation started by providing humanitarian relief, then got engaged in development assistance. It became involved in global education and awareness raising activities, too. These developments are indicative of the hybrid nature of development assistance. The observation that new participants in this type of international cooperation tend to develop their own mode of activity characterises the Polish aid system, too.

Selected aspects of the involvement of Poland in development cooperation have been addressed so far by a couple of researchers. In this respect, the volume edited by Paweł Bagiński, Katarzyna Czaplicka and Jan Szczyciński merits attention[21]. Elżbieta Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka has also been working on issues related to Polish development cooperation[22]. Kamil Zajączkowski, Magdalena Góra and Katarzyna Jasikowska focused on various problems regarding the involvement of the country in development cooperation and global education[23]. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz and Jacek Kucharczyk should likewise be credited for their analyses of the country's democracy assistance policies and priorities[24]. Dominik Kopiński's is one of the first volumes in Polish discussing theoretical and policy-related challenges faced in development cooperation[25]. There are other Polish researchers in international relations, educational science or geography who focus on development co-

[20] J. Witkowski. 2012. "Strategie organizacji pozarządowych działających na rzecz rozwoju międzynarodowego. Socjologiczna analiza kontekstu Polskiego" in G. Chimiak, M. Fronia (eds.) *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski*. Warszawa, p. 213.

[21] P. Bagiński et al. (eds.). 2009. *Międzynarodowa współpraca na rzecz rozwoju*. Warszawa.

[22] See for instance E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2015. "Poland: Attempts at Defining Aid by Solidarity, Democracy and Development" in O. Horký-Hlucháň and S. Lightfoot (eds.) *Development Cooperation of the 'New' EU Member States. Beyond Europeanisation*. UK.

[23] See for example their contributions to the volume *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski* (Chimiak and Fronia 2012).

[24] See J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt (eds.). 2008. *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement*. Praga.

[25] D. Kopiński. 2011. *Pomoc rozwojowa. Teoria i polityka.* Warszawa.

operation, albeit in regard to other countries. And last but not least, the reports and analyses prepared by *Grupa Zagranica*[26], CONCORD[27] and Trialog[28] and the respective Polish state institutions are an important source of information for anyone willing to learn about development cooperation in Poland. There even came out a book *Zapach anioła* (*The scent of an Angel*), plot of which is an allegory of development cooperation. Jan Piekło, who then worked for *PAUCI Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation*, authored this book.

Theoretical and methodological background

The object of this research is the Polish development cooperation system and specifically its non-governmental "branch". The research subjects are individuals involved in development cooperation. The analysis is based on desk research and interviews with representatives of Polish NGDOs, policy makers and experts. Like other researchers in the field[29], here no distinction is made between humanitarian workers and development workers. Furthermore, some of the respondents represent organisations engaged also in global education. Therefore, NGDO professionals interviewed for this research can be identified as representing at least one of the following functions: development worker, humanitarian worker, development educator. In addition to relying on the qualitative data gathered for the purposes of this book, the study is also based on secondary analysis of relevant strategic documents, academic literature, and media releases. Using secondary data has two significant advantages. These are the availability of the data and the possibility to make retrospective analysis thus grasping social change. Furthermore, the analysis of data gathered from official, publicly accessible sources, is considered to represent a nonreactive

[26] The Polish NGDOs' umbrella organisation.

[27] CONCORD is the European NGDOs' confederation.

[28] TRIALOG was a project that ran from 2000 to 2015 to strengthen civil society organisations in the enlarged European Union for active engagement in global development.

[29] J. Gilbert. 2005. "Self-knowledge is the prerequisite of humanity: personal development and self-awareness for aid workers" in *Development in Practice*, no 15, 1; A. Fechter, H. Hindman (eds.). 2011. *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers. The Challenges and Futures of Aidland*. Sterling.

measurement, as compared to interview or observation[30]. My participation in various academic and multi-stakeholder conferences dealing with development cooperation or global education as well as my first-hand observation during consultation meetings organized at the Polish MFA and the European Commission over the last few years also helped to verify some of the assumptions at the basis of this research. As such, the study rests on triangulation of data. Contextualised analysis was undertaken as the individual, social, political, and cultural environment conditioning the establishment of NGDOs have been considered.

Most of the research participants were representing the NGDO sector at the time of interviewing. However, it would be more feasible to regard all interviewees more broadly as aid professionals given their work experience. Provided that some of the staff of the governmental institutions engaged in development cooperation I interviewed had been involved in the NG(D)O sector in the past, it would be hard and unjustified to separate the current roles of these research participants from their previous experience in civil society organisations. Similarly, many of the current NGDO activists used to work for international institutions, the academia, the commercial sector or the government. Yet others at the moment of the interview have been in the process of either joining academic institutions or resigning from their involvement in NGDOs on behalf of other types of engagement in development cooperation. Most of the respondents currently representing the Third sector possess expertise and knowledge about the NGDO sector and development cooperation as such. Therefore in the case of this research it turned out not to be justified to divide the respondents to NGDO activists, experts, and representatives of line governmental institutions, which was my initial assumption. The mix of roles is evidently characteristic of the group under study.

The research can be broadly situated in the field of sociology of development. As it is interdisciplinary in nature, it also relies on insight from other social sciences such as psychology, international relations and political studies, *inter alia* by taking into account theoretical insight from these disciplines. This study assumes a micro perspective as it focuses on the actors' perspective involved in development cooperation on behalf of a number of stakeholders, mostly Polish NGDOs.

[30] R. Singleton, B. Straits and M. Straits. 1993. *Approaches to social research*. New York.

As such, my research rests on the premises of supply-side economic theories of non-profit organisations[31]. These theories highlight the pivotal role NGOs' activists' motivations and background play in the establishment of such organisations. By contrast, the competing demand-side theories assume that NGOs are set up to meet a demand, which has not been (or cannot be) satisfied by profit-maximizing or state institutions. However, as the researcher of entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector Christoph Badelt correctly notes, demand-oriented theories are capable of giving good reasons for a non-profit organisation to come into existence, but "the demand arguments always have to be complemented by specific supply behaviour"[32]. Furthermore, to make this supply happen, it takes special types of human beings who have distinctive personalities. Thus, entrepreneurship theories should be credited for enriching mainstream economic scholarship by an institutionalist element while helping to establish a more psychological vision of non-profit organisations[33]. The other supply-side theories relevant to this research are presented in more detail in Chapter One.

The theoretical underpinnings of this research draw on constructivist thinking and specifically on the second generation of constructivist scholars. Succinctly, constructivism – or social constructionism – rests on the premises that social life is socially constructed[34], i.e. it is neither naturally given nor taken for granted. This idea has first been put forward by the Chicago sociologists and phenomenological sociologists like Alfred Schutz. Over 120 years ago Albion Small, who was associated with the Chicago School and was one of the authors of the first textbook in sociology, expressed the opinion that sociology was born out of the modern fervour to improve society[35]. This credo is indicative of constructivist thinkers' conviction that society is actively produced and can be creatively shaped by human beings. Or,

---

31 H. Hansmann 1987 "Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organisation" in W.W. Powell (ed.) *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, New Haven-Connecticut, pp. 29–33.

32 C. Badelt. 1997. "Entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 8, p. 172.

33 Ibid., pp. 172–173.

34 J. Szacki. 2002. *Historia myśli socjologicznej*. Warszawa, p. 894.

35 Z. Bauman. 2012. *Straty uboczne. Nierówności społeczne w epoce globalizacji*. Kraków, p. 179.

as Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann put it in their seminal book *The Social Construction of Reality*, "social order is a human product"[36]. Following this line of thinking, the study presented here focuses on the *agency of aid professionals* in their quest for developing the system of Polish aid in accordance with state-of-the-art principles of development cooperation.

It should be noted that constructivism in the social sciences can boast older and firmer foundations than constructivism in international relations. As theorist Emanuel Adler argues, in the latter constructivism has only recently become firmly established as a mainstream research approach and a challenger to rationalism[37]. The incorporation of constructivist thinking in international relations clearly has to do with the growth of the role of non-state actors in world affairs. Constructivism is a social theory about the role of knowledge and knowledgeable agents in the constitution of social reality[38]. As an empirical perspective, constructivism seeks to answer questions about the role of identities, norms, and causal understandings in the constitution of national and international interests.

Furthermore, if constructivism can be said to be about anything, it is about *change*. In constructivist scholarship historicity emerges as the path-dependent process involving structural and agent change. Constructivists study the mechanism involved in the explanation of change. They suggest that norm-induced change in identities and institutions should be linked to change in behavioural patterns[39]. In the process of "norms cascade" states are the ones to join other actors, often NGOs, in transforming the international system[40]. Constructivist scholarship has identified different sources of change, but in particular agency, process, structure, and practices. In reference to agency,

---

[36] P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann. 1967. *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. N.Y., p. 52.

[37] E. Adler. 2008. "Constructivism and International Relations" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A. Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London.

[38] Ibid., p. 96.

[39] Iriye 1997 and Mueller 1995 in H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London, p. 522.

[40] H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights," p. 522.

empirical constructivists have generated theoretical and empirical studies about, for example, "policy entrepreneurs", epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks, or moral communities[41]. Thus constructivists underscore the independent role of norms and ideas in impacting both international and domestic policy outcomes[42], while also taking into account the growing role of non-state actors in world affairs.

The constructivist approach is also in tune with John Boli and George Thomas' world-polity institutionalist perspective on world culture and organisations, which are referred to in more detail in the first chapter. The world polity theory namely treats actors "not as unanalyzed 'givens' but as entities constructed and motivated by these enveloping frames"[43]. It should be mentioned here that one of the inspirations for the establishment of the Chicago School, where the tenets of constructivist thinking have been established, was William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's classic book *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Their work is one of the earliest examples of the biographical, or life-story method. *The Polish Peasant* should be credited for inaugurating a move away from the positivist thinking towards a constructivist vision of the social order[44]. In a similar vein, this book focuses on the individuals' perspective regarding the studied phenomenon, which is the growth of citizen initiatives for global solidarity in Poland and the development of the Polish aid system. Florian Znaniecki's methodology of the humanistic coefficient has been applied in this research, as his concept of humanistic sociology is in tune with constructivist thinking. Znaniecki postulated that, unlike natural objects, a cultural object or activity possesses a meaning, which is the socially constructed product of human knowledge and experience[45]. Znaniecki coined the humanistic coefficient concept to

41 E. Adler. 2008. "Constructivism and International Relations," p. 104.

42 H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights," p. 521.

43 R. Jepperson 1991, 1992 in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organisation of World Culture" in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organisations since 1875*. Stanford, p. 13.

44 B. Merrill and L. West, 2009. *Using Biographical Methods in Social Research*. London, p. 22.

45 F. Znaniecki 1968. *The Method of Sociology*. New York, pp. 40–41.

denote the "essential character of cultural data" and he claimed that the cultural system is "really and objectively as it was (or is) given to those historical subjects themselves when they were (or are) experiencing it and actively dealing with it"[46]. In other words, the humanistic coefficient provides the perspective of the participants in social actions, who in this particular case are global activists involved in NGDOs in Poland as well as external observers and representatives of policy-making bodies. The "competence of the research's objects"[47] is another research strategy this research is resting on. Hence, both global activists' subjective experiences and their competences have provided the basis for this research.

As indicated above, this research draws on literature from sociology, political studies, psychology, and international relations alike. As such, insight from these disciplines informed the underpinnings of this research. Yet, the primary theoretical inspiration for this undertaking has been the second generation of constructivist theories. This research is situated in the area of private international governance as exercised by Polish NGDOs. Instead of focusing on the restricted realm of public international governance that interested pioneering constructivists, over the last fifteen years scholars from the second generation moved the discussion towards private international governance[48]. Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker developed a taxonomy of private authority in global governance and identified three major categories of private authority: "market authority", "moral authority", and "illicit authority"[49]. The potential of NGDOs' authority can be actualized via the second of these categories. Moral authority can be attained provided that private actors advance at least one of three claims. Firstly, should they have the capacity to provide expertise, private actors benefit from the authority of authorship. Secondly, they can enjoy the authority of the referee, should they be successful in claiming a status of being neutral actors disassociated both from

[46] Ibid., p. 37.

[47] A. Wyka. 1993. *Badacz społeczny wobec doświadczenia*. Warszawa, p. 70.

[48] R.B. Hall. 2014. "Constructivism" in T.G. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (eds.) *International Organisation and Global Governance*. London and New York, p. 149.

[49] R.B. Hall and T.J. Biersteker 2002 in R.B. Hall 2014. "Constructivism," p. 151.

state interest and self-interest. Thirdly, *normative* moral authority can be bestowed upon private actors representing socially progressive or morally transcendent worldview. It should be noted here that norm entrepreneurship exercised by NGOs refers to both the international and the national level. The relevance of constructivist thinking to explaining norm diffusion at the national level has been corroborated by studies of the effectiveness of global human rights institutions. Although realist, liberal and constructivists elements of theorising have been found to be relevant to account for norm diffusion in the area of human rights, "constructivist theorizing and non-governmental networks are at the center of the explanation"[50].

The concept of normative moral authority is furthermore in tune with the recognition theory of NGOs, which rests on the premises that NGOs working "on behalf and for the recognition of others" rely for their legitimacy on their specialist knowledge[51]. The above-mentioned bases for moral authority are argued to inform NGOs' impact on authoritative governance outcomes[52]. The arguments put forward by the second generation of constructivist scholars are also corroborated by the above-mentioned world-polity theory. According to this theory, these organisations are transnational bodies exercising a special type of authority called "rational voluntarism"[53]. Indeed, as Boli and Thomas convincingly argue, internationally-oriented NGOs lack the rational-legal authority states utilise to make or enforce laws. These NGOs' economic resources are furthermore incomparable to the ones possessed by global corporations. Yet, to understand key aspects of global development, a culturally informed analysis of internationally-oriented NGOs is needed[54]. As far as the sources of legitimation for these NGOs' activities go, they can be discerned in the "legitimated structures and procedures by which they operate, the legitimated

---

50 H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights," p. 531.

51 Vibert 2007 in V.M. Heins. 2014. "Global Cooperation and Economies of Recognition: The Case of NGOs." Global Cooperation Research Papers 5, Duisburg, p. 18.

52 R.B. Hall and T.J. Biersteker 2002 in R.B. Hall 2014. "Constructivism," p. 152.

53 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organisation of World Culture," p. 14.

54 Ibid.

purposes they pursue, and the cultural authority embodied in their members in terms of educational credentials, professional standing, moral charisma"[55].

Case studies in the field of private international governance illustrate the main arguments of second-generation constructivists. For example, Thomas Risse, one of the most prominent researchers on human rights, demonstrates the process whereby the growing complexity and scope of human rights law and the respective international institutions developed *concomitantly* with the growth of transnational civic initiatives in that area. Moreover, local civic initiatives in authoritative regimes have likewise benefited from and contributed to human rights mobilisation. As an example Risse mentions the human rights provision in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which provided dissidents in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union "with a powerful tool against their regimes" and also led to "dramatic human rights mobilisation in Eastern Europe"[56]. The empirical material gathered for the purposes of this research has corroborated this argument, as illustrated later on.

The strategy, whereby domestic civic initiatives actively look for allies abroad, including media and international activists, to "put pressure on local policy elites", has been described in 1998 as the "boomerang effect"[57]. In their well-known work, where they coined the term "boomerang effect", Keck and Sikkink claim that since liberalism presupposes self-interested and risk-averse actors, it cannot account for the process whereby individuals and groups "constitute new actors and transform understandings of interests and identities"[58]. Keck and Sikkink argue instead that individuals and groups are capable of exerting influence on the preferences of their own states (as well as on individuals, groups and even states elsewhere) "through a combina-

---

55 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "Introduction" in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organisations since 1875*. Stanford, p. 9.

56 Th. Risse. 2000. "The Power of Norms versus the Norms of Power: Transnational Civil Society and Human Rights" in A.M. Florini (ed.) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Tokyo and Washington, D.C., pp. 182-183.

57 M.E. Keck and K. Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond *Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca and London, p. 200.

58 Ibid., p. 214.

tion of persuasion, socialisation, and pressure"[59]. Although the tactic of alerting supranational bodies has traditionally been associated with civic activism in non-democratic states, this version of the *naming and shaming* strategy has been utilised with success after the collapse of communism, too. The application of the boomerang effect could also be observed in Poland in the beginning of the transition[60]. In Poland NGOs have been instrumental in utilising the boomerang effect.

The relevance of the constructivist approach to this study is also evidenced in the importance contemporary constructivists attach to social communication. As argued above, this study focuses on NGDOs as the agents that socialised public institutions in the area of development cooperation in Poland. Rather than studying instrumental bargaining and choice, constructivists address social communication issues such as socialisation, thus highlighting the instrumental nature of agents' actions[61]. Indeed, the most spectacular examples of internationally-oriented NGOs' ability to exercise authority are in the field of human rights. However, in terms of quantity, the impact of those NGOs in the economic and technical fields outnumbers human rights' advocacy groups' influence on world culture[62]. This observation corroborates the argument that the public invisibility of the work of some NGOs is not a reflection of their actual impact.

The empirical research

In between May 2014 and February 2015 I conducted 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with respondents who have been engaged in development cooperation and/or international cooperation either on behalf of an NGO or a relevant governmental institution. In fact, with the exception of one respondent, all interviewees – including those who currently work for governmental or foreign institutions – have been engaged with an NGO or NGDO. A number of respondents worked for the business sector or for the media *before* joining the

59 Ibid.

60 P. Gliński. 2006a. *Style działań organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce. Grupy interesu czy pożytku publicznego?*. Warszawa, p. 32.

61 E. Adler. 2008. "Constructivism and International Relations," p. 102.

62 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organisation of World Culture", p. 41.

NGDO sector. Three of the participants in the research represented national institutions supporting NGDOs, while five interviewees have been working for (at the time of the interview) or were previously affiliated with foreign or international institutions funding NGOs' work. Three of the respondents have been private entrepreneurs in addition to working for an NGDO. Two participants in the research were also working as journalists. Three of my interviewees had previous experience in intergovernmental (donor) organisations, like OECD-DAC, UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc. Six of the respondents were affiliated with an academic institution or pursued obtaining an academic degree. Two of the interviewees admitted to be planning to quit the NGDO sector, due to disappointment with the perceived as insurmountable challenges working in the NGDO sector entailed.

(Some of) the institutions research participants were affiliated to at the time of the interview are presented below in alphabetical order: *Białoruskie Stowarzyszenie Roberta Schumana*, *Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej*, *Fundacja Dzieci Niczyje*[63], *Fundacja Edukacja dla Demokracji, Fundacja Ekonomiczna Polska-Afryka Wschodnia, Fundacja Inicjatyw Menedżerskich, Fundacja Inna Przestrzeń, Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Fundacja Kultury Świata, Fundacja Pogranicze, Fundacja Solidarności Międzynarodowej, Fundacja Współpracy Polsko-Ukraińskiej*, *Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka, Global Development Research Group, Grupa Zagranica, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Narodowy Bank Polski, Polska Akcja Humanitarna, Polska Zielona Sieć, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Polskie Centrum Pomocy Międzynarodowej, Polsko-Amerykańska Fundacja Wolności, Stowarzyszenie Edukacja dla Pokoju, Stowarzyszenie Free Tybet* and *Stowarzyszenie Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne*. In addition to these institutions, some respondents have also been involved with other NGDOs, like *Instytut Globalnej Odpowiedzialności*, *Stefan Batory Foundation*, the Polish NGDOs platform *Grupa Zagranica*, and others. However, not all aid professionals representing NGOs were members of the national platform of NGDOs *Grupa Zagranica*.

The respondents in the purposive sample were chosen on the basis of preliminary defined criteria. Both personal characteristics

[63] The organisation subsequently changed its name to *Fundacja Dajemy Dzieciom Siłę*.

(age and sex of the respondent, number of years of engagement in international/development cooperation) and criteria regarding the organisation(s) the interviewees represented were taken into account. As noted above, most respondents were engaged in the NGDO sector at the time of the research, while a number of interviewees represented relevant to development cooperation governmental and international organisations. The one interview with an MFA employee was complemented with official statements by other MFA officials in publicised interviews or other publicly available sources. It is important to remember, however, that the working experience of some of the respondents included affiliations with intergovernmental organisations, international or foreign NGOs, businesses, the media, and the academia. Although not all Polish NGDOs are located in the capital of Poland, most organisations involved in development cooperation and/or global education have their headquarters in the capital. Respectively, most of the respondents who took part in this research live in Warsaw. Nonetheless, some interviews were also conducted with respondents residing outside of Warsaw (Szczecin, Sejny, Lublin).

The choice of NGDOs represented by interviewees was guided by the following principle: in line with the understanding of aid presented in the amended in 2013 *Development Cooperation Act*, development cooperation is understood as "the totality of actions undertaken by government agencies in line with the international solidarity rule", with a view to providing developing countries with development assistance and humanitarian relief as well as undertaking activities in the field of global education[64]. Hence, development assistance, humanitarian aid, and global education are the three distinct fields within the Polish development cooperation program, and also the fields NGDOs whose representatives I interviewed were active in. Virtually all respondents worked in the field of development cooperation at the time of the interview. Six of the 25 people interviewed were also engaged in humanitarian relief, whereas 12 of the research participants were likewise involved in global education. 15 of the respondents were men and 10 of the research participants were women. Four of the interviewees were in the age group 26-35, ten were aged 36-45, seven were in the 46-55 age cohort, and four in the 56-65 age group. Respondents' engagement in international activity related to development coopera-

[64] *USTAWA z dnia 16 września 2011 r. o współpracy rozwojowej*. 2013.

tion varied from 7 to 36 years. As such, both interviewees, whose experience is related to the existence and functioning of Polish aid, and research participants who have been involved in international cooperation/development assistance prior to 2004 or prior to 1989, were included in the sample. Nine of the respondents' engagement in development cooperation was in between seven and ten years, i.e. they got involved *after* Poland joined the European Union and Polish aid kicked off. 12 of the interviewees were engaged in development cooperation between 11 and 20 years at the time of the interview. And finally, four of the respondents had experience in international cooperation ranging in between 22 and 36 years. Clearly, most of the interviewees have been active in international cooperation *after* the toppling of communism. Nonetheless, the legacy of the *Solidarity* movement could be discerned in the autobiographies of at least seven of the interviewees.

An effort was made to interview representatives of different types of NGDOs. Naturally, both "democratising" and "developmental" types of NGDOs were included in the sample. Organisations, which focused their work on national or local issues, yet also had international projects, were also taken into account. These were for example NGDOs dealing with local development, or promoting a particular issue, like advocating for human rights, combatting child abuse, promoting critical civic education, environmental protection, culture promotion. The sub-sector of NGOs working with migrants residing in Poland were not included in the sample, though at least two of the respondents worked for an NGO catering to migrants' needs in Poland. In fact, NGOs working with migrants or refugees were not targeted in this research. While the activity of these NGOs should be recognised, especially in view of the on-going refugee crisis, the field and scope of activity of most of these organisations does not conform to the definition of an NGDO. In line with the definition mentioned above whereby humanitarian aid, development assistance and global education are the three fields of activity to be included in the sample, NGOs catering to migrants' needs were not considered to fulfill the above-mentioned criteria. Although some of the organisations included in the sample also have projects targeting migrants in Poland, the issue was not addressed in the interview guide, so the more that the interviews were conducted before the onset of the current crisis.

The interviews were conducted either at the premises where interviewees worked, or at my workplace (the Institute of Philosophy and

Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw). Most interviews lasted an hour. I also took notes while conducting the interviews. These notes along with preliminary analysis ideas I had at the time of the interview helped with the actual analysis of the research material. The interviews were conducted in Polish. They were recorded and subsequently transcribed *verbatim* by an experienced transcriber. After once again comparing the interviews with the transcriptions, the latter were printed out, coded and analysed. Michael Huberman and Mathew Miles' methodology[65] regarding coding of the research material informed my approach to the interviews. I worked on the list of codes until it fitted both the themes that emerged from the research material and the issues I was originally interested to address. The codes were initially developed on the basis of the interview guide. Thus, the questions from the interview guide constituted "the descriptive analytical framework for analysis"[66]. I applied the cross-case analysis technique described by Michael Quinn Patton as "grouping together answers from different people to common questions or analyzing different perspectives on central issues"[67]. In line with Samia Khan and Robert VanWynsberghe's argumentation[68], it is contended here that by mobilising knowledge from individual case studies to compare and contrast them, cross-case analysis produces new knowledge.

Huberman and Miles' practical directions regarding the application of the cross-case approach informed the process of analysing the research material[69]. Huberman and Miles maintain that looking at multiple actors in multiple settings enhances generalisability, though they admit that the cross-case approach implies a tension of "reconciling the particular with the universal"[70]. Huberman and Miles dis-

---

65 A.M. Huberman and M.B. Miles. 2000. *Analiza danych jakościowych*. Białystok.

66 M.Q. Patton. 1990. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. New Bury Park, p. 376.

67 Ibid.

68 S. Khan and R. VanWynsberghe. 2008. "Cultivating the Under-Mined: Cross-Case Analysis as Knowledge Mobilisation" in *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, no 9(1).

69 See A.M. Huberman and M.B. Miles op. cit. as well as A.M. Huberman and M.B. Miles. 1994. "Data Management and Analysis Methods" in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London, pp. 428–444.

70 A.M. Huberman and M.B. Miles 1994, p. 435.

tinguish between three distinct strategies for cross-case analysis: case-oriented, variable-oriented, and mixed. It is the variable-oriented strategy that was applied in this research to provide answers to the research question. Following Huberman and Miles, this approach consists of "*finding themes* that cut across cases"[71]. Thus, the variable-oriented approach to cross-case analysis focuses more on the variables across cases rather than on the case itself. Variables are compared across cases to "delineate pathways that may have led to particular outcomes"[72]. The variable-oriented approach was applied to classify the interviewees' answers to questions from the interview guide. Parts of the interviews were coded and grouped together according to the previously identified themes. The research material was then analysed from the point of view of those themes. Each theme usually consisted of several codes. Whenever needed, the original text of the interview was consulted to reconstruct the context in which the concrete statement was uttered.

After the analysis of the research material was completed, the findings were presented in a way that provide ample research evidence to illustrate the interpretation while also allowing readers to make their own inferences from the research material. This "thick description" strategy implies the presentation of descriptive data to illustrate the author's arguments, while allowing the readers to draw their own conclusions[73]. Thus, each issue was described, richly illustrated, classified and interpreted separately. To put it in Clifford Geertz' words, the aim was to "draw large conclusions from small, but very densely textured facts"[74]. In order to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents' views, the codes of the interviewees contain only the number of years the respondent has been engaged in development cooperation. For example, the code r10_17 should be read as: respondent nr 10 who has been engaged for at least 17 years in international development cooperation.

---

71 Ibid., p. 436, italics in the original.

72 S. Khan, R. VanWynsberghe. 2008. "Cultivating the Under-Mined."

73 The British philosopher Gilbert Ryle coined the notion of "thick description", which was popularized by Geertz in: C. Geertz 1973 "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" in *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York.

74 C. Geertz. 1973. "Thick Description."

A disclaimer has to be done at this point. The interviews for this book were finished *before* the onset of the current refugee crisis. Hence it is not feasible to draw conclusion regarding the attitude of Polish NGDO activists towards the refugee crisis on the basis of my research material. In any way, the NGO sector dealing with migration issues and the NGDO sector overlap only partially. Some of the NGDOs which representatives took part in this research (the *Polish Humanitarian Action*, *the Institute of Public Affairs*, *Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights*, *Stefan Batory Foundation*, *Foundation Education for Democracy*, *Amnesty International – Poland, Foundation Other Space*) do have projects focusing on refugees residing in Poland. Likewise, many of the NGOs engaged in development education also deal with issue related to migration. In fact, according to the 2012–2014 report of the Supreme Audit Office assessing the refugees' support system in Poland, the state system for refugees' integration was argued to be inefficient[75]. This report also indicated that refugees receive tangible support from NGOs.

According to an analysis of self-declared fields of activities directed to migrants, Polish NGOs provide the following types of support: assistance (citizens' advice and legal aid services, assistance in finding employment, financial assistance), education (for example, organising free polish language courses), culture services and intervention[76]. Unlike the conclusions of the Supreme Audit Office's report mentioned above, the analysis of the role of NGOs dealing with foreigners in Poland found that in the case of immigrants benefiting from international protection, the role of the NGO sector has been complimentary *vis a vis* the one played by the state. In the case of EU citizens and citizens of third countries, the civic sector has been the one to assume the leading role[77]. The analysis of the impact of NGOs on the migration policy of the Polish state indicated that NGOs' role has been limited to consultations and provision of services to migrants. The centralisation

---

[75] E. Siedlecka. 2015. "NIK: Uchodźcy integrowani tylko zasiłkiem" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 13.11.2015. p. 7.

[76] K. Slany 2014 in M. Pawłak and P. Matusz-Protasiewicz. 2015. "Organizacje pozarządowe wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce – od pomocy doraźnej do upowszechnienia Europejskiej ramy polityki integracyjnej" in *Trzeci Sektor,* no 35, 2, pp. 12–13.

[77] M. Pawłak and P. Matusz-Protasiewicz. 2015. "Organizacje pozarządowe wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce."

of Polish migration policy, the dependency of NGOs on public funds and the still underdeveloped consultation culture have been identified as the factors influencing the limited impact of Polish NGOs on the migration policy in Poland[78].

About this book

Chapter One addresses the conditions determining the changing role of civil society organisations in development, with a particular focus on the post-communist context. After making a succinct overview of the most important developments that had an impact on global processes, the chapter moves on to discuss the roles civil society organisations have played in national and international affairs alike. The relevant theoretical stances accounting for the development and growing agency of civil society actors, especially those engaged internationally, are discussed. The theories explaining pro-social engagement are likewise presented. The specific context of the post-communist transformation, which also included participation in the global system of development cooperation where Poland was a recipient of Official aid, is accounted for. It is recognised that the (new) face of neoliberalism, tapered by the new security agenda, along with the experience with transformation, democratisation and the development of civil society in post-communist countries, and the imperatives of organisational survival have created specific conditions for the emergence of new development cooperation actors.

Chapter Two deals with the constellation of circumstances that played a role in the internationalisation of solidarity. While analysing the research material and the relevant literature on the subject, it becomes evident that it is virtually impossible to discuss separately the following developments. The evolution of grassroots activism in communist Poland, which culminated in the emergence of the *Solidarity* movement and *Solidarity*'s impact on civil societies from the other former communist countries in the 1990s, would be incomplete without taking into account the role foreign aid played in the process. Whereas the existing literature provides support to this observation,

[78] M. Lesińska and R. Stefańska. 2015. "Wpływ organizacji pozarządowych na politykę migracyjną Polski i jego uwarunkowania" in *Trzeci Sektor*, no 2, pp. 40–53.

the other example of inter-connectedness is less obvious and accordingly understudied. Namely, the transformation of Poland from recipient of foreign aid to donor, which culminated with the establishment of the governmental Polish aid system, cannot be discussed separately from the developments that took place in the NGDO sector. Furthermore, both the NGDO sector and the governmental system of development assistance in Poland have their distinctive traits that distinguish them from their counterparts in older donor countries. Likewise, the dynamics of the relationship between these stakeholders turn out to differ from the model of cooperation among NGDOs and state agencies in established donor countries.

Chapter Three begins with discussing the evolution of the Polish NGO sector towards international development cooperation. During the analysis of this process, specific attention is paid to the process that can be dubbed changing hats, i.e. the transformation NGOs underwent from being official aid beneficiaries to becoming aid providers themselves. The relevance of the democratising vs. developmental divide in the NGDO sector is then discussed. Evidence is presented to the argument that aid professionals are interested in regions and countries that the mainstream public disregards. As such, the direction Polish development cooperation took is different from the oriented towards the West modernisation in the fields of economy and politics. Given the prevailing belief that the country's comparative advantage in the area of development cooperation is democracy assistance and sharing its transformation experience, this mode of providing development aid is examined in greater detail. Finally, a brief overview of initiatives in the area of global education and international volunteering undertaken by Polish NGDOs and mostly supported by Polish aid is likewise presented.

Chapter Four makes an overview of the history of development cooperation in Poland. Next the cooperation between NGDOs and the state institutions responsible for implementing bilateral cooperation is discussed. To supplement this analysis, the transformation the country itself underwent from being a COMECON member to beneficiary of official aid and finally an OECD DAC donor is taken into account.

In Chapter Five the study of Polish aid professionals' career paths and motivations is put forward. The chapter starts with an overview of existing studies of aid professionals. It moves on to discuss the social and cultural capital of Polish NGDO activists. The career paths of Polish

aid professionals are then examined and compared to those of aid professionals from other countries. The motivational underpinnings of interviewees are presented next. What more, the opinions expressed by research participants about the cohort of NGDO activists in general are likewise illustrated. The factors that inhibit or enhance NGDO activists' engagement in development cooperation are examined along with the way they view their future engagement in the field.

The Conclusion recapitulates the most important findings from the study and discusses their implications for further research.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the aid professionals, who agreed to take part in this research. I appreciate the comments on the early draft of this book, which I received from my colleagues from the Civil Society Department and from prof. Joanna Kurczewska of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences. I am indebted to prof. Krzysztof Jasiecki for his insightful remarks on the almost final draft of the book. I am particularly thankful to prof. Jerzy Bartkowski for reviewing my book. I benefited from participation in several research conferences and seminars, where I had the opportunity to discuss selected aspects of my analysis. I would like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support I received from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, which allowed me to outsource the transcription of the interviews as well as present findings from my research at international conferences. While doing desk research for this book and discussing early ideas for my own research, I also benefited from the EU-funded scholarship funded by the project "Global Education at the Times of Civilisation Changes" – Collegium Civitas' development programme nr POKL (Operational Programme Human Capital).04.01.01-00-096/10 realized within Sub-activity 4.1.1 of the Operational Programme Human Capital – Task 4: Raising qualifications of Collegium Civitas Faculty. This scholarship funded my stay as a visiting fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin in Ireland in 2013. And last but not least, the support I received from my family helped me persevere in my endeavour to finish this book.

1 Civil society, development and the case of post-communism. Theoretical considerations

We have no interest in coming back to the Cold War.
The balance of fear is not a good recipe
for shaping contemporary international relations[1].

This chapter starts with addressing topical issues that have impacted development understood as a historical process of global change[2]. This part of the book tackles the following questions: What have been the most significant recent global processes that influenced the dynamics of the relationship between different stakeholders in social, political, and economic life? How has the dominance of neoliberal thinking impacted on the role ascribed to civil society organisations in development understood as deliberate efforts at improvement undertaken by development agencies? How has aid securitisation influenced the legal regulations and practices governing the functioning of NGOs in the Global North and the Global South alike? What have been the specific characteristics of post-communist transforma-

[1] President Andrzej Duda's speech at the NATO Defense College in Rome on 17 May 2016 (accessed 26.05.2016 at http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,167,presidents-speech-at-the-nato-defense-college.html).

[2] Alan Thomas notes that "development" has been used in three main senses: as a vision or measure of a desirable society, as an historical process and as a deliberate effort at improvements undertaken by development agencies (in Allen and Thomas 2000: 48).

tion that determined the conditions for self-organisation after 1989? Which theoretical perspectives explain the ascendance of non-state actors in international affairs?

Modern quandaries

We live in a world where certainties are being continuously challenged and boundaries redrawn. With the toppling of communism 25 years ago, the hypothesis of the end of history[3], understood as the unencumbered by the Cold War era further spread of liberal democracy, was developed. However, this seemingly self-fulfilling prophecy became undermined by unforeseen events. These are for example the spread of Islamic fundamentalist movements, the accelerated growth of emerging markets like China, India and Brazil, the escalation of conflict between the Russian Federation and the EU and USA and most recently the flood of refugees from war-torn countries towards Europe. The economic crisis which hit the world in 2008 and the subsequent backlash towards the dominating up to that moment neoliberal[4] paradigm also brought about political and economic developments that were unimaginable at the time the "end of history" argument was put forward.

Another false assumption turned out to be the idea that increasing affluence in developed and developing countries alike will have a spillover effect and will thus reduce inequalities among as well as within those countries. Yet, as French economist Thomas Piketty contends in his recent book, data on the evolution of inequality since the beginning of the industrial revolution indicates that the importance of wealth in modern economies is approaching the levels from before the outbreak of the First World War[5]. The critical argument presented by Piketty refers to the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of the very rich. Data regarding the United States corroborates the claim that inequality in wealth is approaching record levels. Namely, the top

[3] F. Fukuyama. 1992. *The End Of History and the Last Man*. New York.

[4] There is a huge literature on neoliberalism, political and economic liberalism, which is not going to be accounted for here. For the sake of clarity, it is accepted that neoliberalism assumes the free movement of goods, resources, and enterprises to make trade between nations easier.

[5] T. Piketty. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. USA.

0.1% hold 22% of America's wealth, which is exactly the same share as the bottom 90% of the population[6]. Wealth inequalities are even more pronounced in emerging markets like China and Mexico[7].

Counteracting inequalities worldwide was recognised as one of the gravest challenges humanity faces. Accordingly, development cooperation policies and practices had to take into account these challenges. 2015 has been a milestone year in the history of development cooperation. The Millennium Development Goals expired in 2015. The new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed upon in 2015. One of the SDGs aims at reducing inequalities within and among countries. The European Commission announced 2015 as the European Year for Development. As such, it has been the first European Year to focus on an issue that lies mostly *outside* of the borders of the European Union. European NGDOs were behind the idea of the European Year for Development and took active part in the formulation of the concept[8]. These initiatives have been matched by an increment of national and international NGDOs' initiatives. In the open letter with which *CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation* addressed its fellow activists across the globe, it admitted new civic actors "sometimes rightfully, feel we [NGOs] have become just another layer of the system and development industry that perpetuates injustice"[9]. Theorists have also confirmed this observation. However, theoretical scholarship views the fact that internationally-oriented NGOs have "lost their 'innocence' and have become part and parcel of international governance structures"[10] as a side-effect of these non-state actors' growing capacity to actually shape domestic and international politics while engaging in consciousness-raising. To remedy this situation, *CIVICUS* called that NGOs direct their primary accountability not to donors, but to their core constituencies, many of whom "have been on the losing end of globalisation

---

6 *The Economist*. 2014. "Forget the 1%," 8.11.2014.

7 *Raport* The Economist*: Bogaci stają się bogatsi, a biedni biednieją. Można z tym skończyć*. 2012.

8 Trialog. 2014e. *European Year for Development 2015.* Policy Digest nr 10, November 2014.

9 CIVICUS. 2014. *An Open Letter to our Fellow Activists across the Globe: Building from below and beyond borders*.

10 T. Risse. 2008. "Transnational Actors and World Politics" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London. pp. 268–269.

and inequality"[11]. Counteracting inequalities has to go hand in hand with empowering those "at the losing end" while globally curbing the impact of the mighty.

However, unlike wealth, which is apparently concentrated in the hands of a few, power is becoming increasingly dispersed. As analytics tell us, power as we used to know it, is changing and is even argued to be undergoing decay[12]. This assertion can be illustrated by examples ranging from the international realm to the public sphere. The cultural, political and economic hegemony of super-powers from the Global North is being challenged by states, which used to be considered as less developed in economic terms. The power of nation-states is being challenged by the power of transnational corporations and non-state actors[13]. The power of men is being accordingly undermined by the slow but steady progress of the gender equality movement. Both far right and far left movements feel increasingly free and justified to promote or try to impose their values and life styles on others. Undoubtedly, some of the examples of the dispersion of power should be attributed to the spread of liberal democracy. Yet, as Stephen Elliott-Buckley succinctly put it, the "self-satisfied embrace of democracy" – which implies the rule of the many, yet each one acting in his or her individual interest – results in the rise of hyper-individualism[14]. This diagnosis may be argued to refer predominantly to Western societies. Nonetheless, it adequately describes the situation becoming prevalent in more recently established democracies as well as in emerging markets. Yet, the very fragmentation and decentralisation of power, which seemingly allows individual freedoms to flourish, leaves individuals and groups with fewer established options to address their grievances to. As Zygmunt Bauman insightfully put it, "Never have we

---

11 CIVICUS. 2014. *An Open Letter to our Fellow Activists across the Globe.*

12 M. Naím. 2013. *The End of Power. From Boardrooms To Battlefields And Churches To States, Why Being In Charge Isn't What It Used To Be*. New York.

13 C.A. Kupchan, 2012. *No One's World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn.* New York, p. 193.

14 S. Elliott-Buckley, 2009. "Democracy(tm): Challenging the Hyper-Individualism of Packaged Democracy," International Studies Association Conference Papers.

been so free. Never have we felt so powerless"[15]. This saying adequately reflects the sentiments becoming prevalent in post-communist societies, too.

The internationalisation and internalisation of neoliberal thinking in the field of civil society can be discerned in the evolution of the modes of civic activism in Poland. Namely, in the 1980s *Solidarity* was characterized by strong communal features rooted in nationalism and Christianity[16]. In the early 1990s patriotic and positivistic values described pro-social activism in Poland[17]. In the beginning of the new century the liberal, individualistic model of civil society, which posits individual entrepreneurship rather than common undertakings, characterized institutionalised civic initiatives in Poland[18]. This change could also be discerned in the democratisation and increasing pluralism among the social activists' corps. Though members of the intelligentsia were still present among NGO activists, representatives from other social strata and educational backgrounds have joined in the development of the Third sector. After 2008 one can observe the emergence of a hybrid model of self-organisation demonstrated in the rise of un-institutionalized civic initiatives[19], also powered by the principles of shared economy. The in-group communitarianism, which has been observed to develop for example in food cooperatives[20], is indicative of the hybridisation of civic activity in Poland. Undoubtedly, the development of a distinct NGDO sector is likewise an example of

---

15 Quoted in P. Verhaeghe. 2014. "Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us" in *The Guardian*, 29.09.2014.

16 W. Wesołowski. 1995. "The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland after Solidarity" in J. A. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society. Theory, History, Comparison*. Cambridge.

17 J. Koralewicz and H. Malewska-Peyre. 1998. *Człowiek człowiekowi człowiekiem. Analiza wywiadów biograficznych działaczy społecznych w Polsce i we Francji*. Warszawa.

18 G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists Make Solidarity Work*. Warszawa.

19 K. Herbst and M. Żakowska. 2013. *Ruchy nieformalne a kierunki rozwoju ekonomii społecznej. Rekomendacje dla polityk publicznych.* Warszawa; G. Chimiak and K. Iwińska (eds.) 2015. *Sektor społecznościowy – Polska 2014*. Warszawa.

20 A. Bilewicz and D. Potkańska. 2013. "Jak kiełkuje społeczeństwo obywatelskie? Kooperatywy spożywcze w Polsce jako przykład nieformalnego ruchu społecznego" in *Trzeci Sektor,* no 31.

this phenomenon. NGDO activists are aid professionals who have often gained experience working for international organisations, the state, the commercial sector, or the academia. Their professionalism and hands-on experience with development cooperation have been among their biggest assets. Undoubtedly, the impact of neoliberalism had its positive and negative aspects, too.

25 years after the toppling of communism the awareness of the "price" the society had to pay for the swift and effective implementation of the neoliberal reforms in Poland is becoming more and more pronounced. The "shock therapy" reform, modelled on the neoliberal Washington consensus, should be credited for ensuring the current leading economic role of Poland among East-Central European post-communist countries, which have been undergoing transformation. Nonetheless, as the Polish sociologist Marcin Król noted, the second phase of the transformation can best be described by a process he calls a "crack". This crack has been the result of the difficulties to reconcile the prerequisite of democracy understood as community with liberalism understood as "forcing private ownership"[21]. It should be remembered, however, that the challenges Poland faces nowadays are not an outcome of those national reforms only. With the end of the Cold War, Poland and the other East-Central European countries opened up to globalisation, too. Strategies associated with globalisation, neoliberalism, and deregulation, got imposed at a national level[22]. This observation refers to the area of societal self-organisation, too. Poland is well known as a country that gave birth to the trade union and mass movement *Solidarity*, which was one of the factors that undermined the previous regime. Having an indigenous civil society and experience in self-organisation, in 1989 the country moved on to implement a three-dimensional transformation towards democracy, market economy and Western-style civil society. In what follows, the role ascribed to civil society in neoliberalism is analysed and applied to the context of post-communist transformation.

[21] M. Król. 2012. *Europa w obliczu końca.* Warszawa, p. 126.

[22] M. Kaldor. 2000. "Eastern enlargement and democracy" in C. Hoskyns, M. Newman. (eds.) *Democratising the European Union: Issues for the Twenty-first Century*. Manchester and New York, p. 144.

Civil society: the triumph or the underside of neoliberalism?

As suggested above, a feeling of powerlessness appears to ail citizens of liberal democracies. Apathy and weak participation are argued to be the result of the strategies associated with globalisation, neo-liberalism and deregulation[23]. Out of this feeling of powerlessness, however, rises a determination to act. The ever increasing engagement and influence of diverse range of participants, such as individuals, citizen initiatives, but also transnational corporations, in national and international affairs alike is indicative of the empowerment of those non-state actors. This feeling of empowerment has in turn been caused by the dispersal of power. The growth of citizen initiatives is especially remarkable in this context, as they embody the will of citizens to take active participation in public life. However, the "global associational revolution"[24] and its documented impact on public life cannot be explained by those social actors' determination to act only. The phenomenon should be accounted for by the interplay of a number of other, also external, factors. Namely, the withdrawal of the state and the growing domination of thinking in free market terms created demand for the increasing importance of new entities in the public sphere, including non-state actors. Those new entities have been variously named, yet the most popular concepts used to describe the activity of private individuals in the public sphere, different from the state and the market, have been called: civil society, non-governmental organisations, non-profit enterprises, voluntary or Third sector. Civil society is the broadest of these terms as it refers to both institutionalised and informal citizens' activities. The other concepts enumerated above can be used interchangeably as they all refer to the institutionalised, registered pillar of civil society.

The growing role of these entities has been registered by studies and accounted for by the respective theories. Thus, the mentioned in the Introduction demand-side economic theories of the non-profit sector are in line with the mode of thinking, where these entities develop to make up for the shortages of the state and the market. Ac-

[23] Ibid.

[24] L.M. Salamon et. al. 1999. *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore, p. 4.

cording to Burton Weisbrod's classic theory of government-market failure, the development of a voluntary sector should be posited as "an adjustment to the restricted capabilities of the other two sectors"[25]. The competitive, supply-side line of thinking about the Third sector, posits that it is the non-profit entrepreneurs' motivations and background that provide the major explanatory variable for the formation of non-profit enterprises[26]. Supply-side theories should likewise be credited for providing a positive definition of the phenomenon in question, i.e. one not founded on the absence of features (neither commercial nor governmental sector), but on its added value.

As supply-side economic theories inform my approach to studying NGDOs, their detailed discussion merits attention. Supply-side economic theories lay emphasis on the contribution of individuals engaged in non-profit firms or on the behaviour of these non-profits. Researcher Estelle James argued that in the social service industry it was the non-profit entrepreneurs' motivations and background that provide the major explanatory variable for the formation of non-profit firms[27]. A second body of literature deriving from supply-side theories was described by Henry Hansmann. One of these theories is called the "optimizing model". According to this model, non-profit entities – like universities, hospitals and performing arts organisations – strive to maximise the quality of the service they provide[28]. However, as Estelle James and Susan Rose-Ackerman contended, "empirical observations give limited support to the theories that emphasise non-profits as key providers of quality, but are generally consistent with theories that stress philanthropy, public goods and financing, and religious or ideological entrepreneurship in the non-profit sector"[29].

---

[25] B.A. Weisbrod. 1977. "Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy" in B.A. Weisbrod (ed.) *The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector. An Economic Analysis*. Toronto, p. 52.

[26] E. James. 1987. "The non-profit sector in comparative perspective" in W.W. Powell (ed.) *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*. New Haven-Connecticut.

[27] Ibid., and E. James and S. Rose-Ackerman. 1986. *The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economics*, Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics series 9, pp. 52–53.

[28] H. Hansmann op. cit., p. 37.

[29] E. James and S. Rose-Ackerman op. cit., p. 62.

The literature on non-profit entrepreneurship is based on supply-side theorising about the rise of the Third sector. Non-profit entrepreneurs are defined as "social", "religious", "ideological", "moral", or "public" entrepreneurs. In the field of development cooperation, the respective term is "aid entrepreneur". Clearly, each of the abovementioned adjectives describes an entrepreneur who is different from the businesspersons to be found in the commercial sector. Social entrepreneurs have been defined as people, who "bring about innovation, create change and introduce new solutions to social problems"[30]. Paid or unpaid workers, professionals or amateurs alike can be(come) social entrepreneurs. Like other actors involved in NGOs, entrepreneurs were found to possess particular personality traits that distinguish them from non-entrepreneurs. Accordingly, people with different entrepreneurial traits can be found in organisations practicing in different areas. Entrepreneurs most often take leadership positions in their organisations, which is natural, given that they are committed to a particular vision and possess the resources to carry out the mission of their organisation.

Taxonomies of entrepreneurs' personalities form the conceptual basis for another relevant to this study branch of theorising, i.e. behavioural theories of non-profits[31]. Christoph Badelt identified the two most salient contributions these theories have made to the field. First, he too highlighted the advantages of supply-side theories over demand-side ones. Namely, Badelt asserted that although demand-oriented theories can account for the establishment of a non-profit organisation, it nevertheless takes "special types of human beings, with special personalities"[32] who would make the supply happen. Also, behaviour-oriented theories focus on the entrepreneurs' preferences for the non-profit form over profit-oriented enterprises. Thus, supply-side theories complement demand-side ones and also underscore the individual agent's contribution to the founding of NGOs.

In the field of development the concept of "norm entrepreneurs" should likewise be considered. Norm entrepreneurs advocate for

---

30 P. Grenier. 1997. *Social Entrepreneurs – Vision and Action*, unpublished MA thesis, London.

31 C. Badelt. 1997. "Entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 8, p. 165.

32 Ibid., pp. 172–173.

social change leading to global justice. Norm entrepreneurs can be individuals, but states and societal actors can likewise act as norm entrepreneurs[33]. Indeed, at the international level, all norm promoters "need some kind of organisational platform from and through which they promote their norms. Sometimes these platforms are constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting the norm, as are many non-governmental organisations … and the larger transnational networks of which those NGOs become a part"[34]. An example of norm entrepreneur is Henry Dunant, who acted as a catalyst of the establishment of the *International Committee of the Red Cross*. Indeed, Dunant was a "world-cultural 'entrepreneur' whose action was not power-seeking or utility maximizing, as most conventional social-theoretical perspectives would expect"[35]. In the case of the *International Committee of the Red Cross*, agency was not driven by interest, but by a "cultural model of Christian charity and humanitarian duty"[36]. Ultimately, the codification of the Red Cross principles into international law represented a victory of humanitarian principles over claims for state control. This is not to imply that state power has been undermined by such examples of successful norm entrepreneurs. Yet, "the realms in which legitimate state power . . . may be exercised have been redefined by challenges from these world-cultural humanitarian principles"[37]. Another example of successful norm entrepreneurship is the definition and institutionalisation of a global norm of racial equality, which brought about the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa[38]. In other words, norm entrepreneurs – be they NGOs or individuals – also account for the relevance of supply-side theories for the field of development coopera-

---

33 C. Ingebritsen. 2002. "Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics," in *Cooperation and Conflict,* no 37:1, p. 12.

34 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" in *International Organisation*, no 52:4, p. 899.

35 M. Finnemore. 1999. "Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State Violence" in J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organisations since 1875*. Stanford, p. 163.

36 Ibid., p. 164.

37 Ibid., pp. 164–165.

38 Klotz 1995 in E. Adler. 2008. "Constructivism and International Relations" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A. Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London, p. 103.

tion. The outcome of the analysis of my research material on the basis of supply-side theories will be presented in Chapter Five.

The explanatory power of supply-side theories for accounting for the rise of non-profit entrepreneurship notwithstanding, one is entitled to enquire about the justification for piling so many accolades on civil society over the last few decades. On the one hand, the appropriation of civil society as "critical to democratisation, good governance, and development" can be traced back to the late 1970s and the 1980s, when Eastern European dissidents revived the idea of civil society as an analytic concept and a mobilising discourse[39]. However, the restoration and rehabilitation of the concept of civil society has actually been part and parcel of the change in the development discourse. Colette Chabbott's work provides an overview of international development approaches' impact on the role ascribed to national and international societal actors. She argues that the focus in development approaches after the Second World War has shifted from economic planning and economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s through equitable growth in the 1970s and structural adjustment in the 1980s to sustainable development in the 1990s. Accordingly, the role for national and international NGOs in these development models evolved from minor in the 1950s through limited in the 1960s and 1970s to significant in the 1980s[40]. With the advent of sustainable development as the prevailing approach to development, the role of societal actors grew to major.

[39] J. Howell at al. 2006. *The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror*. Civil Society Working Paper nr 26, London School of Economics, p. 9.

[40] C. Chabbott. 1999. "Development INGOs" in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, p. 239.

Table 1: The evolution of development policies and the role of internationally-oriented NGOs in development cooperation

decade	Development approaches	Role for (I)NGOs
1950s	Comprehensive economic planning; Industrialisation and community development	**Minor**: emergency relief
1960s	Economic growth; Dependency	**Limited**: technical assistance, schools, and hospitals
1970s	Equitable growth Micro/domestic: poverty alleviation; basic human needs Macro/international: New International Economic Order	**Limited**: small-scale rural social service delivery pilots and development advocacy
1980s	Structural adjustment and social dimensions of adjustment	**Significant**: social service delivery to the poor
1990s	Sustainable development	**Major**: development and dissemination of environmentally sound innovations and modern contraceptives
post 9/11.2001	Security-development nexus	***Controlled****: disciplining and taming of civil society*

Table 1: adapted from Chabbott 1999: 239 except for the last row, which draws on relevant literature, including Howell et al. 2006: 8

The increasing role of NGOs in governance has been accompanied by the growth of resources available to national and international NGOs alike. This has been especially true for developing countries, where as an alternative approach to the state, the idea of incorporating civil society in reform strategies became "an attractive policy instrument"[41]. Reportedly, currently international NGOs "raise more money for development assistance than the entire UN system"[42].

[41] L. Suleiman. 2013. "The NGOs and the Grand Illusions of Development and Democracy" in *Voluntas,* no 24, p. 246.

[42] O. Barder et al. 2010. "Governance of the aid system and the role of the EU," p. 10.

However, recent research indicates that official development assistance – ODA[43] to civil society organisations has "plateaued", levelling at around 13% of total ODA[44]. Furthermore, most of this ODA is aid *through* NGOs. ODA *through* NGOs has been on the rise, while ODA *to* NGOs has fallen, which indicates that donors tend to see NGOs as a pipeline for project delivery and a contractor[45]. Clearly, NGOs' pivotal role in international development has been increasingly challenged over the recent 15 years.

The development-security nexus, which emerged after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 was the first serious blow to the central role ascribed to NGOs in some transition and developing countries[46]. Referring to the security-development nexus, Erin Simpson argued that development discourse, development resources, and the public support for development "are at risk of being high-jacked by an agenda that, in reality, has little to do with development"[47]. An example of the internalisation of the development-security nexus in Poland is the global challenges' order of priority developed by the intersectoral group on global education in Poland. For example, it was decided that to guarantee "peace and security in the world" is a priority preceding the need to improve the quality of life in the Global South[48]. Nonethe-

[43] According to the OECD DAC definition, ODA comprises of "flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)" (accessed 29.03.2016 at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm).

[44] *State of Civil Society Report 2015*. 2015. Civicus, p. 143.

[45] Ibid.

[46] G. Chimiak. 2015. "Wpływ kwestii bezpieczeństwa na rolę organizacji pozarządowych w teorii i praktyce rozwojowej" in W. Misztal et al. (eds.) *Obywatele wobec kryzysu: uśpieni czy innowatorzy?*. Warszawa.

[47] E. Simpson. 2007. "From Inter-Dependence to Conflation: Security and Development in the Post-9/11 Era," *Canadian Journal of Development Studies,* no 2(28), p. 263.

[48] K. Jasikowska. 2012. "Globalizacja a rozwój – międzysektorowa debata na temat globalnej edukacji w Polsce" in G. Chimiak and M. Fronia (eds.) *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski*. Warszawa, p. 191.

less, aid securitisation has been only one of the factors that impacted the mode of thinking about societal actors' role in development. The strategic decisions of donor agencies are likewise responsible for the recent crackdown on non-governmental organisations. I have addressed the arrays of circumstances that affected the rise and stall of NGOs in development in more detail elsewhere[49].

Back in 1996 Michael Edwards and David Hulme professed that "The present popularity of NGOs with donors will not last forever: donors move from fad to fad and at some stage NGOs, like flared jeans, will become less fashionable"[50]. Furthermore, as the Oxfam analysts Ross Clarke and Araddhya Mehtta argued recently, the increasing prominence of information and communication technology has been a blessing in disguise for civil society. Most worrying, however, are the trends that have contributed to the depoliticisation of some NGOs. The decreasing dependence of aid-recipients on Western financial support is creating opportunities for governments to crack down on NGOs perceived as acting for the political opposition. In many countries there has been a backlash especially against NGOs working in the advocacy and monitoring field[51]. Polish NGDOs have likewise been affected by this last trend. In 2015 the *Education for Democracy Foundation* and the *East European Democratic Centre* were on the list of twelve "undesirable" NGOs to be banned from Russia for being "anti-Russian"[52]. However, as far as national affairs are concerned, among 22 countries studied, in 2015 only in Poland the relationship between civil society and the governments were assessed to have improved in the last year[53].

The initial increase of the role ascribed to societal actors and the growth of resources specifically earmarked for the Third sector can be accounted for by the development of policies aimed at supporting non-

---

[49] G. Chimiak. 2014. "The Rise and Stall of Non-Governmental Organisations in Development" in *Polish Sociological Review*, no 1.

[50] M. Edwards and D. Hulme 1996: 227 in D. Lewis and K. Nazneen. 2009. *Non-Governmental Organisations and Development*. London and New York, p. 183.

[51] R. Clarke and A. Mehtta. 2015. *5 trends that explain why civil society space is under assault around the world.* Oxfam's Knowledge Hub on Governance and Citizenship.

[52] D. Sharkov. 2015. "Russia draws up list of 'undesirable' NGOs to be banned," *Newsweek,* no 7/8.

[53] *State of Civil Society Report 2015*. 2015. Civicus, p. 193.

governmental, non-commercial initiatives. This shift can be explained by the fact that in addition to the economic and political factors, which used to be considered as the primary influences explaining growth, one more variable has been added to the equation of development. The concept of social capital has accordingly been rejuvenated to account for the resources, or lack of resources, describing given society's potential to achieve sustainable development. The importance of supporting civil society organisations was therefore additionally justified, due to these entities' "rediscovered contributions to building 'social capital"[54]. Hence, international organisations, like the World Bank, embraced and promoted social capital, suggesting that it comprises "the missing link' in economic growth and development"[55]. Social capital effects likewise started to be used to account for the development of civil society[56]. It has been questioned, however, whether NGOs from aid recipient countries can actually contribute to social capital development, as "quite often they are responding less to the community's needs than to those of the donor or northern NGOs"[57]. The relationship between civil society and social capital began to be seen as one of mutual reinforcement. Accordingly, Polish NGO activists as well internalised the idea of social capital's pivotal role. As Anna Rozicka, the director of the *Stefan Batory Foundation*, admitted in an interview, in the beginning of the transition NGO activists like herself "strived after [having] Poland where social capital would be rebuilt"[58]. A closer inspection of this ultimate goal revealed that the rebuilding of social capital was supposed to take place via the restoration of imagined lost, though recoverable, virtues[59].

Being considered a prerequisite for the emergence and development of civil society, the concept of social capital has made a remarkable career over the last two decades. It has been popularized by Robert

---

54 L.M. Salamon et. al. 1999. *Global Civil Society*, p. 5.

55 C. Grootaert. 1998. "Social capital: the missing link?" Social Capital Initiative Working Paper, no 3.

56 J. Fox. 1996. "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico" in *World Development*, Vol. 24, no 6.

57 A. C. Hudock 1999. *NGOs and Civil Society. Democracy by Proxy?*. Cambridge, p. 16.

58 Anna Rozicka in I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze o idei Trzeciego sektora w Polsce*. Warszawa, p. 63.

59 I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 63.

Putnam, who understood it narrowly as "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement"[60]. To Putnam, trust was one of social capital's basic embodiments. Prior to Putnam, James Coleman incorporated vertical as well as horizontal associations in the concept of social capital[61]. Mancur Olson's view of social capital was the broadest, as it also took into account the more formalised institutional relationships and structures[62]. Later on Olson tuned down his theory and maintained that participation in philanthropic organisations relied on individual, non-collective satisfaction whereas participation in large groups was controlled by social rewards or sanctions[63]. Thus, social capital has been operationalised in terms of values and norms and/or in terms of institutional structures. However, social capital's most important contribution to the theories of development has been its imputed value to de-politicise development[64]. The case of post-communist transformation well illustrates this point.

The case of post-communist transformation

In the context of countries undergoing transformation in the 1990s, it was considered crucial to *externally* support existing social capital to enhance the development of indigenous civil societies. Indeed, the prevailing deterministic view, evident for example in Robert Putnam's writing, presupposes the historically conditioned development of social capital. By contrast, Jonathan Fox's research suggested that in spite of historical legacies' impacts on the social fabric, "those imprints are not necessarily fixed by history"[65]. Yet, according to this researcher, even the existence of strong local social capital should not necessar-

---

60 R. Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. New Jersey, p. 167.

61 J. Coleman. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology*, no 94.

62 Olson 1982 in C. Grootaert. 1998. "Social capital: the missing link?" p. 3.

63 M. Olson. 1995. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Groups and the Theory of Groups*. London, pp. 51–61.

64 J. Harriss. 2002. *Depoliticizing Development: the World Bank and social capital*. London.

65 J. Fox. 1996. "How Does Civil Society Thicken?", p. 1098.

ily lead to "spillover effects"[66]. These findings suggest that public and private institutions, both national and international, are capable of as well as required to promote social capital to achieve sustainable development. Indeed, research into the impact of external funding on enhancing social capital implies that it is not easily created, and the prospects for generating social capital through funding or policy may be limited[67]. Sidney Tarrow famously argued that policy makers who opt for coping with the lack of social capital by encouraging associations would actually be "attacking the symptoms and not the causes of the problem"[68]. Undoubtedly, although certain aspects of social capital do positively impact sustainable development and economic growth, research evidence suggests that "an inappropriate path of development can destroy social capital, setting off a vicious circle of social and economic decline"[69]. These findings do not question the relevance of social capital for development and democratisation, though. They indicate the interdependence between social capital and development. In fact, policy-makers interested in reducing poverty have been advised to consider promoting social capital, either directly or by creating an environment friendly to the emergence of local associations[70].

The potential of pro-developmental social capital and civil society to enhance democratisation notwithstanding, it should be remembered that the donors' focus on supporting those societal characteristics emerged primarily as a solution to the dissatisfaction with state-led development[71]. The proliferation of NGOs since the 1980s has justifiably been linked to the growing domination of worldwide neoliberal policies aimed *inter alia* at downsizing the state welfare programs. As argued above, the dispersal of power and its corollary, the disaggregation of authority, were further facilitated by the advent of glo-

66 Ibid., p. 1091.

67 M.K. Gugerty and M. Kremer. 2000. "Does development assistance help build social capital?", p. 17.

68 S. Tarrow. 1996. "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work" in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, no 2, p. 396.

69 C. Grootaert. 1998. "Social capital: the missing link?", p. 18.

70 T.A. Johannes, 2009, "Does Social Capital determine Poverty? Evidence from Cameroon Household Survey," pp. 20–21.

71 L. Suleiman. 2013. "The NGOs and the Grand Illusions," pp. 244–5.

balisation[72]. Yet, the disaggregation of authority resulted in empowering citizens. As researchers of internationally-oriented NGOs John Boli and George M. Thomas argued, world citizenship, as enacted by these NGOs, is the "institutional endowment of authority and agency of individuals. It infuses each individual with the authority to pursue particularistic interests, preferably in organizations, while also authorizing individuals to promote collective goods"[73]. Hence, whereas indeed "power remains a state prerogative, . . . the impact of the world-cultural authority of INGOs is substantial"[74].

Globalisation has justifiably been held responsible for increasing disaffection "by widening the gap between winners and losers"[75]. At the same time, globalisation had positive side-effects, too. Globalisation as a state of mind seems to have had a decisive influence on the growth of social and business entrepreneurship alike[76]. Globalisation's impact itself has been boosted by the triumph of neoliberalism. The omnipotence ascribed to neoliberalism can be found even in the literature on the entities supposed to be neoliberalism's most ardent critics. Ronnie Lipschutz, among others, argues that (global) civil society is actually a product of "globalist liberalism"[77]. Lipschutz highlights the fact that although the origins of liberalism as such can be traced back to Western political and economic thinking, liberalism has gained autonomy of its own. The privatising logic of neoliberalism is undoubtedly responsible for both the opportunities unprecedented freedom of expression offers and the limitations to impact policies caused by the dispersal of power.

---

72 J. N. Rosenau. 2002. "Governance in a New Global Order" in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.) *Governing globalisation. Power, authority and global governance*. USA, p. 71.

73 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organisation of World Culture" in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, p. 40.

74 Ibid., p. 48.

75 C.A. Kupchan, 2012. *No One's World…*, p. 152.

76 A. Iriye. 2002. *Global Community. The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p. 12.

77 R. D. Lipschutz, 2005. "Global Civil Society and Global Governmentality: or, the Search for Politics and the State amidst the Capillaries of Social Power," in: M. Marnett and R. Duvall (eds.) *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge, p. 229.

With the end of the Cold War, in the context of post-communist European countries, it was argued that the growth of the NGO sector had been additionally triggered by two more external factors. These are namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and the efforts of the West to secure its influence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)[78]. The motivation behind foreign support for the development of civil society notwithstanding, the seminal role societal self-organisation has played in both the overturning of the previous, communist regime *and* the post-1989 democratisation processes in Poland has been unanimously acknowledged by a plethora of researchers[79]. The national discourse of civil society followed suit. The concept of civil society has accordingly been revived to reflect on the developments taking place in East Central Europe. Interestingly, it was Western leftist intellectuals and academics who hailed the emergence of the mass movement and trade union *Solidarity* in Poland in the 1980s as the materialisation of *their* dream of civil society, i.e. one where the working class is the driving force of change[80]. As the civil society researchers Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind observed, the leftist intellectual Adam Michnik "resurrected the language of civil society" to express his opposition to the authoritarian rule and his vision of an alternative democratic society[81]. At the same time, the postulate that the development of civil society should be accompanied by the downsizing of the government in transition countries, derives from the conservative assumption that individuals and groups are better equipped to cope with social needs than state institutions[82].

---

78 G. Sussman. 2010. *Branding Democracy. U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe*. New York.

79 See for example: Zb. Pełczynski. 1988. "Solidarity and 'The Rebirth of Civil Society' in Poland, 1976–81" in J. Keane (ed.) *Civil Society and the State*. London; J. Szacki. 1997. "Wstęp. Powrót idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego" in J. Szacki (ed.) *Ani książę, ani kupiec: obywatel*. Kraków; M. Bernhard. 1996. "Civil Society after the First Transition" in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 29, no 3, pp. 309–330.

80 D. Ost. 1990. *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics. Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968*. Philadelphia.

81 J. Howell and J. Lind. 2009. *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society Before and After the War on Terror*. New York, pp. 31–32.

82 G. Sussman. 2010. *Branding Democracy*, p. 125.

It should not be surprising, though, that protagonists of rightist and leftist visions of social reality alike find evidence to support *their* interpretation of the development of civil society in Poland. After all, it was representatives of various social groups and adherents to sometimes conflicting values that should be credited for the birth of civil society under communist rule in Poland. Civil society in Poland in the early 1980s exhibited an untypical constellation of traits. It united workers and members of the intelligentsia, the Catholic Church and artists, to pursue one common goal. Their mission was to undermine the totalitarian system[83]. The fact that societal self-organisation in the country emerged and thrived independently from foreign support merits attention, too. In the 1980s US support for the events in Poland took the form of political and economic pressure, to be followed by economic incentives[84]. Foreign support to *Solidarity* of the 1980s and the underground movement after the delegalisation of the trade union was only secondary, i.e. auxiliary to the emergence of these initiatives.

Democracy assistance and its impact in Poland

The empirical evidence for the emergence of social activism in democratic and non-democratic states alone does not suffice to explain the long-term dominance of the belief that civil society is a panacea to a range of governance-related problems. In order to understand why international organisation, governments and private foundations started supporting the development of civil society sectors worldwide, it is necessary to shortly dwell in more detail on the concept of good governance. The term has become commonplace by now and has been implemented in developing and developed nations alike. The idea of good governance in the area of development cooperation was in tune with the tenets of the Washington consensus, which emerged at the end of the 1980s as a donor-originating, neoliberal paradigm which initiated a turn away from state-led policies and the substitution of these with market-led ones. In lieu of state-led development and as

[83] G. Chimiak. 2012. "Lengyel Álom a civil társadalomról" in *Civil Szemle*, no 1.

[84] G.F. Domber. 2008. "Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development: Poland 1980–1989." Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law Working Papers nr 88.

a remedy for perceived state fallacies like corruption, aid fungibility[85], accountability issues, cumbersome administration or ineffective use of resources, support for NGOs was introduced to bypass state institutions in countries receiving foreign assistance[86].

It is a seldom exposed fact that the concept of good governance has been initially developed with the problems of the then Third world countries in mind. Namely, the World Bank coined the term in 1989 to cope with "the crisis of governance" in Africa[87]. In 1989 Poland was a country facing transformation from command economy to market economy and from socialism to democracy. Like the other nations from Eastern Europe, Poland "inherited a fake modernity"[88]. Having in mind that back then Poland was *mis*developed, rather than underdeveloped, the implementation of the good governance principle can be interpreted as an example of reverse innovation[89]. In developing countries the support for good governance was meant to circumvent the governments of countries receiving aid, as their public officials were considered ineffective and/or corrupted. Therefore, to avoid working directly with governmental institutions, international donors turned to support the development of civil society sector in aid recipient countries instead[90].

Compared with other transition countries, in Poland international donors' support for civil society came later than the support for economic reforms. This neglect is so the more surprising having in mind that civil society in the region has been considered as one of

---

85 Aid fungibility is an unintended side-effect caused by some aid modalities, especially budget support. The concept of fungibility refers to the possibility that aid is used by the government of the partner country in ways not intended and not agreed with the donor country, for example by funding projects in a different sector. For instance, direct budget support for the health care system of the recipient country may end up in the increase of military spending.

86 G. Chimiak. 2014. "The Rise and Stall of Non-Governmental Organisations in Development", p. 31.

87 World Bank. 1992. *Governance and Development*. Washington, p. 2.

88 P. Sztompka. 1993. *The Sociology of Social Change*. UK, p. 138.

89 G. Chimiak. 2014. "Między Zachodem a Globalnego Południa: Innowacje Odwrotne w Polsce" in *Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja*, no 16.

90 A. Sen 2000 in A. Bankole. 2008. "Actions for Development: From Local to Global and Vice-Versa" in A. Bankole, E. Puchnarewicz (eds.) *NGOs, International Aid and Development in the South.* Warsaw, p. 19.

the primary factors that brought about the toppling of the previous regime[91]. In the beginning of the transition, the United States were the donor providing the most significant funds in terms of Official Development Assistance to civil society organisations in Poland. In between 1990 and 1997 it was funds earmarked for CEE that constituted almost 39% of NED funding[92]. NED's approach to supporting local civil society has been commended for providing direct grants to their local partners[93]. Undoubtedly, it was the political culture of the Cold War, rather than preoccupation with poverty reduction, that shaped the focus of United States' development cooperation priorities after the toppling of communism in CEE. Although the United States' support for civil society was most sizeable and therefore most influential, British, French, Swedish and German public funds were also supportive in the development of the non-governmental sector after 1989[94]. Indeed, as analysis of Western support for women NGOs in Poland and Hungary suggests, instead of trying to get a grip of the role of civic initiatives in post-communist countries, Western foundations invested in newly created organisations modelled on the West[95]. In addition to American foundations (the NED, the *Ford Foundation* and others), some German foundations (*Alexander Humboldt Stiftung*, *Bosch Stiftung*, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*) were among the foreign foundations most involved in supporting Polish NGOs from the very start of the transition[96]. Unlike US assistance, German aid has been praised for providing decentralized aid[97].

---

91 F. Miszlivetz and K. Ertsey. 1998. "Hungary: civil society in the post-socialist world" in A. Van Rooy (ed.) *Civil Society and the Aid Industry*. London, p. 81.

92 Scott and Steele (2005: 447) in G. Sussman. 2010. *Branding Democracy. U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe*. New York, p. 127.

93 P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*. Pittsburgh, p. xx.

94 I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 87.

95 P.C. McMahon. 2002. "International actors and women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary," in S.E. Mendelson and J.K. Glenn (eds.) *The Power and Limits of NGOs. A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. New York, p. 47.

96 J. Krzyszkowski. 2007. "Poland" in H. Anheier and S. Daly (eds.) *The Politics of Foundations: A Comparative Analysis*. USA, p. 267.

97 J.R. Wedel. 2001. *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*. New York, p. 102.

After the toppling of communism, *Soros Foundation* immediately started supporting civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe[98]. The European Commission, which was assigned the role of coordinator of bilateral and multilateral aid from G24 for Poland and Hungary, opened its own programme PHARE in 1989. PHARE focused on financing and providing technical assistance for the restructuring of the economy. Only three years later, i.e. in 1992 did the European Parliament decide to include a "democracy line" into its budget for 1992 support politics and civil society and so PHARE introduced a democratisation-dedicated programme[99]. It is important to note, however, that – especially in the first years of the transformation – national policy-makers likewise prioritised economic reforms over political issues. The reportedly belated foreign aid for civil society notwithstanding, it should be credited for its "hitherto unmet" scale of support[100]. The slogan raised by the father of the shock therapy in Poland Leszek Balcerowicz "first market, then democracy"[101] well illustrates the approach of both national decision-makers and foreign support providers.

Belated as it might have been, external support for civil society should be credited for its important contribution to the maturation and professionalisation of the Polish non-governmental sector. Given that political elites in the country had reportedly been "at the very least uninvolved"[102] in supporting civil society especially in the first decade of the transformation, foreign assistance appears to have been a catalyst in the development of the Polish Third sector. Early analysis of the effects of external aid indicated that although in the first decade of the transition the amount of foreign foundation assistance earmarked for higher education and economic reforms in Poland exceeded the support for civil society, Polish NGOs together with local govern-

98 F. Miszlivetz and K. Ertsey. 1998, p. 81.

99 U. Sedelmeier and H. Wallace. 1997. "Policies Towards Central and Eastern Europe" in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.) *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford, p. 361.

100 I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 85.

101 L. Balcerowicz 1992 in Z. Sadowski. 1993/2005. *Transformacja i rozwój. Wybór prac*. Warszawa, p. 145.

102 P. Gliński. 2006a. *Style działań organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce. Grupy interesu czy pożytku publicznego?* Warszawa, p. 32.

ments were most successful in putting foreign aid to good use[103]. Piotr Gliński likewise attributed the development of the NGO sector largely to the combined effect of the indigenous, grassroots initiatives and the support of foreign aid[104].

The quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the development of civil society after the toppling of communism and the external factors which influenced this process are discussed in greater detail later on. Here it suffices to underline that, especially after the overturning of the communist system, international cooperation in which Polish civil society took part in, was not limited to Polish NGOs benefitting from foreign assistance. Cooperation with representatives of civil societies from other former communist countries was another aspect of the internationalisation of Polish civil society. Upon joining the European Union, from being recipients of Official Aid, some Polish NGOs have evolved towards providing development assistance to other countries themselves. Yet other internationally-oriented citizens' organisations were established from scratch after Poland developed its own bilateral development cooperation program. Having gained freedom and increasing affluence, Polish society itself has been faced with the need to attend to previously unconsidered aspects of solidarity and human rights. Global solidarity and global education have emerged as the natural continuation and consequence of the evolution of Polish civil society itself.

Indeed, civil society and the non-governmental sector have significantly changed over the last decades. The international dimension of NGOs' activity is just one, and certainly not the most well-known field, where NGOs are striving to make a difference. Yet, as Filip Kaczmarek – who is one of the few Polish politicians actively interested in as well as well-versed in development cooperation – aptly observed, unlike all other spheres where the role of NGOs has been complementary to that of the state and the market, in the case of development cooperation, Polish NGDOs' role has been a key one[105]. This has been especially

[103] K. Quigley. 1997. *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe*. Washington, D.C.

[104] P. Gliński. 2006b. "The Self-Governing Republic in the Third Republic" in *Polish Sociological Review,* no 1, p. 71.

[105] F. Kaczmarek. 2014. Presentation during the workshop *Jaką rolę powinny pełnić organizacje pozarządowe zajmujące się współpracą rozwojową*

relevant in the case of democracy assistance funded by Polish aid and implemented by Polish NGDOs. As Paulina Pospieszna, who was the first to conduct analysis of democracy assistance provided by Polish NGOs to two Eastern Partnership[106] countries noted, democracy assistance implemented by Polish NGDOs has been justified for three reasons. Firstly, Polish civil society exemplified by the activity of the mass movement and trade union *Solidarity* in the 1980s, was instrumental in toppling communism. Secondly, Poland has been an example of successful democratisation. And thirdly, during the communist times and after the overturning of the previous system, Polish civil society has been the major recipient of Western assistance in the region[107]. In fact, foreign aid's impact on the development of the non-governmental sector had at least four dimensions. The financial one is the most obvious. The educational aspect of foreign aid can be discerned in the transfer of know-how. The cultural impact took place via the rebuilding of the ethos of social activism. The political aspect refers to the boomerang effect[108], which was referred to in the Introduction. As the following two chapters will illustrate, the impact of external support on institutionalized civic initiatives in Poland has been multi-dimensional and was not limited only to the first decade of the transition, when foreign funders were most engaged in assisting Polish civil society.

The above presented arguments for the engagement of the country in development cooperation highlight the comparative advantage[109] of

---

w kształtowaniu polskiej pomocy rozwojowej? (What should be NGDOs role in shaping Polish aid?) at the VII National Forum of Polish Non-Governmental Organisations, Warsaw, 15.09.2014.

[106] The Eastern Partnership is a joint initiative of the EU, its member states and six European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The declaration establishing the Eastern Partnership was signed in May 2009. The architects of this policy initiative were Carl Bildt of Sweden and Radosław Sikorski of Poland.

[107] P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave…*, pp. xxi–xxii.

[108] P. Gliński. 2006a. *Style działań organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce. Grupy interesu czy pożytku publicznego?* Warszawa, p. 32.

[109] The term "comparative advantage" was first used in 2006 in the European Consensus on Development. It says: "The EU will continue to prioritise support to the least developed and other low-income countries (LICs) to achieve more balanced global development, while recognising the value of concentrating the aid activities of each Member State in areas and regions

Poland in providing assistance abroad, the moral obligation to give back, and the seminal role currently played by NGOs in the field of development cooperation. In fact, not only Poland considered its experience in transition and democratisation as its comparative advantage. The strategy papers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia likewise referred to these countries' transformation and democratisation know-how as their comparative advantage in development cooperation[110]. These observations should be considered also from the point of view of the emergence of an internationally-oriented branch of civil society. Three major developments justify the need to conduct research on the Polish NGDO sector and the vision of development it advocates. Namely, the successful transformation Poland underwent from an authoritarian rule to liberal democracy, the change from aid recipient to full-fledged OECD DAC donor and the evolution of Polish civil society itself are all indicative of the need to probe into the factors that determined the growth of the NGDO sector and establish the role NGDOs played in the appropriation of development norms and practices by Polish aid.

Theories accounting for the ascendance of non-state actors in international affairs

The growth of the internationally-oriented NGO sector in Poland should also be attributed to a number of additional factors. The development of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) along with the subsequent eruption of new social movements worldwide has been hailed as a "globalisation from below"[111]. The rise of these non-state actors has been reflected in theoretical thinking, too. Indeed, researchers on transnational advocacy networks in international politics openly admit that in the contemporary global political

---

where they have comparative advantages and can add most value to the fight against poverty" (The European Commission 2006: 2).

[110] L. Krasteva. 2010. *The EU New Member States 2004, challenges and patterns in providing Official Development Assistance, policy implications for the EU New Member States 2007*. MA Professional Graduation Project – Research paper defended at Ohio University, p. 20.

[111] Ekins 1992 and Dirlik 1998 in S. Madon. 2000 "International NGOs: Networking, Information Flows and Learning," *Development Informatics Working Paper Series*, University of Manchester.

system "states remain the predominant actors"[112]. Some argue that the concern that the nation-state might be withering away mostly refers to the advanced industrial countries in the West[113]. In other parts of the world, the state's power has remained mostly unchallenged, or – in the case of failed states – inexistent. Yet, state power and its legitimacy have been questioned by recent developments. The evolution of theoretical thinking in international relations is indicative of the greater pluralism and complexity characterising world affairs nowadays. The predominant reaction in international relations theory to NGOs still seems to be a dismissive one[114]. Among Polish scholars, Witold Morawski expressed a similar view by arguing that "the role of civil society should be appreciated, though not overestimated"[115]. Still, the overview of international relations' theories reflects the changing power dynamics in world affairs.

Clive Archer's typology of four major schools of thinking in the literature on international organisations well illustrates this point. He distinguished between traditionalist, revisionist, structuralist, and globalist schools[116]. The realist and neo-realist perspectives, which belong to the "traditionalist" school, epitomise the pure state-centric model of international relations. Classic realists tend to depict the world as anarchic. Only states and economic organisations are argued to matter internationally[117]. Neo-realists furthermore do not recognise norms (such as human rights) or NGOs as significant and independent players in world affairs[118]. Contemporary versions of realism however

---

112 M.E. Keck and K. Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca and London, p. 212.

113 C.A. Kupchan. 2012. *No One's World…*, pp. 194–5.

114 B. Reinalda. 2001. "Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory" in B. Arts et al. (eds.) *Non-State Actors in International Relations*. Aldershot, p. 15.

115 W. Morawski. 2012. Discussion during the promotion of the book *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski* (G. Chimiak and M. Fronia). Warsaw, 30.05.2012.

116 C. Archer. 1992. *International Organisations* (2nd ed.). London and New York.

117 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture", p. 15.

118 H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London, p. 521.

do take into account the role of non-state actors. For example, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck's "cosmopolitan realism" acknowledges that co-operation and conflict among states is influenced by non-state superpowers and actors, too[119]. Beck's "cosmopolitan realism" should be credited for registering not only the impact of civic, law-abiding non-state actors, but also the increasing role played by terrorist networks. Neo-realists likewise seem to make a step forward by acknowledging that actions happen within a web of transnational institutions. Yet, neo-realists reductively conceptualise these structures merely as "networks of interdependence"[120] controlled by interest-motivated actors which created them. The emergence of updated versions of realism notwithstanding, classical realists' mode of thinking is intrinsically reticent to account for the role non-state actors play in international affairs.

The "revisionist" school of thought is more progressive in this respect. This school seems to be best known by its so-called functionalist and interdependence branches. According to interdependence theory, the potential effectiveness of both intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations is understood as a corollary of these entities' ability to acquire resources indispensable for their existence[121]. In spite of their contribution to organisational analysis literature, however, the authors adopting interdependence perspective fail to notice the *autonomous* role international organisations can play in international relations and national politics alike. John Boli and George Thomas, who studied international NGOs, are justified to argue that according to the interdependence and functionalist theorists, international institutions are simply viewed as "reducible to state interests"[122].

Unlike the mostly neglectful attitude towards NGOs assumed by the theoretical perspectives discussed above, representatives of the third, "structuralist" school tend to ascribe significant power to both intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations' ability to effect a change on global and domestic politics alike. The various Marxist-

---

119 U. Beck. 2005. *Władza i przeciwwładza w epoce globalnej. Nowa ekonomia polityki światowej*. Warsaw, p. 12.

120 H. Jacobson 1979 in Ibid.

121 A.C. Hudock. 1999. *NGOs and Civil Society.*

122 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture", p. 16.

derived views place emphasis on the structures of world politics being formulated by economic factors[123]. Thus, unlike "traditionalists" who focus on interstate relations and "revisionists" who tend to deal with interest groups, the "structuralists" have adopted a social class-oriented level of analysis. This is not to say that "structuralists" view INGOs as a positive force. For example, Third World theorists, who have also assumed a "structuralist" perspective, exhibit ambiguous attitude towards INGOs, which they view as either tools of salvation or instruments of exploitation[124].

The dependency perspective, which focuses on the legacy of colonialism practices, is yet another branch of the "structuralist" school. As an author from the Global South put it, "voluntary agencies . . . were born and nurtured as part of the colonisation process . . . and not as the product of the altruistic desires of some individuals"[125]. World-system theories similarly regard the spread of human rights' discourse as an expression of cultural imperialism or "capitalist domination"[126]. Although comparable examples of determinist thinking should be credited for challenging modern Western views and highlighting important arguments regarding this unforeseen interpretation of NGOs' activity in the Global South, such mode of thinking seems to lead to a blind track. The problem is not only that critical thought has been centred exclusively on Western Europe and the United States[127], but that its point of reference has been the Western world.

Unlike the representatives of the three major schools of thought discussed so far, the so-called "globalists" place greatest hope in international organisations and especially in internationally-oriented NGOs. Arguing that global problems need global solutions, representatives of the "globalist" school call for greater grassroots activism, which should make up for governments' reported lack of commitment or inability to solve the problems of the Planet Earth. Instead of speaking about abstract and impersonal international relations, "the 'globalists'

123 C. Archer. 1992. *International Organisations*. London and New York.

124 Ibid.

125 P.J. James. 1995. *Non-governmental voluntary organisations. The true mission*. Kottayam, p. 4.

126 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture," p. 15.

127 J.M. Domingues. 2011. *Global Modernity, Development, and Contemporary Civilisation*. New York and London, p. 14.

opt for regarding this realm of interactions between national governments and trans-national entities as 'world society'"[128]. By doing so, they lay emphasis on co-operation rather than confrontation as the guiding principle of the "world society". Hence, it can be said that the "globalists" set the trend of regarding NGOs and international grassroots activism as legitimate as well as significant actors in international affairs. As Ramesh Thakur puts it, "the world needs NGOs so that they can operate outside the framework of the states' system in order to put pressure on states on a variety of fronts"[129].

Another example of the "globalist" school is John Boli and George M. Thomas' world-polity institutionalist perspective on world culture and organisations[130]. One of the most important contributions of Boli and Thomas' world-polity theory is the identification of five global cultural principles, which constitute the world polity and are embodied by internationally-oriented NGOs. These "fundamental cultural themes" are namely called universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, the dialectics of rationalising progress, and world citizenship. Internationally-oriented NGOs are viewed by Boli and Thomas as impersonating and spreading universalism in two major respects. Firstly, these organisations' field of activities represents human needs and purposes that are common to all people. Secondly, any person on earth is free to join these organisations. And finally, everyone can become a beneficiary of their activities[131]. At the same time, it should be recognised that internationally-oriented NGOs emerge as the true embodiment of individualism.

Individualism can be discerned in these organisations' structure. Without the commitment of individuals, none of the universal aims espoused by these organisations can be put into practice. Directly following from this claim is the next cultural theme identified by Boli and Thomas, which they called "world citizenship". This principle puts emphasis on the in-born right and capacity of each person on earth to

---

128 C. Archer. 1992. *International Organisations*.

129 R. Thakur. 1999. "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations," in P. F. Diehl (ed.) *The Politics of Global Governance. International Organisations in an Independent World*. Boulder CO. and London, p. 265.

130 J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture."

131 Ibid., p. 35.

pursue his or her interests via participating in common activities like those implemented by international NGOs. INGOs likewise represent one of the most active forces involved in the advocacy as well as the implementation of the principle of rational and humanised progress. Akira Iriye contended that it was the emergence of "global consciousness" or "internationalism" that could explain the growth of INGOs[132]. The concept of "development", that has come to substitute the XIX century idea of progress, highlights the idea that economic growth has to go hand in hand with the improvement of the welfare of citizens[133]. As Chabbott demonstrates, international NGOs were at least partly responsible for promoting the emphasis on individual human rights and progress based on science in international development. NGOs' comparative advantage in delivering development services focus on these entities' abilities to reach the poor sections of the population, enable the beneficiaries' participation in development activities, respond to partners' needs in a flexible manner, work with and through local institutions, work cost-effectively, provide innovative and creative solutions, undertake people-centred research, practice learning-by-doing to develop solutions to problems, take into account the actual needs of the people they work with, rather than rely on outside analysis[134].

Development is certainly not the sole field of activity where NGOs have been the major forces shaping the discourse and the practice of the issue in question. In the field of environmental protection, internationally-oriented NGOs were the ones to pioneer a "world-level rationalized discourse around nature long before nation-states were interested, and they now play an active role in maintaining the international environmental sector"[135]. Also, the international women's movement has likewise played a leading role in spreading world-cultural ideas about women[136]. Women INGOs have successfully lobbied intergovern-

---

132 A. Iriye. 2002. *Global Community. The Role of International Organisations*, p. 12.

133 C. Chabbott. 1999. "Development INGOs."

134 Fowler 1988 in A.C. Hudock. 1999. *NGOs and Civil Society*, p. 8.

135 D.J. Frank et al. 1999. "The Rationalization and Organization of Nature in World Culture" in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875.* Stanford, p. 99.

136 N. Berkovitch. 1999. "The Emergence and Transformation of the International Women's Movement," in J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing*

mental organisations and national policy-makers thus bringing about the tremendous expansion of activities and ideas regarding women's issues on international and domestic level alike, including developing countries. The role women's NGOs have played in promoting women's rights' issues in Poland corroborates this contention.

Development, women, and environmental NGOs are just three instances of the impact of these non-state actors' activities worldwide. It should be recognized, however, that INGOs' growing role and importance should not be attributed to the dispersal of state power only. According to a hypothesis informed by the demographic-structural theory, the acceleration in INGO numbers during the last half-century was caused by the post-war baby boom in the Western world and a crisis in the credential system[137]. Edward Turner tested the hypothesis according to which the proximate mechanism for the surge in INGOs was the growing supply of credentialed professionals, rather than the greater demand for their services. He concluded that the growth of INGOs was due to the "cyclical demographic-structural processes [which] have increased intraelite competition over the last half-century"[138]. This finding is clearly in line with supply-side theories.

Paola Grenier's work on the "people behind global civil society"[139] corroborates this finding. She found out that these "new pioneers" were often people educated, proficient in several languages, and from middle-class backgrounds[140]. Furthermore, they were oftentimes professionals who have previously had experience working for local or global institutions, which influence the daily lives of ordinary people worldwide. For example, the regional director of the World Bank for East Africa Peter Eigen unsuccessfully tried to tackle corruption via the institution he worked for. He retired early and together with supporters founded in 1992 *Transparency Interna-*

World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organisations since 1875. Stanford, pp. 100–126.

137 E.A. Turner. 2010. "Why Has the Number of International Non-Governmental Organisations Exploded since 1960?" in *Cliodynamics*, no 1(1), p. 81.

138 Ibid., pp. 83, 88.

139 P. Grenier. 2004. "The New Pioneers: The People Behind Global Civil Society" in H. Anheier et al. (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2004/5*, London.

140 Ibid., pp. 147–178.

tional, a board of directors and advisory council[141]. Nowadays there are even more examples of such "rooted cosmopolitans"[142]. In fact, citizens *are* the new development actors as there are more and more small-scale initiatives and projects set up by private persons in the Global North aimed at improving the living standards of people in the Global South[143]. Unlike the group studied by Paola Grenier, those new actors are not always professional from the start. Furthermore, individuals from the Global South are likewise getting engaged in philanthropic initiatives.

South-South cooperation has recently become a fact in development assistance. Current research even suggests that more than half of respondents from emerging economies saw themselves first and foremost as global citizens rather than national citizens. What is more, the trend in the industrialised countries appears to be the opposite, i.e. the concept of global citizenship seems to "have taken a serious hit after the financial crash in 2008"[144]. With the exception of Russia and Germany, which are special cases, none of the former communist countries was included in this poll, hence it is difficult to compare the way in which the residents of East-Central Europe approach global citizenship. It should be recognized, however, that the cited poll left it open to respondents to interpret the meaning of the concept. This is not surprising, given the vast literature on citizenship and the set of characteristics active citizenship implies.

In the context of this book, global citizenship is assumed to be about solidarity with other nations or commitment to tackle world problems like climate change. Following Oxley and Morris, there are two major types of global citizenship: cosmopolitan and advocacy. The former is linked to the idea of cosmopolitanism and view the global citizen as a citizen of the world. By contrast, advocacy types of global

---

141 F. Galtung. 2000. "A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The Experience of Transparency International" in A. Florini (ed.) The *Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society.* Tokyo and Washington.

142 S. Tarrow. 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge University Press, p. 7.

143 I. Pollet et al. 2014. *The Accidental Aid Worker: A Mapping of Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity in Europe*. Leuven and Nijmegen, pp. 7–8.

144 N. Grimley. 2016. "Identity 2016: 'Global citizenship' rising, poll suggests" in *BBC News*, 28.04.2016.

citizenship focus on interconnectedness and interdependencies[145]. It seems citizens of the Global South in the above-mentioned survey had in mind the cosmopolitan type of global citizenship, whereas reticence to global citizenship displayed by the citizens of the Global North is a result of the recent refugee crisis. What matters is that the Global South is becoming more and more open to the opportunities of global citizenship, whereas the traditional donors and industrialized countries are reconsidering the hitherto pros and cons of being a global citizen, a status they have enjoyed longer than other nations in the world. As far as Poland is concerned, its in-between status can be discerned in its reticence to refugees coupled with taking for granted the entitlement to travel and work the world without restrictions. Yet, to be an *active* global citizen, it takes a special type of motivation. The research presented in this book also tries to unravel the most typical motivational underpinnings of aid professionalism. As NGDO activists are over-represented in the cohort of aid professionals in Poland, it is justified to focus on the theories accounting for pro-social activism, rather than limiting the overview of relevant theories to the theories of paid workers and/or volunteers.

Theories explaining pro-social activism

Social psychologists and sociologists alike have contributed to the domain of motivation theory[146]. When studying human motivation, the former differentiate between "social motivation" (which lays emphasis on external and situational factors) and "learned motive states" (which refer to the internal, enduring characteristics of the individual)[147]. Sociologists do take inspiration from psychologists' research, yet they have tried to develop an understanding of the motivation process, which would incorporate the complex reality modern human beings live in. Charles Handy's overview of motivation theories seems to be the one most relevant to this book, because he focuses on the motiva-

[145] Oxley and Morris 2013 in M. Kuleta-Hulboj. 2016 "Global citizen as an agent of change. Ideals of global citizen in the narratives of Polish NGO employees", in *The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 223.

[146] G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists Make Solidarity Work.* Warszawa.

[147] C.N. Cofer and M.H. Appley. 1964. *Motivation: Theory and Research*. New York, p. 768.

tion to work. Handy classifies the early motivation theories as "satisfaction", "incentive", and "intrinsic" theories[148]. Satisfaction theories assume that a satisfied worker will be motivated to work harder. Incentive theories presume that the individual will work in order to receive a reward. Intrinsic theories are inspired by Abraham Maslow' concept of the hierarchy of human needs[149]. Maslow distinguished between basic and meta- needs. According to his theory, needs that have already been satisfied do not motivate the individual to pursue the fulfilling of the same category of needs. However, once basic needs have been met, one aspires to satisfy his/her meta-needs. Maslow's idea was that needs' satisfaction propels human behaviour in general.

Charles Handy proposed an alternative model of the motivation process. He maintained that each individual has a set of needs and of desired results, both of which are mediated by a "motivational calculus"[150]. This "internal decision process" operates "*within the litmus of a . . . psychological contract* that each individual has with each group that plays any part in his or her life"[151]. This contract, in turn, is usually a mixture of coercive, calculative, or co-operative types of relationship in the group(s)[152]. However, it transpires that the group itself can be a motivating factor. Being part of an NGDO can fulfil the function of a reference group for the individual engaged in development cooperation. The social psychologist Herbert Hyman coined and developed the concept of reference group in the early 1940s[153]. Later on this theory was elaborated upon by scholars from the functionalist's and symbolic interactionist's schools. Reference group theory is relevant to this study, because it aims at accounting for the relationship of the individual to his or her social environment. A reference group need not be a membership one. It is a group against which the person assesses his or her status or behaviour.

Following Harold Kelley, Turowski differentiates between "comparative" and "normative" reference groups. The former of these

148 C. Handy. 1999. "On the Motivation to Work" in *Understanding Organisations*. England, pp. 31–37.

149 A.H. Maslow. 1970. *Motivation and Personality*. New York.

150 C. Handy op. cit., p. 38.

151 Ibid., p. 45, italics in the original.

152 Ibid., p. 50.

153 See J. Turowski. 1993. *Socjologia. Małe struktury społeczne*. Lublin, p. 117.

refers to groups, values, or patterns of behaviour, to which the individual compares oneself. By comparison, normative reference group is a group the individual views as a *source* of values, norms, or patterns of behaviour. Participation in an NGDO can fulfil the function of either comparative or normative reference group for some aid professionals. Reference group theory can also help us understand why some people become volunteers abroad or join NGDOs. Perhaps it is normative reference groups that have higher explanatory potential as far as aid professionalism is concerned.

At this point it is necessary to introduce one more concept, which has relevance both to reference group theories in particular and to motivational theories in general. Whereas the concept of the reference group lays emphasis on the importance of the milieu for the choices the individual makes, self-concept focuses on the other side of the problem, i.e. on the individual's conception of what he or she could be. This "pull of the ego-ideal", i.e. the self-concept, is argued to be the basic motivating drive[154]. The self-concept corresponds to the "me". The social psychologist and behaviourist Herbert Mead[155] introduced this distinction between the "me" and the "I". According to Mead, "the 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. . . . [T]he 'me' . . . is the self [one] is aware of"[156]. Thus, whereas the "I" is subjective and spontaneous, the "me" is "essentially a member of a social group, and represents, therefore, the value of the group"[157].

This brief presentation of the differences between the "me" and the "I" was important in order to back the argument that I am studying the "me", i.e. the self-concept of aid professionals. The "me" is the self a person is aware of as well as the self a person would disclose to others, in order to comply with the expectations of what Mead called "the generalized other"[158]. Hence, in my research I tried to find out

---

154 Levinson quoted by C. Handy op. cit., p. 54.

155 H. Mead. 1972. (1934) *Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (ed. C.W.). Chicago and London.

156 Ibid., p. 175, emphasis mine.

157 Ibid., p. 214.

158 Ibid., p. 155; Mead provides the following definition, 'It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members' (1972: p. 155).

what is the self-concept (the "me") of aid professionals I interviewed *without* implying that what they have disclosed during the interviews was their "authentic selves". Research participants' self-concept will be analysed in Chapter Five. Here I would like to point out that the reference group can provide a model for the self-concept of the individual. However, it is the individual who is in the position to make choices that is of interest of this research.

Having briefly presented the theoretical underpinnings of the more general motivation theories, I will now discuss several pertinent theories and empirical studies involving their typologies of motivations. Remarkably, each theoretical standpoint or empirical study seems to be endorsing its own typology of motivation. The social psychologist Janusz Reykowski's conceptualisation is particularly relevant to this research. He differentiated between three types of "pro-social motivation": *axiological* (one expects to be awarded or to avoid punishment), *normocentric* (implies responsibility, honour, the wish to avoid stings of conscience), and *allocentric* (out of compassion or selfless love)[159]. Another taxonomy differentiates between "private good" and "common good" sub-types of motivation, which could account for pro-social behaviour[160].

Often typologies elaborated by psychologists are based on the above-mentioned Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, which concept forms the basis of his theory of self-actualisation. Craig Pinder[161] merged the theory of human needs with the motivation to volunteer and developed a typology of motivations. Different types of needs fall into three distinct types of motivation: extrinsic, intrinsic, and motivation based on the need for power. Pinder exemplified *extrinsic* motivation by existence and relatedness needs. The former of these stand for the pursuit of food, sleep, safety, whereas the latter are concerned with the social side of human behaviour, i.e. gregariousness and affiliation. By contrast, *intrinsic* motivation satisfies the needs for self-

[159] J. Reykowski. 1979. *Motywacja: postawy prospołeczne a osobowość*. Warszawa, pp. 39–44 and pp. 376–377.

[160] M. Załuska after J. Supińska 1991 in M. Załuska and J. Boczon (eds.) 1996 *Organizacje pozarządowe w społeczeństwie obywatelskim*. Warszawa, p. 76.

[161] C.C. Pinder. 1985. "Needs, Cognitive Factors, and the Motivation to Volunteer" in L.F. Moore (ed.) *Motivating Volunteers. How the Rewards of Unpaid Work Can Meet People's Needs?* Vancouver.

actualisation[162], self-esteem, competence and self-determination, and achievement. Unlike intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, the *need for power* is not socially desirable motivation and as such it might be under-reported. Pinder also argues that *frustration* can be responsible for much of the motivation of volunteers. As the analysis of the empirical research in the last chapter demonstrates, these sources of motivation (save for the satisfaction of existence needs) can at least partially explain participation in NGDOs. Nonetheless, aid professionals' scope of motivations is wider than that of volunteers.

There are several other propositions regarding the motivation to volunteer that merit attention. A group of American social psychologists developed a functional approach to volunteering, which has later on been tested in several empirical studies. According to Allen Omoto and Mark Snyder, the "central tenet of functionalist theorizing is that different people can and do engage in the same behaviours for different reasons, in pursuit of different ends, and to serve different psychological functions"[163]. The usefulness of these theories notwithstanding, psychological analyses of volunteering focus predominantly on *internal* factors. As such, they present a partial picture of the phenomenon. Sociological studies have identified more varied set of factors that are responsible for the individual's involvement in organisational volunteering. The main reasons to volunteer were given different labels in sociological studies, but in general referred to several major sets of motivations. Sheila Puffer and James Meindl's typology is a good example. They differentiated between normative, rational, affiliative, and status motives and incentives[164]. The *normative* one implies altruistic attitude towards the task or a group of people. The *rational* motive means that the actor is conscious of some benefit she or he might gain from participating, like career-advancement. *Affiliative* motives reflect the desire to spend time with people one likes or iden-

---

[162] Self-actualisation is the ultimate need one can aspire after (see A.H. Maslow op. cit.).

[163] A.M. Omoto and M. Snyder. 1995. "Sustained Helping without Obligation: Motivation, Longevity of Service, and Perceived Attitude Change Among AIDS Volunteers" in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 68, no 4, p. 673.

[164] S.M. Puffer and J.R. Meindl. 1992. "The congruence of motives and incentives in a voluntary organisation" in *Journal of Organisational Behavior*, Vol. 13, pp. 425–434.

tifies with. *Status* motive is naturally based on the wish to achieve as well as maintain (higher) status. This theoretical typology was backed up by the outcomes of empirical studies.

To sum up, studies of volunteering have identified several different sets of circumstances that explain how and why people become volunteers. These variables can be broadly defined as context, social background, situation, attitude, and personality[165]. Thus, it can be volunteers' social background as well as their psychological orientations and attitudes *or* some particular circumstances which exist independently of people's will or preferences that can account for their volunteering. The combination of different sources of motivation seems to comprise the strongest predictor for that person's engagement. Also, whereas most studies tend to regard organisational volunteers as individuals primarily impelled by personal reasons or influenced by some limited set of local circumstances, the comparative quantitative study analysed by Lester Salamon and Wojciech Sokołowski forwards a dissenting (in this respect) view. They strongly argue that volunteering is not just an individual choice or spontaneous outburst of altruism, but is affected by larger social and institutional forces. Countries with more developed Third sector organisational structures tend to have a higher volume of volunteer activity, because such structures are *instrumental* in recruiting and maintaining volunteer participation[166].

In other words, the importance of individual characteristics and circumstances notwithstanding, structural factors have as strong explanatory power as the person's decision to volunteer. The discussion about who volunteers and why has to be positioned in the broader context of sociological theorising. Namely, volunteering can be viewed as being the outcome of the agent's action and at the same time being a side-effect of structural circumstances. Kevin Bales merged the concepts of "volunteerism" and "activism" and argued that there is one, underlying "volunteerism-activism attitude"[167]. He found that a sense of effectiveness, sociability, idealism, and the "feel good" factor

[165] D.H. Smith (1994) in K. Bales. 1996. "Measuring the Propensity to Volunteer" in *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 30, no 3, pp. 210–211.

[166] L. Salamon and W. Sokołowski. 2001. "Volunteering in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence from 24 Countries" Working Papers of the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no 40. Italics mine.

[167] K. Bales op. cit., p. 214.

are all strong predictors of this attitude[168]. However, Jone Pearce, who compared paid and unpaid workers, persuasively argued that "volunteering appears to be a less behaviourally committing act than taking a paid job", despite the fact that empirical findings consistently point to the more positive workplace attitude volunteers have compared to employees[169]. When she compared the job attitude and motivation differences of paid and unpaid workers, she came to the conclusion that volunteers, doing the same work as employees, are more likely to report that they work for the rewards of social interaction and service to others, that their work is more praiseworthy, and that they are more satisfied and less likely to leave their organisation[170].

Even if we accept that volunteers are not exceptional when compared to employees, and that the latter can actually be more diligent workers than the former, unpaid work has undeniable advantages. However, the issue of professionalism may tip the scale in favour of paid workers, if we assume that professionals have invested more times and energy in acquiring their skills and therefore can expect respective remuneration. In Western countries volunteers are often regarded as amateurs and rarely take positions that are related to the running of the organisation. Although historically the terms volunteer and professional appear to have been linked[171], in modern societies professionals are regarded as paid members of a specific expert work community, who are broadly competent and business-like[172].

Richard Goodall analysed the relationship between professionalism and voluntarism. He argued that the former is regarded to have corrupted the latter. He found out that not only the word "professional" is interpreted differently by separate actors in voluntary organisations, but the consequences of professionalisation can be ambiguous.

---

168 Ibid., p. 215.

169 J.L. Pearce. 1993. *Volunteers. The Organisational Behavior of Unpaid Workers.* London.

170 J.L. Pearce. 1983. "Job Attitude and Motivation Differences Between Volunteers and Employees From Comparable Organisations" in *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 68, no 4, p. 650.

171 B.D. Karli. 1998. "Volunteers and Professionals: Many Histories, Many Meanings" in W.W. Powell and E.S. Clemens (eds.) *Private Action and the Public Good*. New Haven and London, pp. 245–257.

172 R. Goodall. 2000. "Organising cultures: voluntarism and professionalism in UK charity shops" in *Voluntary Action*, Vol. 3, no 1, p. 47.

Thus, for example, Goodall discovered that the alleged amateurism of volunteers is not that self-evident. Furthermore, voluntarism cannot be juxtaposed to professionalism, thus implying that volunteers are not capable of undertaking strategic positions in the NGOs. What more, as Barry Karli convincingly claimed, "there is now a genuinely modern form of relation between amateurs and professionals . . . as professionals in one area are called upon to be volunteers in another"[173]. It seems there is significant empirical evidence for arguing that the boundaries between paid and unpaid workers as well as between amateurs and professionals have blurred. As the research evidence presented in the last chapter of this book will illustrate, Polish aid professionals do espouse features considered characteristic for volunteerism.

As mentioned previously, voluntary work has often been defined as planned helping, which implies dedicating one's time and efforts to an organisation. By contrast, those who give money instead of their time have been dubbed philanthropists. In both cases, though, the rationale behind giving and volunteering is traditionally assumed to be altruism. Paul Schervish and John Havens made a critical overview of the theories of altruism which "emphasise either or both the intentional *motivation* to assist others and the relative *cost* to the actor"[174]. Altruism theories assume that pro-social behaviour is due to the individual's commitment to serve other people's interests, which attitude necessitates certain disregard for one's own interests. By contrast, the competing rational-choice theories highlight the advantages people gain through participation. Clearly, in the case of philanthropic giving and voluntary service, it is more difficult to recognise the actors' purely utilitarian motives. Hence, Schervish and Havens argue that neither altruism nor rational-choice theories can explain volunteering and giving.

To amend the weaknesses of the altruism and rational choice theories, Schervish and Havens developed what they called an "identification theory". According to them, "the level of measured charitable giving, and perhaps of volunteering, depends . . . on the density and mix of opportunities and obligations to voluntary associations"[175].

---

[173] B.D. Karli op. cit., p. 256.

[174] P.G. Schervish and J.J. Havens. 1997. "Social participation and charitable giving: a multivariate analysis" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 8, no 3, p. 237, italics in the original.

[175] Ibid., p. 256.

Otherwise put, active involvement and participation either impel identification with the organisation *or* are part of it. The more one identifies with the cause, the more he or she is likely to contribute to it. Schervish and Havens concluded that it is "*associational capital* in the form of social networks of invitation and obligation"[176] that can account for giving and volunteering.

Similar to Schervish and Havens' identification theory is the "microstructural theory of volunteering and giving" developed by Wojciech Sokołowski. To him, philanthropic behaviour consists of two components: volunteering and charitable giving, the former of which implies a more sustained engagement. Sokołowski argued that volunteering "requires a more diversified array of inducements that includes not only social ties to voluntary organisations, but also altruistic orientation and the promise of self-fulfilment"[177]. Charitable giving, unlike volunteering, appears to be contingent upon the availability of pecuniary resources rather than on the donor's "value system". Sokołowski furthermore contended that social ties lead to participation in philanthropic activities, involvement in which triggers change in the participant's attitudes, thus motivating him or her for further giving. In other words, both Schervish and Havens' identification theory and Sokołowski's microstructural theory of volunteering and giving throw light on the external factors that influence philanthropic giving and voluntary service.

However, both the identification theory and the microstructural theory of volunteering and giving fail to reckon with the internal factors, which motivate people to contribute to the well-being of others, especially if these other people are strangers in faraway countries. As the research analysed in the last chapter demonstrates, the circumstances and motives involved in the process of becoming an NGDO activist involve a much wider scope of factors that lead to prosocial commitment.

As the overview of theories and studies on the motivations of different actors in NGOs illustrated, the myth of the altruists peopling voluntary organisations has long been refuted. However, these studies

---

176 Ibid., p. 257, italics in the original.

177 S.W. Sokołowski. 1996. "Show me the way to the next worthy deed: towards a microstructural theory of volunteering and giving" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 7, no 3, p. 274.

have also highlighted the effect of NGOs on people already engaged, even if initially they were not "untypical" compared to others. The practical problem in distinguishing between initial motives and effects of engagement lays in the uncovering of what came first. Usually it is assumed that personality characteristics, which are believed to be stable over time, can explain why people found or join NGOs. Still other factors intervene to account for NGO activists' self-perception and behaviour. A research revealed that the dramatic rise in applications from professional adults in the UK wishing to volunteer overseas was triggered by "post-consumer blues"[178]. This study also disclosed that while intending volunteers exhibited primarily focus on self, the experience brought about a change: returned volunteers focused on others *and* self[179]. Thus, there seems to be empirical confirmation of the hypothesis that involvement in internationally-oriented volunteering experience makes the difference for the participants themselves. Whether and to what extent these people have brought about change in the lives of the beneficiaries of the services they provided is a problem that requires a separate discussion.

Conclusion

To recapitulate on the evidence presented so far in this chapter, it is suggested to focus on the following. An array of developments, that were unforeseeable when the third wave of democracy hit the world, challenged two concepts that gained prominence twenty-five years ago. On the one hand, the end of history understood as the unencumbered further spread of liberal democracy, soon turned out to be a wishful thinking. On the other hand, power as we used to know it, has become increasingly dispersed. Both these developments have been associated with the onset of neoliberalism and its corollary, the Washington consensus. The tenets of the latter were likewise implemented in Poland in the beginning of the transformation. The dominances of neoliberal thinking configured not only the roles of the state and the market, but also impacted on the function ascribed to civil society. The withdrawal of the state coupled with the domination of thinking in free

[178] *Material World: a research report on our have-it-all culture*. 2000. London, p. 4.

[179] Ibid., p. 25.

market terms created demand for a growing role of non-state actors. Accordingly, states and development agencies alike took on to support civil society organisations as these started to be viewed as critical to democratisation, good governance and development.

The purposefulness of this policy was further corroborated by the emergence of grassroots activism in some then communist countries and most notably the *Solidarity* movement in Poland in the 1980s. What is more, *Solidarity* itself was oriented internationally, which would be discussed in more details later on in the book. The eruption of grassroots activism was welcomed as a sure sign of the birth of civil society in the region. In the early 1990s, when the role ascribed to national and international NGOs in development grew to major, the avalanche-like growth of newly established NGOs in Poland was met with a supply of funding. Polish NGOs started to receive support also from foreign public and private donors. The golden era of NGOs in international development lasted until 2001. The development-security nexus, which emerged after the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001 contributed to the spread of "disciplined networking"[180] of donors and NGOs and to NGOs' auto-censorship in some countries.

As far as the support for civil society in Poland and other former communist countries undergoing transformation was concerned, in the early 1990s donors considered it essential to assist the existing social capital to facilitate the development of civil society. Civil society was viewed as crucial to democratisation processes, especially that the then dominant policy thinking emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with state-led development. Although external aid initially focused on the transformation of the economy, in the early 1990s Polish civil society also started to receive significant financial and know-how support from abroad. This assistance contributed to the maturation and professionalisation of the Polish NGO sector. Along with benefiting from foreign aid, Polish NGO started exchanging experiences with NGOs from other countries from the former Soviet bloc. The early 1990s also witnessed the founding of the most well-known secular humanitarian organisation, the *Polish Humanitarian Action*. Upon joining the European Union in 2004, more and more NGOs got engaged in

[180] United Nations. 2004. *We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance. Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations– Civil Society Relations*.

providing development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and/or global education. The governmental Polish aid system was likewise established when the country became a EU member. Given Poland's overall positive experience with the transformation and democratisation processes, it was argued that its comparative advantage in development cooperation is to transfer this experience to other countries facing similar challenges.

The growth of internationally-oriented NGO sector in Poland can and should be explained by other developments, too. These developments are reflected in theoretical thinking discussed in this chapter. The overview of the major schools of thinking in the literature on international organisations provided clues as to the evolution of the role ascribed to those societal actors. The importance of individuals engaged in NGOs was likewise recognized and studied by some researchers. However, there is a gap in the literature on civil society and development cooperation. The overview of existing studies provided in the Introduction suggests that to understand the evolution of this part of the civil society in Poland that started providing development and democracy assistance abroad, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the circumstances determining this evolution and the role NGOs have played in their cooperation with the respective state institutions.

The focus on NGDOs' impact on global governance and national policy-making as well as on the role individuals play in development cooperation is furthermore justified for the following reasons. In the literature, five types of civil society's impact on global governance have been identified: on the institutional evolution of global regulation, on agenda formation, on policy decisions taken in global governance, on discourse construction and on deeper social structure (polycentrism of governance)[181]. As the empirical research presented in this book demonstrates, Polish NGDOs' impact on policy processes can be discerned, albeit to a differing extent, in all of the five areas enumerated above. The importance of individuals propelling the development of civil societies worldwide was recognised when assessing the impact of those entities on national and international affairs. In order to study

[181] J.A. Scholte. 2014. "Civil Society and NGOs" in T.G. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (eds.) *International Organisation and Global Governance*. London and New York, pp. 329–330.

the evolution of self-organisation in the 1980s, understood as solidarity among workers and between nations, through the development of freely associating civil society organisations benefiting from foreign support to the emergence of internationally-oriented NGOs participating in development cooperation, it is necessary to first review the roots of the internationalisation of civil society initiatives in Poland.

2 Self-organisation in Poland and the role of foreign assistance

We return to solidarity like wanderers
who are coming home from a long journey on the road to freedom[1]

As suggested in the Introduction, any attempt to analyse separately the history of international engagement of the Polish NGO sector and that of the development cooperation provided by the Polish state would be incomplete and misleading, particularly given that both the Polish NGDO sector's and Polish aid's capacities were supported by foreign aid. This chapter addresses the following research questions: What factors have been at the roots of the transnational activity of Polish civil society actors? What has been the impact of foreign aid on the development of civil society in Poland, especially during the first decade of the transition? How has the NGO sector developed after the toppling of communism?

Historical determinants of contemporary self-organisation in the country

If we are to trace the history of solidarity, how far back in time should we look for? Clearly, organised solidarity is a XX century phenomenon, and so are the institutions of civil society. The origins of modern civil

[1] Krzysztof Czyżewski. 2014. "Culture and solidarity" in *New Eastern Europe*, no 3.

society organisations might be said to have their predecessors in voluntary associations in XIX century America[2]. Contemporary NGOs furthermore share some common characteristics with charities functioning since medieval times in Europe. Some scholars have argued that the history of NGOs in Poland dates back to the XIV century[3]. Yet, it is an instance of presentism to regard a phenomenon of the Middle Ages as corresponding to modern forms of civic activity. In the Middle Ages foundations were run by churches. As Elżbieta Mazur observed, charity has its origins in Christian, Judaic and Islamic religions, and its essence was giving as an obligation to God. By contrast, the modern term philanthropy is secular in nature and places emphasis on the recipient, i.e. on the human being[4]. Hence, both the legal form and the philosophy behind the functioning of foundations in the Middle Ages and modern times differ significantly. Unlike the more egalitarian social basis of organised solidarity, in advanced industrial countries individual philanthropists have usually come from well-off families. In this respect, Polish philanthropy stands out as a distinctive one. Namely, in Poland philanthropy benefactors did not represent the moneyed strata of the society. In the past it was the Polish *intelligentsia*[5] that was most engaged in helping the poor. In her excellent account of charity giving during the XIX century Warsaw, Elżbieta Mazur admitted that at that time charity activity derived from the needs of the heart as much as from the desire to comply with the then contemporary fashion and customs[6].

---

[2] A. de Tocqueville. 1850/1969. *Democracy in America* ed. by J.P. Mayer, M. Lerner, New York.

[3] For example, M. Guć. 1996. *Razem. O współpracy samorządu terytorialnego z organizacjami pozarządowymi*. Gdynia; E. Leś. 2001. *Zarys historii dobroczynności i filantropii w Polsce*. Warszawa.

[4] E. Mazur. 1999. *Dobroczynność w Warszawie w XIX wieku*. Warszawa, pp. 7–8 and pp. 157–158.

[5] There are a number of informative works on the characteristics of this specific to Poland and Russia social strata. For example, J. Chałasiński. 1946. *Społeczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej*. Warszawa: Czytelnik; M. Kennedy. 1992. "The intelligentsia in the constitution of civil societies and post-communist regimes in Hungary and Poland" in *Theory and Society* 21: pp. 29–76; T. Zarycki. 2008. *Kapitał kulturowy. Inteligencja w Polsce i w Rosji*. Warszawa; T. Zarycki and T. Warczok. 2014. "Hegemonia inteligencka: kapitał kulturowy we współczesnym polskim polu władzy – perspektywa długiego trwania" in *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* no 4, pp. 27–49.

[6] E. Mazur. 1999. *Dobroczynność*, p. 137.

Generally speaking, the tradition of self-organisation in Poland has been shaped by the partition of the country in the XIX century, the two World Wars, and the communist regime in the XX century. Indeed, as early as the XIX century, there were Polish foundations, activity of which was connected with the Catholic Church[7]. However, the communist regime delegalised the functioning foundations, nationalised their assets in 1952, and banned the establishment of new ones. Only some quasi-civic associations were allowed to exist during communist times. Yet, in communist Poland indigenous civic and political grassroots activism manifested itself virtually during the whole lifetime of the oppressive system. Undoubtedly, self-organisation in Poland as we know it today should be traced directly to the resistance against communism[8]. One could single out several group actors raising demand to reform the communist system, albeit utilising peaceful means. Workers, leftist intellectuals, artists and the Catholic Church should be credited for harbouring the civic spirit in communist Poland[9], as well as the independent scouts' movement[10] and the informal activity of veterans of the Home Army[11].

There is an ever growing body of literature on the role those societal actors played in the process[12]. However, there is no doubt the culmination of protest was the emergence of the unprecedented in its scope and unparalleled elsewhere in Europe social movement

---

7 J. Krzyszkowski. 2007. "Poland" in H. Anheier, S. Daly (eds.) *The Politics of Foundations: A Comparative Analysis.* USA, p. 266.

8 D. Gawin. 2015. "Solidarność i kryzys. Społeczeństwo obywatelskie lat 70. i 80." in W. Misztal et al. (eds.) *Obywatele wobec kryzysu: uśpieni czy innowatorzy?* Warszawa.

9 G. Chimiak. 2012. "Lengyel Álom a civil társadalomról" in *Civil Szemle*, no 1, pp. 91–102.

10 D. Gawin. 2015. "Solidarność i kryzys"in W. Misztal, A. Kościański and G. Chimiak (eds.) *Obywatele wobec kryzysu: uśpieni czy innowatorzy?* Warszawa.

11 M. Jedynak. 2014. *Niezależni kombatanci w PRL. Środowisko Świętokrzyskich Zgrupowań Partyzanckich Armii Krajowej "Ponury"–"Nurt" (1957–1989)*. Kielce–Kraków.

12 See for example: D. Gawin. 2013. *Wielki zwrot. Ewolucja lewicy i odrodzenie idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego 1956–1976*. Kraków; Z.A. Pełczynski. 1988. "Solidarity and 'The Rebirth of Civil Society' in Poland, 1976–81" in J. Keane (ed.) *Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives.* London.

and trade union *Solidarity* in the early 1980s[13]. Workers were supported by the Polish opposition leaders. The latter developed indigenous to Poland, yet influential abroad, civil society discourse. In fact, it has been argued that the framing strategy of "civil society" should be credited for bringing together those diverse groups and as such was instrumental in triggering the successful democratic transitions in Poland as well as in Czechoslovakia[14]. The universality of the postulates brought up by *Solidarity* can also be discerned in the intentional inclusion of an international aspect to their demands.

During the first Congress of *Solidarity*, which took place in September 1981, one of the most important and momentous documents adopted by the Congress was the *Message of the First Congress of NSZZ "Solidarity" Delegates to the Working People in Eastern Europe*[15]. Here is a quotation from this *Message*:

> *Delegates gathered in Gdańsk at the 1st Congress of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" extend greetings and words of support to workers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Hungary, and all the nations of the Soviet Union.*
>
> *As the first independent trade union in our post-war history we are deeply aware of our interlocking fates. We assure that, contrary to lies spreading in your countries, we are a genuine, 10-million-strong employee organisation set up as a result of worker strikers. We aim*

---

[13] *Solidarity* keeps being an attractive topic for scholars of self-organisation. Some of the studies that should be mentioned are: M. Łopiński et al. 1984 *Konspira*. *Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarności*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Przedświt; J. Holzer. 1984. *"Solidarność" 1980–1981. Geneza i historia.* Paris. J. Kurczewski, J. Kurczewska. 2010. *Konflikt i "Solidarność" 1980/1981*. Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Lecha Wałęsy. The research network "Solidarność. Nowe podejścia do analizy ruchu społecznego" (*Solidarity. New approaches to studying social movement*) at Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and their Working Papers on the Solidarity Movement also merits attention in this respect (http://solidarnosc.collegium.edu.pl/?page_id=5).

[14] John Glenn 2001 in F. Polletta and M. Kai Ho. 2006. "Frames And Their Consequences" in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford University Press.

[15] G. Majchrzak. 2011. *Niebezpieczny dokument. Posłanie do ludzi pracy Europy wschodniej* in *Wolność i Solidarność. Studia z dziejów opozycji wobec komunizmu i dyktatury*, no 2.

to fight for improved living standards of all working people. We support those of you who decided to embark on the difficult road of struggle for a free trade union movement. We believe that your and our representatives will soon be able to meet with a view to exchange union experiences[16].

The *Message* is succinct, yet implicit in its aim to highlight the community of experiences of the working people in the then communist countries. Members of *Solidarity* found it imperative to initiate a dialogue with their colleagues from these nations. The *Message* indicates the then trade union's members' conviction that what *Solidarity* has achieved up to that moment is worth sharing and transferable to other countries. Indeed, in addition to representing 10 million employees, back then *Solidarity* could also boast having organized the first democratic election of delegates.

With the advantage of hindsight, some historians express the opinion that the publicising of the *Message of the First Congress of NSZZ "Solidarity" Delegates to the Working People in Eastern Europe* was an "unwise stepping on the tiger's tail"[17]. The document indeed inadvertently contributed to the demand for the introduction of martial law in Poland by the Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev. Most importantly, however, this document exemplified the transnational aspirations of solidarity promoted by the trade union *Solidarity* in the 1980s. Moreover, the delegates of the first congress of *Solidarity* in 1981 could not foresee the long-term impact of this instinctive reaching out to fellow workers abroad. This long-term impact is evident in the present-day involvement of Polish civil society organisations in international cooperation and development assistance. As one of my respondents admitted, the "*ideational roots*" of the contemporary international engagement of Polish civil society derive from the *Message of the First Congress of NSZZ "Solidarity" Delegates to the Working People in Eastern Europe* (r25_18). This research participant was convinced that the "*obviousness*" of Polish civil society's effort to share the "*democratic know-how*" abroad has been a result of the "*messianic conviction that the skills we acquired should be further trans-*

[16] http://solidarnosc.gov.pl/index.php?document=89.

[17] A. Wiełowieyski. 2015. "Gra o 'Solidarność'" in *Ale Historia, Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16.02.2015, p. 13.

ferred. This is the mission of Polish civil society, which goes back to the Solidarity ethos" (r25_18). Another respondent, who was a member of *Solidarity* in the 1980s, said that the international aspect of the work of the Helsinki Committee in Poland has been at the heart of the work of this organisation. Back in the 1970s and in 1983, the Helsinki Committee in Poland functioned as an underground organisation and prepared its shadow reports exposing the violation of human rights in communist Poland. This research participants admitted that "*we used extensively international support… hence, if asked when thinking internationally [at my organisation] goes back to, I should say it has been [there] from the very start*" (r19_34). Clearly, Polish civil society in the 1980s consciously resorted to employing the boomerang effect referred to in the Introduction.

The transnational dimension of solidarity is neither self-serving nor self-evident. In fact, as author Jose Maurico Domingues points out, in modernity solidarity is intuitively understood as related to and limited to the nation state[18]. In fact, the trade union *Solidarity* did not have any pragmatic or political aims or gains in addressing "the working people of Eastern Europe". The *Message* was a symbolic opening to those nations. It unequivocally signalled *Solidarity*'s will to share its road to self-determination. History has shown that the very framing of solidarity can be instrumental in social mobilisation. As Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho have argued, "powerful frames may be able to substitute for indigenous networks in spurring protest"[19]. As we know now, this first attempt at sharing experiences with the working people of other nations of the Soviet sphere of influence was killed in the bud. Nonetheless, this *Message* can and should be credited for symbolizing the willingness to find common ground for cooperation and the possibility to share experiences with other countries.

With the overcoming of the oppressive system in 1989, Polish civil society itself underwent transformation and is still in the process of adapting to changing circumstances and learning to cope with new issues. The need for civil society organisations advocating for solidarity and promoting human rights has not subsided with the democrati-

[18] J.M. Domingues. 2011. *Global Modernity, Development, and Contemporary Civilisation.* New York and London, p. 98.

[19] F. Polletta and M. Kai Ho. 2006. "Frames And Their Consequences," p. 199.

sation of the public sphere. Solidarity and advocacy for human rights have acquired global dimensions. The dissidents' noble aspiration to "unremitting participation" in public life has evolved from undermining the then oppressive system and acquired more pragmatic, constructive characteristics as well as emphatic attitude and the responsibility to give back to eastern neighbours and countries from the Global South[20]. The democratic opposition has fulfilled its historical function, thus paving the way for the next generation of Polish social activists to freely reinterpret and implement solidarity. The continuity between *Solidarity* of the 1980s and the contemporary embodiment of global solidarity, exemplified by civil society organisations active abroad or involved in global education at home, represents an understudied, important aspect of the history of the country. In order to understand how the evolution of Poland towards full-fledged OECD DAC membership took place and the impact of the transformation in Poland on the development of its civil society, one should first review the international factors that shaped development cooperation and civil society's role in it.

The external support to self-organisation

In the 1980s the social movement *Solidarity* not only extended a helping hand towards other nations from the then communist bloc, but the movement itself benefited from the support offered by international, mostly American, foundations. During the 1980s there was much less European support for the dissident movements in Eastern Europe than in the years superseding the toppling of the communist system. By contrast, Poland started to receive significant US assistance as early as the 1980s, as "the Polish corridor was the West's entry point to the region"[21]. American unions likewise supported underground *Solidarity* in the 1980s. It was the US government (mainly through the government-funded, yet independently managed, *National Endowment for Democracy* – NED) and private donors (among which George Soros' *Open Society Institute*) that provided support to the dissident

[20] G. Chimiak. 2012. "Lengyel Álom a civil társadalomról" in *Civil Szemle*, no 1.

[21] G. Sussman. 2010. *Branding Democracy. U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe*. New York, p. 127.

movements in Poland and the then Czechoslovakia[22]. Specifically established in 1983 with the aim to support political dissidents abroad, NED provided grants to underground civil society in the 1980s and continued assisting Polish NGOs after the toppling of communism[23]. Foreign foundations were also instrumental in establishing some Polish NGOs. For example, the president of the American Federation of Teachers Albert Shanker, whose parents were Polish immigrants, founded the *Foundation for Education for Democracy* in 1989[24].

The importance of individuals of Polish origin for the support of civil society in the 1980s and in the 1990s merits a special attention. Figures such as Zbigniew Brzeziński and Nicholas Ray, who were on the board of directors of the *Polish-American Freedom Foundation*, should be credited for in this respect[25]. Some of the representatives of foreign foundations delegated to support Polish civil society were of Polish origins, like Irena Grudzińska-Gross from the *Ford Foundation*, Zbigniew A. Pełczyński who worked with George Soros, Michael Kott, and Rodger Potocki[26]. Also, individuals who were not of Polish origins, but who have previously established contacts with the country, supported Polish civil society. Lane Kirkland of the United States and Alina Margolis-Edelman of France are two such individuals. Since 2000 the *Polish-American Freedom Foundation* has been running a Lane Kirkland scholarship program, which aim has been to share Polish experiences in transformation with candidates representing selected countries from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. As one of the research participants indicated, "*On behalf of the American trade unions, Lane*

---

[22] J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt. 2008. "Re-energising Europe to Champion Democracy. The Visegrád Four bring fresh transition experience to the donors' side of the table" in J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt (eds.) *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement.* Praga, p. 20.

[23] R. Potocki. 2008. "The National Endowment for Democracy" in *Pomoc zagraniczna – tendencje, wyzwania, doświadczenia. Raport końcowy*. Warszawa, p. 15.

[24] J. Kucharczyk's personal communication, 2007 in G. Sussman. 2010. *Branding Democracy…*, pp.127–8.

[25] P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*. Pittsburgh, p. 76.

[26] I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze o idei Trzeciego sektora w Polsce.* Warszawa, p. 88.

Kirkland supported Solidarity, but he also learnt a lot from the Solidarity movement. He promoted the idea that the concept of solidarity should be further transferred to the East" (r15_10). The paediatrician and social activist Alina Margolis-Edelman, who was wife of Marek Edelman[27], should be credited for establishing the Nobody's Children Foundation (*Fundacja Dzieci Niczyje*) in 1989. This foundation has been the first to deal with child abuse in the former communist region.

The importance of foreign support for the fledgling Third sector in Poland was a theme that emerged in the research I did in 2001–2002. Back then I conducted 40 interviews with NGO activists engaged in a variety of organisations in small towns and bigger cities alike. It turned out that almost half of them had cooperated with foreign NGDOs or benefited from foreign funding[28]. Polish NGO activists appreciated this external assistance. This international cooperation exposed my then respondents to novel ideas, challenged their own stereotypes, provided them with know-how, showed them how to approach problems recognised in their communities, helped them establish contacts with Western institutions and occasionally with Eastern partners, too. Indeed, some argued the know-how they gained while cooperating with American or Western European partners had little relevance to their own work. Nonetheless, it is important to underline the significant *scale* of presence of foreign support available to Polish NGOs in the first decade of the transition.

Importantly, as far as the assessment of external assistance is concerned, early analysis of foreign support for democratisation processes in Poland seems to be rather critical, especially compared to more recent studies. Thus, for example in 1998 Joanna Regulska claimed that the *US Agency for International Development* (USAID) and other donors had exhibited "delayed commitment" to building local democracy in Poland. Regulska maintained that this belated attention furthermore did not provide equal opportunity for all NGOs in Poland[29]. This line of argumentation has not found empirical support in the

[27] Marek Edelman (1922–2009) was the last surviving leader of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.

[28] G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists Make Solidarity Work*. Warszawa, p. 182.

[29] J. Regulska. 1998. "Building Local Democracy: The Role of Western Assistance in Poland" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 9, no 1, p. 74.

research presented in this book. As one of the respondents who had first-hand experience in implementing projects funded by US public and private funders admitted, "*the strongest interference [on behalf of US donors] I remember was when the Ford Foundation asked us to fill in a table how many men and women worked in the project, which in those boorish times we considered as a horrible imposition of some rotten, feminist ideas. . . . Now I actually have the feeling that these foundations didn't interfere as much as they should have. Let's consider the Ford Foundation: they were very liberal and progressive and they used to distribute funds indiscriminately, thus also supporting rather conservative individuals and organisations. . . . Were I the Ford Foundation, I would have been more uncompromising back then. . . . I am actually under the impression that the Ford Foundation and Soros weren't the ones to enforce their priorities on us; quite on the contrary*" (r25_18).

Another respondent, who has had significant experience in implementing projects funded by US public and private funds, by EU funds and recently by Polish governmental funds, unfavourably compared current EU and Polish public funds to the then American ones: "*Succinctly, Americans focused on supporting us to become independent, to gain capacity. . . . They treated us like partners. . . . There is no such mode of thinking in Europe. Europe asks us to always be on our knees, to keep applying for more grants and be dependent on them. There is no long-term thinking. There is no such trust [towards us]. . . . [The Polish aid] has inherited all the blueprint of European grant-giving*" (r22_36). Not all observers share this assessment. Some researchers have recognised the beneficial impact of Polish organisations' cooperation with European institutions. The internalisation of new ideas and building the culture of consensus among Polish NGDOs is indicative of the phenomenon Krzysztof Jasiecki dubbed "EU effect"[30]. Namely, via their cooperation with European partners and by participating in EU-level fora dealing with development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and global education, Polish NGOs engaged in development cooperation contributed to the legitimisation of new external norms, principles and customs, thus redefining the understanding of what constitutes public interest and changing social practices. Furthermore, as Andrada Nimu argues in her recent comparative analysis of women

[30] K. Jasiecki. 2013. *Kapitalizm po polsku: między modernizacją a peryferiami Unii Europejskiej*. Warszawa, p. 189.

and LGBT NGOs in Poland and Rumania, those NGOs have been successful in challenging the foreign funders' agenda, procedures and techniques, through strategies of decoupling[31].

Also other aspects of external assistance in the beginning of the transition have been critically assessed by participants and commentators. In an early description of the impact of foreign aid, Daniel Siegel and Jenny Yancey analysed Western assistance to the NGO sector in the Visegrád countries in the aftermath of the toppling of communism[32]. Siegel and Yancey were among the first to highlight the tied aid[33] nature of USAID assistance to Polish civil society in the beginning of the transition. Namely, as much as 75% of aid ended up being consumed by American organisations, as USAID applied the external project method[34] whereby American consultants and NGOs were contracted to provide support for their Polish counterparts. This approach, known as the "flying experts"[35], has also been adapted by other donors, and it stands for the cohort of consultants specialising in development cooperation and providing support to aid recipients from all over the world. In the Polish circumstances, those experts were dubbed the "Marriott brigades", because they resided in the pricey hotel Marriott in the centre of Warsaw. They have become proverbial among the Polish NGO sector to indicate handsomely remunerated, yet insufficiently familiar with the specificity of the country, consultants residing in upper-end hotels while providing assistance to local civil society.

However, the negative experiences Polish NGO activists had with their cooperation with their partners had one unexpected side effect. By having first-hand experience with foreign donors, who in spite of

---

31 A. Nimu. 2015. *From „Counter-culture" to „Contract-culture"? Effects on implementing external funded projects on women based and LGBT rights NGOs in Romania and Poland*. Manuscript of PhD thesis.

32 D. Siegel and J. Yancey. 1992. *Odrodzenia społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Rozwój sektora organizacji pozarządowych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej a rola pomocy zachodniej*. Warszawa.

33 Tied aid describes official grants or loans that limit procurement to companies in the donor country or in a small group of countries (see http://www.oecd.org/development/untyingaidtherighttochoose.htm).

34 T. Carothers (1999: 257) in P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave…*, p. xix.

35 E. Puchnarewicz. 2003. "Darczyńcy – niezrozumienie kontekstu działania" in E. Puchnarewicz (ed.) *Organizacje pozarządowe w krajach rozwijających się i Europie Wschodniej.* Warszawa, p. 43.

their expertise knowledge were culturally distant and insensitive to the local context, Polish civil society activists engaged in providing development assistance abroad feel more competent and claim to avoid the pitfalls of international cooperation. As one of them put it: "*[W]e know what made us resists [donor's] ideas, what angered us . . . so, now we treat our colleagues [from the former USSR states] like partners. . . . I know that they are the experts on their own country*" (r19_34). As another respondent engaged in the Eastern Partnership countries explained, "*We have tried to remember these experiences we had in Poland, these Marriott brigades, we tried to avoid such relationships [with our partners]"* (r13_20). Another interviewee reflected, *"[T]his was education, when we were beneficiaries [we learnt] how important the partnership approach was. After all, we did experience the Marriott brigades and even though not all NGOs had first-hand experience [with them], [the Marriott brigades] were notorious"* (r15_10). One of the respondents told a story when the German presenter at a conference in Ukraine shared her dissatisfaction for her speech not being as appreciated as the speech my research participant delivered. "*I told her: you see, they respect you, but you speak about standards that would be relevant here in 40 years. Whereas I talked about issues I have personally been involved in changing*" (r17_15).

Siegel and Yancey's criticism of the Western mode of support for democratisation processes was constructive, as it highlighted the fact that Western donors learned along with their partners from the Visegrád countries how to most effectively assist civil societies. Siegel and Yancey's analysis had an element of applied research as its aim was to identify ways to improve on the effectiveness of Western support in the region. Some of these researchers' suggestions were taken into account and successfully implemented by foreign donors and their local partners. For example, the "train the trainers" technique Siegel and Yancey promoted has been used more often after their analysis came out. Other observers, however, were less emphatic as to the real intentions behind Western assistance. For example, Janine Wedel argued that it was economic agendas that had been the decisive factor in aid decisions earmarked for civil society in Eastern Europe[36]. The centralisation of American aid (support for

[36] J.R. Wedel. 2001. *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*. New York, p. 100.

groups in major cities) was highlighted as another underside of their democracy assistance.

No doubt, however, civil society activists in Poland were exposed to new ideas and approaches via their cooperation with Western partners[37]. Perhaps the most palpable effect of foreign aid on the fledgling Polish Third sector has been the internalisation of these ideas by the group of leading social activists[38]. Many of these ideas were progressive and novel to this part of the world, which contributed to the internationalisation of Polish NGOs' activities. The cases of the *Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights* or the then *Nobody's Children Foundation*, which early on started cooperating with other countries from Eastern Europe and later on with former USSR states to share the know-how they gained via their cooperation with Western partners, corroborate this contention. Apparently, the externally supported introduction of novel concepts had its underside, too. When analysing the effects of Western support for women NGOs in Poland during the first decade of the transition, Patrice McMahon observed that Western foundations were more prone to cooperate with and fund liberal or feminist NGOs, irrespective of the fact that professional organisations or women's sections enjoyed better institutional and societal embeddedness[39]. This approach reportedly resulted in the marginalisation of newly-established, Western-funded NGOs, as these failed to attract significant constituencies' attention[40]. In a similar vein, Janine Wedel contended NED played partisan politics by favouring leftist groups after 1989, to the extent of claiming that the former dissident Adam Michnik became the "darling of many Western foundations"[41].

Yet, in the opinion of one of the beneficiaries of foreign aid I interviewed, foreign aid inadvertently supported, or in any way did not prevent, the progressing "*clericalisation of Poland*" (r25_18). Furthermore, another research conducted in Hungary suggested that trans-

---

37 K. Quigley. 1997. *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe.* Washington, D.C, pp. 54–55.

38 I Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 87.

39 P.C. McMahon. 2002. "International actors and women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary," in S.E. Mendelson and J.K. Glenn (eds.) *The Power and Limits of NGOs. A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. New York, p. 47.

40 Ibid., p. 29.

41 J.R. Wedel. 2001. *Collision and Collusion*, p. 99.

nationalisation does not necessarily trigger the domestic uprooting of civic organisations, whether as a cause or consequence[42]. The lack of agreement as to the relationship between NGOs' domestic embeddedness and transnational cooperation notwithstanding, the formative years of Third sector development in Poland and Hungary (and to a lesser extent in other post-communist countries from CEE) were positively impacted by the support provided by foreign public and private donors during the first decade of the transition. USAID, the major and most influential among foreign public funders supporting Polish civil society, withdrew in 2000. Thus USAID graduation in 2000 represents a milestone in the development of the Third sector in Poland[43].

The case of the philanthropist George Soros' support for civil societies in post-communist Poland merits special attention. His approach was to provide re-granting to local NGOs via the national chapters of the *Soros Foundation*. Paulina Pospieszna however pinpoints one underside of the "going local" strategy applied by the *Soros Foundation*. Funds distributed by the national *Soros Foundations* reportedly were more susceptible to nepotism, when compared to the direct grants or the external project methods[44]. However, as highlighted earlier, the external project method promoted tied aid and had its shortcomings, too. Nonetheless, given the posited inability or unwillingness of national governments to fund some NGOs, many Western NGOs (including the *Soros Foundation*) resorted to providing money and in-kind assistance to help develop infrastructures to sustain those local NGOs[45]. The *Open Society Institute*'s *East East Beyond Borders* programme was originally created in 1991 for the *Soros Foundations* in Central and Eastern Europe. In Poland the *East East Beyond Borders* was administered by the *Stefan Batory Foundation* and was functional until 2012. The programme offered Polish civil society actors opportunities for international cooperation in the context of post-socialist transition with partners from East-Central Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

---

42 D. Stark et al. 2006. "Rooted transnational publics: Integrating foreign ties and civic activism" in *Theory and Society,* no 35 (3).

43 I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze*…, p. 13.

44 P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave…*, p. xxi.

45 P.C. McMahon. 2002. "International actors and women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary," p. 37.

Quite evidently, the "*democratisation know-how*" (r25_18) Polish civil society gained from their cooperation with foreign funders after the toppling of communism established the foundation of what was to become the Polish NGDO sector. The long-term impact of foreign aid on the NGDO sector and on Polish aid is addressed in the next chapter. At this point it is important to highlight the contribution of external assistance for the kicking off years of the Polish NGO sector. The *Soros Foundation* alone provided almost one-third of foundations' assistance to the region[46]. The *Charles Stewart Mott Foundation*, the *France Pologne Foundation*, the *Ford Foundation*, the *Levi Strauss Foundation*, the *Alfred Jurzykowski Foundation*, among others, should be credited for supporting Polish civil society in the beginning of the transition[47].

At that time NGOs in Poland also received funds from other Western European donors. One respondent, who has been working on local government reform, claimed that back then "*the priorities of the Dutch donor, invented in the Netherlands, had nothing to do with our needs"* (r17_15). Another respondent, who also worked with Dutch donors, explains the friction of this cooperation the following way: "*I remember how our colleagues from the Netherlands came and they seemed to know better [than us]. They drove me mad. Actually, as I can see this now, ¾ of the times they were right indeed. But I was not ready to agree with them. Or perhaps they were not sensitive enough when they communicated their ideas*" (r19_34). Another interviewee appreciated the support they received from their Dutch partners in the formative years of their organisation, which deals with environmental issues (r14_8). Interviewees' accounts about support from Western European donors are mixed and echo the concerns about aid provided by US public and private funders. Most of these concerns have to do with the alleged lack of sensitivity of those donors to the local context, and the barriers in communication.

Kevin Quigley's study of Western European, North American, and Japanese foundations' financial support in Central Europe during the first five years of the transition corroborates the argument that the foreign foundations, which did not withdraw from the region, learned their lesson and had been evolving to become increasingly engaged in supporting grassroots initiatives outside the capitals and the larger

[46] K. Quigley. 1997. *For Democracy's Sake…*, p. 87.

[47] I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 87.

cities. It should be noted that Poland and Hungary received the largest share of foreign foundations' involvement with democracy assistance[48]. What more, Quigley provides ample evidence to support the argument that Poland has been "the principal Central European beneficiary of Western attention"[49] in the form of grants, loans, and debt relief. However, as the then director of the *Stefan Batory Foundation* Anna Rozicka admitted, the first five years when NGOs started receiving foreign aid were characterised by "sowing of money"[50] and by no system of control in place in terms of the effectiveness or accountability of these funded interventions. The interview with r25_18 substantiates this argument. One of the respondents, who is currently working in a public institution, but used to be part of the NGO sector, opined that "*European money spoiled the civic sector in Poland. Undoubtedly, the big amount of easily accessible funds triggered the professionalisation of the Third sector, in the positive and negative meaning of this concept"* (r6_22). This view however seems to underestimate the creativity of NGO activists. As one of the aid professionals I interviewed explained: *"It is very important to think in terms of civic or non-governmental activity when we engage in development cooperation. There is always an added value [to our work]. . . . Were I not to work for an NGO, were I to have a 'normal job', I wouldn't have been able to implement the projects while engaging on a voluntary basis with issues unrelated to the projects. Here I have the flexibility, I can accommodate a number of tasks*" (r24_13).

Perhaps the most easily discernible effect of foreign aid on the Polish Third sector has been the change of language it brought about. The change of language also contributed to a change in mode of actions. Instead of "initiatives", "activities", or "actions", Polish NGO activists had to start thinking and acting in terms of "projects". Equally important are the norms that the appropriation of the new language triggered. Ilona Iłowiecka-Tańska distinguished three aspects of this normative change: the way of thinking about social activism, the

[48] See K. Quigley. 1997. *For Democracy's Sake…* Poland and Hungary got 21.68 and 21.43 per cent respectively of the resources earmarked for the whole region.

[49] Ibid., p. 46.

[50] Anna Rozicka in I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 124.

methods of assessment, and the mode of work[51]. Wojciech Sokołowski examined one more side-effect of Western know-how introduced to Poland. By analysing professional innovation, which has reportedly been brought about by Western health care and social service professionals, Sokołowski highlighted the far-reaching consequences of "organisational isomorphism", i.e. the selective emulation of organisational forms, for the Polish Third sector[52]. Indeed, although foreign funds earmarked for civil society organisations had to eventually move on to other parts of the world, their impact outlived the decade of their actual presence.

Foreign assistance to Polish civil society has produced some unexpected results, too. As the study of the impact of foreign aid on women NGOs in Poland and Hungary found out, the most disturbing unintended consequence of this support has been the ensuing infighting among women's NGOs competing for these funds[53]. The absence of domestic financial or moral support in the first years of the transition reportedly exacerbated these organisations' dependence on international assistance. Another related unintended side-effect has been the relative isolation of women's NGOs from the general public and marginalisation from the local decision-making process. Despite these negative side-effects of foreign aid, it was assistance from international actors that allowed women NGOs to focus on issues previously considered taboo in Polish society, such as violence against women or child abuse. Eventually, those issues gained public attention in Poland and became mainstream[54]. Women NGOs also engaged in other activities modelled

---

[51] I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 123.

[52] S.W. Sokołowski. 2000. "The Discreet Charm of the Nonprofit Form: Service Professionals and Nonprofit Organisations (Poland 1989–1993)" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 11, no 2.

[53] P.C. McMahon. 2002. "International actors and women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary", p. 48.

[54] The *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) was signed in December 2012 in Poland. Its ratification took place in April 2015 amid harsh, on-going criticism from rightist circles in Polish society. The president Bronisław Komorowski signed the convention at the headquarters of the Centre for Women's Rights Foundation and thanked women's NGOs for their advocacy and social support for women victims of domestic violence (https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,3219,trzeba-pryncypialnie-stac-po-stronie-ofiar.html).

on the West, such as opening shelters, lobbying, and conducting gender-sensitive research. In terms of development cooperation, in spite of the significant capacity growth of the Polish aid governmental program, Polish NGDOs still have comparative advantage over the governmental institutions as far as concepts innovative for Poland, such as global education or gender mainstreaming, are concerned (r5_8). Foreign support to Polish NGO activists was instrumental in highlighting and providing know-how about how to attend to other previously marginalised issues, for example the care for former prisoners.

Two decades after the beginning of the transition, when Poland is already a EU member state and as such receives support in the framework of the *European Social Fund*, the fact that only a limited number and types of NGOs have been successful in tapping external opportunities for financing has not changed. Namely, in 2012 only 6% of all social organisation in Poland implemented projects (co)financed by the *European Social Fund*. Importantly, these were organisations that possessed resources and previous experience in applying for such grants[55]. The statistics regarding Polish NGDOs' use of EU financial instruments to provide development cooperation or humanitarian assistance are likewise indicative of the relative weakness of the capacity of Polish NGOs to use such opportunities. A study of the success rate of NGDOs from the 13 newer EU member states, which had applied to four thematic programs and the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights*, found that out of the 3921 grants taken into account, only 30 went to NGDOs from the 13 new EU member states during the first decade after those countries joined the EU[56]. The *Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights* of Poland implemented one of those 30 projects.

As far as the success rate of Polish NGDOs in securing grants for implementing European humanitarian assistance projects during the first decade after joining the EU is concerned, only the *Polish Humanitarian Action* was successful in receiving such a grant. Altogether 42 grants were awarded to five NGDOs from the 13 newer EU member states by the *European Commission's Directorate-General Humanitar-*

[55] S. Nałęcz, K. Gość-Wójcicka. 2012. "Stowarzyszenia, podobne organizacje społeczne i fundacje w epoce funduszy strukturalnych i 1%."

[56] Trialog. 2014b. *A Decade of EU13 Civil Society Participation in European Development Cooperation Projects.*

ian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) between 2004 and 2013, thus obtaining only 0.41% of the total funding for humanitarian operations awarded by DG ECHO to EU member states NGDOs[57]. However, the positive discrimination measures set for the 12 new EU member states' NGDOs when applying for grants to implement global education project resulted in these organisations' relatively higher success rates during the application process. 14.1% of the total amount awarded for global education projects was allocated to organisations from those countries. In this particular case, Poland obtained 18% of the EC *Development Education and Awareness Raising* (DEAR) funding for NGDOs from the 12 EU new member states[58]. The lack of public co-financing programme for NGDOs was one of the circumstances identified by Polish NGDOs that hamstrung their chances to implement EU-funded development cooperation projects[59]. There is however a chance the issue will be tackled. The then Plenipotentiary for Civil Society and Equal Treatment Wojciech Kaczmarczyk declared his office was committed to addressing this problem[60].

The fact that currently only a limited number of NGOs are successful in tapping external resources signifies not only the weakness of the Third sector in terms of its limited capacity and the lack of support by instruments earmarked for NGOs' "own funding", but also the end of the "golden era" of external support for NGOs. Even some representatives of the NGDO sector openly admit that in the beginning of the transition many NGOs were established in order to implement foreign donors' funded development projects in Poland[61]. A negative side-effect of foreign aid for the Polish civil society has thus been that "suddenly some grasped the idea that what used to be regarded as civic

---

57 Trialog. 2014c. *A Decade of EU13 Civil Society Participation in European Humanitarian Actions.*

58 Trialog. 2014d. *A Decade of EU13 Civil Society Participation in European Development Education and Awareness Raising Projects.*

59 Zob. Grupa Zagranica. 2015b. *Polskie MSZ bezskuteczne we wspieraniu polskich organizacji pozarządowych zajmujących się współpracą rozwojową.*

60 Statement at the seminar *Civil society and democracy in the XXI century – cases of Poland and Taiwan* which took place on 9 May 2016 at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.

61 G. Gruca. 2011. "History and Challenges of Polish Aid: The Polish Humanitarian Action Case" in K. Pędziwiatr et al. (eds.) *Current Challenges to Peacebuilding Efforts and Development Assistance*. Kraków, p. 29.

and voluntary activity can now be done for remuneration"[62]. Yet, as indicated above, external assistance was only one of the factors to which the initial growth of the NGO sector in the country should be attributed. Foreign aid was auxiliary to the major circumstance explaining the emergence of a vibrant institutionalized civil society in the country. Piotr Gliński was justified to highlight the fact that the most important condition accounting for the development of the Third sector in Poland has been the indigenous, grassroots activity of individuals and groups engaged in institutionalising their self-organisation initiatives, once the freedom to associate was granted in Poland[63]. In order to understand the evolution of the NGDO branch of Polish civil society, it is important to briefly present the development of the Third sector after the toppling of communism.

The development of the Third sector after 1989

With the toppling of the communist system, the freedom to associate was embraced by citizens who started to establish new non-governmental organisations or continued their engagement in existing grassroots initiatives. From 1948 until 1984 association was the only legal form of societal self-organisation in the former Soviet bloc. In Poland the law on foundations was re-activated in 1984, and in 1989 the *Association Law* was changed. In Poland for the first time the term "non-governmental organisation" appeared in legal terminology in 1997[64]. The 1997 *Constitution of the Republic of Poland* provides the legal basis for freedom of association. The legal framework of functioning of the Third sector keeps undergoing changes. In 2003 the *Law on Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism* was introduced. The law regulates the rules for appointing NGOs to the status of public benefit organisation and for the operation of such organisations. This law also

---

[62] Krzysztof Stanowski in I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 98.

[63] P. Gliński. 2006a. *Style działań organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce. Grupy interesu czy pożytku publicznego?*, Warszawa, p. 31.

[64] In the Act concerning vocational and social rehabilitation, and the employment of the disabled (see B. Iwankiewicz-Rak. 2002. "Słabe Państwo – silny trzeci sektor? Wybrane problemy rozwoju i funkcjonowania organizacji pozarządowych" in P. Gliński et al. (eds.) *Samoorganizacja społeczeństwa polskiego: Trzeci sektor*. Warszawa, p. 123, footnote 1).

sets forth basic provisions related to volunteering and regulates the possibility to donate 1% of the tax to support public benefit organisations chosen by the individual tax-payers. Since 2012 a draft *Law on Political Foundations* has been undergoing consultations in the Polish Sejm[65] (the lower house of the Polish parliament). Towards the end of 2014 the then president Bronisław Komorowski came out with an initiative to change the *Association Law*, especially in terms of the rights of the so-called common associations[66]. One year later the Polish Sejm adopted this new law. It came into force on 20 May 2016.

The impact of external assistance on civil society after the toppling of communism notwithstanding, since the beginning of the transformation period NGOs unsupported by foreign funders have also been established. All NGOs have been gradually earning their legitimisation as important institutional actors on the public sphere. The institutionalisation and professionalisation of these initiatives have been well documented[67]. Two and a half decades after the onset of the reforms, it has been argued that Poland is one of the two countries in post-communist Europe and Eurasia which civil society organisations exhibit the highest levels of sustainability[68]. Over relatively short period of time, the Polish civil society has not only capitalised on the civic initiatives which thrived under the previous oppressive political system, but has also witnessed the development from scratch of thousands of new NGOs. Some of these have been fashioned after the NGOs in the advanced industrial countries from Western Europe and North

---

65 http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=381.

66 http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosci/1267549.html.

67 Among Polish researchers and practitioners who have contributed to the growing body of literature regarding self-organisation and especially its institutionalized aspect, one should mention Andrzej Siciński, Jerzy Szacki, Piotr Gliński, Joanna Kurczewska, Ewa Leś, Barbara Lewenstein, Katarzyna Górniak, Kazimierz Dziubka, Eugeniusz Górski, Darusz Gawin. Jerzy Bartkowski, Joanna Regulska, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Jacek Kurczewski, Mirosława Marody, Jakub Wygnański, Piotr Frączak, Artur Kościański, Wojciech Misztal, Michał Guć, Piotr Marciniak, Małgorzata Fuszara, Jacek Kucharczyk, Mateusz Fałkowski, Marek Rymsza, Grzegorz Makowski, Magdalena Dudkiewicz, Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves, Piotr Borowiec, Paweł Załęski, Agnieszka Rymsza, Bohdan Skrzypczak, Tomasz Schimanek, Krzysztof Herbst, Ilona Iłowiecka-Tańska, and others.

68 USAID. 2014. *The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*, p. 5.

America. Yet others continue the local tradition of grassroots activism. Nonetheless, fifteen years after the toppling of communism the centrum-peripheries divide continued to characterize Polish civil society organisations. As Magdalena Dudkiewicz's research indicated, NGOs functioning in the bigger cities implemented the American model of civil society, where it is viewed as independent from the state. By contrast, local NGOs exemplified the European model of civil society where NGOs' natural partners are local self-governments, and civil society is viewed as an extension of the state[69]. Furthermore, whereas Warsaw-based NGOs considered the state "the other", for local NGOs it was public and non-governmental institutions with headquarters in Warsaw that constituted "the other"[70].

This divide of the NGO sector appears to be still relevant. As of 2015, 58% of organisations in the rural areas relied on volunteers' work and only 20% of these entities had paid personnel. By contrast, in Warsaw 56% of NGOs have remunerated workers and 27% rely only on the unpaid engagement of its members[71]. In spite of this divide and the varying level of professionalisation of the NGO sector in Poland, the sector as a whole came to be perceived as overly bureaucratised. This perception, along with a number of other factors, led in recent years to the dynamic growth of a sector of un-institutionalised civic initiatives[72]. The emergence of this new type of activism is indicative of the authentically grassroots nature of civil society in Poland. Grassroots civic activism has not subsided since the overcoming of the previous system; it rather evolved to adapt to changing circumstances.

The growing importance of new civil society actors notwithstanding, NGOs remain the most developed pillar of civil society in the country. Indeed, with the ousting of the communist system and the liberalisation of the public sphere, the Third sector experienced an

---

69 M. Dudkiewicz. 2004. "Dwie wizje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w świadomości ludzi trzeciego sektora" in P. Gliński et al. (eds.) *Samoorganizacja społeczeństwa polskiego: III sektor i wspólnoty lokalne w jednoczącej się Europie*. Warszawa.

70 Ibid., p. 171.

71 *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa, p. 11.

72 G. Chimiak and K. Iwińska (eds.) 2015. *Sektor społecznościowy – Polska 2014*. Warsaw.

avalanche-like growth[73]. Yet, as Krzysztof Stanowski rightfully pointed out, the argument that this "boom" of NGOs took place after 1989 is true as long as it refers to the fact of formalisation, i.e. registration of already existing citizens' initiatives[74]. The dynamic growth of the NGO sector finds empirical evidence in the statistics regarding newly established organisations. After the first decade of the transition it was estimated that in between 80 and 95 percent of all NGOs in Poland were registered after 1989[75]. These estimations reflect the numerical growth of newly established NGOs. However, the 2000 *Klon/Jawor* survey found out that only about two-thirds of all registered associations and foundations registered at that time were really active. The fact that there is no legal obligation to inform the authorities should the NGO disband or suspend its activity can explain the existence of "dead souls" in the data. According to the most recent, seventh edition of the *Klon/Jawor* survey, at present there are about 70 thousand associations and foundations *active* in Poland. 43% of the contemporary NGO sector consists of organisations functioning for at least 11 years[76]. Therefore, the contemporary NGO sector is significantly different than the NGO sector from the beginning of the century when less than one-tenth of NGOs could boast more than 15 years' activity.

The continuing maturation (in terms of age as well as in terms of experience) of the Third sector in Poland is undoubtedly one of its characteristic features. Therefore Piotr Gliński's thesis regarding the "gradual maturation and professionalisation"[77] of the Third sector in Poland still holds true, although maturation has recently gained an additional meaning with the documented *aging* of the Third sector. Not only does the Polish NGO sector mature in terms of age. The nature of institutionalised civic activism has changed over the years, too. One of my respondents opined that *"At present, in the world – not only in*

[73] The bi-annual Association Klon/Jawor's surveys have registered this process as far as associations and foundations are concerned. Their surveys are available at http://civicpedia.ngo.pl/. The Main Statistical Office's studies encompass a much wider scope of organisations which can be labelled non-governmental.

[74] K. Stanowski in I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…,* p. 52.

[75] See J. Wygnański 2001 and P. Gliński 2000 in G. Chimiak. 2006. *How individualists…*, p. 91.

[76] *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa, p. 4.

[77] P. Gliński. 1999b. "The Development of the Third Sector in Poland."

Poland – there is an identity crisis of the NGO sector. We used to join NGOs and be its members for all our lives. Now we organize around single issues, ad hoc, but we are afraid to accept the membership card. Task-orientedness, not membership, has become the common denominator" (r6_22). In spite of the critical comments regarding the functioning of the NGO sector, there were also voices commending on these entities' activity and accomplishments. The necessity to tap the same sources for funding is no longer propelling NGOs to compete with each other. For example, two respondents highlighted the fact that it was NGDOs who suggested the small grants system to be introduced, so that local NGOs in partner countries could apply for these funds at the Polish embassies. One of them pointed out that *"after all, this is a system that takes away funds from Polish NGDOs themselves"* (r5_8). Another aspect of NGDOs' work appreciated by observers has been their quick response. As one interviewee said, "*Quick reaction has been one of the strengths of Polish NGOs. When Maidan took place, there was immediate response. . . . They know how it feels to be beaten by the militia*" (r15_10).



Figure 1: Annual growth of newly established association and foundations according to the Register of the National Economy – REGON[78]

[78] Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor. 2013. *Podstawowe fakty,* p. 27.

The 2012 *Klon/Jawor* survey identified a number of other trends characterising the contemporary Third sector in Poland. For example, although there are still almost seven times more associations than foundations, recently more and more NGO founders opt for establishing a foundation rather than an association. The average number of members in associations has likewise been falling from 42 in 2004 to 30 in 2015[79]. This trend is indicative, on the one hand, of the progressing individualisation of social life, including civic activity. On the other hand, the inter-sectoral dynamics, which are more conducive to the establishment of foundations than of associations, likewise affect the growing number of newly established foundations. In general, although sport and hobbyist associations are still forming the most numerous branch of NGOs, the share of associations active in the field of social assistance and health promotion has decreased from 19 to 12 percent over the last years. At the same time, an increase of the share of NGOs active in the field of culture has been noted. This trend can be accounted for by the difficulties public cultural institutions experience in financing their activities[80]. Indubitably, cultural as well as academic institutions are more and more prone to tap opportunities for funding originally earmarked for the Third sector.

The relative stagnation in the number of newly established associations can also be explained by the above-mentioned growing incidence of unregistered civic initiatives. As one of the "founding fathers" of the Third sector, Piotr Frączak noted, whereas in 1989 Poles had their dreams come true as far as the opportunity to register an NGO were concerned, currently the registration of civic initiatives came to be interpreted as their "failure"[81]. This observation refers to the growth of un-institutionalised civic initiatives in Poland and their reticence to register as an NGO. The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 and the concomitant rise of sharing economy resulted in the growth and proliferation of all kind of grassroots initiatives. As empirical research suggests, un-institutionalised civic initiatives in Poland tend to focus on their neighbourhoods and on solving local issues. As such, informal civic activism emerges as the contemporary embodiment of the *sub-*

79 *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa, p. 9.

80 Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor. 2013. *Podstawowe fakty*, pp. 7–8.

81 Piotr Frączak at the opening ceremony of the VII National Forum of Civic Initiatives, Warsaw, 14.09.2014.

sidiarity[82] principle. These informal initiatives bring new meaning to civic activism and point to a renaissance of communitarian engagement in Polish civil society[83]. Unregistered initiatives pose a constructive response to the challenges modernity poses. Informal activism furthermore proposes an alternative way of organizing, instead of participating in one-off protest events or engaging in NGOs.

Another feature, that has been invariably characterising the Third sector in Poland, is the predominantly unpaid nature of civic engagement. Although an increase in the number of remunerated NGO activists has been observed, especially in recently established organisations, still majority of associations keep relying on the unpaid work of its members. Another unchallenged by the transition trend is the prevailing reliance on public funds. Polish NGOs most often tap financial opportunities from local self-governments or the central administration (60%), membership fees (60%), donations from individuals or entrepreneurs (56%), economic activity (26%), European funds (18%), subsidies from other organisations (14%) and income from 1% personal income tax (23%)[84]. It should be mentioned that during the first decade after the introduction of the opportunity to allocate 1 percent of the personal income tax to a public benefit organisation, the share of taxpayers among those entitled to earmark this 1 percent increased from 0,33 in 2004 to 44 in 2013[85]. Importantly, statistics show that public benefit organisations performing tasks that should belong to the state (mostly health care and social assistance) receive the highest budget allocations. The possibility to create sub-accounts

[82] The principle of subsidiarity was developed by the Catholic social science, but it can also be traced back to 19th century liberal political thinking (Guć 1996: 43). The definition of subsidiarity states that officials from the higher ranks of government should not intervene in the internal problems of the local community, thus depriving people from their competence – and responsibility – to cope with it by themselves. By the same token, the local community is not supposed to intervene when a group representing a yet smaller structure can deal with their problems.

[83] D. Polańska and G. Chimiak. 2016. "Organizing without organizations" in *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 36.

[84] *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa, p. 15.

[85] G. Piechota. 2015. "Legislation on Financing Public Benefit Activities from Tax Designation in Poland" in *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, Vol. 17, no 1, p. 89.

leads to the predominating practice of allocating tax deductions to concrete, usually disabled, individual beneficiaries. This legally sanctioned practice leads to supporting the private, rather than the public, benefit and in practice precludes smaller, local NGOs to tap this opportunity for funding their activities[86]. The 1 percent instrument thus fails to support smaller public good NGOs. In fact, although more and more NGOs declare they apply for EU funds, there was documented increase in the number of NGOs possessing very limited or no resources. These tendencies, along with the existence of 4% of NGOs having significant financial resources at their disposal (more than one million PLN annual budgets[87]), are indicative of the growing fragmentation of the NGO sector in Poland in terms of access to resources.

According to most recent data, in 2015 there were more than 100 thousand NGOs registered in Poland, including 17 thousand foundations and 86 thousand associations (excluding the *Voluntary Fire Brigades*)[88]. According to the National Statistical Office, which utilises a broad definition of NGOs, in 2010 there were 80,4 thousand NGOs active in Poland, out of which 67,9 thousand were associations and similar social organisations, 7.1 thousand were foundations, 3,6 thousand were organisations of employers' and employees' self-government, and 1,8 thousand were religious entities[89]. As far as the fields of activities of Polish NGOs are concerned, as a result of the previously described dynamics of this aspect of the Third sector, currently 34% of associations and foundations' major field of activity is sports, tourism, recreational activities and hobbies, to be followed by those engaged in education and upbringing (15%), culture and the arts (13%), social assistance (8%), health (7%) and local development (6%)[90]. In 2015 38% of NGOs' scope of activity was covering the whole country or international issues. That is, those NGOs did not focus on local or regional, but on national or supranational issues. In 2015 10% of NGOs were active

[86] Ibid., pp. 89–90.

[87] J. Przewłocka. 2013. *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2012*. Warszawa, p. 8.

[88] *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa.

[89] GUS. 2013. *Trzeci sektor w Polsce. Stowarzyszenia, fundacje, społeczne podmioty wyznaniowe, samorząd zawodowy i gospodarczy oraz organizacje pracodawców w 2010* r. Warszawa, p. 25.

[90] *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa.

on the international arena[91]. The next chapter will present the evolution of Polish internationally-oriented NGOs.

A question arises as to how significant was the international activity of the sector of Polish NGOs. As of 2002, the *Klon/Jawor* survey showed that 16% of Polish NGOs undertook activities targeted to individuals, groups, or institutions outside Poland[92]. A quarter of those was directed towards Ukraine, whereas 2,5% of Polish NGOs cooperated with partners from Germany. According to the current database on NGOs registered in Poland, as of December 2016 there were 19520 NGOs in the group of "international activity, local communities, social activity"[93]. Out of these 19520 organisations, 6710 declare they undertake activities in the field of European integration and establishing contacts and cooperation among societies[94]. Importantly, not all Polish NGOs active abroad or Polish branches of bilateral or international organisations are involved in development cooperation as such. There are also NGOs, which *primary* field of activity is not related to international cooperation. These are for example organisations providing social services, local NGOs, or NGOs closely cooperating with self-governments, single-issue NGOs. In the case of these organisations, their engagement in development cooperation has been a natural continuation and expansion of their major field of activity. Likewise, not all NGOs active abroad are working in countries-recipients of Official Development Assistance. In fact, only part of Polish NGOs, which have (had) some programme involving cooperation with other countries, or which primary field of interests was activity abroad, have been active participants in development cooperation and/or providers of global education.

There are some non-governmental organisations specialising in development cooperation among Polish think-tanks, too. As one publicist aptly observed, Polish think-tanks are the missing link in Polish

---

91 Ibid.

92 J. Dąbrowska et al. 2002 in A. Wróbel. 2003. "Wspólne problemy, wspólne działania," p. 16.

93 According to the on-line data base of NGOs run by the Klon/Jawor Association, database accessed 7.12.2016 at http://bazy.ngo.pl/search/wyniki.asp?wyniki=1&kryt_nazwa=&kryt_miasto=&kryt_woj=&kryt_pola=K25.

94 http://bazy.ngo.pl/search/wyniki.asp?wyniki=1&kryt_nazwa=&kryt_miasto=&kryt_woj=&kryt_pola=26.

politics, and especially in foreign affairs[95]. This observation, however, is not indicative of the lack of supply of organisations providing expertise. According to the analysis of responses to a questionnaire distributed among Polish think-tanks, think-tanks in Poland are like pioneers yet to conquer the borderland between knowledge and politics[96]. This diagnosis is to a significant extent also relevant in the area of development cooperation. There are a number of public and private think-tanks, which have had projects or policy papers referring to development cooperation. These are, for example, the Polish *Institute of International Affairs*, the *Think Tank* centre, the *Institute of Global Responsibility*. The *Global Development Research Group,* a think-tank explicitly focusing on development cooperation, has recently suspended its activity.

Conclusion

In the opinion of research participants, the internationalisation of citizen initiatives in Poland should be traced back to the adoption of the *Message of the First Congress of NSZZ "Solidarity" Delegates to the Working People in Eastern Europe*. The *Message* was indicative of the *Solidarity*'s will to share its commitment to self-determination with other societies from the then communist bloc. Indeed, it is hard to empirically gauge the actual impact of the trade unions of the 1980s on the post-1989 internationalisation of citizens' initiatives in Poland and the consequent engagement of the country in modern-day development cooperation. In fact, the suggestion that there *is* a direct causal link between the *Message* and contemporary Polish NGDOs' activity, surfaced while conducting the interviews for this research. It was an interpretation of events raised by my interviewees. Scholars can be justified to question the veracity of the argument regarding the direct impact of the *Message* on the subsequent involvement of the civic sector in transnational exchange of experience, humanitarian aid, democratisation assistance, development cooperation, and finally global education. Nonetheless, the participants in the described events vol-

[95] W. Smoczyński. 2009. "Myślą i rządzą" in *Polityka*, no 40.

[96] D. Stasiak. 2012. "'Pomiędzy', czyli gdzie? Polskie think tanki w poszukiwaniu recepty na siebie" in T. Bąkowski and J.H. Szlachetko (eds.) *Zagadnienie think tanków w ujęciu interdyscyplinarnym*. Gdańsk, p. 121.

unteered themselves such an interpretation and justified it with their continuous hands-on experience in international cooperation. The referral to the *Solidarity* legacy characterised both contemporaries of the events of the 1980s and some of the younger respondents. Furthermore, in accordance with Polish strategic documents, "Solidarity is very high on the list of principles that underlie Polish international engagement. Solidarity is both the driving force behind and the objective of Poland's involvement in development cooperation"[97]. Thus, it can be argued that it is the spirit of solidarity, which has become mainstreamed in Polish public discourse, and the emergence of the practice of extending solidarity to other nations that justify the referral to the legacy of the *Solidarity* of the 1980s' when speaking about modern-day development cooperation provided by Polish entities.

The role *Solidarity* played in eventually overturning the previous regime was noticed and appreciated by external observers, too. Although the external support for societal self-organisation in the country for political reasons could only be limited before 1989, after the toppling of communism public and private foreign assistance was one of the most important factors that contributed to the growth, professionalisation, and maturation of the institutionalised civil society sector. Interestingly, unlike the produced in the 1990s critical assessment of various facets of this external aid, my respondents' account of the legacy of foreign funding did not substantiate all of those critical claims. For example, respondents who have had first-hand experience in the NGO sector since the 1990s and whose organisations have benefited from foreign aid, disagreed with the popular argument that external support favoured and promoted organisations and social activists voicing leftist and/or liberal views. Instead, my respondents argued foreign funders were *indiscriminate* towards left-wing and right-wing non-state actors as they supported liberal newly established NGOs and conservative individuals and organisations associated with the Catholic church alike. As far as the experience with the foreign experts collectively known as the Marriott brigades are concerned, NGDO activists I interviewed argued they have actually learned from their familiarity with cases of maladjusted foreign aid. Polish aid professionals are careful not to treat their partners in a pa-

[97] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015*, p. 3.

tronising way, as many Poles believed the "flying experts" cohort in the beginning of the transition regarded them. Furthermore, Polish NGDO activists are capitalising on the proximity of the Polish transformation experience to the situation in partner countries.

The importance of foreign aid for the maturation and professionalisation of the Polish NGO sector notwithstanding, it was the indigenous, grassroots activity of individuals and groups the avalanche-like growth of the NGO sector should be attributed to. The significant and ever-growing literature on NGOs in Poland has documented various aspects of the evolution of this sector. Although the growth of the Third sector can be measured in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the undeniable development of institutionalised civil society in the country came at a price. For example, the divide between Western-line, city-based NGOs and the more traditional, local, volunteer-based NGOs can still be discerned in the country. The recent dynamic growth of un-institutionalised civic initiatives is a response, *inter alia*, to the perceived as overly bureaucratised NGO sector. Both formal and informal types of civic activism remain the domain of individual social entrepreneurship. Individual entrepreneurship characterises aid professionals establishing NGDOs, too. As far as their professionalism goes, Polish NGDOs share similar features with NGDOs in established donor countries.

3 From *Solidarność* to Global Solidarity?

Poland is not East or West.
Poland is at the center of European civilisation[1]

The research questions this chapter addresses are as follows: How has the international engagement of Polish civil society evolved? What are the characteristic features of the NGDO sector in Poland, especially when compared to the NGO sector? Is the divide between democratising and developmental NGDOs still relevant? What factors contributed to this split? Are there other divides that characterise the contemporary Polish NGDO sector? Why has democracy support emerged as the *spécialité de la maison* of Polish aid? How does the current official vision of the Polish comparative advantage in development cooperation fare when compared to the experience of Polish NGDOs? What role NGDOs have played in promoting development education and awareness raising in Poland?

[1] President Ronald Reagan's speech in 1982 to members of the British Parliament in the Royal Gallery at the Palace of Westminster in London (accessed 29.03.2016 at http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/reagan-parliament.htm).

The growth of Polish NGOs active abroad

Before discussing the evolution of the Polish Third sector towards international development cooperation, it is important to briefly mention one especially relevant aspect of the emergence of non-governmental organisations. It is not a widely known fact that the first non-state actors to be dubbed NGOs were international organisations. In 1945 the United Nations coined the term "NGO" to recognize the importance of NGOs in development efforts worldwide and involve them in consultation processes[2]. It was only later on that the term started to be used for virtually any type of privately run organisation active not only on the international arena. Nonetheless, the international activity of NGOs, along with their consultative and inter-governmental organisations' partner status, appear to have been encoded in their genes. Polish NGDOs are a case in point.

NGOs' role in development evolved from marginal to major over the second half of the XX century[3]. Importantly, development can be understood in three different ways: as a vision of a desirable society, as a historical process of global change and as the deliberate efforts at improvement undertaken by development agencies[4]. NGOs have been a natural ingredient of the last of these interpretations of development. As Gillian Hart insightfully claimed, NGOs have been seen as sources of alternative ways of intervening, or big "D" development[5]. NGOs have emerged over time as the entities considered best equipped to initiate what came to be known as "development from below". These organisations became "platforms through which local people could be mobilized for development purposes"[6]. Yet, although civil societies' role in the development process was acknowledged as crucial, taking de-

---

[2] K. Martens. 2002. "Mission Impossible?…" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 13, no 3, p. 271.

[3] G. Chimiak. 2014. "The Rise and Stall of Non-Governmental Organisations in Development" in *Polish Sociological Review,* no 1.

[4] A. Thomas 2000 in T. Allen and A. Thomas. 2000. (eds.) *Poverty and Development in the 21st century*. Oxford.

[5] G. Hart. 2001. "Development debates in the 1990s: Culs de sac and promising paths" in *Progress in Human Geography,* no 25, p. 605.

[6] A. Bankole. 2008. "Actions for Development: From Local to Global and Vice-Versa" in A. Bankole and E. Puchnarewicz (eds.) *NGOs, International Aid and Development in the South*. Warsaw, p. 20.

cisions rested on the resource-distributing institutions. National and international NGOs remained the favoured child of donor agencies up to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 2001[7]. The superseding development-security nexus had an impact on states' and other donors' strategy towards NGOs worldwide[8].

As demonstrated in the first two chapters of this book, global processes coupled with local developments influenced grassroots civic initiatives in East-Central Europe and elsewhere. At the same time, the growth of citizens' initiatives especially in Poland in the 1980s in turn played a role in the process of the rise and stall of NGOs' role in development polices and processes worldwide. Jude Howell et al. argued that development agencies' appropriation of civil society as "critical to democratisation, good governance, and development" should be traced back to the 1980s when Eastern European dissidents revived the idea of civil society as an analytic concept and a mobilizing discourse[9]. This reinterpretation of civil society's potential for democratisation coupled with the dissatisfaction with state-led development in newly independent post-colonial states resulted in framing civil society as a panacea in both underdeveloped and *mis*developed countries. Hence public and private donors alike focused on supporting civil societies in countries undergoing transformation, too.

Although donors' primary aim might not have been the growth of internationally-oriented NGO subsector in the countries receiving aid, they saw value in supporting initiatives aiming at sharing transformation-related experiences with international partners. As one of my interviewees noted, "*The [Open Society Institute's] East East programme rested on the premises that we represent the East, too. . . . A network of Polish trainers, under the leadership of Krzysztof Stanowski, who himself was an eminent trainer, trained other trainers from Ukraine, Russia, etc. . . . The Americans went whole hog, because they seemed not to discriminate between Poland and Mongolia. They wanted to create*

[7] J. Howell et al. 2006. "The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror," Civil Society Working Paper, no 26. London School of Economics.

[8] G. Chimiak. 2015. "Wpływ kwestii bezpieczeństwa na rolę organizacji pozarządowych w teorii i praktyce rozwojowej" in W. Misztal et al. (eds.) *Obywatele wobec kryzysu: uśpieni czy innowatorzy?* Warszawa.

[9] J. Howell et al. 2006. "The Backlash against Civil Society," p. 9.

a network of trainers in the whole region. . . . But then, the network lead by Stanowski stood out and became their darling" (r15_10). Undoubtedly, the history of contemporary Polish NGOs' international cooperation cannot be reviewed without taking into account the impact of foreign aid on the Polish Third sector. Succinctly, the internationally-oriented NGO subsector in Poland evolved from NGOs benefiting from (financial, in-kind, know-how) support from foreign public and private donors towards exchange of experiences with other NGOs from Central and Eastern Europe towards transfer of their own experiences with democracy assistance to partners from the Eastern Partnership countries, and engaging in development cooperation mostly in Africa.

Participants in these events have corroborated this argument. According to Krzysztof Stanowski, the history of Polish NGOs' engagement abroad up to 2002 should be divided into three stages. Stanowski argues that the first stage, which lasted from 1989 until 1994, was characterised by Polish NGOs' utilising foreign aid and learning from Western NGOs while establishing their first contacts with partners from Poland's neighbouring countries. The *Stefan Batory Foundation* and the Foundation *Pogranicze* were crucial actors during these first five years of the transition. The second stage identified by Stanowski, which took place from 1995 until 1999, paved the way for the long-term engagement of Polish NGOs abroad. The *Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights*, the *Education for Democracy Foundation*, the *Polish Humanitarian Action* as well as a number of other NGOs engaged in bilateral and trilateral cooperation dominated on the arena of international cooperation during the second half of the 1990s. The third stage described by Stanowski begun after 1999. He argues that at that time a "rapid boom" of transnational cooperation involving Polish NGOs took place. Along with the established players, more and more smaller local NGOs started implementing projects abroad. With the gradual withdrawal of the foreign public and private donors financially supporting civil society organisations in Poland, there emerged several other new programs providing funds for international activity of Polish NGOs[10].

[10] K. Stanowski. 2002. "Z kart historii współpracy polskich organizacji pozarządowych w III RP a partnerami zagranicznymi" in G. Czubek. (ed.) *Międzynarodowa działalność polskich organizacji pozarządowych.* Warszawa, pp. 2–5.

Given that Stanowski's analysis dates back to 2002, his overview of the history of Polish NGOs' engagement abroad should be complemented by more recent studies. For example, Ilona Iłowiecka-Tańska, who in the second decade of the transition studied the self-perceived attitudes of leading NGO activists, argues that an analysis of international engagement of Polish NGOs after 1989 should distinguish between three, partially overlapping, stages. According to this author, the idea to transfer the transformation experience of Central-European countries to former USSR member states characterised the first stage of Polish NGOs' activities abroad. At that time Polish NGOs were financed primarily by some US public and private funds. The second stage identified by Iłowiecka-Tańska referred to the initiation of cultural diplomacy by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where NGOs were also to play a role. The third stage started with Poland joining the European Union in 2004[11].

Whereas chronologically this account is accurate, the internationalisation of Polish NGOs' activities was more nuanced. For example, immediately after 1989 Polish NGOs have been involved not so much in transferring Poland's experience to the former USSR states, but in exchange of experiences with other CEE states. As one of my respondents who was active in the Third sector at that time recalled, *"We should keep in mind that whereas at the onset of the democratic transition, in 1988–89, Poland politically aspired after the West, a very important aspect of Polish NGOs' activity was to breach the borders, to rebuild the neighbourhood. . . . We [Polish NGOs] used to cooperate with the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars; the Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity Foundation worked in the South. . . . Over the course of several years there started to emerge a culture [of cooperation] which had nothing to do with the government's policy"* (r6_22). Another interviewee substantiated this argument. She agreed that in the NGO sector *"democratisation [projects] definitely preceded developmental [ones]. But then, even in 1994 we did not speak about democratisation directed to the East either. Back then some of these countries were even better off than Poland economically speaking. . . . All our countries were newly independent, so [this cross-border cooperation] felt natural. Plus there was this authentic, mutual interest to get to know your neigh-*

[11] I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze o idei Trzeciego sektora w Polsce*. Warszawa, pp. 159–160.

bours. . . . We had the chance to establish contacts on totally new principles [of cooperation], unlike the way it was before 1989. We relished the opportunity to legally do things that had to be done underground [previously]" (r13_20).

This process of cross-border cooperation took place among NGOs dealing with a wide scope of issues. Some Polish NGOs, which were among the first in the region to get know-how and capacity in tackling (back then novel) problems like child abuse and women's rights, were initially supported by foreign donors. These NGOs then started to cooperate with NGOs interested in coping with this issue in other countries undergoing transformation, too. The involvement of NGOs in humanitarian relief also dates back to the 1990s. Perhaps it would be most accurate to say that the several trends related to the internationalisation of Polish NGOs' activities took place in a parallel fashion. In any way, development cooperation and democracy promotion projects implemented by NGOs started well *before* Poland developed its own bilateral assistance program. As interviewees claimed: *"Undoubtedly, Polish NGOs have been playing a much more important role in development cooperation, when compared to other countries. This is beyond doubt."* (r6_22) and *"[the role Polish NGOs played in shaping the governmental aid program] has been very different than it was in Western Europe. But then, I should make a disclaimer and say that actually not all types of spending labelled 'aid' by the government qualifies as aid, like for example the 'humanitarian aid' our ministry of defence was about to send to the Ukrainian army, or loans, debt relief"* (r9_12).

In fact, NGOs engaged abroad represented by their umbrella organisation have been systematically lobbying against the inclusion of loans and debt relief when calculating Polish aid. Polish NGDOs have furthermore been advocating for a definition of development assistance in accordance with OECD-DAC standards. In many respects, NGDOs were pioneers in the field of humanitarian relief, development cooperation and global education. However, the question arises as to how successful NGOs have been in not repeating the mistakes foreign funders allegedly committed when supporting Polish NGOs, especially during the first decade of the transition. For example, Joanna Regulska claimed that foreign donors' approach was not derived from local circumstances and localised needs. That is, instead of adjusting their priorities to the issues formulated by Polish NGOs, US public donors reportedly had a standard "menu" from which potential providers could

choose when applying for funding[12]. The change of hats Polish NGOs underwent, when they moved from being recipients to acting as aid providers, represented one of the issues addressed in this research.

Given the former engagement of many NGDOs as recipients of foreign aid, one is entitled to ask whether Polish NGDOs have capitalised on this experience now that Poland has become a donor. My research participants provided explanation as to why the transfer from recipient to donor is not as straightforward as one could initially expect. As a representative of the line ministry explained, *"We used to think that since we have experience with implementing foreign-funded projects, it would be the same now [that we have become donors]; but it is not. Now it is a different story altogether. These [experiences] are not transferable. Of course, we know how foreign aid works . . . but it is different when you receive funds, than when you provide funds"* (r16_20). Another respondent, who has been involved in providing humanitarian relief since the 1990s, explained, *"The catch-phrase 'from beneficiary to donor' has been motivating us. It has been especially strong when Poland joined the European Union. . . . I think [being former beneficiary turned donor] certainly helped, but one quickly forgets [what it meant to be a recipient], too"* (r10_17). Another interviewee focused on a different aspect of the legacy of being aid beneficiary, *"First of all, I should say that when [Polish aid] slowly started functioning, Poland was still an aid recipient… We were used to the idea that we are the ones being supported. It is very difficult to overcome this syndrome… The syndrome of the recipient was deeply rooted in Polish minds and it did not become overcome with the help of the [Polish] foreign ministry, but with the help of people like Ochojska. People who started to help others, because they knew there were those who had been worse off than we had been, people in Sarajevo or in Africa. We wanted to give at least testimony . . . that even though we might not have the capacity, the programs, the funding, we wanted to demonstrate that we could and we did get engaged in [humanitarian] missions along with more experienced nations. . . . This engagement triggered the thinking whereby we became aware that given that such horrible things were going on there, we should give it a try to make our world a better place. [In Poland] we used to think about ourselves as the victims of history. . . . So it was really difficult to imbue in*

[12] J. Regulska. 1998. "Building Local Democracy: The Role of Western Assistance in Poland" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 9, no 1, p. 74.

people that we were also responsible for what was going on in the world and that we could also do something about it" (r11_22).

It seems, however, the most important factor that contributed to the limited transfer of hands-on experience from being a recipient to becoming a donor has been the lack of institutional memory caused by the high staff turnover in the NGDOs. Several respondents referred to this fact, *"the people who used to be in the NGO sector before 2004 are no longer there*" (r1_8), *"[T]here is no institutional memory, especially in NGOs. There is significant staff turnover. . . . But then, Polish firefighters who used to be trained by foreign funders in the 1990s, are now happy to go and train [their colleagues] in Georgia or Africa*" (r4_14). Another respondent attributed the limited extent to which Polish NGDOs tap their internal resources in terms of the experience they have gained as aid recipients, *"Indeed, one of the reasons has been the lack of institutional memory caused by high staff turnover. But the other reason is that Poland has been the parrot of nations*[13]*. We uncritically accepted the West's propositions and we uncritically used, though to our benefit, [the support from the West]. . . . In many other areas, including development cooperation, Poland does not make use of its experience"* (r9_12).

Another interviewee sought different explanation of the limited use Polish NGDOs make of their experience as aid recipients: "*neither NGDOs nor the MFA are learning organisations*[14]*.... The idea behind learning organisations is that even when people leave, the know-how stays*" (r5_8). However, there were also dissenting voices in this respect. It is workers of NGDOs established or supported by American

---

[13] The saying that Poland is a "parrot of nations" is attributed to the Polish poet Juliusz Słowacki:

O Poland, trinkets you are still fooled by trinkets;
You have been the peacock and parrot of nations,
And now you are a foreign servant.

Catherine O'Neil's translation in *Poland's Angry Romantic. Two Poems and a Play by Juliusz Słowacki*, 2009, edited and translated by P. Cochran et al. Newcastle upon Tyne. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 5.

[14] The concept of "learning organisation" was coined by Peter Senge, who defined is as one where "people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together" (P. M. Senge. 1990. *The Fifth Discipline. The art and practice of the learning organisation*. London: Random House, p. 3).

foundations and engaged at present in democratisation efforts eastwards, who are the proponents of the idea that *"although people [in the NGDO] have changed [over the last 20 years], the know-how and the experience have been transferred*" (r8_11). The hands-on experience with trans-border externally funded cooperation had lasting consequences for the Polish NGDO sector. Even after foreign funders withdrew from the country, the capacity Polish NGOs gained had influenced the nature of the contemporary NGDO sector. To understand why democratisation assistance emerged as a distinct characteristic of both NGDOs and Polish aid, it is necessary to discuss the interdependence between these two stakeholders' focus of activity.

Development Assistance the Polish Way

As indicated earlier, it has been commonly acknowledged that the support provided during the 1990s by foreign public and private donors to the emerging democracies in East and Central Europe was conducive to their successful transition to full-fledged democracies[15]. Yet, Ewa Leś argued in one of the earliest analyses of the voluntary sector in the region, that the extent of these sectors' internationalisation varied from country to country, as it was contingent on the advancement of the democratic transition and the interests of Western donors in specific CEE countries[16]. Furthermore, as Paulina Pospieszna noted, the United States and the European Unions' approaches to democracy assistance differed significantly. The former of these has been largely political as it focused on supporting citizens' participation in democratic political processes. By contrast, the latter of these approaches has been developmental and it prioritized socio-economic development over the support for political openness[17]. Keeping in mind that Poland has benefited from

[15] J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt. 2008. "Re-energising Europe to Champion Democracy. The Visegrád Four bring fresh transition experience to the donors' side of the table" in J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt (eds.) *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement*. Praga, p. 15.

[16] E. Leś. 1994. *The Voluntary Sector in Post-Communist East-Central Europe*. Warsaw, p. 43.

[17] P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine.* Pittsburgh, p. 33.

both types of support programs (political and developmental), the question arises as to which mode of assistance Poland would opt for while devising its own aid program.

In accordance with the *Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation*, the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015 focused on two cross-cutting thematic areas: democracy and human rights, as well as political and economic transformation[18]. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine were to receive at least 60 percent of the funds allocated for activities implemented by the MFA and its partners. According to the *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015*, at least 70% of funds earmarked for the Eastern partnership countries and at least 60% earmarked for ten countries from Africa, as well as Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the Palestinian Authority were to support democratisation and transformation projects[19].

The thematic priorities of the second *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016–2020* have been defined as follows: good governance, democracy and human rights, human capital, entrepreneurship and the private sector, sustainable agriculture and development of rural areas, as well as environmental protection[20]. The *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016–2020* foresees about 90% of the funds the MFA disburses for development cooperation to be used to support ten priority countries: Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine among the Eastern Partnership countries, along with Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, the Palestinian Autonomy, Senegal and Tanzania. According to this programme, Poland is about to graduate from Afghanistan and Tunisia by the end of 2017. Funds for humanitarian aid targeting refugees, especially those from Syria, have likewise been earmarked in the Programme.

Judging by the priorities of Polish bilateral development cooperation and the share of funds earmarked for democratisation, the country provides both developmental and political support to partner countries, though the latter type seems to predominate. The reasons

---

[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015.*

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015b. *Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016–2020*.

Poland opted for specializing in politically-oriented democracy assistance warrant an explanation. In an article tellingly titled "Poland's new ambition" Andrew Curry searches for the justification of Poland's development programme's focus on the promotion of democratisation and support for civil society in its Eastern neighbours. Curry outspokenly argued that the focus of Polish aid on democracy assistance to its Eastern neighbours should be understood as a backlash against Russian influence. He concluded that Poland's recent past has been its "asset and a responsibility", which justified the use of limited resources for the benefit of both the donor and its neighbours. Curry admitted that Poland might as well prove to be most effective in actually focusing on transferring the lessons learned from its own experience in democratisation and transition to market economy[21]. This line of argumentation was also voiced by the then vice minister of MFA Konrad Pawlik. In 2015 he defended the decision to focus on supporting transformation processes in Eastern Partnership countries arguing that the experience of Poland in socio-economic transformation is relevant for those partner countries. Geo-political proximity and historical ties have likewise been mentioned as an explanation for Polish aid's choice of focus countries and field of support[22]. The predominating opinions of my respondents on this issue likewise indicate that Poland's focus on transferring the country's transformation know-how is an asset and a responsibility of Polish aid.

Not all analysts, however, are so optimistic regarding the feasibility of the transfer of CEE transition experience to the post-communist East and the post-colonial South. For example, by building on the distinction between the political and technical dimensions of the development process, Ondrej Horky argues on the case of Czech development cooperation that the transfer of the transition experience "is mere rhetoric"[23]. This radical opinion, however, has not been substantiated by other studies. Regarding the case of Poland, it is important to have in mind that it has not been only for national policy makers and

[21] A. Curry. 2010. "Poland's New Ambitions" in *Wilson Quarterly*, no 34/2, p. 42.

[22] "Rozmowa z wiceministrem Konradem Pawlikiem." 2015. PAP.

[23] O. Horky. 2012. "The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European 'Transition Experience' to the South: Myth or Reality?" in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 13, no 1, p. 17.

NGDOs who consider Polish experience with transformation relevant to other socio-political contexts. In the context of the Arab Spring, upon visiting Warsaw in 2011, the American president Barack Obama publicly voiced his hope that Poland would share its experience with other regions[24]. In line with the European Consensus on Development, the European Transition Compendium Report of 2010 similarly expressed the conviction that the post-communist new member states as donors should "play a significant role in the EU's development cooperation policy, in particular because of their valuable practical experience in transitional economy, democratisation processes and other reforms shaping human development"[25].

Horky substantiates his argument about the rhetoric quality of transfer of transition experience by providing evidence that technical assistance (carried out in close partnership with partner countries' local and/or central governments) cannot trigger lasting political changes in the partner country[26]. Horky contends that the transition experience is a myth that obscures EU new member states' reticence to honour their development commitments[27]. In his view, the transition experience discourse is likewise a strategy used to justify the use of tied assistance for the promotion of political, security, or commercial interests in the middle-income countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe[28]. Horky does not take into account the impact NGDOs had on establishing the priorities and aid modalities of the national aid programmes. Furthermore, as my research indicates, given that NGOs in the region were trained by foreign funders to develop expertise in democratisation, it is more than natural that these NGOs would be opting for sharing this particular experience with partners in countries, where the transformation towards democracy, market economy and civil society has not been as successful

Indeed, most new EU member states' focus of aid programs diverges from the priorities established by the 15 "old" EU member

---

[24] The White House 2011 in O. Horky 2012, p. 18.

[25] *The European Transition Compendium Report.* 2010. The European Commission, p. ii.

[26] O. Horky. 2012. "The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European 'Transition Experience' to the South," p. 19–22.

[27] Ibid., p. 27.

[28] Ibid., p. 28.

states[29]. However, after EU enlargement in 2004, an increase of interest in Eastern issues within the EU itself was documented, along with a "mental change in the perception of the region" on behalf of the 15 "old" EU MS[30]. Similarly, EU enlargement in 2004 promoted the support for civil societies in Ukraine and Belarus among all EU diplomats[31]. Dominik Kopiński's analysis of the alleged reticence of Visegrád countries to increase the share of aid allocation to Africa confirms these observations. Kopiński presents evidence for the argument that the amount of ODA earmarked for Africa remains "drastically low"[32]. The volume of the support dedicated to Africa remains contrary to public opinion polls' results, which indicate that Africa should be prioritised in the geographical distribution of development assistance[33], and in contrast to obligations of Poland ensuing from EU and OECD DAC membership.

Kopiński should be credited for his overview of the theoretical explanations accounting for Poland and the other Visegrád countries' limited amount of development assistance for Africa. Indeed, the most popular of these assumptions views these countries' choice of priority countries as an outcome of the communist legacy. Path dependence explanations, however, prove to be of limited use in accounting for the geographic focus of Visegrád countries' development assistance. Kopiński's intuition is to attribute these nations' support for neighbouring countries rather to the "lack of strategic vision in foreign policy and the ad hoc style of formulation of such policy"[34]. Another prevalent in the literature argument for the limited involve-

---

[29] S. Lightfoot. 2010. "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies: The Case of Central and Eastern European States" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 62, no 2.

[30] K. Pisarska. 2008. *The role of the new Member States in the developing of the EU's Eastern agenda in the years 2004–2007 – perceptions of EU officials*, p. 6.

[31] Ibid., p. 7.

[32] D. Kopiński. 2012. "Visegrád Countries' Development Aid to Africa: Beyond the Rhetoric" in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 13, no 1, p. 40.

[33] In 2014 47% of respondents chose Africa as the primary geographic target of assistance, 28% selected Ukraine and Belarus, 13% – other former Soviet republics (Poles on Development Assistance 2014).

[34] Szent-Iva´nyi and Tetenyi 2008: 575 in D. Kopiński. 2012. "Visegrád Countries' Development Aid to Africa," p. 42.

ment of new donors in Africa rests on the premises that V4's lack of colonial history in Africa explains their interest in *other* than established donors' choice of priority countries. The fact is, however, that the lack of colonial record can actually be an *asset* of Poland and other CEE donors' development cooperation with ODA recipients[35]. Yet the most popular argument for the choice of priority countries by the V4 has been their reported "comparative advantage" in democratic and economic transition[36].

The focus on democratisation of Polish aid's bilateral programme perhaps could be better understood in context, i.e. by considering the array of initiatives the country has undertaken in promoting democracy worldwide. The first report of Poland's democratisation agenda provides a list of the flagship initiatives in democracy promotion that prove that "support for democracy is a Polish priority and a Polish brand"[37]. These are the European Endowment for Democracy, the Warsaw Dialogue for Democracy, the Lech Wałęsa Solidarity Prize, and the Community of Democracies[38]. As one of my respondents said, *"one of the most important yield of the Polish presidency [of the EU] has been the European Endowment for Democracy. No one believed it could be established. . . . Bigger [than Poland] countries did not make it. . . . Within just one year, the principles of functioning of this flexible and efficient institution were established, and it supports initiatives not assisted by other institutions. . . . [The European Endowment for Democracy] aids unregistered initiatives and takes decisions really fast*" (r6_22). In addition to Poland's development cooperation in support of democracy and the above-mentioned initiatives, the nation is also undertaking other activities related to democratisation. These are initiatives in the area of cultural and public diplomacy, Poland's bilateral cooperation with other countries, as well as the country's participation in multilateral fora, like the United Nations system, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe[39].

---

35 Ibid., p. 43.

36 Bucar and Mrak 2007 in D. Kopiński. 2012. "Visegrád Countries' Development Aid to Africa," p. 44–5.

37 Radosław Sikorski in *Poland's Development Cooperation. Annual Report 2012*. 2013. Warsaw, p. 4.

38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. *Support for democracy in Poland's foreign policy. First Report Poland's Democratisation Agenda 2014–2015*. Warsaw.

39 Ibid.

Another plausible explanation for the geographic focus of contemporary Polish aid is the continuity of the engagement of Polish NGDOs in the region. Before Poland joined the European Union, almost all Polish NGOs, which primary field of activity was international cooperation, focused on Ukraine[40]. Projects in the area of transfer of know-how related to the Polish transformation experience started in the early 1990s. The *Central* and *Eastern European Forum* at the *Stefan Batory Foundation* was one of the first to initiate such exchange. Later on these meetings of experts from both countries have been superseded by on-going advisory activities. For example, since 1993 *the Centre for Economic and Social Research* – CASE and *the Institute for Strategic Analysis* from Cracow have been involved in developing experts' reports on economic and political reforms in CEE, including Ukraine. Early cooperation between Polish NGOs and Ukrainian ones was undertaken by NGOs working in various fields. Thus, Foundation SYNAPSIS shared their experience with Ukrainian partners in the area of establishing cooperation between parents of autistic children and doctors. Other issues included transfer of experience in the area of work with people with mental disorders, prevention and treatment of prisoners' addictions, or fostering the increase of HIV/AIDS related awareness in Ukraine. Most projects jointly implemented by Polish and Ukrainian partners referred to sharing the know-how and transformation-related Polish experience (CASE, *Education for Democracy Foundation*, FISE, *Foundation for Development of Local Democracy*, *Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity Foundation*, the *Stefan Batory Foundation*, and others). The second realm of cooperation between Poland and Ukraine was in the area of reforming the educational system (Foundation *Nowy Staw*, Association *Szkola Liderów*, ZHP, ZHR, FED, and others). The cooperation in the area of cultural and scientific exchange also merits attention (Foundation *Pogranicze*, Foundation KARTA, *Institute of Central and Eastern Europe*, *South-Eastern Research Institute*, and others)[41].

As Ilona Iłowiecka-Tańska noted, at the beginning of the transition Polish NGOs' engagement in countries from the former USSR derived

[40] J. Dąbrowska et al. 2002 in A. Wróbel. 2003. "Wspólne problemy, wspólne działania" in *Polska-Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa, p. 16.

[41] P. Kosiewski. 2003. "Lata doświadczeń i perspektywa europejska," p. 9–10.

from Polish social activists conviction of the community of fate they shared with the peoples from those countries[42]. This conviction was part of the contribution derived from these activists' experience with self-organisation in the 1980s to the then fledgling Third sector in Poland. Polish NGO activists firmly believed in the transferability of Polish experience to those countries. The opinions of my respondents who have been engaged in international cooperation since the 1980s or the 1990s largely substantiate this claim.

After Poland joined NATO in 1999 and started preparing for EU accession, it was mostly cooperation between think-tanks from all the involved countries focusing on the experience of Poland related to joining NATO and EU that took place. Examples of this type of cooperation are projects implemented by the *Institute of Public Affairs*, *Batory Foundation* and the *Foundation Education for Democracy*. Polish NGOs (the CAL Association, *Foundation Institute of Eastern Studies*, FRDL, and others) also organised study visits for Ukrainian counterparts in the area of local government reform[43]. Projects addressing Ukrainian media and journalists have likewise been implemented at that time. Scholarships for students from Ukraine comprised yet another field of activity targeting Ukraine. Scientific cooperation between scholars from Poland and Ukraine, often focusing on difficult issues common to those countries' history, took place, too. Towards the end of the 1990s projects dealing with alleviating severe social problems, like poverty, addictions, social exclusion, likewise started to be implemented. Often those were ground-breaking activities, as the state has been withdrawing from these areas both in Ukraine and in Poland, and/or ceding responsibility for these issues to other social partners. Polish NGOs have been instrumental in transferring to Ukraine various innovative techniques in areas such as human trafficking, as well as organising fundraising activities, or support for disabled persons. Polish-Ukrainian cooperation was also undertaken by institutions promoting culture and by representatives of the business sector[44]. In the opinion of representatives of Polish NGOs working in Ukraine interviewed by Paulina Pospieszna, Polish NGOs' work with students, teachers, and civil society organisations triggered the Orange Revolution in Ukraine

42 I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze…*, p. 160.

43 A. Wróbel, 2003. "Wspólne problemy, wspólne działania," pp. 17–18.

44 Ibid., pp. 19–22.

in 2004[45]. Some of the participants in Pospieszna's research expressed the belief that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, synergised with the cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian civil societies before and during the revolution, created a climate conducive to the establishment of new sustainable Polish-Ukrainian initiatives[46].

According to another analyst, foreign funds earmarked for Polish NGOs also contributed to the development of projects targeting Ukraine and other countries east of Poland. The Polish-American Freedom Foundation and USAID were instrumental in the development of programmes aimed at supporting Ukraine and other countries east of Poland[47]. The *Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative* (PAUCI) was also funded by USAID and run by Freedom House up to 2005. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, PAUCI was transformed into a "legacy foundation"[48]. Polish-Ukrainian cooperation has been supported by re-granting organisations like PAUCI, PAFW and *Batory Foundation*, as well as American foundations.

In the beginning of the transition Polish NGOs, supported by foreign funds, enhanced the capacity building of the NGO sector in Ukraine. Foreign public and private funders encouraged Polish NGOs to establish cooperation especially with partners from eastern Ukraine. As a result, Polish NGOs contributed to building civil society from scratch for example in Crimea. In fact, cooperation with Ukraine has often been the first destination chosen by newly established Polish NGOs which opted for being active abroad[49]. It should be highlighted, however, that it was not only Polish NGOs' partners who benefited from this cooperation. The sector of Polish NGOs active abroad itself benefited from the opportunity to work with civil societies in neighbouring countries.

---

45 P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from The Third Wave…*, p. 103.

46 Ibid., p. 106.

47 P. Kosiewski. 2003. "Lata doświadczeń i perspektywa europejska" in *Polska-Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa, p. 9.

48 G. Sussman. 2010. *Branding Democracy. U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe*. New York, p. 164.

49 A. Wróbel. 2003. „Wspólne problemy, wspólne działania", pp. 23–24.

The Polish NGDO sector: democratising or developmental?

It is tempting to present the opinions of global activists themselves regarding the contemporary NGDO sector. Such analysis will provide insight into the visions and divisions within the sector. To place the discussion of the NGDO sub-sector in context, some of the most significant challenges the NGO sector faces according to the most recent *Klon/Jawor* representative survey, are presented next. According to this study, 65% of Polish NGOs have declared that the most significant problem they keep facing has been the difficulty to access funds for their activities. 56% of NGOs in Poland negatively assessed the perceived as overly complex bureaucratic structure of public administration. An increasing share of NGOs experiences problems with keeping their paid personnel and volunteers. This problem accordingly leads to staff fluctuation. More than one-third of NGOs declared their leaders face burnout. Intersectoral conflicts have likewise been noted[50]. These issues appear to be relevant to the NGOs engaged abroad, too. This observations refers both to organisations, which international cooperation is their primary field of activity, and to local NGOs, which have programs implemented with partners from abroad, though their general focus is on Poland.

Both representatives of the NGDO sector and the research participants from other institutions I interviewed viewed the NGDO sector as vulnerable. This vulnerability is evidenced in some NGDOs' over-reliance on their leaders and on the precarious situation of its finances. The NGDO sector was described as "*a sector, which is the outcome of individual entrepreneurship. . . . [It is] weak and puny . . . though authentic*" (r1_8). Another respondent, in spite of being affiliated with a well-established NGDO, admitted: "*There is a constant struggle to secure funds for paying our staff*" (r5_8). One of the interviewees, who has worked for NGDOs, international institutions and public administration alike, opined that "*[In Poland] there aren't many NGDOs that think strategically . . . there is no time for this. . . . If NGDOs would have a lot of time, money, and human resources . . . the ideas [they come up with] would have been more attractive, their vision would have been comparable to that of Western NGDOs*" (r7_13). Comparisons with Western NGOs also brought other insights. One respondent observed: *"I was recently on*

[50] *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa, p. 18.

a study visit to the US. Wherever we went . . . I noticed that although our US colleagues had to deal with various difficult issues, they were much more relaxed than we are [here]" (r8_11). Certainly, there are a number of circumstances that could explain why Polish NGDOs are unfavourably compared to Western NGDOs. One could surmise, however, that the lack of financial stability, which also leads to work overload and the danger of burnout, are perhaps among the most important factors that account for Polish NGDO activists' excessive focus on the everyday problems they face than on thinking strategically, or having the laid-back attitude their US colleagues have.

The issue of work overload of NGDO activists has been repeatedly raised at seminars and other events, where NGDOs' representatives participated. Fluctuation of labour and brain drain ensue. As one interviewee illustrated this argument, *"The East-European Democratic Centre used to be such place which attracted talented individuals [interested in working in Belarus]. Pawel Kozanecki, who was a genius in finding such people, couldn't keep them later on"* (r23_11). This situation also leaves many NGDOs to overly rely on the commitment of their core staff and/or their leaders. The lack of financial stability of the NGDO sector exacerbated by the difficulties these organisations experience with securing funds for capacity building, results in inability to plan future activities and increase the probability to experience burnout. A couple of interviewees admitted to had been working too much. One of them said: "*I am trying to delegate more work tasks to others. . . . I need to find a way to make the workload manageable. . . . We should introduce more rigid working hours, maybe corporative working time, so that we won't work in the evenings, because this burns out a lot"* (r4_14). Another one admitted *"Our partners [abroad] experience huge difficulties, because there is war going on there, so we can spend 20 hours at work, but we should find a way to secure [work-life] balance*" (r8_11). The frustration borne by work-overload and other circumstances viewed as barriers to their engagement by Polish NGDO activists lead some of them to quit the NGDO sector. This issue would be addressed in more detail later on.

The issue of NGDOs' capacity has been another problem often addressed by my interviewees both from the NGDO sector and from funding or re-granting institutions. A couple of aid professionals admitted that their organisations have limited organisational capacity to implement a larger number of projects. The lack of institutional

capacity emerges to be the major obstacle towards increasing Polish NGDOs' competitiveness towards Western, but also Czech, NGDOs. A couple of interviewees admired the system in the Czech Republic that supports Czech NGDOs. One respondent explained that "*Polish NGDOs are too weak to compete with other entities [from the EU]. . . . I do not regard [Polish NGDOs] as sufficiently professional. There are three big NGDOs in Poland, and the rest are really small . . . and are run by people who have to earn their living elsewhere. This is fine, but you can't build an organisation this way; you have to invest in the organisation, work full-time"* (r4_14). Another opined, *"We are not competitive in Europe. We are not capable of offering solutions that are innovative enough, so that we can outdo our competitors [in Europe], who have years of experience and don't have to do this job off-the-clock"* (r3_10). The opinions of other respondents corroborated the view that many NGDOs' limited economy-of-scale potential further restricts their chances to increase their capacity: "*With the exception of the American funds that initially supported capacity building of Polish NGOs, there hasn't been created a system in Poland to support the functioning of these organisations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not create such funds, nor does it support NGDOs to provide own contributions to EU-funded projects. . . . TRIALOG tried to build a system that favoured partnership with big Western NGDOs, so we [in Poland] were courted by those [Western] NGDOs at that time. . . . This is the structural problem which limits the emergence of new NGDOs and prevent existing NGDOs from developing"* (r20_17). Accordingly, "*some of the NGDOs [active in Ukraine and Belarus] gave up on their international activity"* (r13_20). Hopefully, as indicated above, soon there would be public funds earmarked for NGDOs' own contributions to access EU funds.

Given the lack of funds for capacity building, NGDOs resort to submitting several project proposals, assuming that after the selection procedure they would anyway be left with implementing a smaller number of projects. Provided that the capacity of NGDOs is reportedly not taken into account by decision-makers, some interviewees observed that as a result "*NGOs-scrubs receive relatively large amount of funds"* (r25_18). Another respondent considered the alleged lack of agency of Polish NGDOs as their most pressing weakness: *"Polish NGDOs have to do what the Polish government asks them to do, this is a clientelistic system"* (r24_13). However, it seems this view is partial. The same respondent was very positive as far as his and his fellow activists' work in the NGDO

was concerned. He said: *"My work in this organisation makes it possible to link being a volunteer and an employee. This is a valuable aspect of working for an NGO and I think it characterises other NGDOs, too, so that we manage to realize our mission outside of the projects"* (r24_13).

The inventiveness of Polish NGO activists appears to be the biggest obstacle against the emergence of a clientelistic system. The following opinion substantiates this claim: "*Most of the sensible and important things we did in global education, we did outside of the projects*" (r5_8). Those two opinions regarding NGDOs' ability to fulfill their mission, even if the projects' system does not always allow them to implement risky ideas, provide an answer to the doubts expressed by one of the respondents who asked rhetorically: *"If an NGO does everything for money, and there is no added value to its work, how is it different from a laundry or a bank? One could argue that NGOs are useful. But banks and laundries are useful, too. . . . Maybe this is a non-governmental sector, but it is definitely not a civic one"* (r6_22). Clearly, both funders and NGDOs are aware that the projects' system has its limitations. However, NGDOs' ability to realise their mission outside of the activities they receive funding for, acts as a safety valve against the possibility that the current funding system is undermining the civic nature of NGDOs' work.

Apparently, in spite of the difficulties they encounter, NGDO activists find ways to fulfill their mission and are genuinely committed to their work. However, there are divides within NGDOs that sometimes prevent it from speaking as one sector. One of the dividing lines identified by respondents has been the lack of unanimity regarding the set of principles that should guide Polish NGDOs' work. One of the respondents admitted, "*When compared to the environmental NGO sector, the developmental one is very weak, not sufficiently consolidated, and rarely speaking unanimously . . . especially when it comes to agreeing on shared values. I also negatively assess [NGDOs'] will to self-perfection, to increasing the efficiency of its activities. . . . The level of complacency is a bit too high*" (r14_8). The NGDOs' umbrella organisation *Grupa Zagranica* has been discussing its Code of Conduct since 2012. The work on this set of principles has not been finalized as of April 2016[51]. This Code of Conduct was to be based on the Istanbul principles.

[51] *Prace nad Kodeksem Zasad Postępowania Grupy Zagranica* (accessed 30.09.2016 at http://zagranica.org.pl/dzialania/rozwoj-sektora/prace-nad-kodeksem-zasad-postepowania-grupy-zagranica).

In fact, one of the issues I intended to tackle initially was to probe the opinions of NGDO activists on the Istanbul principles. The so-called Istanbul Principles were agreed at the *Open Forum for Civil Society Organisations Development Effectiveness' Global Assembly* in Istanbul in 2010. These eight principles are meant to be a set of mutually shared values guiding the work of NGDOs worldwide[52]. However, not all interviewees were familiar with the Istanbul principles, nor with the discussion within the NGDO sector about those principles, so in the process of conducting the interviews I decided to drop this issue. One of the respondents nonetheless expressed her disappointment with the perceived inability of the NGDO community to unanimously endorse this set of principles. Unlike other sub-sectors in the Third sector, the NGDO community is perceived as unable to agree on a shared set of values[53]. The issue of (gender) equality and equity was the bone of contention that divided the sector. Some of the organisations associated with the Catholic Church "*viewed the issue as a threat*" (r14_8).

The lack of consensus on fundamental issues among entities engaged abroad was a source of frustration for other respondents, too. One of them admitted: "*When the Grupa Zagranica's members' discussion regarding gender took place, my brain steamed, I had to give up following this discussion. Both sides got carried away. . . . Grupa Zagranica is an interesting mix, given that Catholic organisations are members, too. These organisations opposed the issue of gender. Interestingly, though, both sides had excellent arguments to support their position*" (r15_10). The missionary work of the Roman Catholic

[52] Succinctly, the eight principles are: Respect and promote human rights and social justice; Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girls' rights; Focus on people's empowerment, democratic ownership and participation; Promote environmental sustainability; Practice transparency and accountability; Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity; Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning; Commit to realising positive sustainable change. (see for example http://www.concordeurope.org/publications/item/87-istanbul-principles).

[53] This observation refers to the current state of affairs and may change in the future. Polish NGOs engaged abroad have from the start been aware of the need to agree on a shared set of principles to guide their work. See for example *the Declaration of Guiding Principles of Polish Non-governmental Organisations Working Abroad* accepted during the conference *Social diplomacy* which took place in 2002 (Czubek 2002: 18–19).

Church in Africa as such has not been criticized by any of the respondents. Actually, as one of the respondents representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted, the involvement of Polish missionaries has been much appreciated: "*In the early days [of Polish aid], we tapped the knowledge of Polish missionaries who back then had hands-on experience in Africa*. *[Polish missionaries and priests] have been our natural partners, who knew the region very well"* (r16_10). Importantly, the disagreement over values in *Grupa Zagranica* indicates that the development cooperation discourse among Polish non-state actors engaged in development cooperation has not been dominated by the unanimous emulation of solutions developed abroad. The argument that in Poland all stakeholders engaged in development cooperation look up to the "ideal" Western model[54] does not take account of the complexity of those stakeholders' views and actual impact on development assistance policies. Even if most members of *Grupa Zagranica* would be willing to sign under the Istanbul principles and endorse gender equality in their work, the organisations related to the Catholic Church present a dissenting view.

The most important divide, however, seems to be the differentiation between NGOs engaged in poverty reduction and those promoting democracy. Previous analysis pointed to such cleavage within the NGDO sector. Namely, Polish NGDOs were argued to be either of the "democratising" or "developmental" type[55]. The former have been mostly active in Eastern Partnership countries, whereas the latter have focused on countries from the Global South, mainly in Africa. Given the origins of the post-1989 NGO sector in Poland, it is only natural that NGOs, which have themselves benefited from foreign aid earmarked for democratisation, would want to share *their* experience with democracy assistance with NGOs in partner countries. At the same time, the *Millennium Development Goals*, which informed much of the work of established donors in between 2000 and 2015, laid emphasis on poverty reduction. Some research evidence does suggest that democ-

[54] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2015. "Poland: Attempts at Defining Aid by Solidarity, Democracy and Development" in O. Horký-Hlucháň and S. Lightfoot (eds.) *Development Cooperation of the 'New' EU Member States. Beyond Europeanisation*. UK, p. 48.

[55] Grupa Zagranica, 2012. *Demokracja i rozwój w perspektywie polskich organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa, p. 23.

racy "is a consequence of and not a prerequisite to development"[56]. In the case of post-communist countries, however, which civil societies have had first-hand experience in democracy promotion, the focus on democratisation has been a logical consequence of their work. In fact, civil society as such has both democratising and developmental roles to play[57]. Yet, the participants of the above-mentioned 2012 research regarding Polish NGDO activists' visions of democracy and development "unequivocally discerned the existence of two types of organisations . . . 'democratising' and 'developmental'"[58]. This divide has been viewed as either reflecting the geographical focus of the NGDOs or the philosophy to provide top-down or grassroots support accordingly. Some of the respondents viewed the schism as unbridgeable and saw evidence for this argument in the composition of the working groups of *Grupa Zagranica* itself. Others however expressed the opinion that after the initial distrust representatives of these two fractions expressed towards each other, democratising and developmental organisations have started to cooperate.

My interviewees' comments regarding this divide only partially confirmed the continuing relevance of the differences reportedly characterising these two groups. One of my respondents, who has been engaged early on in the consolidation of NGOs engaged abroad, noted: *"When I came to Grupa Zagranica, I was shocked. I never thought there could be such differences. Now maybe everyone would say that I am exaggerating, or that I have memory deficits, that no such things happened; but my memory is a good one. [Back then the representatives of developmental and democratising NGDOs] looked at each other with contempt"* (r8_11). It could be that differing worldviews characterised developmental and democratising NGDOs in those early days of the consolidation of the NGDO sector. As another interviewee opined, *"Rightist fringes opt for working in the East . . . [whereas] Africa attracts the leftist fringes"* (r25_18). Even if initially there was a noticeable divide

[56] L. Suleiman. 2013. "The NGOs and the Grand Illusions of Development and Democracy" in *Voluntas,* no 24, p. 260.

[57] S. Bailer et al. 2008. "What Makes Civil Society Strong? Testing Bottom-up and Top-down Theories of a Vibrant Civil Society" in H. Volkhart and L. Fioramonti (eds.) *CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Comparative Perspectives*. USA, p. 248.

[58] Grupa Zagranica. 2012. *Demokracja i rozwój*, p. 23.

between developmental and democratising NGDOs, this cleavage has been diminished, if not obliterated. As one of the research participants who have been affiliated with *Grupa Zagranica* claimed, *"We care about overcoming this division, so that it becomes the representation of two strands"* (r9_12). Despite the conscious efforts to even out this cleavage, as one respondent opined, *"there are even more breakaway groups [than just developmental and democratising]"* (r10_17). Other respondents also substantiated his opinion. The branch or single-issue NGOs are a case in point, *"there are organisations which have a unique agenda . . . and the rest [are not so much democratising nor developmental], but their members are concrete region's 'freaks', or people who believe in the development agenda"* (r2_7).

It seems the alleged initial conflict between developmental and democratising NGDOs has been defused only to be replaced by other, smaller divisions among the NGDO sector. One such divide exists between generalist NGDOs and single-issue NGDOs. Yet all NGDOs learnt from each other as a result of their cooperation under the auspices of *Grupa Zagranica*. The following quotations substantiate this claim: *"This division . . . used to be more noticeable. We have begun to understand that we are one sector. In any way, this breach is rather a geographical one"* (r14_8) and *"we could say that the divide is among the humanitarian, democratising, and developmental NGOs. . . . But this is an artificial demarcation. In our work all these aspects interlock with each other*" (r11_22). Another respondent, whose organisation implements infrastructural, i.e. developmental projects in post-Soviet countries, claimed: *"Doing developmental work without values, without involving the local people, is a waste of money*" (r13_20).

This last statement indicates furthermore that the "democratisation" or "promoting civil society" elements of projects implemented by Polish NGOs and funded by Polish aid in post-Soviet states should not be understood as "translating such vogue but, most importantly, Western-centric concepts as 'civil society' to other cultures"[59]. Also respondents who implemented developmental projects in African countries admitted to always focus on cooperating with local communities to make sure they own the project. Therefore, even if NGDO activists refer to the admittedly Western-centric concept of civil society in their

[59] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2015. "Poland: Attempts at Defining Aid by Solidarity, Democracy and Development". UK, p. 54.

project proposals, in their work they declared to actually aim at involving local leaders and local communities to take over the maintenance of the project (results). As such, NGDOs implement two of the principles of aid effectiveness, i.e. ownership and alignment[60]. Namely, NGDOs involve local (formal and informal) institutions and they use the local systems.

Yet, some respondents argued that development cooperation and democratisation assistance are two distinctive experiences. One interviewee, who has been involved in Africa, mentioned that individuals who were previously involved in democratising projects and later on moved to work in development *"underwent a total transformation. They started to view reality differently*" (r1_8). By contrast, another research participant, who has been engaged in democratising projects, expressed the opinion that the focus of some Polish NGDOs on catering to basic human needs represents the *"dark side of the transformation ethos of the Polish Third sector"* (r25_18). These two distinct philosophies of international cooperation have partially been shaped historically. As one aid professional recalled, *"when Grupa Zagranica was established, there was this huge debate. The EU pushed us in the direction of development [cooperation], whereas those of us who have been previously trained by the Americans in the 1980s and the 1990s, didn't have the experience to support development without taking into account [the enhancing of] democratisation and [civic] liberties; we found it natural that there could be no development without democracy. . . . But the EU back then, due to the attack of the US on Iraq, persisted [in supporting development], and democracy promotion became a pejorative term"* (r15_10). The changes in the scope of priority countries established by the MFA also affected the divide between democratising and developmental NGDOs. Dividing priority countries into two categories (countries from the Eastern Partnership and countries from Africa, Asia and the Middle East) dates back

[60] The issue of ownership is one of the principles of the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) and the *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008). According to the latter, ownership refers to having recipient countries having "more say over their development processes through wider participation in development policy formulation, stronger leadership on aid co-ordination and more use of country systems for aid delivery". The principle of alignment in the Paris Declaration refers to having "donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems".

to 2012, in accordance with the first *Multiannual Programme of Development Cooperation for 2012-2015*. As one observer noted, prior to 2012 *"the traditional development [NGO] sector prevailed . . . so the more that [after 2012] the MFA started earmarking more funds for democratisation projects in the Eastern Partnership countries. So the democratisation NGOs became stronger, and the developmental ones were weakened"* (r12_9).

The democratisation vs. development divide in the NGDO sector actually reflects a wider debate as to what the comparative advantage of Poland in development cooperation could be. As suggested elsewhere, although democratisation did not comprise a specific focus of Polish aid up to 2011[61], the 2012-2015 *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme* had just two cross-cutting thematic areas: democracy and human rights as well as political and economic transformation[62]. According to this programme, by setting out medium-term goals and priorities of cooperation, the country meant to "define a streamlined catalogue with thematic and geographical areas where Poland plans to develop its competitive advantages"[63]. In the current *2016–2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme*, thematic priorities were broader, yet stipulated that Poland will be using its "comparative advantages stemming from Polish experiences and the know-how, skills, and expertise of stakeholders of Poland's development cooperation"[64]. The Polish development assistance programme has therefore evolved towards mastering this comparative advantage. In what follows the experience of Polish NGDOs will be presented to compare the perspective of Polish NGDOs with that of Polish aid.

[61] E. Kaca. 2011. *Pomoc demokratyzacyjna w polskiej współpracy rozwojowej*. Warszawa.

[62] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015*.

[63] Ibid., p. 2.

[64] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015b. *Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016–2020*, p. 8.

Aid professionals' view on the country's comparative advantage in development cooperation

Respondents, who either represented governmental institutions or have had experience working for international organisations, underlined that Poland does not have the responsibility, nor interest, in being engaged in Africa. They substantiated the current focus of Polish bilateral aid on Eastern Partnership countries the following way: *"80% of Polish multilateral aid goes to Africa. So we are anyway supporting [development] in Africa. It is obvious why we direct our aid to the Eastern Partnership [countries]. . . . When we joined the EU, we were encouraged to support the former French colonies. We have no such obligation. . . . Central Asian countries are as poor as African ones*" (r6_22). Another respondent explained: *"We don't have colonial past, so we couldn't have had previous experience in Africa. . . . All OECD-DAC members provide aid to countries where they have a comparative advantage. . . . Because they know the region, they have people who are familiar with the mentality [of their partners]"* (r16_10). Indeed, as other interviewees opined, *"In order to be able to provide support, you need people who have command of the respective languages, who know the region"* (r16_10) and *"our [Polish] advantage is that most of our consultants speak Russian*" (r3_10). Yet not all aid professionals found Polish aid's current focus in democracy promotion in the Eastern Partnership countries justifiable. As one of them explained, *"I do not think democracy is a panacea to all diseases. From my experience in Africa I can say that by involving the community, all kind of disagreements and conflicts can be solved. . . . I think it is a mistake that Poland should be now the main promoter of democracy"* (r1_8).

Despite the differences of opinions regarding the desirable geographic and thematic focus of Polish aid, NGDO activists are aware of the advantages of the *in-between developmental status* of Poland for the country's current engagement in development cooperation. In spite of the end of the Cold War and the end of the First, Second, and Third World divide, some of the divisions dating back to the Cold War times still hold true. The current bipolar divides, whereby we have the Global North vs. the Global South, or the Minority vs. the Majority World, have not obliterated the in-between status of some former communist states, including Poland. The following statements substantiate this observation: *"Poland is the 22nd economy in the world. In*

an ideal world, we should be the 22nd biggest donor. We have no colonial past. Yet, as a rich country, which nonetheless has first-hand experience with poverty. . . . I think we have a duty to help those who are poorer than us" (r4_14) and *"We have this advantage that we have been in the European Union for ten years now, and we are the affluent West. On the other hand, we still belong to the rest of the world; as far as our mentality goes, we are closer to the people of Myanmar, than to the Dutch*" (r14_8). Clearly, those who have first-hand experience in development cooperation projects have (gained) an understanding that, in spite of the economic growth and socio-political transformation the country underwent over the last quarter of a century, Poles still have a lot in common with current recipients of aid.

The key to understanding why the focus on democratisation and sharing the Polish experience with transformation could be the comparative advantage of Poland is not the concrete experience with transformation, but the credibility of Polish organisations and aid professionals. Polish NGOs are more likely than entities from established Western donors to find synergy with partners from aid recipient countries, because of the shared common past and the comparable level of socio-economic development. As one of my interviewees explained: *"it is not so much a matter of having some concrete transformation experiences to share . . . but the credibility of Polish NGDOs, when they work with partners from Ukraine or Georgia, is different than the credibility of German NGOs, for example. . . . The Ukrainian partners may negate the relevance of the experience of German NGOs, but they can't tell us: Well, you did it, but the situation is different in our country. . . . [Also], the representatives of think-tanks from Egypt found real synergy with Janusz Onyszkiewicz, who from being in the anti-communist opposition moved to become a vice-minister of defence; they listened to him attentively, because they faced the same issues at home, i.e. having civilians to reform the military department*" (r25_18).

Another respondent gave the following example to illustrate the argument that although the situation in Poland is already different than that in partner countries, it is nonetheless comparable: *"When our partners from Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, or Armenia go to visit prisons in Denmark, Belgium, or Sweden, they come back as if they have been to outer space. They [our partners from the East] told us that even the conditions of sanatoria in their home countries are not as good as the conditions in the prisons [in the Western countries they visited]. The*

same could be said about the areas of self-government, the educational system, health care, or the psychiatric wards in hospitals. . . . We [in Poland] have a similar experience with a totalitarian system. And we have successfully got out of this system. You cannot overestimate the importance of these issues. We have a common point of reference and we share similar values. Poland stands for an example that one can [do it], and it is worthwhile to take this road [to self-determination]" (r19_34). A Belarusian interviewee admitted that Polish consultants engaged in Belarus *"are more knowledgeable than the French or the Germans"* (r23-11). Another aid professional, who has been engaged in transferring the Polish experience with reform of the self-government, put it this way: *"Polish experts are credible, they understand the mentality of Ukrainians, their soul. . . . [The German consultant] is probably wiser than I am, but he has no sense of what communism was, what it means to be a Slav, that we drink vodka together"* (r17_15). In addition to this anecdote-like comparison, the same respondent highlighted the "community of experience", "intuitive knowledge", "competence", "background", "sensitivity", and "synergy" as the strengths of Polish engagement in the Eastern Partnership countries.

Another interviewee, who prior to his engagement in the NGDO sector used to work for an international organisation providing humanitarian aid in various places in the world, pointed out some other advantages of Polish aid: *"Poland has experience in all kinds of transformation, be it democratic or developmental ones. . . . But also, Poland has a neutral image in the world. We, Poles, are canny and we are good at manoeuvring, which helps us find solutions in various situations which other organisations or people would find insurmountable. . . . We are not only capable of working in difficult circumstances, but we also have greater respect for our partners"* (r4_14). According to the same respondent, the facts that Poland is a newcomer to development cooperation (and, by extension, did not have the opportunity to have her reputation sullied), and also has an intuitive understanding of the challenges partner countries face, likewise stand for the comparative advantage of Polish aid. "Adherence to freedom", "defiance", "[the promotion of] human rights and liberties" were in the opinion of another respondent the Polish "*spécialité de la maison*" worth sharing (r19_34).

In fact, respondents who were proponents of the idea that the trademark of Poland in development cooperation is the country's experience with peaceful transformation, were clear about specify-

ing their understanding of democratisation and development. As one of them explained, *"Poland does not believe in development without empowerment. . . . I say empowerment, not liberal democracy. Just as we check whether gender balance and environmental protection have been taken into account, we should be paying attention in our projects whether, as an outcome of these projects, the local communities have gained a little bit ownership*" (r6_22). Other respondents' statement were in tune with this vision: *"it is not so much sharing our Polish patents of problem-solving . . . but creating space for independence, so that [our partners] can come into their own"* (r14_8) and *"In Asia we are better off [than established Western donors], because we understand the cultural specificity of these countries. We are capable of not imposing democratisation and participation [as it is understood in the West], but identify the existing mechanism on the spot . . . and involve the local leaders [to own the project], because this is how these communities have been functioning for thousands of years"* (r13_20). Another interviewee expressed a similar view, *"it is important to be aware of cultural differences... our partners should feel this is* their *project, that it is not imposed. We should be able to create the atmosphere of project community, an ownership"* (r21_10).

Moreover, a significant share of respondents claimed that rather than trying to impose on their partners their own visions, Polish NGDO activists are learning themselves in the process. Here are some instances of the openness interviewees showed towards their partners, *"We are the ones who learn from our foreign partners [in the Global South]. . . . Also, and this is an issue rarely talked about in Poland, because we are in this network with Western partners, we learn from them, too. . . . People who are not engaged [in development cooperation] tend to think that ours is some philanthropy, sacrifice, or that we are the ones who help. But what we, Polish NGOs, get is a win-win situation. We are the ones being enriched"* (r14_8). Via their engagement in development cooperation, other aid professionals came to the conclusion that oftentimes it is their partners from the Global South, who have the know-how, and not the other way around, *"we realized that the competence is on their side"* (r22_36) and *"I learnt that, in many cases, it is our local partners who should be doing some of the things, they are much more effective and efficient than I am"* (r2_7). Some of the interviewees actually talked about their cooperation with partners in the Global South with humility, *"in the development cooperation sector it*

is crucial to apply the anthropological approach. One should go native; one should accept and live the life of local people. I cannot imagine living in a bunker, which I would occasionally leave to help those poor people. This would be lack of respect, disdain [on our part]" (r20_11).

However, not all agreed that Poland's comparative advantage in the area of development cooperation is its transformation experience, nor that successful projects should have both development and democratisation elements. One of the interviewees argued, *"So far Poland hasn't created its own comparative advantage. . . . In Poland everything is politicised. The most pressing problem is that political and developmental issues are conflated"* (r20_12). Another respondent explained why she thought the transformation experience of Poland is not transferable: *"I do not believe such experience can be 'sold', it was the resultant of too many factors. . . . But I think we could create our own specialisation [in development cooperation]"* (r14_8). The opinion of another research participant substantiated this last argument, *"There is no such thing as Polish comparative advantage in development cooperation. We could be good at any freely chosen issue we decide to be good at and train people who would be good at that issue [in development cooperation]. . . . Indeed, we have no colonial past in the South, but this [argument] does not apply to the East. So the idea that we should be engaged in the East, because we have experience [cooperating with these countries], is reminiscent of the way Britain justifies her engagement in former British colonies. . . . What we consider in Poland to be our comparative advantage, is the flaw of our system"* (r3_10).

Such opinions are marginal, yet they highlight overlooked aspects of assistance delivered by Polish entities. Most research participants albeit considered the Polish experience with transformation relevant to its development cooperation activity. Some thought, though, that actually the time has passed when Poland could have shared her transformation experience. As one interviewee explained, *"it was [during] the first decade after the transformation that Poland should have shared its transformation experience. . . . Since we didn't use this great potential back then, perhaps at present there are other things we could boast about . . . so the more that the former leaders of this [Polish] transformation do not currently have a say"* (r24_13). Another respondent, who is a Belorussian, was of the opinion that a decade ago Polish NGOs' cooperation with Belarus was more attractive and possibly more effective. She admitted that in Poland *"a decade ago it was possible to make*

a career working with Belarus. It was hot, interesting, trendy. . . . One could be a pioneer back then. . . . But now, twenty years since Lukashenko has been in power, many people [in Poland] just gave up [engagement in Belarus]" (r23-11).

According to an interviewee who implements projects in Africa, development cooperation should be an element of a larger strategy that encompasses the purposeful internationalisation of the country, *"Unless our foreign policy starts viewing [development cooperation] as an instrument to develop our own country and if we keep focusing on the East for political reasons, development cooperation will be like a square peg in a round hole"* (r1_8). On the other hand, NGDOs engaged in the Eastern Partnership countries, held the opposite view. As one respondent opined, *"Africa is still a black land for us, meaning that we know nothing about it"* (r13_20). Another interviewee put it bluntly: *"Poland has an interest in [cooperating with] Eastern [partners]. Poland has very limited interest in Africa"* (r4_14). The discrepancy of these opinions is indicative of the lingering gap between developmental and democratising NGOs, or between aid professionals working in Africa and those engaged in the Eastern Partnership countries.

In fact, the discussion whether democratisation or development could be the comparative advantage of Polish aid is a reflection of the wider cleavage on the competing notions of Polish public diplomacy, where "modernity fights with tradition; a pro-European stance with a national-conservative position"[65]. This cleavage in understanding the national identity in Poland explains the failure of the 2004 branding campaign. In 2005 Wally Olins' notion of "creative tension" along with the respective logo were eventually abandoned. The concept of "creative tension" adequately reflected the characteristic feature of Poland as a nation in a state of tension, which goes for seemingly impossible feats. In a way, the lack of agreement about the comparative advantage of Poland in development cooperation fits into this more general debate about the nature of the indigenous Polish spirit. Rather than trying to unravel the issue of whether Polish aid would be better off focusing on democratisation or development interventions, one should focus on the underlying common threads. As the quotations

[65] B. Ociepka. 2013. "New Members' Public Diplomacy" in M. K. Davis Cross and J. Melissen. (eds). *European Public Diplomacy. Soft Power at Work*. New York, p. 52.

presented above indicate, the strengths of Polish aid lie in the legacy of *Solidarity*, the hands-on experience with transformation and cooperation with foreign funders and the subsequent credibility of Polish aid professionals, the still relevant community of fate with other nations who have experienced living under a totalitarian system, the neutral image of the country, and the in-between developmental status of the nation. As the then American president Ronald Reagan famously said in his speech to the members of the British Parliament in London on June 8 1982,

> *In the center of Warsaw, there is a sign that notes the distances to two capitals. In one direction it points toward Moscow. In the other it points toward Brussels, headquarters of Western Europe's tangible unity. The marker says that the distances from Warsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are equal. The sign makes this point: Poland is not East or West. Poland is at the center of European civilization. It has contributed mightily to that civilization. It is doing so today by being magnificently unreconciled to oppression. Poland's struggle to be Poland and to secure the basic rights we often take for granted demonstrates why we dare not take those rights for granted*[66]

Furthermore, as David Kupchan persuasively argued, democracy assistance should be just one component of a long-term vision to eradicate tyranny "rather than serve as a defining objective"[67]. Having in mind the increasing fragmentation of the world order and the resulting disaggregation of hegemony, our nonetheless interdependent world would need responsible governance, rather than liberal democracy[68].

Other areas of NGDOs' activity

In 2008 Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz argued that the "commitment and experience of NGOs in Poland's eastern neighbours" along with the "transnationalisation of democracy assistance efforts of Polish NGOs

[66] President Ronald Reagan's 1982 speech to members of the British Parliament in the Royal Gallery at the Palace of Westminster in London.

[67] C.A. Kupchan. 2012. *No One's World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*. New York, p. 192–3.

[68] Ibid., p. 189.

through [their] participation in European networks" have been the most important strengths of Polish democracy assistance[69]. Indeed, researchers among other EU new member states have highlighted the seminal role played by NGOs in both creating public awareness about development-related issues and advocating for greater involvement in development cooperation at political level[70]. This has been achieved *inter alia* by NGOs' engagement in public diplomacy and global education.

Polish NGDOs have played an important role in raising awareness about the need to be involved in development cooperation. They use various tools, including expertise, cooperation with mainstream media, global education, and international volunteering, to influence national and international public opinion in this respect[71]. As such, the Polish NGDO sector has emerged as the major non-state actor involved in public diplomacy in the field of development aid and democracy promotion[72]. NGDOs have been argued to fulfill a number of functions in public diplomacy. They contribute to establishing the brand of Poland on the international arena. In Poland those NGDOs initiate projects in global education, which target not only the young generation, but also the public opinion in general.

NGDOs have been instrumental in informing the public opinion by providing materials for the mainstream media, too. As the publicist Andrzej Brzeziecki noticed, NGOs have turned into "indispensable prosthesis" for the media, especially regarding developments taking place abroad[73]. Representatives of Polish NGDOs residing abroad

---

69 P. Kaźmierkiewicz. 2008. "Eastern Promises and Achievements. Poland's Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities" in J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt (eds.) *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement*. Praga, p. 82.

70 S. Lightfoot and I.L. Zubizarreta. 2011 "The Emergence of International Development Policies in Central and Eastern European States" in P. Hoebink (ed.) *European Development Cooperation: in between the Local and the Global*. Amsterdam, p. 178.

71 K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid…".

72 B. Ociepka. 2014. "Public Diplomacy in the European Union: Models for Poland," PISM Policy Paper, no 5 (88), February.

73 A. Brzeziecki. 2013. "Niezbędna proteza" in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24.07.2013.

provide first-hand information and expertise for national media. NGDOs also fund Polish journalists' visits abroad. Finally, it should be pointed out that unlike the majority of development cooperation projects, which have been taking place in countries of the Eastern Partnership, global education projects focus *more* on raising awareness about the problems in the Global South[74].

Keeping in mind the increasing importance of development education and awareness raising (DEAR) initiatives in the EU development policy, the comparative advantage of Polish NGDOs in the area of development education is an asset. DEAR initiatives provide citizens with tools to understand the increasing complexity of global development issues. DEAR is also an area where NGDOs from Poland and the other NMS can compete for EU funds with NGDOs from the established donor countries. In fact, NGDOs from the 13 NMS have participated on an equal footing with NGDOs from the "old" EU member states at the 2013 DEAR call for proposals (44% and 50% respectively)[75]. As pointed out previously, between 2004 and 2013 in the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance NGDOs from the 13 EU NMS were awarded respectively 0,75% and 0,41% of the total funding for these areas. By contrast, EU NMS NGDOs working in the area of development education obtained 14,1% of the EC DEAR funding. The positive discriminatory measures applied to the area of development cooperation clearly helped NGDOs from the EU NMS to obtain more funding from the EU than they tapped in the field of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. In 2012 less than 1,5% of bilateral aid distributed by the MFA was spent on global education and related activities[76]. According to the Development Cooperation Plan for 2016, about 2,4% of the state budget target reserve to be dispensed by the MFA for development cooperation is earmarked for global education activities[77]. In spite of the relatively limited share of Polish aid funds earmarked for global education, NGDOs have been

[74] K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. op. cit., p. 172.

[75] *Development Education and Awareness Raising (DEAR) Stakeholder conference* organised by DEVCO EC 5-6.X.2015 in Brussels.

[76] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2013. *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2012*. Warszawa, p. 22.

[77] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015a. *Plan współpracy rozwojowej w 2016 r*.

instrumental in bringing global education issues to the attention of the general public and schools' curricula[78].

As one of my respondents, who has been in the process of becoming more and more engaged in development education activities at home, admitted, *"after all these years [working in development cooperation] I can see how interrelated some issues are. If we are not capable of speaking in a sane way about the rights of women in Poland, how can we shape those standards in the world?"* (r24_13). Another respondent justified the engagement of her organisation in promoting human rights and freedoms' education at home and abroad the following way, *"we figured out such education would act as a safety catch against the return of the totalitarian system"* (r19_34). A couple of other research participants shared their view that Polish society needs global education and argued that work has to be done also at home, not only by providing development assistance abroad. One of the interviewees, who gave up on engagement in development cooperation for the sake of focusing on global education at home, said, *"I wanted to work in Africa, and I went there. . . . But later on I figured out that rather than getting frustrated at the level of effectiveness of development interventions, more education is needed. [Global] education is not in contraposition to development cooperation; it is rather an assessment of its effectiveness. I realised that what takes place in the Global North has a bigger impact on the lives of people in the Global South, than the digging of yet another well. . . . The change we aim after here, towards openness to diversity and towards responsibility, is a challenge. We keep asking ourselves if teachers themselves are sometimes unprepared to think critically, can they teach kids to be open-minded?"* (r5_8). The fact that as many as half of my respondents were also involved in global education is indicative of the great importance NGDO activists attach to DEAR activities.

International volunteering is another distinct way allowing individuals to get engaged in development cooperation. The UN International Year of Volunteers in 2001 raised the political and legal recognition of volunteers and their social importance. The European Year of Volunteering, which took place in 2011, likewise aimed at attracting economic and political support for international volunteering. The Polish MFA has been implementing the Polish Aid Volunteering Pro-

[78] *Edukacja globalna w polskiej szkole. Raport z badań wśród nauczycielek i nauczycieli III etapu edukacyjnego*. 2013. Warszawa, p. 45.

gramme since 2008. Polish NGOs supported by the MFA also send out volunteers abroad. Young people in Poland are increasingly interested themselves in taking part in international volunteering programmes. Polish NGOs have a long and established tradition of working with volunteers. As of 2015, altogether 5142 NGOs declared they promote and support volunteerism[79]. According to the *Report on Returning Volunteers' Involvement in Global Education in Poland*[80], about 400 Poles take part in volunteering abroad schemes annually. Most of these volunteers went to Africa and the former Soviet states. The report concludes that volunteering abroad can best serve global education if the volunteering experience is a stage in the professional career of the volunteer, where the volunteer possesses previous interest in development cooperation and global education, and views the volunteering mission as an award and opportunity to enhance his/her personal and professional capacity to work in global education[81]. Indeed, one researcher suggested that NGDOs' function as public policy actors in the area of international volunteering is more of a side effect than an intended consequence of their activities[82]. Nonetheless, Polish NGDOs have been at the forefront as stakeholders enabling the involvement of returning international volunteers in their work, thus capitalising on the know-how those volunteers gained during their experience abroad. The seminal role individuals have played in the growth of the NGDO sector itself will be addressed in the last chapter.

It should be noted that in addition to secular NGDOs, the Polish Roman Catholic missionaries in Africa are yet another actor that should be credited for its engagement in supporting individuals and communities in the Global South. Indeed, in the literature there are dissenting opinions whether religious organisations should be considered part of the non-profit sector. However, as far as development assistance is concerned, according to the researcher of voluntary associations David Korten, some North-based and South-based NGDOs

---

79 Accessed 04.03.2016. at http://bazy.ngo.pl/search/wyniki.asp?wyniki=1&kryt_nazwa=&kryt_miasto=&kryt_woj=&kryt_pola=28.

80 *Raport o zaangażowaniu wolontariuszy po powrocie z misji zagranicznych*. 2013. Kraków.

81 Ibid.

82 K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid," pp. 170–171.

had roots in church- or mission-related activities. Many of the contemporary internationally-oriented NGOs were originally established to help victims of World War II in Europe, including the Catholic Relief Services[83]. Charitable activities in the South often were church-related, while depending on funds and commodities from the North[84]. In fact, Catholic missions' mode of activity is similar to the one undertaken by the so-called first-generation of NGDOs presented earlier, the "doers", which focus on responding on immediate and visible needs, and where the beneficiary is a passive recipient. Undoubtedly, Catholic missions' vision of development assistance is specific and does not comply with state-of-the-art standards of providing development cooperation. Nonetheless, given the continuing presence of Polish missionaries in countries which have been traditional recipients of aid, the participation of some Church-related organisations in the Polish NGDOs' umbrella group and their impact on the decision-making processes in *Grupa Zagranica*, as well as the fact that (especially in the beginning of the establishment of the Polish aid programme) Polish missionaries played a role in supporting the MFA, it would be unjustified to avoid discussing their role in development assistance provided by Polish entities.

In 2007 there were 919 Polish missionaries in Africa[85]. As of 2016, there are 2121 Polish missionaries in 94 countries, mostly in Africa and Latin America[86]. Polish missionaries' first-hand experience with supporting communities in Africa made them a natural partner for the Polish embassies, which started implementing development cooperation projects. As one of the respondents recalled, *"initially, [the MFA] tapped Polish missionaries' [know-how], because back then they were the ones who knew Africa better [than other entities]*" (r16_10). In a way, unlike Polish NGDOs, Polish missionaries related to the Catholic Church are more independent, because they have not had to rely on the Polish state to fund their activities. However, as one interviewee noted,

---

83 D. Korten. 1990. *Getting to the 21st century: voluntary action and the global agenda*. USA, p. 116.

84 Ibid.

85 D. Kopiński. 2012. "Visegrád Countries' Development Aid to Africa," p. 46–7.

86 *Konfederacja episkopatu Polski* (http://episkopat.pl/kosciol/kosciol_w_swiecie/polacy_na_misjach/4532.1,Polscy_misjonarze_w_swiecie.html accessed 26.02.2016).

although some Polish NGOs engaged in development cooperation are closely related to missionaries, Polish missionaries in general *"have significantly less impact on shaping [the Polish development cooperation] policy, also because they do not take part in consultation processes"* (r9_12). Apparently, financial independence comes at a price. The case of Polish NGDOs is illustrative of the argument that the dependence on public funds serves as an incentive to look for ways to shape public policy in the field of development cooperation.

Conclusion

To understand how NGDOs built their capacity in development cooperation, one has to go back to the beginning of the transformation period when foreign donors and especially American ones, supported transnational cooperation among the countries from East-Central Europe and the post-Soviet states. Some of the individuals and NGOs from Poland stood out and eventually became favoured by those funders. In addition to engaging in trans-border cooperation, Polish NGOs started to play a role in cultural and public diplomacy, too. The fact is that whereas politically and economically the country was oriented towards the West, Polish civil society got engaged in rebuilding the neighbourhood and re-establishing contacts with post-Soviet states on new principles. This observation still holds true. Actually, as it would be demonstrated in the last chapter, one of the incentives for individuals to become aid professionals has been their authentic interest in regions and countries that the mainstream public disregards, except for touristic purposes. Thus, the tendency to run against the current, as far as the choice of countries of cooperation is concerned, characterises aid professionals in Poland.

Although intuitively one could expect that the experience some Polish NGOs gained in trans-border cooperation in the beginning of the transformation would be relevant when the country became a donor itself, it turned out that the transfer from recipient to donor is not as straightforward as one could initially presume. Not only those experiences are not always transferable, but also some of the former beneficiaries of foreign aid admitted that one easily forgot what it meant to be a recipient. Furthermore, the institutional memory was lost in some of the NGOs as far as the donor-partner relationship is concerned. Besides, it transpired that the syndrome of the recipient

has stayed with the society and with its political representation accordingly. It is the uprooting of this syndrome that seems to be the biggest challenge the society faces. It is a task that has to be jointly tackled by all stakeholders in development cooperation.

The NGDO sector itself faces various challenges, the most pressing of which appears to be the lack of financial security. Unlike their western counterparts, Polish NGDOs do not have the financial stability their colleagues in advanced industrial nations enjoy. As a corollary of that, most Polish NGDOs are not competitive when it comes to accessing EU funds for development cooperation or global education activities. A particularly interesting characteristic of the NGDO sector in Poland is that it comprises of a rather wide variety of organisations as far as their genesis and the respective philosophy of providing aid are concerned. It is a positive sign that the NGDOs' umbrella organisation gathers representatives of wide scope of organisations. At the same time, the process where Roman Catholic missionaries and representatives of secular NGDOs engaged in democratisation, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and/or global education try to establish a common code of conduct to guide their work, is fraught with difficulties.

The most important divide, however, is between democratising and developmental NGDOs, or between NGOs active in Eastern Partnership countries and those engaged in Africa. Most of democratising NGDOs used to be beneficiaries of foreign aid when Polish NGOs received external support under the slogan of democratisation. Most of the developmental type of NGDOs evolved later on. Whereas interviewees' comments predominantly substantiated the argument about the continuing relevance of this divide, NGDOs from these two "camps" have come to learn from each other and to truly appreciate each other's work. This development is indicative of maturation of the NGDO sector and its consolidation. NGDO activists have come to realise that it is not so much the first-hand experience with transformation that represents the country's *spécialité de la maison* in development cooperation. According to aid professionals I interviewed, it is living under a totalitarian system, the legacy of *Solidarity*, the neutral international image of the nation, the credibility of assistance provided by Polish aid professionals, and the in-between developmental status of the country that stand for its real comparative advantage in development cooperation.

Currently the country provides both developmental and political support to partner countries, with an emphasis on politically-oriented democracy assistance. Some researchers are sceptical about the feasibility of transferring the transition experience to other countries. Yet, there are reasons to believe that it is not so much a matter of sharing concrete solutions that fulfill the "one size fits all" condition. The comparative advantage of the nation should rather be understood as a matter of the credibility of Polish experts and organisations and the comparable proximity of the level of development of Poland and its partner countries. In addition to providing development and humanitarian assistance abroad, more and more of Polish NGDOs are getting involved in development education and awareness raising activities. In fact, this process is accelerated by the increasing awareness among NGDO activists that development cooperation by itself will not solve the problems of the Global South. The very experience of working in development was an opportunity for aid professionals to come to the conclusion that our world is interconnected and it takes concerted effort in the Global South and the Global North alike to solve global problems. The formulation of the *Sustainable Development Goals*, which unlike the expired *Millennium Development Goals* foresee the concerted effort of all nations to achieve those goals, are likewise indicative of the change of thinking about development as such,

The need for global education is so the more pressing bearing in mind that although Poland became an OECD DAC member in 2013, thus joining the club of traditional donors, the country still has not reached even the threshold of 0,33% of its GNI earmarked for development cooperation. In fact, in spite of its declared support for the nations' engagement in development cooperation, the public opinion is not in favour of *increasing* the amount of this support. The lack of political championship to advocate for the boost of the volume of aid further exacerbates the chances to move beyond the current commitments of the country in the area of development assistance. Therefore, NGDOs have a further role to play to bring to the attention of the public opinion and all stakeholders engaged in development cooperation the perspective of the partner countries.

4 The evolution of the Polish development cooperation system

Aid is a choice.
Sometimes a pitiless one[1]

This chapter addresses the following research questions: What has been the dynamics of the relationship between the Polish NGDO sector and the governmental Polish aid? What role has the NGDOs' umbrella organisation *Grupa Zagranica* played in the process? Which factors shaped the evolution of the Polish aid system? What are the characteristic traits of the Polish development cooperation programme? Does the priority focus and volume of Polish aid reflect the opinions of the public regarding the involvement of the country in development cooperation?

The beginnings of the cooperation between NGDOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

As mentioned in the introduction, the first official Polish aid projects took place in 1998. Hence, the cooperation between Polish NGOs active abroad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started before

[1] Janina Ochojska 2014 in "Janina Ochojska. Czy jesteś dobrym człowiekiem?". 2014. Grzegorz Sroczyński talking with Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Duży Format*, 07.08.2014.

the Polish aid system was officially established in 2004. This inter-stakeholder cooperation also facilitated the institutionalisation of the formal networking of Polish NGOs engaged abroad. In December 1999 the *Stefan Batory Foundation* and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-organized the conference "NATO, the European Union and East Central Europe. NGOs in Polish foreign policy"[2]. This conference also gave Polish NGOs active abroad the opportunity to exchange information with each other. Decision was taken to establish a sub-portal www.go2east.ngo.pl dedicated to NGOs' cooperation with partners from countries to the east of Poland[3]. The name of this portal is indicative of the roots of Polish NGDOs. As the previous chapter demonstrated, these roots are clearly grounded in democratisation projects targeting Poland's eastern neighbours. This sub-portal functioned as the first internet site for information-sharing and cooperation among Polish NGDOs.

Grupa Zagranica, the NGDOs' umbrella organisation currently having 61 members, held its first meeting on 26 March 2001[4]. The establishment of *Grupa Zagranica* resulted from a process to build a federation of NGOs active abroad. Initially NGOs engaged to the east of Poland had their secretariat in the *Stefan Batory Foundation*. Justyna Janiszewska, who later on superseded Krzysztof Stanowski as the president of the managing board of the Education for Democracy Foundation, run the first secretariat of *Grupa Zagranica* located in *Stefan Batory Foundation* in between 2003 and 2006. As one respondent recalled, in those early days *"Batory Foundation was mothering the other NGOs [engaged abroad] and was closely related with Grupa Zagranica"* (r7_17). The previously mentioned East East programme at the *Batory Foundation* became a natural agora for NGOs active abroad, which in the beginning of the century mostly consisted of NGOs involved in the East. Networking support for NGOs was provided back then also by the *Polish-American Freedom Foundation*

---

[2] "NATO, Unia Europejska, Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia. Organizacje pozarządowe w polskiej polityce zagranicznej," Falenty, 12.1999.

[3] K. Stanowski. 2002. "Z kart historii współpracy polskich organizacji pozarządowych w III RP a partnerami zagranicznymi" in G. Czubek (ed.) 2002. *Międzynarodowa działalność polskich organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa, p. 5.

[4] *Polska–Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa, p. 95.

(PAFW) and Trialog. The Trialog project has been led by the Austrian organisation HORIZONT3000, which specialized in monitoring and implementation of development cooperation projects. Trialog facilitated the networking among NGDOs at both national and international levels. This NGDOs' capacity-building project also served to integrate NGDOs' national platforms into the European NGDOs' confederation CONCORD[5].

As one of the respondents recalled, *"this was networking support [for NGOs engaged abroad], it was the result of the wider strategy implemented by Batory Foundation and PAFW to enhance networking among NGOs in selected areas of activities. The NGOs involved in the East were identified as one of those target groups. . . . In fact, with the exception of the networking support for NGOs engaged abroad, the other networking efforts targeting branch NGOs failed. [PAFW and Batory Foundation's networking efforts directed towards NGOs engaged abroad] were intertwined with efforts on behalf of the EU, namely by Trialog"* (r15_10). In other words, the grassroots self-organisation of NGOs active abroad towards federalisation of their activities was met with support from other institutions active on both national (*Batory Foundation*, PAFW) and international level (Trialog). The same respondent also talked about the impact of foreign donors on the government in the field of development cooperation: *"along with supporting the establishment of Grupa Zagranica, the same [capacity-building] efforts were directed towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MFA was lobbied, mostly by the European Union, but also by OECD and the UN*" (r15_10). Another interviewee explained why institutionalisation of the network of Polish NGOs engaged abroad became necessary, *"[NGDOs' network institutionalisation] was triggered by the EU membership. . . . The European Commission does not communicate with single entities, but with platforms. . . . To formally join CONCORD, the European [NGDOs'] platform, we had to have legal personality... In the meantime the government also caught up. . . . They were trained by the Canadians. . . . What is more, [CIDA] knew that for Polish aid to kick off, they need non-governmental partners, so CIDA also supported Grupa Zagranica*" (r10_17). The cooperation between Poland and Canada in the area of development cooperation took place under the *Official Development Assistance in Central*

[5] Trialog. 2014a. *Trialog in the enlarged EU. 15 years supporting civil society to engage in development.* Vienna, pp. 9–11.

Europe Programme in between 2002 and 2008. The programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of the then new EU member states as donors. Under this programme, line ministries in the target countries received institutional support and capacity building. Trilateral joint projects were implemented, too[6]. Therefore, foreign aid targeting both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders was instrumental in strengthening the capacity of these actors and, by extension, the development of the Polish aid system.

All commentators agree that a milestone date in the institutionalisation of the dialogue between Polish NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 2002. In 2002 the Polish NGDOs initiated contacts with the MFA by convincing the then minister of foreign affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz about the need for Poland to provide funds for development cooperation on a regular basis. Here is how interviewees remembered this process, *"[Jakub] Boratyński [from Batory Foundation] was the main mover and shaker [of this process]. It was NGOs however who initiated the cooperation [with the ministry]. Cimoszewicz was the foreign minister back then. . . . Cimoszewicz looked like he felt the need to undertake dialogue with NGDOs and he personally participated in these meetings . . . later on this dialogue [between NGDOs and the line ministry] underwent routinisation*" (r25_18).

In fact Cimoszewicz's role was not limited to attending the conference in 2002. As one of the respondents recalled, *"It was Cimoszewicz's initiative to establish the Council for Cooperation with NGOs"* (r7_13). The Council was instituted on November 19, 2002[7]. The coverage of the agenda of the Council's first meeting indicates the agential role NGDOs played in the process of developing the priorities of the Polish aid system back then. The fact that the then minister of foreign affairs personally took part in this seminal conference in 2002 is to this date appreciated by Polish NGDO activists. At the same time, they are painfully aware that this level of cooperation is hardly attainable at present,

[6] See https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Konferencja,podsumowujaca,programy,Polsko-Kanadyjskiej,Wspolpracy,Rozwojowej,i,Edukacji,Rozwojowej,447.html accessed 18.02.2016 and http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/poland-pologne/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/cooperation.aspx?lang=eng accessed 23.02.2016.

[7] M. Dobranowska. 2003. *Inauguracyjne posiedzenie Rady ds. współpracy z organizacjami pozarządowymi przy Ministrze Spraw Zagranicznych [relacja].*

"Right now I cannot imagine a [development cooperation] conference attended by the minister [of foreign affairs]. The deputy minister may drop in at a conference for five minutes and say s/he is glad [about us NGDOs]" (r5_8). The lack of political championship has clearly been one of the major factors that also preclude the increase of the share of GDP Poland earmarks to development cooperation.

During the 2002 conference "Social diplomacy", Polish NGOs working abroad finalized the draft document *Partnership in Foreign Policy. A proposal for co-operation between public authorities and non-governmental organisations* and presented it to minister Cimoszewicz. During this conference Cimoszewicz praised the seminal role played by NGOs in the area of social diplomacy and called for NGOs' further engagement in this field. He said:

> *The organizers of this meeting have also emphasized that the activities of NGOs are complementary to the activities of government. I would go even further than that and say that they can and should be substitutive in many areas. Whenever public institutions cannot take up certain projects because of protocol or political correctness, there is much room for civil initiative. It should be stressed that there are numerous fields where NGOs are irreplaceable and these are areas critical to the public interest (e.g. co-operation between societies)*[8]

One of the postulates raised in the *Proposal for co-operation between public authorities and non-governmental organisations* was broadening the definition of international aid to take into account the support provided by Poland to its eastern neighbours and other CIS countries[9]. As mentioned in the previous chapter, initially Polish aid did not differentiate between aid going to the country's eastern neighbours and other aid recipients. It was NGOs who advocated for the enhanced focus on Poland's eastern neighbours. However, the fact that eventually Polish aid started to earmark 70% of its bilateral assistance to this group of countries was related to the launching of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009. As one of the respondents recalled, *"it is a relatively recent idea that the countries from the Eastern Partnership are to become [Polish aid's] priority countries"* (r16_10).

---

[8] G. Czubek (ed.) 2002. *Social Diplomacy. The Case of Poland International activity of Polish NGOs and their dialogue with government*. Warsaw, p. 20.

[9] Ibid., pp. 12–13.

Whereas there is no doubt that Polish civil society has been cooperating internationally since the 1980s and that this engagement abroad intensified and institutionalised after the toppling of communism, the opinions about the role the NGDO sector played in the emergence of the Polish governmental development assistance programme are divided. In terms of the "hen or egg" causality dilemma, one is entitled to ask who lead the effort of establishing the priorities of Polish aid system: NGDOs or the line ministry? Respondents are not unanimous regarding this issue. One of them argued, *"The egg were definitely NGOs, because they were the first [to initiate dialogue with the government]"* (r5_8). Another representative of the NGDO sector noted that because of their prior experience with providing development cooperation, *"NGDOs served as an inspiration [for the Department for Development Cooperation]"* (r9_12). Another interviewee, who likewise worked in the MFA and took part in the establishment of Polish aid, opined, *"Initially the ministry was not very open [to dialogue with the NGOs]… we thought [Polish aid] is our, i.e. the MFA's domain. . . . This is not NGOs' domain, I was honestly surprised back then. . . . Proposals should be formulated by the ministry*" (r7_13). A SWOT analysis of Polish democracy assistance conducted a few years ago pointed out that the priorities of assistance were "still selected and defined by officials"[10].

The juxtaposition of the point of view of NGOs' representatives and officials of the MFA highlights two different interpretations of the reality of social dialogue between these stakeholders in the beginning of the establishment of Polish aid. NGOs found it natural that since they already had had the know-how and experience in development cooperation, they should be part of the process of the establishment of Polish aid. The line ministry, on the other hand, considered the bilateral cooperation system to be just another realm of foreign policy and therefore a field that should be developed using internal, i.e. inter-ministerial, resources. This finding however runs against the conviction presented by one researcher that May 1, 2004, the date when Poland joined the EU, is the milestone marking the engagement of the country in devel-

[10] S. Lightfoot and I.L. Zubizarreta. 2011. "The Emergence of International Development Policies in Central and Eastern European States" in P. Hoebink (ed.) *European Development Cooperation: in between the Local and the Global*. Amsterdam.

opment cooperation[11]. Indeed, Polish aid dates back to 2004 and the official narrative promotes the view of Poland as a country that become a donor in 2004. However, the NGO sector engaged abroad does not view 2004 as a caesura marking the engagement of Poland in development assistance. For one thing, NGOs have been engaged internationally (which included sharing experiences, providing humanitarian aid and development cooperation) *before* 2004. Also, the Polish state did provide some funds for development cooperation as early as 1998. As two of my respondents argued, *"Aid provided by NGOs is older than Polish aid"* (r7_13) and *"Polish NGOs got involved in development cooperation much earlier than state authorities"* (r9_12).

However, EU accession and the establishment of the Polish aid system institutionalised the regular cooperation between NGOs and the line ministry in the area of development cooperation. EU membership likewise spurred the process of institutionalisation of Polish aid. Since all new EU member states had to have their own development cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Polish bilateral cooperation programme *Polska pomoc* (Polish aid) in 2004. Polish NGOs became natural partners for the MFA and started implementing projects financed by Polish aid. One of my respondents noted, *"it was natural, anyway there weren't many people interested in development cooperation, hence those contacts among people from the academia, NGOs, state administration were natural"* (r9_12). Yet, it was not only NGDOs that considered their role in the process as especially important. Jan Hofmokl of the MFA likewise acknowledged NGDOs' pivotal role in the process of institutionalisation of Polish aid and establishing its priorities[12]. He admitted that before the MFA started developing the Polish aid system, Polish NGDOs possessed experience in development cooperation and resources, which the Ministry lacked. NGDOs likewise lobbied the then minister of foreign affairs that Poland should have its own bilateral aid programme[13].

---

[11] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2015. "Poland: Attempts at Defining Aid by Solidarity, Democracy and Development" in O. Horký-Hlucháň, S. Lightfoot (eds.) *Development Cooperation of the 'New' EU Member States. Beyond Europeanisation*. UK, p. 46.

[12] Jan Hofmokl in I. Dudkiewicz. 2015. *Razem dla świata, osobno dla siebie? MSZ a organizacje*. wiadomości.ngo.pl.

[13] Ibid.

Indeed, it has been argued that on technical level NGDOs have the leading role in their relationship with public institutions; however, their influence on policy is regarded as limited[14]. In the case of Poland, however, this observation does not do justice to a couple of factors. Perhaps the most palpable impact of the NGDO sector on public policy related to development cooperation has been achieved by the transfer of human resources from the NGDO sector to the governmental institutions. As one of my respondents put it, *"it is people from NGOs, who to a significant extent contributed to the present form of Polish aid"* (r6_22). The scale of the "brain-gain" the MFA received from staff who used to work in the NGDO sector has not been researched in depth, yet a number of sources identified this factor and its impact on the human resources of the MFA Department for Development Cooperation. Krzysztof Stanowski is perhaps the most important person to be mentioned in this respect. Mr. Stanowski has been long involved in the development of the NGO sector in Poland, especially in the area of education. In 2007 he moved to the Ministry of National Education and in 2010–2012 he acted as an undersecretary of state at the Polish MFA. The passing of the *Act on Development Co-operation* in 2011 should be attributed at least partially to his efforts. As one interviewee recalled, *"Krzysztof Stanowski knew by heart what was ailing the NGDO sector, so he undertook the strategic goal to bring about the adoption of the draft Act on Development Cooperation"* (r10_17). Also, Stanowski played an important role in the signing of the agreement among the MFA, the Ministry of Education, and the platform of Polish NGDOs *Grupa Zagranica*, to support global education in Poland. As one of the respondents reminisced, *"We were actually really lucky to have this agreement signed. Weren't it for minister Stanowski, this agreement wouldn't have seen daylight"* (r5_8). Mr Stanowski keeps playing an important role in Polish development cooperation, as since 2012 he has been the president of the management board of *Solidarity Fund*[15].

[14] B. Szent-Iványi, S. Lightfoot. 2015. *New Europe's New Development Aid*. Routledge, p. 153.

[15] Solidarity Fund PL (previously known as the Polish Foundation for International Cooperation for Development "Knowing How") is a State Treasury Foundation established in the late 1990s to provide aid to countries undergoing transformation. In 2005 the „Know-How" Foundation suspended its

NGDOs' impact on Polish aid has not been limited to the transfer of human resources only. As one of the participants of my research observed, *"Grupa Zagranica was really important stakeholder [in its early years]. Back then NGDOs were the main partners for the MFA Department for Development Cooperation, but the funds from the MFA were not decisive about functioning of NGDOs. So [during those first years of functioning of Polish aid] NGDOs had advantage in terms of know-how and in terms of resources. NGDOs shared their know-how with the MFA and supported the ministry to develop this new area in foreign policy. . . . NGDOs taught the MFA to organize tenders. The know-how developed in NGOs and was then transferred to the MFA. A couple of people, who now work in the department, came from the NGDO sector. [Since then] NGDOs have been gradually losing their advantage over the MFA*" (r5_8). This statement is in line with the opinions of other respondents, who were likewise convinced about the seminal role Polish NGOs, mostly those engaged to the east of Poland, played in the early years of the functioning of Polish aid.

Another respondent, who had the opportunity to take part in the establishment of Polish aid, did not find sufficient evidence for the argument that Polish NGDOs were the *leader* in the initial cooperation between the MFA and the NGDO sector. Nonetheless, this interviewee did not question the seminal role NGDOs played in the establishment of the Polish aid system. He namely argued that were it not for NGDOs' capacity and will to share their know-how and experience with the MFA, the Polish aid's mode of assistance delivery would have been different, and for the worse, than it is at present. This research participant, who used to work for the MFA, admitted, *"It is hard to say whether [Poland] started developing its aid programme because NGDOs had capacity and they convinced the MFA to organise tenders. However, weren't it for NGDOs, we might have kept organising those competitions and the project proposals would have been horrible, and the MFA would in the end have had to resort to providing budget support*[16]*. This [aid*

activities. In 2011, in accordance with the growing participation of Poland in development cooperation and democracy support, it was decided to reconstruct it. (http://solidarityfund.pl/en/fundacja1/o-fundacji).

[16] Budget support involves direct financial transfers to the national treasury of the partner country, conditional on policy dialogue, performance assessment and capacity building (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/budget-support/index_en.htm_en, accessed 16.02.2016).

modality] would have totally changed the Polish aid system and Poland would have been like Turkey. There are countries, which are emerging donors like Poland, and this is how they go about providing bilateral assistance" (r7_13).

A representative of the NGDO sector likewise opined that *"we NGDOs feel underappreciated. Polish aid wouldn't have been possible without us, NGOs. There might have been cooperation among self-governments. But without Polish NGOs, who have contact with local communities in our partner countries, Polish aid wouldn't have reached those people"* (r13_20). This comment highlights an aspect of the impact of NGDOs on Polish aid that has not been reflected in the literature so far. Namely, an emerging donor, who does not have established and experienced partners at home to implement development cooperation projects abroad, has two options. One is to resort to directly supporting the budgets of recipient countries, which practice has been known to increase the danger of aid fungibility. Another option is to "breed" NGOs that will be taught to consume the funds earmarked for development cooperation. The latter option is not limited to the development cooperation sector only. It has been described in the literature as "grantosis"[17]. In the case of Poland, none of these black scenarios took place, due to the fact that Poland already had well-established NGO sector with hands-on experience in democracy promotion, humanitarian aid, and civic education.

Politicians were likewise aware that in the early years of Polish aid the state did not have the know-how and human resources, unlike the Polish NGOs engaged in international cooperation which possessed both. Actually, in the beginning of the century, it was not unusual for top politicians to contact Polish NGOs active abroad in an attempt to tap *their* resources. This fact is likewise indicative of the advantage NGDOs used to have in terms of capacity over the governmental sector. For example, before Marek Belka became prime minister in 2004, in between June and October 2003 he was appointed a Chairman of the Council for International Coordination for Iraq and thus was responsible for international aid coordination for the reconstruction of Iraq. One interviewee recalled that at that time Mr. Belka organized a meeting with Polish NGOs engaged abroad and *"declared that the*

[17] Ewa Leś (2013) quoted in R. Gębura. 2013. *Sektorowy rachunek sumienia [relacja].*

government doesn't have funds for [development assistance] and he is meeting us to ask us [NGOs] to implement development cooperation projects [in Iraq] using own funds. We all had a hearty laugh and that's how it all ended" (r25_18). This anecdote-like story indicates the scope of the *demand* for entities possessing capacity and resources in development assistance and the lack of such capacity in the state sector at that time.

The impact of existing NGOs engaged abroad was enhanced by the establishment of *Grupa Zagranica*. Apart from meeting the obvious need to federalise NGOs engaged abroad, *Grupa Zagranica* as an entity in itself could soon boast its first success. As one of the participants in the events that lead to the founding of the umbrella organisation recalled, *"the role of Grupa Zagranica in the inception of the bill for development cooperation has been a crucial one*" (r10_17). Most respondents were however divided in their assessment of *Grupa Zagranica*'s subsequent effectiveness. Even those who viewed positively the role of the platform, were aware of its limitations, *"[initially] we, as Grupa Zagranica, were very strong. We used to be invited to parliamentary commissions. We were present at each legislative step, though, well, we have not been that successful, given that our major postulate hasn't been positively considered yet. Funds for development cooperation are still part of the national budget special purpose reserve*" (r10_17). Another interviewee expressed a similar opinion, *"Recent times have not been that good for Grupa Zagranica. The platform used to be stronger when it was established, than it is at present. . . . They [Grupa Zagranica] have those [membership] fees, and they have their own projects to implement"* (r18_16). The fact is not all NGOs engaged abroad could afford to pay those membership fees. As one research participant admitted, *"we are not members [of Grupa Zagranica] for two reasons. Firstly, we didn't think this membership could help us. And secondly, we don't have the resources to pay their membership fee. . . . Furthermore, we were under the impression Grupa Zagranica is not a real [NGDOs'] lobby group. It rather advocates for itself"* (r20_12). The fact the *Grupa Zagranica* funds its activity by collecting membership fees was held against it by representatives of a state institution and an NGO alike, *"for a long time now Grupa Zagranica was funded by [membership] fees. It did not want public money*" (r6_22) and *"I hold it against Grupa Zagranica's management board that they can't make up their mind whether they want the MFA to support it, or not*" (r5_8).

At the same time, as it has been pointed out in other parts of this book, most NGDOs and *Grupa Zagranica* itself, face huge difficulties to secure funding for their administrative costs and to cover their "own contribution" to access EU funds[18]. This observation is reflected in the following quotation, *"Grupa was much more active 8–9 years ago. Now NGOs are not that ready to get engaged, because they conceive the effectiveness of the Grupa's interventions as low. . . . Probably this is also because many NGOs fight for survival and don't have the time and resources to participate [themselves] in the activities of the Grupa*" (r8_11). It could be the disagreement over values (reflected in the discussion regarding the Istanbul principles) has also contributed to the disengagement of some NGOs in the work of the umbrella group. As one of the respondents, who was not happy with the current policy of the platform, admitted, "*I like Grupa Zagranica less and less now… It has started to make me angry. They lost compass. . . . Grupa Zagranica has become EU's mouthpiece"* (r15_10). But then, not all research participants expressed dissatisfaction with the functioning of the NGDOs' platform. As one of them explained, *"Grupa Zagranica is a factor that facilitates the work of NGOs engaged abroad. It does not create [our interest in the East], it civilises this phenomenon"* (r17_15). The opinion of another respondent seems to represent a balanced judgment about the *Grupa*, *"Now that I've been observing Grupa Zagranica for ten years I can see that it cuts both ways. On the one hand, I honestly cannot disregard its achievements. The very fact that there is such platform, which – sometimes faster, sometimes clumsily – speaks up on issue related to development cooperation, is a success. The MFA has to take into account our opinion. . . . But then, when some of our postulates keep being disregarded . . . this breeds frustration"* (r8_11).

Viewed from outside, it could be said that the platform has reached its glass ceiling. One respondent observed that whereas *"the Grupa has not grown in strength, the MFA's [human resources engaged in development cooperation] increased tenfold*" (r5_8). After all, as suggested before, the MFA's Department for Development Cooperation's human resources has been strengthened also by people who used to work in

[18] For example, as of the beginning of 2016, NGOs from the 13 NMS were to contribute 5%, i.e. minimum 50 000 EUR, to an EU-funded project in development cooperation, which in practice disqualifies most NGOs from the region to apply for grants from the EU (see for example Kramers 2015).

the NGDO sector. Furthermore, as another respondent noted, at present there are more people in the Department for Development Cooperation *"who intend on building their own career in the field of development co-operation. . . . Before that it was diplomats, who would work in the department for a while, in between [coming from] one diplomatic mission and [going to] another. At present we can see that there are people there, who have the knowledge and try to understand these issues*" (r10_17). Another respondent was of the opinion that *"a lot has changed, as if light years [have passed]. I am really impressed by the Department for Development Cooperation, the speed with which they process tenders*" (r2_7). Her words were corroborated by an interviewee who admitted that *"in terms of management of the system, since 2004 the jump [made by Polish aid] has been huge"* (r3_10). The professionalisation of the Department's activities has been accompanied by a change in its relationship with NGDOs. The following statement adequately describes this process, *"I can say that the initial euphoria of cooperation [between NGDOs and the Department], when Poland joined the EU, has passed now. The times when these relations were characterised by tensions, derived by the lack of mutual understanding, have passed, too. Now the time of maturity in our relations has started. . . . Both sides have learnt . . . an understanding was reached as to the role NGDOs play in development co-operation, which [understanding] was not at all evident in 2005*" (r9_12).

At the same time, however, as another interviewee noted, the lack of security regarding workers' long-term employment is ailing not only the NGDO sector, but also the MFA Department for Development Cooperation. She said, *"In my opinion, more people move from the MFA to work in an NGDO [than the other way around]. The Department [for Development Cooperation] doesn't employ [all] its staff on a full-time basis. . . . Just like in NGOs, once the project is over, these people lose their jobs. This is the reason for the low professionalisation of the Polish development assistance system, because these people's [capacity] is not utilised. . . . But then, most ministries do not hire new workers full-time [any more]*" (r3_10). In a way, the fates of many individuals engaged in development cooperation – whether by working for the NGO sector or in the line ministry – are comparable, as they are not free from the threat of precarity. Projectariat[19] is another term that grasps the reality

[19] "Projectariat" is a distinct type of "precariat". Like precarious workers, projectariats engaged in NGOs face job insecurity and low remuneration.

where NGO activists depend on implementing projects to secure their living, i.e. they are not employed on work contract. Projectariat workers have no guarantee their next project proposal will win the bid and secure them with resources to work and make a living.

Representatives of the Department for Development Cooperation at the MFA were likewise of the opinion that NGDOs used to have comparative advantage over the MFA, which advantage NGDOs have now lost due to the development of the DDC itself and the stagnation of the Third sector[20]. The human and know-how capacity of the MFA came to outgrow the initially stronger capacity of the NGDO sector in this respect[21]. This diagnosis is in line with other analyses of the dynamics of the development of the Polish NGDO sector. Indeed, while the MFA enhanced its capacity in the area of development cooperation, the NGDO sector has been argued to decline towards stagnation[22].

The situation responsible for the stagnation of the NGDO sector can be described as Catch 22[23]. Namely, the postulate NGDOs have been repeatedly raising (also during the interviews conducted for this research and the national stakeholders' consultation meetings I attended) regarding the need to support their everyday activities, has been a bone of contention to both the MFA and the NGDO sector. On the one hand, the MFA has been repeatedly calling to NGDOs to lobby the Ministry of Finance to increase the amount of funds earmarked for bilateral development cooperation. Indeed, having in mind, on the one hand, the major role played by NGDOs in development cooperation and awareness raising initiatives, and – on the other – the still limited knowledge about and support for development cooperation exhibited

---

On the one hand, the reliance on grants imposes this system. On the other hand, some NGO leaders are of the opinion that involvement in NGOs should be voluntary based, and as such unpaid (see D. Owczarek in A. Banaszak. 2015. *Projektariat Ma Dość!*).

[20] J. Witkowski. 2015. *Dialog obywatelski w polskiej polityce rozwojowej – studium uwarunkowań*. Manuscript of PhD thesis defended at *Uniwersytet Szkoła Wyższa Psychologii Społecznej* in Warsaw, p. 192.

[21] Ibid., p. 246.

[22] I. Dudkiewicz. 2015. *Razem dla świata, osobno dla siebie?*

[23] *Catch 22* is a novel written by the American author Joseph Heller in 1961. The term Catch 22 refers to a frustrating situation, whereby mutually excluding rules and self-contradictory regulations (one is subject to but has no control over) make it impossible to come up with a solution.

by Polish society, NGDOs need to keep being involved in promoting development cooperation and advocate for increasing the Polish aid volume. However, NGDOs cannot afford to sustain long-term and intensive advocacy for and monitoring of decision-makers responsible for the issue, given that NGDOs have no regular sources to support their everyday activities[24]. Paradoxically, the lack of capacity of the NGDO sector to sustain its watchdog function exacerbates its chances to obtain (more) funds for its activities, which in turn limits its chances to win over political support for increasing the Polish aid volume. The crux of the matter is that funds for development cooperation come from the state's budget dedicated reserve and as such need to be disbursed during the calendar year. Hence, the argument of the MFA goes, at present NGDOs are not eligible for applying to Polish aid for funds for their everyday administration. However, a ray of light appeared in the *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016–2020*. It says that "activities aiming at building the capacity of non-governmental organisations as well as training and coaching targeting stakeholders participating in the implementation of development cooperation" are to be undertaken in the framework of this programme[25].

To sum up the discussion about the hen-or-egg dilemma, it would be most accurate to say that whereas NGDOs, which used to cooperate with foreign partners in East-Central Europe and in the post-Soviet space, were the ones that were the first natural partners for Polish aid, the state bilateral programme played a role in the emergence of NGOs engaged in traditional aid recipient countries in Africa and Asia. One of the respondents observed, *"in my view, 80% of development NGOs, which were established after 2004, were generated by Polish aid"* (r3_10). Other interviewees' statements substantiated this claim. For example, another research participant admitted that during the first five years of his NGO's functioning, it *"focused only on development cooperation. But since, 2011, when the Polish government had its first humanitarian aid call for NGO proposals, we started to implement humanitarian projects, too"* (r4_14). In other words, the availability of funds for NGOs in the area of humanitarian relief was instrumental in allowing some NGOs to develop capacity in this field, too.

---

[24] Jan Bazyl of *Grupa Zagranica* in I. Dudkiewicz. 2015.

[25] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015b. *Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016–2020*. p. 35.

In 2015, the assessment of this aspect of the cooperation between Polish NGDOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not changed significantly. As Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* contended in an interview, the MFA only in theory consulted the priorities of Polish aid with Polish NGDOs. In the opinion of Ochojska, this tokenism was exemplified by the tendency of the MFA to keep changing the priorities of Polish aid and the list of recipient countries[26]. Ochojska considered many of the changes in Polish aid priorities "incomprehensible", whereas the withdrawal of Poland from Afghanistan with the end of the Polish military mission she dubbed "improper". Ochojska is not alone in this assessment. During a meeting held at Collegium Civitas in 2014 and dedicated to Polish aid in Afghanistan, it was highlighted that Polish aid, delivered via the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams consisting of soldiers and civilian experts, was overpriced and ineffective[27]. Also one participant in my research, who had know-how and experience and whose organisation had the capacity to implement projects in Afghanistan, negatively assessed the withdrawal of Poland from Afghanistan.

Other observers of the cooperation of the MFA and NGDOs were less critical in their assessment of the process. For example, Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska argued that NGDOs and the Polish MFA are interdependent and that they "need each other to be successful" in development cooperation and public diplomacy alike[28]. Perhaps this observation was relevant in the first years of functioning of the Department for Development Cooperation. As one of my respondents opined, *"up to 2006, NGDOs were the main partner for the MFA; later on their role decreased. Back then NGDOs were the prime movers, their impact was bigger, but also there were less NGOs. They did not have competition from the other sectors, so [the relationship between NGOs and the MFA] was more symbiotic. . . . Now that there are more stakeholders, it*

---

[26] J. Ochojska. 2015. "Woda i polityka" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 19.03.2015, p. 8.

[27] "Afganistan. Bilans pomocy 2001–2014. I co dalej?" in Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, 24.11.2014.

[28] K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid and the Polish model of public diplomacy" in H. Allan, S. Gembická (eds.) *International Conference Booklet 10 years of Slovak Aid: A Vision Of Development Cooperation For A Changing World*. Bratislava, p. 173.

is more difficult to reach compromise" (r12_9). Nonetheless, according to employees of the MFA Department for Development Cooperation cited by Jędrzej Witkowski who studied civic dialogue in the area of development cooperation, MFA's employees' cooperation with NGDOs played a very important or even decisive role in the professionalisation of the Polish aid system itself. In long-term perspective, also when compared to other countries providing aid to less developed countries, the impact of Polish NGDOs on the direction and mode of implementation of development cooperation in Poland has been assessed as very significant by the MFA. Interestingly enough, representatives of NGDOs interviewed by Witkowski were more critical about their own (i.e. NGDOs') role and expressed reservations regarding their actual impact on establishing the priorities of Polish aid[29].

It should be remembered, however, that initially the Polish aid's application process was different. As one of the interviewees recalled, *"the application process was totally reverse [when compared to nowadays]; we would just send an application along with our concept . . . and we received funding [from Polish aid]"* (r3_10). Another one reminisced, *"initially when the Department for Development Cooperation started functioning, everything was chaotic, but at least there were no priorities"* (r20_12). Another research participant found Polish aid conservative, *"we have problem with Polish aid, this programme used to be better initially. . . . They really do various positive stuff, they do try to be objective, but are ineffective in what they try to achieve . . . one shouldn't be afraid to experiment and we should also strengthen the ownership of our partners"* (r18_16). Several other respondents also highlighted the fact that it was very difficult to work abroad, when Polish aid's planning was on an annual basis. Other interviewees however noted that nowadays NGDOs themselves have to invest more effort in preparing their project proposals. One of the respondents admitted that *"it used to be so that needful projects received funding [from Polish aid]. Now the project proposals have to be needful and interesting, because [development cooperation] has become a competitive field since 2012. . . . There are more applying entities now, the projects have become longer and more costly, whereas the volume of [Polish] aid hasn't increased"* (r2_7).

[29] J. Witkowski. 2015. *Dialog obywatelski w polskiej polityce rozwojowej – studium uwarunkowań*. Manuscript of PhD thesis defended at *Uniwersytet Szkoła Wyższa Psychologii Społecznej* in Warsaw, p. 178.

In Witkowski's research, NGDOs also positively assessed their impact on Polish aid in the areas where NGDOs are believed to still have comparative advantage over the MFA, i.e. in global education, gender mainstreaming, and projects implemented in African countries[30]. One of my respondents, who called her experience with the application procedure in the MFA *"the first circle of hell"*, nonetheless admitted that *"in spite of Polish aid's faults, [Poland] should be credited for being one of the [countries] most engaged in supporting the democratisation [processes in] Belarus"* (r23_11).

To sum up, even though the initiative to undertake international cooperation has been indigenous, foreign funders played supportive role in the process. They assisted the grassroots effort at federalisation of Polish NGOs engaged abroad, as well as the establishment of a dedicated department at the Polish MFA to deal with development cooperation. Both NGOs and individuals, who used to be engaged in the sector, played an important role in strengthening the capacity of the Polish aid system. Interestingly, although the NGOs who were the first partners for Polish aid were mostly engaged in the East, it was the establishment of Polish aid and the initially indiscriminate method to provide funding to project proposals, irrespective of the target country, that appears to have facilitated the emergence of a well-developed NGDO sector focusing on poverty reduction in traditional aid recipient countries in Africa and Asia. Before discussing these developments, though, it is necessary to make an overview of the history of engagement of the country in providing aid.

From COMECON member to OA beneficiary to OECD DAC donor

As indicated earlier in this book, the overturning of the previous communist system necessitated the change of the rules of the game especially in the public sphere. The systemic transformation resulted in the negation of the legacies of communism. This heritage was at best considered in terms of its irrelevance[31] or, more commonly, as

[30] Ibid., p. 179.

[31] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2013. "From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Development Cooperation" in *Human Organisation*, Vol. 72, no 1, p. 68.

a burden[32]. The discussion of the legacy of communism as an affliction characterized foreign and Polish observers alike. The voluntary emulation of systemic solutions developed beyond the borders of the nation can be exemplified also by the self-colonising mentality of some examples of public discourse in Poland[33]. As Marek Ziółkowski explains, "for several centuries, the region of East-Central Europe was . . . undergoing a delayed repetition of processes that had already taken place elsewhere. . . . The dominant ideology of the post-communist transformation in the region was guided by the concept of 'imitative modernisation'"[34]. This observation is to a great extent relevant for the country's engagement in providing aid to the Third World during the Cold War era and the country's subsequent involvement in development cooperation.

This argument is also shared by other researchers, who view the involvement of Poland in development cooperation as an example of the mimetic nature of the transformation in Poland[35]. In fact, prior to overturning communism, Poland was a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). As mentioned previously, COMECON was established as an alternative to the prototype of modern development cooperation, the American Marshall Plan. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) emerged from the Marshall Plan and the Conference for European Economic Co-operation, which was established in 1958 to supervise the distribution of aid provided by the Marshall Fund to Western Europe. By contrast, COMECON member countries provided development assistance to some of the then Third world countries, namely those which sympathised with communist ideology[36]. The Polish People's Republic

---

[32] M. Schartau and R. Rodela. 2013. "Political Culture: One of the Conditions for Participatory Governance. The case of Poland". Warsaw.

[33] E.M. Thompson. 2010. "Whose discourse? Telling the story in post-communist Poland" in *The Other Shore*, no 1, pp. 1–15.

[34] M. Ziółkowski. 2015. "Fulfilled promises and unexpected results: Solidarity's double-edged legacy" in A. Rychard and G. Motzkin (eds.) *The Legacy of Polish Solidarity. Social Activism, Regime Collapse, and Building of a New Society.* Frankfurt am Main, p. 130.

[35] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2013. "From Recipient to Donor," p. 68.

[36] P. Bagiński. 2009. "Ewolucja pozycji Polski w międzynarodowej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju," in P. Bagiński et al. (eds.) *Międzynarodowa współpraca na rzecz rozwoju*. Warszawa, p. 190.

– which was one of the countries to establish COMECON in 1949 – supported Yemen, Mongolia, Vietnam and Cambodia, among other countries[37]. The volume of COMECON countries' development assistance actually was "more than symbolic," as it even complied with the current 0,7 percent of GDP target[38].

Nonetheless, the official discourse in Poland has been largely oblivious of the country's involvement in development cooperation prior to 1989. It has insisted on disregarding this pre-1989 experience as irrelevant to Poland's current role as an ODA provider. For example, the *2003 Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation* envisaged globalisation and the end of the Cold War as the main factors influencing international development cooperation[39]. Such interpretation was argued to overlook the 50-years Cold War history of development, when the categories of First, Second, and Third World were coined, and which shaped the politics of development[40]. The aptly described by Elżbieta Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka struggle over identification processes and geopolitical positioning is inherent in most analyses of Poland's involvement in development cooperation. For example, in the otherwise sophisticated analysis of Poland's road to becoming a donor, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz argued that the transformation of Poland from beneficiary of Official Aid to a donor has been exacerbated by the "lack of tradition"[41]. Indeed, most aid programs which existed before 1989 were terminated at the beginning of the transition. Yet, some types of foreign aid were continued. For example, in the framework of aid, Poland and Hungary supported their respective ethnic minorities in neighbouring countries[42]. The purposeful omission of the experience

[37] D. Kopiński. 2011. *Pomoc rozwojowa. Teoria i polityka*. Warszawa, p. 144.

[38] Manning 2006 in D. Kopiński. 2012. "Visegrád Countries' Development Aid to Africa," p. 34.

[39] Accessed 28.11.2014 at http://www.un.org.pl/rozwoj/ppp_dokumenty.php.

[40] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2013. "From Recipient to Donor," p. 68.

[41] P. Kaźmierkiewicz. 2008. "Eastern Promises and Achievements. Poland's Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities" in J. Kucharczyk and J. Lovitt (eds.) *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement*. Praga, p. 81.

[42] B. Szent-Iványi and S. Lightfoot. 2015. *New Europe's New Development Aid*. Routledge, p. 53.

the country gained as participant in international development cooperation prior to 1989 resulted in framing Poland as a rising donor. This shortsighted attitude favoured the vision of the nation primarily as a recipient of foreign aid at the onset of the transition. Accordingly, the Polish aid system justified its focus on democracy assistance to Eastern Partnership countries on its own post-1989 experience with democratisation.

Interviewees who had worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of development cooperation were aware of the historical jump Poland has made in this field. As one of them recalled, *"there is this assumption, that because [Poland's engagement in development assistance] dates back to communist times, this is something we should be somehow ashamed of. . . . [The current OECD-DAC chair] Erik Solheim was saying recently that China is not an emerging donor, because they had 50 years' experience in providing aid. But then, I say, Poland too [has had experience]. We only had this gap in the 1980s, because of the crisis in Poland, the martial law. Officially [our experience as a COMECON donor] has not been negated. But [our experience as a donor before 1989] is left unsaid as something shameful. I don't understand why this should be so. We used to have so many students from Africa who studied in Poland and came back to become presidents in their home countries. . . . We built nuclear power station in Iraq and a shipyard in Viet Nam. We should remember this, we have nothing to be ashamed of here"* (r19_10). This statement is indicative of a discrepancy between official statements defining Poland as an "emerging donor" and the private opinions of aid professionals. This quotation as well as the opinions of NGO activists who took part in my research also provides evidence that Polish governmental and non-governmental aid professionals alike do not define Poland as being in an inferior position vis-à-vis other international actors. This finding is contrary to the conclusion arrived at by other researchers who claim that "the hierarchy of donors is not only accepted but also reproduced by Polish development activists, both on the NGO and the state side, who often manipulate the complicated history of aid in order to formulate their own discourses of development"[43]. However, my own research did not find sufficient evidence to substantiate this claim. Contemporary aid professionals are concerned with

[43] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2015. "Poland: Attempts at Defining Aid by Solidarity, Democracy and Development," p. 44.

implementing the state-of-the-art principles of development cooperation and they do not feel the need to justify their engagement in development assistance in historical terms other than the *Solidarity* legacy. Their approach is easily understood given that civil society was not a stakeholder in COMECON-times aid.

Yet, the most important transition Poland has made appears to be the one from being an official aid recipient to an OECD-DAC donor. As one respondent commented, *"ten years after Poland and the other NMS joined the EU, there grew this awareness in OECD-DAC that the issue of DAC membership should be somehow addressed. . . . But back then no one even imagined that Poland would become an OECD-DAC member... the fact that five countries [Iceland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland and Slovenia] joined OECD DAC in one year, in 2013, was a historical event"* (r7_13). OECD DAC membership is essential, as it helps EU member states to develop their aid system in line with the vision of development promoted by the European Union.

It should be noted that none of my respondents engaged in the NGO sector referred to the COMECON legacy. Instead, some of the representatives of Polish NGDOs I interviewed referred to their personal experience with international or trans-border cooperation dating back to the 1980s. However, these examples of international solidarity were ones that developed *independently* of the Polish state's activities as a member of COMECON. The negation of the pre-1989 experience of the country with development cooperation notwithstanding, the most important factor that triggered the (renewed) involvement of the Polish state in international development cooperation was prospective EU accession[44]. Similarly to the other former communist countries that joined the European Union, Poland was made to accept international documents[45], which obliged the state to act as a donor. Poland

[44] G. Gruca. 2011. "History and Challenges of Polish Aid: The Polish Humanitarian Action Case" in K. Pędziwiatr et al. (eds.) *Current Challenges to Peacebuilding Efforts and Development Assistance*. Kraków, p. 36.

[45] These were, among others, the Cotonou Agreement (a partnership agreement signed in 2000 between 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific and the EU), the UN Millennium Declaration (a resolution adopted in 2000, which set the basis for the eight Millennium Development Goals – MDGs. The MDGs range from reducing extreme poverty to arresting the spread of HIV/AIDS, promoting maternal health, and providing universal primary education) and the Monterrey Consensus (a consensus dealing with

formulated its preliminary priorities as a donor in development cooperation in 1997[46].

As mentioned before, the first official Polish Aid projects took place in 1998. One of the respondents believed that *"this was the milestone moment [in the history of Polish aid], when the MFA announced NGOs can apply for funds earmarked for former Yugoslav states*" (r10_17). Nonetheless, it took five more years to adopt a strategy paper, which outlined the objectives, tasks, principles, and mechanisms of Polish aid. To fulfill the country's international development commitments, in 2003 the Council of Ministers adopted the *Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation*. According to this strategy, the main objectives of Polish development cooperation shall be the support for sustainable economic growth, respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance, promotion of global security, transfer of good practices from the Polish transformation experience, the development of human resources, capacity building of central and local administrative structures, environmental protection, as well as providing humanitarian and food aid[47]. The post 9/11 2001 development-security nexus discussed in the first chapter is discernible in the *2003 Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation*, as counteracting terrorism has been singled out as one of the circumstances conditioning global development cooperation.

As far as the MFA itself is concerned, in the beginning the aid programme was coordinated by its Department of the United Nations System and Global Affairs. In 2005 the Development Cooperation Department was established. According to the *Strategy*, the MFA was to be the leading national institution to coordinate the aid program. However, in view of the typical for the post-communist countries pattern, bilateral assistance has been delivered via the MFA, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education. The Development Cooperation Department of the MFA therefore managed initially only

financing for development signed in 2002. Most importantly, it postulated that donor countries should be committed to the target of allocating 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) to Official Development Assistance).

[46] Trialog. 2014a. *Trialog in the enlarged EU. 15 years supporting civil society to engage in development.* Vienna, p. 30.

[47] See *Strategia Polskiej Współpracy Na Rzecz Rozwoju*. 2003. Warsaw: MFA (accessed 13.03.2015 at http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/25bbbbef-404c-43ec-93d6-b2477645338a:JCR).

10% of bilateral aid[48]. In 2013 the MFA managed 21% of total aid disbursement[49]. Under the 2011 Act on Development Cooperation, this department came under the National Coordinator for Development Cooperation. This coordinator was given the position of Under Secretary of State, thus indicating this newly acquired importance of development cooperation for the policy area[50]. The crowning of the relevance of Polish development assistance for foreign aid however came in 2013, when Poland became the 28th member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee.

Polish NGOs have been ascribed a special function in the *Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation*. The Strategy recognises the know-how accumulated by Polish NGDOs and foresees that the priorities of Polish aid would be based, *inter alia*, in the areas and countries where Polish NGDOs have comparative advantage. As such, NGDOs are named to be among the most important partners that would implement foreign aid projects. Yet another important function ascribed to these organisations is their role in promoting Polish foreign aid. Cooperation with Polish NGDOs is likewise foreseen to take place during consultations. According to the Strategy, Polish NGDOs along with Polish companies are expected to develop their capacities by participating in the Polish foreign aid system. Furthermore, both types of non-state actors are expected to gain a "measurable benefit" from participating in the EU "aid market"[51]. In financial terms, the involvement of NGOs in implementing Polish aid projects has been limited. In 2012, 37 million PLN, which amounted to 17% of bilateral aid, has been transferred via NGOs-implemented projects[52]. In 2013 NGOs implemented almost 15% of Polish bilateral aid[53]. However, this share is close to the EU average. In 2011 among the then OECD DAC member states, the share of bilateral aid channelled to and through NGOs ranged from 1% in

[48] B. Szent-Iványi, S. Lightfoot. 2015. *New Europe's New Development Aid*. Routledge, p. 148.

[49] P. Kugiel 2014, p. 2 in Ibid., p. 150.

[50] B. Szent-Iványi, S. Lightfoot. 2015, op. cit., p. 149.

[51] Ibid.

[52] K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid and the Polish model of public diplomacy", p. 171.

[53] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2014. *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2013*. Warszawa, p. 12.

France to 38% in Ireland[54] and was about 17% in average[55]. In terms of the of fields of intervention for bilateral aid, NGOs from the 2011 OECD DAC member states focused primarily on the sub-sectors Government and Civil Society as well as on Emergency Response[56]. In Poland, in 2013 almost 77% of bilateral aid was spent on projects in Education and Good Governance[57].

The cooperation between Polish NGDOs and MFA has been institutionalised via the adoption of a set of principles of cooperation between MFA and social partners[58]. In 2011 in the area of global education, an agreement among the MFA, the Ministry of Education, and *Grupa Zagranica* has been signed regarding the support for global education in Poland[59]. As a matter of fact, unlike similar initiatives in Europe, in Poland the process was not initiated nor conducted by the government. It was NGOs that initiated and coordinated the process of developing and signing the *Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Global Education in Poland*[60]. The establishment of the Development Cooperation Policy Council was another element of the institutionalisation of cooperation between NGDOs and MFA. The establishment of the *Development Cooperation Policy Council* was stipulated in the *Strategy*. This advisory body's functions include opinionating development aid policies, developing propositions regarding the future direction of Polish aid, championing the issue of development cooperation and cooperating with local governments. In 2015 the Council included stakeholders representing the following institutions: the MFA and other ministries, representatives of the political parties' parliamentary groups, the NGDOs' umbrella group *Grupa Zagranica*, and some individual NGDOs, as well as representatives of an academic institution and a confederation representing employers' interests in

54 *Aid At A Glance. Flows of official development assistance to and through civil society organisations in 2011*. OECD, p. 6.

55 Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2014, p. 19.

56 *Aid At A Glance*, p. 10.

57 Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2014, p. 20.

58 https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Partnerzy,spoleczni,1454.html.

59 https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Porozumienie,w,sprawie,wspierania,rozwoju,edukacji,globalnej,1165.html.

60 K. Krzemińska. 2011. "The Polish DE Consensus process: towards a strategy, ending up with an agreement" in *DEAR matters Strategic approaches to development education in Europe.* Brussels, p. 25.

Poland and the EU. In 2014 representatives of the line ministry and NGDOs alike have assessed the functioning of this Council as unsatisfactory[61]. The unanimity of this assessment is indicative of the need to reform some aspects of the functioning of the Council, notably the frequency of its meetings.

Eight years after adopting the *Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation*, the Act on Development Cooperation was approved by the Polish parliament. Undoubtedly, this law has been the chief achievement of all stakeholders involved in development cooperation. Nonetheless, as one of the observers in these events noticed, *"after three or four failed attempts, apparently due to the Ministry of Finance's objections, this law was [eventually] passed. It took a person [coming from] the NGO sector to push this bill [through the parliament]"* (r6_22). The Act was amended on the 20th of November 2013. The amended law stipulates that along with the states, the societies of partner countries are likewise recipients of Polish aid. This law legitimises the promotion and support for the development of democracy and civil society as the primary goal of Polish aid[62]. In the *Guidelines for the Draft Act on Development Cooperation* adopted by the Council of Ministers on February 15, 2011, the following solutions were introduced: funds allocated by the MFA for the implementation of development cooperation were to be partly included in the budget section "45-Foreign affairs and Poland's membership of the European Union", whereas the remaining funds were to remain part of the state budget target reserve; target reserve funds were to be earmarked to finance the so-called "small grants" projects implemented by public finance sector entities and foreign diplomatic post, as well as projects which implementation period did not exceed one financial year; the funds which remained in the Ministry's budget were to support, *inter alia*, competitions organised by the MFA for multi-annual projects; and finally, the implementation of activities aimed at supporting civil society, the independent

[61] Opinions expressed by Filip Kaczmarek of the European Parliament, Jędrzej Witkowski of the Centre for Civic Education and Zuzanna Kierzkowska of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the workshop dedicated to the role NGOs should fulfill in the area of moulding Polish aid. The workshop took place during the VII National Forum of Polish NGOs in Warsaw on 15.09.2014.

[62] P. Pospieszna. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*. Pittsburgh.

media, democratic institutions, and the rule of law, as well as the protection of human rights, were to be commissioned to the (then) *Polish Foundation for International Development Cooperation "Know-How"*[63].

This Foundation was commissioned to carry out tasks in countries of the Eastern Partnership, as well as countries from Central Asia, Tunisia, and Myanmar/Burma. In 2013 the Foundation was renamed to *Solidarity Fund PL*. It conducts re-granting of the abovementioned funds. The *Solidarity Fund* has two common traits with the US *National Endowment for Democracy*. Polish and international entities can also contribute to the *Solidarity Fund PL.* At present the Foundation is also supported by USAID, the Canadian government, and other donors. *Solidarity Fund PL* focuses on five areas: support of local democracy, self-governance and agency of citizens; support of independent media; elections' observation; helping victims of oppression, and supporting the monitoring and advocating activity of organisations which defend human rights; cooperation of public and civic institutions in the implementation of good practices related to the work of public institutions. The Solidarity Fund PL has also been engaged in *ad hoc* activities to provide on time support to its focus countries[64].

Respondents' opinions about the Solidarity Fund varied. Some highlighted its strengths, arguing that by reactivating this state treasury foundation *"an opportunity was created whereby the minister [of foreign affairs] can commission Polish NGOs [via the Foundation] the task to implement development cooperation-related projects, except humanitarian aid. Like the National Endowment for Democracy, Solidarity Fund is bipartisan . . . and it is also an example of private management of public finance. . . . It is a state treasury foundation, but it is as flexible as an NGO*" (r6_22). The noble premises for the functioning of *Solidarity Fund* notwithstanding, a couple of respondents were very bitter about their experience with accessing funds provided by the foundation. One of them observed, *"there was no political will to create a [development cooperation] agency independent from the MFA. The establishment of the Solidarity Fund has been a half-measure . . . a crippled solution. [The*

[63] Information accessed at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Development,Cooperation,Act,252.html on 18.11.2015.

[64] Information accessed at http://solidarityfund.pl/en/fundacja1/o-fundacji on 18.11.2015.

MFA] didn't find it necessary to explain [to NGOs] why they don't want to severe the links between this development agency and the MFA. Probably because politicians still regard [Solidarity Fund] as a policy tool. . . . Also, there is a secret plot [in Solidarity Fund], the procedures are not transparent. This is not only my opinion, but many other people who work in NGOs share it. The Solidarity Fund's staff argue they cannot disclose information because they support the democratic opposition in regime countries" (r11_22).

Another interviewee admitted to have taken the decision to give up on trying to acquire funds from Polish aid, which he found *"overly bureaucratised and increasingly un-transparent"* (r20_12). He provided the following illustration, *"More than once I would go into a rage when I had to deal with the thoughtless decisions of [Solidarity Fund's] officials. . . . I once received 40-something comments on my report. . . . I took the effort and analysed all of these, and sent them back a dozen or so pages of my analysis. Eventually their list of 40 comments was reduced to two reservations only. They admitted the other 40 were trumped up. . . . But they did not learn. I know that next time I would again have to invest my time in satisfying their ambitions, rather than spend time to work on development"* (r20_12). Another respondent was likewise disappointed with the substantive quality of comments her organisation's project proposals received from *Solidarity Fund*'s experts. She gave an example with the reasoning used to turn down the continuation of a project, first edition of which was very successful in Belarus. Namely, on behalf of *Solidarity Fund*, the evaluating experts decided that due to the alleged lack of internet connection in Belarus, the continuation of the project would not be feasible. This same respondent opined that another proposal they had received "*five pages of totally messed up comments. We have to deal with inexperienced people [experts], who may have graduated from Russian studies, but who know nothing about Belarus. It is a waste of [my] time*" (r23_11). The research *Solidarity Fund* conducted among its grant-receivers in February 2016 likewise indicated that the foundation's partners find especially challenging the considered as overly bureaucratised communication between *Solidarity Fund* and the entities applying for support as well as the financing procedure used by *Solidarity Fund*.[65]

[65] Fundacja Solidarności Międzynarodowej. 2016. *Jak grantobiorcy ocenili współpracę z FSM w 2015 r.?*

The reason for the misunderstanding between some NGDOs and the state institutions distributing public funds could be that *"rhetorically the support for democracy is winning, but in practice it is mostly developmental projects that are implemented, because it is easier this way in terms of politics*" (r25_18). The experiences of some respondents appear to corroborate this observation. One of the organisations has been engaged in supporting communities' access to water in two post-Soviet states. This respondent explained, *"Our projects . . . have both developmental and democracy-related elements. 90% of those funds would go to the pipes and 10% would go to our work with young people and meeting with local communities, with their informal leaders. On the one hand, we simply facilitate people's access to water, but on the other hand [we want to ensure ownership of the project]. And the MFA would try to cut out those democratisation elements of our projects, the ones that related to taking decisions and management [of the infrastructure]. They found it redundant, even though it is not costly. . . . Once the then undersecretary of state Ms. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz visited the site of one of our projects, and exclaimed: 'Oh, you do here not just development, but also democratisation!'. And I say: Hallelujah! . . . But then, Ms. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz went to Moscow, and now we have to convince [the new undersecretary of state] that we are not camels"* (r13_20). Another representative of the NGO sector spoke about the structural constraints that in her opinion obstruct the cooperation of the line ministry with NGDOs. She said, *"The ministry seems to be lagging behind, lacking human resources to do as much as they would like to do. So it is not a matter of a lack of good will on their behalf, but out of institutional fossilisation, lack of time, lack of people, so they just do the minimum"* (r14_8). In spite of their legitimate dissatisfaction regarding some aspects of their cooperation with the line ministry, NGDOs are not litigious and they understand the institutional limitations that condition this cooperation.

The limitations in terms of human resources are one element of the challenges faced by public administration responsible for development cooperation. The development of institutional backbone and legal framework for the functioning of Polish aid notwithstanding, the limited amount of funds Poland has dedicated to development cooperation remains an issue of concern. EU membership obliged all member countries to earmark funds for development cooperation. Thus one of the commitments made by Poland at the meeting of the EU's General

Affairs and External Relations Council in 2005 has been to earmark 0,17% of its GDP to development cooperation by 2010 and reach the threshold of 0,33% by 2015. It has become clear by now that these obligations have not been met. Back in 2009 Barbara Mrówka from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted that such an obligation would be impossible to fulfill[66]. During the consultation processes in 2015 *Grupa Zagranica* postulated to include in the *Multiannual Plan of Polish Development Cooperation 2016-2020* the commitment to provide 0,33% of GNI for development cooperation by 2020. However, Polish MFA argued that this deadline should be prolonged to 2030, in line with EU directives[67]. At the *Third International Conference on Financing for Development* in Addis Ababa in July 2015, the then Polish minister of finance Mateusz Szczurek declared that Poland "pledged to *strive to* spend 0,33% of GNI on development aid by 2030"[68]. Indeed, as of 2015, Poland brings up the rear among OECD DAC members in terms of its ODA as per cent of GNI[69].

In fact, the continuing postponement of the increase of the share of GNI dedicated to development cooperation has been in line with Polish taxpayers' expectations. According to the most recent survey, 40% of respondents declared they would agree to increase by 20% or more the current amount of Polish aid, which in 2014 equalled about 5PLN per taxpayer[70]. Only 25% of respondents were against such an increase. The better educated and the more affluent among the respondents have been more prone to support development cooperation as such. It is important to note that at present the level of acceptance for such slightly increased transfer of tax money to development

---

66 Quoted at O. Dekhtiarova at al. 2009. *„We Are Not Scouts": The Reality of Polish Development Cooperation*, Humanity in Action.

67 Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015c. *Zestawienie zgłoszonych uwag i odpowiedzi* in *Podsumowanie konsultacji społecznych dot. projektu Wieloletniego programu współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020*, p. 31.

68 Statement by Mr. Mateusz Szczurek, Minister of Finance of Poland Addis Ababa, July 14, 2015 (emphasis mine).

69 See OECD DAC. 2016. *Development aid rises again in 2015, spending on refugees doubles* (accessed 18.04.2016 at http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/development-aid-rises-again-in-2015-spending-on-refugees-doubles.htm).

70 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. *Poles on Development Assistance*.

assistance is at its lowest since 2004[71]. In 2004 (when the amount of Polish aid corresponded to 2PLN per taxpayer) almost 55% of respondents would have approved of the allotting of 1/3 more of their tax payments to development assistance[72]. Given the registered reticence of the public to support the (further) increase of funds earmarked for development assistance, so as to match the commitments Poland has made in this respect, it is not surprising the government likewise is cautious about introducing such changes. It is important to note, however, that this reticence is most probably based on the mistaken belief that respondents keep underestimating the progress Poland has made and respectively their own affluence when compared to other countries. In 2014 Poles expressed the conviction that 82 out of 200 countries were poorer and less developed than Poland, whereas the actual figure was 160 such countries[73]. This data indicates the need for enhanced global education. This finding can also be interpreted as search for justification to postpone "giving back" or as a sign of the growing aspiration and expectations of Poles regarding their own desired level of affluence.

Polish NGDOs have long been advocating for the increase of Polish ODA as a percent of GNI. The MFA traditionally responded that as Polish GNI has increased over the last years, the amount of ODA has accordingly been on the rise, too. Interestingly, during the presentation of *Grupa Zagranica*'s shadow report in 2013, both Jan Hofmokl of the MFA and Krzysztof Stanowski of the *Solidarity Fund PL* suggested that Polish NGDOs should be lobbying the Ministry of Finance to increase the funds allocated to development cooperation. To this, Marta Gontarska of *Grupa Zagranica* responded that NGDOs' role is not one of exerting pressure on the Ministry of Finance and also added that the MFA actually does not support lobbying activities of NGDOs[74]. Indeed, the volume of ODA has been on the rise since 2004, as Figure 1 from the OECD 2014 report illustrates. Importantly, Poland has been delivering about a quarter of its ODA via bilateral channels. In 2013 almost

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2006. *Poles about development assistance*.

[73] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. *Poles on Development Assistance*.

[74] Communications at the meeting presenting the 2013 shadow report of Polish aid developed by *Grupa Zagranca*. The meeting was held on 12.12.2013 in Warsaw.

15% of Polish bilateral aid has been channelled via NGOs[75]. In 2012 and 2013, Poland channelled 71 and 74% respectively of its ODA to multilateral organisations[76]. By comparison, in 2012 the DAC country average was 27% for multilateral cooperation[77]. Given the current amount of Polish aid, it is not feasible to expect the reversal of the ratio between bilateral and multilateral ODA so as to match the ratio of established donors' aid programs.



Figure 1: *Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of Gross National Income, 2003–14, Poland*[78]

The ODA/GNI and the bilateral/multilateral aid ratios have not been the only aspects of Polish aid that have been identified as problematic. In 2012 Polish NGDOs highlighted the fact that about half of Polish bilateral aid went to countries absent from the list of priority countries. *Grupa Zagranica* was especially concerned about the ODA disbursement the country had been making in between 2008 and 2012 on tied aid, i.e. the credit support for the People's Republic of

[75] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2014. *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2013*, p. 12.

[76] Ibid., p. 10.

[77] OECD. 2014. *Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development*. OECD Publishing, p. 348.

[78] OECD. 2015. *Development Co-operation Report 2015. Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action*. OECD Publishing, p. 254.

China, which amounted to about 40% of Polish bilateral aid during those years[79]. According to the 2015 shadow report by *Grupa Zagranica*, another 40% of Polish bilateral aid went to middle income countries outside the list of priority partners, i.e. Angola, China, Viet Nam and Mongolia[80]. In 2013, however, Poland's share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 99% (compared to the DAC average of 83,2%)[81].

The examples of Poland's practicing of tied aid can be explained by two factors. Firstly, as indicated above, the system of Polish aid is still rather fragmented and is not focused in the MFA only. The main institutions implementing the national system of development cooperation were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Finance transfers some of the contributions to international financing institutions and the EU development policy, as well as granting governmental loans. These loans account for the Polish tied aid. The MFA is responsible for setting the aid priorities and coordinating the activities of the other ministries in the area of development cooperation. However, the aid implemented by the MFA is financed via specific budget reserve disbursed annually by the Ministry of Finance. This circumstance limits both the MFA and NGDOs in planning and implementing development cooperation projects.

The political and public support for the current engagement of the country in development cooperation

In spite of giving the National Coordinator for Development Cooperation the position of Under Secretary of State, there has been a lack of strong political championship to promote development cooperation. As the report co-developed by *Grupa Zagranica* and the internet portal *MamPrawoWiedziec.pl* indicate, during the seventh term Sejm (2011–2015), the lower chamber of the Polish parlia-

[79] Grupa Zagranica. 2013. *Polska współpraca rozwojowa. Raport 2012.* Warszawa, p. 13.

[80] Grupa Zagranica. 2015a. *Polska współpraca rozwojowa. Raport 2014*. Warszawa, p. 17.

[81] OECD. 2015. *Development Co-operation Report 2015*, p. 254.

ment discussed only once issues related to development cooperation in regard to the novelisation of the Act for Development Cooperation. During this same period of time, MPs' interventions related to development cooperation either referred to the support for democracy in the former USSR states or to the economic cooperation with African countries[82]. *Grupa Zagranica* and *MamPrawoWiedziec.pl* also asked party candidates for the parliamentary elections in November 2015 to express their opinions regarding the commitment of Poland to dedicate 0,33% of its GNI to development cooperation by 2030. Judging by the declarations of the candidates of three of the electoral committees which representatives were then in the Sejm, most candidates were of the opinion that the commitment to dedicate 0,33% of GNI to development cooperation by 2030 is not on a par with the national interest of Poland[83].

Even more telling were the Polish aid's sectoral priorities identified by those candidates. Thus, the reduction of poverty, which remains a flagship priority for donors from OECD DAC, has been supported by about half of the representatives of the leftist parties only. The assistance for the promotion of good governance and democratisation, which has been a major focus of Polish aid, was solely favoured by half of the candidates of *Platforma Obywatelska*. Representatives of the electoral committees of both the liberal .*Nowoczesna* and the conservative *Kukiz* and *Korwin* opted instead for supporting Polish entrepreneurs to invest in developing countries as an overarching aim of the country's development cooperation. The Polish aid priorities, which appeared to appeal to most candidates, were education and humanitarian aid[84]. These results are indicative of the lack of politicians' awareness of the gist of present-day development cooperation priorities and principles. Indeed, as one of the few publicists specializing in foreign aid-related issues Adam Leszczyński contends, given that politicians understand development (cooperation) as the growth of the national economy and the promotion of the national political interest, it is no wonder that aid money is dis-

[82] MamPrawoWiedziec.pl and Grupa Zagranica. 2015. *Współpraca rozwojowa w debacie sejmowej VII kadencji Sejmu (2011–2015).*

[83] Grupa Zagranica and MamPrawoWiedziec.pl. 2015. *Kandydaci/tki w wyborach parlamentarnych o współpracy rozwojowej*.

[84] Ibid.

bursed in ways not always compatible with the contemporary standards of aid delivery[85].

One is entitled to ask whether Polish MPs' stance towards development cooperation is on a par with the attitude of the general public. Public opinion polls measuring Polish citizens' support for the engagement of Poland as a donor in development cooperation have been carried out since 2004. From 2004 until 2014, the share of respondents who have been in favour of the opinion that Poland should support less developed countries increased from 63 to 71%[86]. Even more telling is the fact that the share of those who were against this view decreased by half over this period of ten years, i.e. from 35% to 17%. Curiously enough, when asked whether they have come upon information regarding the involvement of Poland in development cooperation, the share of respondents who admitted to have been acquainted with such data dropped from 49 to 24% in between 2006 and 2014. It seems the support for the engagement of Poland in development cooperation is *inversely* proportional to the familiarity of the public opinion with Polish aid! This puzzling non sequitur can perhaps be explained by the suggestion that these public opinion polls rather measure the support for the principle of Polish aid than its actual implementation[87]. Furthermore, as one of my respondents noted, *"in Poland there is significant support for [providing] aid, because people do not distinguish between development aid and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, given that Poland received huge aid in the 1980s and in the early 1990s, people feel responsible to give back*" (r16_10).

Further analysis of the surveys regarding public support for Polish development cooperation appears to corroborate this view. Namely, in 2014 when asked about the areas where Poland has most to offer to poorer countries, the support in the field of education and health-care were identified as most relevant to Poland's specialisation (selected by 39% and 35% of respondents respectively), whereas the assistance for

---

85 A. Leszczyński. 2015. "Solidarni, byle niedrogo" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17–18.10.2015, p. 33.

86 Ibid., see also https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Public,Opinion,Polls,197.html.

87 E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2011. *The Emerging Powers and the Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation. Public Perceptions of Development Cooperation*. Summary Paper 3: POLAND.

democratic reforms was selected by just 17% of respondents[88]. When regarded from the perspective of Poland's commitments to engage in reducing poverty in the Global South, which has been at the core of the recently expired *Millennium Development Goals*[89], the public opinion's preferences are in tune with the priorities of established donor countries. Poland is also a signatory of the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, which obliged Poland to increase its aid to Africa. However, as noted, Poland chose as its specialisation the support for good governance understood as democratisation and development of autonomous civil society. This seeming discrepancy is addressed in more detail in other parts of this book.

On the eve of the 2015 European Year for Development, a special Eurobarometer revealed the views EU member states' citizens hold on development, cooperation, and aid[90]. According to this poll, 88% of respondents from Poland were in favour of helping people in developing countries. The European average was 85%. In terms of personal involvement in helping developing countries, with the exception of Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus, the remaining 10 countries which joined the EU most recently bring up the rear. In the other countries the percentage of those who either provide time or money to an NGO that helps developing countries or is politically involved to support development cooperation ranges from 89% (in the Netherlands and Sweden) to 24% in Italy. In the above-mentioned 10 NMS, as well as in Greece and Portugal, this share of actively engaged citizens does not exceed 22%. In Poland the percentage of citizens who declared to have supported an NGDO financially was 14%, whereas 3% and 1% respectively have volunteered for an NGO or were politically involved in helping developing countries[91]. Interestingly, 75% of EU citizens considered volunteering an effective way to help reduce poverty in developing countries, whereas 66% and 63% respectively believed

---

88 *Poles on Development Assistance*. 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

89 The MDGs encompassed *inter alia* halving extreme poverty, halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education by the target date of 2015. The MDGs were agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions in 2000 (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml).

90 European Commission. 2015. *The European Year for Development – Citizens' views on development, cooperation and aid, Special Eurobarometer 421.*

91 Ibid., p. 47.

official development aid and donating to organisations to be effective. For Poland those figures were 69%, 65% and 61% respectively, i.e. the tendency in Poland is comparable to that in the other EU countries. These attitudes further legitimise NGDOs' engagement in development cooperation as the general public is clearly in favour of personal involvement in supporting development.

At the same time, both corporate giving and support from the wealthy to NGDOs is negligent. According to the opinion of one of the icons of Polish humanitarian assistance, Janina Ochojska, in Poland the prevalent attitude to supporting those in need is "sentimental, kind-hearted and anachronic"[92]. What is more, the affluent in Poland are unwilling to support even such established and well-known organisations as the *Polish Humanitarian Action*. Janina Ochojska admitted her appeal to the 500 richest persons in Poland did not convince any of them to support development cooperation abroad. Culture and the sports are considered more attractive and potentially income-generating activities the rich in Poland are willing to fund. The small and medium entrepreneurs, on the other hand, opt for helping orphanages. Ochojska argued that "nowadays real help is different from bringing tins with food with expiring dates or sweets to orphanages"[93]. The experience of one of the respondents in my research, whose organisation tried to raise funds to build a school in Pakistan, was equally disheartening. In 2010 the organisation *"tried various methods to raise funds and addressed different groups of people, including alpinists . . . and there was no reaction on their behalf, not even a negative one. . . . It is equally difficult to raise funds to support Afghanistan, so the more that Poles are convinced that the Polish army is already there and provides help [anyway]. . . . Without MFA's funds, there is no chance to do anything [in these countries]"* (r20_12).

Conclusion

To recapitulate on the findings presented in this chapter, it is important to underline that the internationalisation of solidarity (originally defined by the trade union *Solidarity* in the 1980s, and further put into

[92] "Janina Ochojska. Czy jesteś dobrym człowiekiem?". 2014. Grzegorz Sroczyński talking with Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Duży Format*, 07.08.2014.

[93] Ibid.

effect by civil society organisations after the toppling of communism) and the transformation of the country from a COMECON member through recipient of official aid to an OECD DAC member, initially took place separately. However, towards the end of the first decade of the transformation, the trajectories of the development of the civil society sector engaged abroad and that of the state institutions responsible for providing humanitarian and later on development assistance abroad, started to converge. The beneficial results of this synergistic cooperation can be observed *inter alia* in the establishment of the backbone of the Polish aid system and the dialogical relationship between these stakeholders in defining the priorities and modalities of Polish aid.

The international engagement of Polish civil society was shaped by a set of internal and external factors. Yet the initiative lays within civil society. Foreign aid facilitated and to an extent shaped the growth of concrete branches of NGOs, which were considered vital for the consolidation of democracy and building of civil society in Poland. Nonetheless, even foreign aid had an indigenous element in the case of aid earmarked for Poland. This was because individuals of Polish origins, or who were related to Poland prior to their work for the institution providing support for Polish civil society, played an important role in focusing foreign funders' attention on the nation. Due to those combined efforts, the Polish NGOs who gained experience and capacity in democratisation projects along with branch NGOs specializing in (then) novel issues (like child abuse, women rights, support for former prisoners, or reform of the self-government) and the first humanitarian NGO were already in place *before* the process to build a governmental bilateral assistance system kicked off. In parallel to those developments, Polish missionaries related to the Catholic Church, have been likewise engaged in supporting communities in need in the Majority World.

The history of the cooperation between the relevant state institutions and NGDOs, which remain by far the most important stakeholders as far as development assistance is concerned, can be said to bode well for the long-term engagement of Poland as a donor. A milestone in the cooperation between these two stakeholders was the conference organized in 2002 when the then minister of foreign affairs commended on the seminal role played by NGOs in the area of social diplomacy. During this conference NGOs postulated the broadening of the definition of international aid to include support provided to the

country's eastern neighbours. Surprisingly, although some of the representatives of NGDOs engaged in providing traditional development cooperation were critical about the current predominance of funds for the Eastern Partnership countries, it was the NGDO sector itself that heralded this idea, which was later on put into effect with the launching of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009. Undoubtedly, NGDOs played a seminal role in the early years of the functioning of the Polish aid system. Individuals who worked for the NGO sector before joining public administration are argued to have contributed to the professionalisation of the Polish aid system. The capacity NGDOs already possessed when the Polish aid system was established undoubtedly influenced the aid modality still preferred by the MFA.

Like Polish civil society, the state also played various roles in the development cooperation system over the last sixty-something years. Initially considered to benefit from the Marshall Plan, which was the prototype of the contemporary development cooperation system, Poland eventually became a donor itself in 1949 when it joined COMECON. This experience was regarded as irrelevant after the end of the Cold War, when the country started receiving Official Aid. Later on, when the first state-funded projects in development assistance started to be implemented, the country was framed as a rising donor. One could argue that the pre-1989 experience of the nation as a donor is not relevant given the end of the Cold War. But then, most traditional donors established their aid programmes exactly as a result of the onset of the Cold War. The negation of the pre-1989 experience of the country as a donor should actually be understood against the background of the negation of other processes that took place during communist times. Aid professionals themselves, however, do not feel the need to refer to this experience, probably because civil society was not a stakeholder in this process prior to 1989.

Given the limited support of the public for enhanced development cooperation funded by the Polish budget and the lack of interest on behalf of corporate non-state actors to contribute to development assistance, Polish NGDOs have to continue their advocacy and awareness raising activities while relying on the state to fund their work. There is no doubt public funds have been and are likely to continue to be the major source for funding Polish NGDOs. The chances that Polish aid would refocus on "traditional" aid recipients in the Global South are limited. However, as the analysis of the interview material has indicat-

ed, projects implemented in post-Soviet states have both developmental and democratising elements. Furthermore, the *Multiannual Plan of Polish Development Cooperation 2016-2020* limited Polish bilateral support to ten priority countries only, only four of which are Eastern Partnership countries. This is to say that democracy assistance for post-Soviet states supported by Polish aid and implemented by Polish NGDOs is not the *sole* focus of Polish ODA.

Like the previous chapters, this one focused on the institutional aspects of the double-track transformation of the nation and the various roles it played in development cooperation. Although state-led and citizens-led participation in development cooperation initially took place independently, several years after the toppling of the previous regime their trajectories started to converge. To fully understand how this process came into effect, it is necessary to take into account the individual life histories and motivational underpinnings of the individual actors engaged in development cooperation. In the following chapter the perspective of aid professionals is analysed, thus complementing the discussion presented so far in this book.

5 Understanding Polish aid professionals' vocational choice

My vocation is to help others[1]

This chapter is going to address the following research questions: What has been the documented impact of individuals on development cooperation? What are the characteristic features of aid professionals? What have been the most common career paths and motivations of aid professionals? What are Polish NGDO activists' self-concepts? Are aid professionals driven by different motivations than other NGO activists or those involved in informal civic initiatives? Which factors facilitate Polish NGDO activists' engagement in development cooperation? Which circumstances obstruct involvement in development assistance? How aid professionals view their future commitment to development cooperation?

Who are the people engaged in development cooperation? Desk research

In his book *Understanding Voluntary Organisations* Charles Handy voiced the intuitive, yet often taken for granted, argument that "organisations are people"[2]. Hence individuals working in NGDOs have an

[1] Janina Ochojska in A. Leszczyński. 2012. "Janka w poszukiwaniu Boga Sprawiedliwego" in *Gazeta Wyborcza,* 14.12.2012.

[2] C. Handy. 1998. *Understanding Voluntary Organisations*. London, p. 25.

impact on the policies and practices of development cooperation, too. Private individuals as well as people representing non-state entities both influence the other stakeholders involved in development cooperation (governmental and intra-governmental institutions providing development assistance, the institutional and individual recipients of aid). Not only have those individual visionaries become the "new pioneers"[3] to bring difference to the lives of ordinary people worldwide. The impact of private development assistance is likewise significant in quantitative terms. Recent trends in development assistance indicate that Private Development Assistance (PDA) is on the way to eclipse Official Development Assistance (ODA) in terms of volume[4].

As mentioned in Chapter One, ODA comprises of flows from official agencies to countries and territories on the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral institutions. By contrast, PDA concerns "finance from private sources given voluntarily through formal channels, such as nonprofit organisations, and transferred across borders for international development and to reduce poverty"[5]. PDA is also referred to as international private giving, international philanthropy, or voluntary giving. Unlike ODA, which relies on contribution by states, PDA's main providers are NGOs, foundations, and corporations. This rise of non-state actors in development is argued to have been a result of the increase in private giving by the middle classes, wealthy individuals, and corporations[6]. Importantly, ODA works through governments of recipient countries, whereas PDA works through local NGOs. PDA differs from ODA in other ways, too. Whereas ODA supports developing countries, PDA is more issue-oriented and assists poor people and communities irrespective of the countries they live in. Historical ties between countries and geo-strategic concerns determine ODA, whereas PDA is argued to be more oriented towards exploring opportunities for change[7].

---

[3] P. Grenier. 2004. "The New Pioneers: The People Behind Global Civil Society" in H. Anheier et al. (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2004/5*. London.

[4] H. Kharas. 2009. *Development Assistance in the 21st Century*. Contribution to the VIII Salamanca Forum The Fight Against Hunger and Poverty, p. 5.

[5] S. Hénon. 2014. *Measuring private development assistance: emerging trends and challenges*. Development initiatives report, p. 4.

[6] Ibid., pp. 6–7.

[7] H. Kharas. 2009. *Development Assistance in the 21st Century.*

Until recently it was singers and celebrities engaged in humanitarian actions that used to be the individuals most easily recognised by the general public as ambassadors of aid. This trend dates back to 1984, when the singer Bob Geldof became an activist and organized 40 British pop musicians to record the tune "Do They Know It's Christmas" under the name *Band Aid*. The song became a huge hit. The held in London and Philadelphia on July 13, 1985 charity concerts are still remembered as the most spectacular effort to raise funds for victims of starvation in Africa. In 2005 another series of *Live Aid* concerts took place. In the meantime critics of this mode of supporting developing countries highlighted the underside of such charitable events. In 2006 Bob Geldof himself said that *Band Aid* in 1985 was dealing with an emergency, as the aim was to stop as many of the 30 million people dying as possible. However, he admitted that since that time, moving the general agenda from charity to justice has turned out to be the real challenge[8].

Other celebrities philanthropists supporting causes abroad include for example the musicians Bono and Madonna, the actresses Angelina Jolie and Sandra Bullock, the actor Sasha Baron Cohen, the baseball player Lance Berkman, the model Gisele Bundchen, and others. Celebrities from Poland, like Amma Omenaa Mensah or Szymon Hołownia, also got engaged in development cooperation by establishing foundations active in Africa. Celebrity advocacy for development cooperation has become the norm worldwide. Yet this type of celebrity advocacy was criticised for serving as a proxy for public engagement. Researcher of celebrity advocacy for development Dan Brockington argues that it "marshals publics in ways that governments can appreciate, even if . . . it fails to engage them", which results in having populist form confused with popular participation[9]. The veracity of this argument notwithstanding, celebrities engaged in development assistance should be credited for raising awareness about the needs of vulnerable individuals, especially those living in the Global South.

The terms "Billanthropy" or "philanthro-capitalism" have been coined to describe a related phenomenon accounting for individuals'

[8] "Bob Geldof: A ‚You Ask The Questions' Special." 2006. *The Independent.*

[9] D. Brockington. 2014. *Celebrity Advocacy and International Development*. New York, p. 149.

impact on development cooperation[10]. The precedent dates back to 1997, when the billionaire media mogul Ted Turner became philanthropist by announcing his historic pledge of up to $1 billion to the United Nations Foundation. Contemporary billionaire philanthropists are George Soros, Bill and Melinda Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, but also philanthropists from the Majority World like Carlos Slim Helú of Mexico. These philanthro-capitalists have been praised for their commitment to development. However, they have also been criticised for bringing their own agendas, the choice of which has been argued to have little to do with participative policy processes. Undoubtedly, it is much more difficult to hold accountable philanthro-capitalists than governments, inter-governmental organisations, or NGDOs for that matter.

In addition to celebrities and philanthro-capitalists engaged in development cooperation, thousands of other individuals work for governmental and intergovernmental agencies, NGDOs, or are engaged in informal initiatives for global solidarity. Most aid professionals receive remuneration for their work. Others are involved on a voluntary basis. In addition to development professionals and volunteers engaged in the governmental or non-governmental sectors, the category of "accidental aid entrepreneurs" has been on the rise in recent years[11]. The characteristics of accidental aid entrepreneurship and the motivations of accidental aid workers have recently been addressed by researchers in the Netherlands[12] and in Norway[13]. Yet, the majority of individuals involved in development cooperation are affiliated with institutions. There are a number of ethnographic and anthropological accounts discussing development workers' everyday lives and professional

[10] M. Moran. 2014. "Global Philanthropy" in T.G. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (eds.) *International Organisation and Global Governance*. London and New York, p. 379.

[11] In January 2014 the *First European Conference on Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity* took place in Brussels under the header "Mobilising European Citizens for Global Development". For more information, see http://citizeninitiatives.eu/.

[12] S. Kinsbergen. 2014. *Behind the Pictures. Understanding Private Development Initiatives*. PhD thesis defended at Radboud University, Nijmegen.

[13] H. Haaland and H. Wallevik. 2014. "Spotlight presentation: What's happening in Norway?" at *the First European Conference on Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity*, Brussels (30-31.01.2014).

careers. These works also serve to bust some of the myths about work in the aid industry.

That the stereotypical aid professional is hard to find is one of the most salient findings in the volume edited by Anna-Meike Fechter and Heather Hindman[14]. Unlike most research on development, which focuses on the entities delivering aid or on aid recipients, this book deals with the "human actors who transform policy into projects"[15]. Rather than identifying as aid workers, aid professionals studied by the authors of the papers in this book considered themselves engineers, educators, or missionaries. The editors argue that "only through investigating the structural impingements and seemingly mundane aspects of the lives of aid workers are the affective dimensions of 'Aidland' . . . revealed"[16]. The book exemplifies the argument that if one wishes to identify trends in aid and development, one should talk to and study the actual aid workers. The volume edited by Fechter and Hindman likewise endorses the opinion that the actual NGDO activists should be consulted when identifying trends in the development sector. My book has sprung from the same conviction.

In another ethnographic volume, that attempts to reestablish the transformative quality of the development worker, David Mosse draws attention to the fact that the focus on global professionals in research comes "strangely late and reluctantly"[17]. This reticence to approach the subject can perhaps be explained by the seeming contradictions work in development entails. David Mosse nicely sums up the dilemmas faced by the contemporary aid workers:

> *Theirs is the messy, practical, emotion-laden work of dealing with contingency, compromise, improvisation, rule-bending, adjustments, producing viable data, making things work, and meeting delivery targets and spending budgets. In doing so, they have to negotiate national identity, race, age or gender. They have to manage personal*

---

[14] A. Fechter, H. Hindman (eds.). 2011. *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers. The Challenges and Futures of Aidland*. Sterling.

[15] A. Fechter, H. Hindman. 2011. *Introduction* in Ibid., p. 2.

[16] Ibid.

[17] D. Mosse. 2013. "Introduction. The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in International Development" in D. Mosse (ed.) *Adventures in Aidland. The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. New York/Oxford, p. 14.

> *security, family relations, loneliness, stress and anxiety . . . while also shoring up their motivation within moral-ethical or religious frameworks, which remain private. . . . As experts and professionals, they have to make themselves bearers of travelling rationalities, transferable knowledge and skills, context-free ideas with universal applicability or purified moral action*[18]

Especially relevant to my own research is David Lewis' comparative study of UK voluntary sector and INGO professionals in the abovementioned volume edited by David Mosse[19]. By utilising the life-history approach, David Lewis describes the realities of these two "parallel worlds" and discusses the ways his respondents' careers were shaped by values, family backgrounds, religious, and political convictions. He concludes that the chasm between these two sub-sectors obstructs the travel of ideas. Also, the movement of professionals between the UK voluntary sector and INGOs was very rare. Lewis' informants had to opt either for a professional identity based on working "at home" or on "Third world" context. Those who decided on the latter were characterized early on by a strong predisposition towards travel and international service, thus striving after self-realisation. Lewis came to the conclusion that it is the post-colonial context that determines the realities of division of labor in the non-governmental sector in the UK. The same can be said about the accidental aid entrepreneurs previously described. However, these circumstances appear to be irrelevant for the case of new donors like Poland.

Although individuals engaged in NGOs providing global education often work in their home countries and target their compatriots, global education is a distinct type of engagement in development cooperation. As such, the analysis of global educators' professional identity is pertinent to this discussion. According to a recent research on the lived experiences of 16 global education practitioners working in small NGOs from 15 different countries, their professional identity is becoming increasingly "in-between" and "hybrid" to reflect the mainstreaming and professionalisation of global education, the new resistances to neolib-

---

18 Ibid., p. 16.

19 D. Lewis. 2013. "Tidy Concepts, Messy Lives: Defining Tensions in the Domestic and Overseas Careers of U.K. Non-Governmental Professionals" in D. Mosse (ed.) *Adventures in Aidland.*

eralism and the changing development aid landscape[20]. Global education itself emerges as a practice "shaped by the dynamically evolving knowledge, emotions, creativities and coping strategies" of the practitioners themselves[21]. Theirs is a role that involves moving between activism, voluntarism, and professionalism. NGO activists working in global education in Poland highlighted the importance of possessing global awareness while being open-minded, unprejudiced, critically thinking and knowledgeable[22].

Humanitarian activists are as well aid professionals. David Kennedy discusses what he sees as the dark side of international humanitarianism by studying human rights activists' advocacy work. According to him, one of the challenges humanitarian workers face is that the concept of human rights is limited by its relationship to Western liberalism[23]. Bernard Kouchner, the French doctor and co-founder of the well-known international medical humanitarian organisation *Médecins Sans Frontières*, likewise equated humanitarianism with the "Western ideology of human rights"[24]. Indeed, humanitarian aid as such has been associated with Western Christianity[25]. The human rights vocabulary was also criticised for encouraging false solidarity among humanitarian activists from developed and developing countries. But then, as Sarah Lansky whose study focused on *local* humanitarian aid workers, reminds us, "to be called a humanitarian was not always a compliment"[26]. In the XIX century the term humanitarianism was used to deride "busybodies and people fond of telling others how to live their lives"[27]. In fact, the present-day understanding of humani-

---

[20] A. Skinner and M. B. Smith. 2015. *Reconceptualising global education from the grassroots: the lived experiences of practitioners*. Brussels, p. 9.

[21] Ibid., pp. 25–27.

[22] M. Kuleta-Hulboj. 2016. „*Global citizen as an agent of change. Ideals of global citizen in the narratives of Polish NGO employees*", in *The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, Vol. 14, no 3.

[23] D. Kennedy. 2005. *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism*. Princeton.

[24] D. Rieff. 2002. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York, p. 66.

[25] Barnett 2011 in S. Lansky. 2014. „My Brother Before Me. The Role and Experience of Local Humanitarian Aid Workers in Eastern Cameroon." *Anthropology Honors Projects*. Paper 22.

[26] S. Lansky. 2014. „My Brother Before Me," p. 10.

[27] Barnett 2011: 10 in Ibid.

tarianism was championed by the oldest international humanitarian organisation, the Red Cross[28]. As suggested earlier, by insisting that human beings have rights and value by the virtue of their humanity, humanitarians like Henry Dunant who founded the *International Committee of the Red Cross* created a set of normative assertions contesting the claims made by states[29]. His case corroborates the line of thinking of constructivist scholarship, which underlines that norms do have constitutive effects on the identity formation of actors[30]. The legitimacy of various criticisms of the theory and praxis of humanitarian work notwithstanding, contemporary humanitarianism views individuals' status and worth *irrespective of* these individuals' relationship to particular states and independently of the type of disaster (man-made or natural) they suffer.

In countries like Poland, which never had formal colonial territories, the image of humanitarianism is not tainted by its association with neo-colonialism. Yet the popular image of the humanitarian worker is somewhat removed from the realities of humanitarian activism. According to the conducted in 2013 representative survey commissioned by the *Polish Humanitarian Action*, the public opinion in Poland harbours a number of myths about the humanitarian worker[31]. The most popular of these, voiced by almost 70% of the respondents, is that humanitarian workers receive no remuneration for their work. More than half of the participants in this survey believed that being a humanitarian worker was a hobby rather than a vocation that required professional skills, adequate educational background, command of foreign languages, and personal qualities like resilience

[28] The International Committee of the Red Cross was established in 1863. Its objective has been to ensure protection and assistance for victims of international and internal armed conflicts alike. (see https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/history).

[29] M. Finnemore. 1999. "Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State Violence" in J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds.). *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, pp. 152–153.

[30] H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London, p. 521.

[31] See Polska Akcja Humanitarna. 2014. *Sześć mitów o pracownikach humanitarnych.*

to stress. Furthermore, respondents overestimated the relevance of propensity to risk-taking and physical strength for the vocation of the humanitarian worker. In short, the public opinion entertains a *romanticised* vision of the humanitarian worker. This popular view where humanitarian workers are "good-hearted, conscientious people who sometimes even risk their own lives to help other people" is also shared by politicians[32]. Rather than a good-hearted or risk-taking globe-trotter looking for exotic and dangerous places or a celebrity who occasionally advocates for engagement in humanitarian relief, the actual humanitarian worker is a professional who coordinates and oversees the implementation of the project on the spot, not only in times of war or natural disasters. Volunteers abroad also represent a distinct type of aid practitioners. The outcomes of a research on Polish volunteers' abroad will be presented later on in this chapter.

Another popular myth about aid professionals is their alleged cosmopolitanism. Ten years ago Sidney Tarrow famously called transnational activists "rooted cosmopolitans"[33]. Not all researchers, however, agree with the view that all who work in the development are cosmopolitan. For example, Dina Rajak and Jock Stirrat argue that the cosmopolitanism of aid workers is a "very parochial form of cosmopolitanism"[34]. This parochialism can be discerned in their "circumscribed expatriate lifestyles"; theirs is a social world, which is a "parody of 'home'". According to those researchers, development professionals furthermore fail to be cosmopolitans, as they are said to be unable to move between cultures, let alone blur boundaries[35]. Yet, a recent research on *Médecins Sans Frontières* demonstrates the key idea that "realizing cosmopolitanism need not always depend on committed cosmopolitans advocating for their principles"[36]. Furthermore, this study also demonstrates that the idealist who becomes humanitarian worker with the idea to change the world can experience "com-

---

32 Address of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, 28.09.2015.

33 S. Tarrow. 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. USA, p. 7.

34 D. Rajak, Dinah and J. Stirrat. 2011. "Parochial Cosmopolitanism and the Power of Nostalgia" in D. Mosse (ed.) *Adventures in Aidland,* p. 161.

35 Ibid., p. 174.

36 B.R. Scholz. 2015. *The Cosmopolitan Potential of Exclusive Associations. Criteria for Assessing the Advancement of Cosmopolitan Norms*. London, p. 188.

passion fatigue" and end up disillusioned; whereas the humanitarian worker who approaches his/her work "not expecting to live up to all the ideals of humanitarian work is able to navigate the world of moral dilemmas and ethical compromises"[37]. Therefore, an idealistic motivation for helping in conflict zones would not always create a sense of obligation or a sense of empowerment and global agency.

So far there has not been a research dealing with the career paths and motivational underpinnings of Polish aid professionals. That the importance of individuals has been seminal for the emergence and evolution of the Polish aid system has already been indicated in the previous chapters. Research participants themselves were aware of this factor. A couple of respondents highlighted the seminal role played by individuals in the emergence and development of Polish NGDOs. One of them noted, *"The most important factor [that facilitated the engagement of Polish NGOs abroad] has been people, . . . people who understood that Poland should start providing development cooperation"* (r16_10). Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska also argued that although in material terms NGDOs' involvement in implementing development cooperation projects might be limited, it is concrete individuals like Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* that constitute the trade mark of Polish development cooperation[38]. Drawing on this, one could argue that concrete individuals constitute NGDOs' biggest asset. In the following sections the career paths, motivations, and self-identification of aid professionals I interviewed are presented.

On becoming an aid professional in Poland

The role of social and cultural capital in the actualisation of pro-social behaviour has been well documented. My previous research confirmed the relevance of the continuation of the family tradition of social activism, the influence of Catholicism and the role of the intelligentsia values for NGO activism in Poland. The study also uncovered that NGO activism could be the outcome of acting in defiance to social norms. It also provided evidence for the emergence of first-generation activ-

[37] Ibid., p. 128.

[38] K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid," p. 172.

ists[39]. The continuing relevance of the intelligentsia ethos for formal and informal civic activism was documented in more recent studies, too[40]. Some of the outcomes of the presented in this book research among aid professionals are in tune with the above-quoted findings of previous studies. However, there are a number of circumstances that distinguish NGDO activists[41] from other social activists in Poland. It should be recognised that the analysis in this book is based on aid professionals' *declarations*. Nonetheless, the (self-)critical elements of their statements and the opportunity to juxtapose the point of view of actors with various vocational background grant credibility to the research participants' arguments.

A recurring theme in several of my respondents' biographies was that they were brought up in families where at least one parent was a teacher. This circumstance was brought up by the respondents themselves. For example, one of the older respondents said, *"I come from a family of schoolies, my parents were social activists"* (r19_34). Another one claimed, *"It is a well-known fact in the NGO world, that a huge share of people working in global education have parents [who worked as] teachers. They are teachers' kids and so am I. . . . Many people who advocate for global justice have been brought up to respect justice*" (r9_12). In addition to sensitivity to global justice, other aid professionals I interviewed also referred to values like curiosity, responsibility, diligence, interest in politics and participation in public life, openness to diversity, independence, sharing one's talents with others, multitasking. They believe in dialogue and community values. Importantly, a couple of aid professionals said their motive in life has been "do no harm". "Do not harm" is one of the principles of humanitarian assistance. However, apparently, it is also relevant for individuals engaged in other type of development interventions. NGO employees engaged

[39] G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists Make Solidarity Work*. Warszawa, pp. 164–175.

[40] A. Bilewicz. 2015. "Odnowa etosu społecznikowskiego? O inteligenckim charakterze niezinstytucjonalizowanych inicjatyw społecznych" in G. Chimiak, K. Iwińska (eds.) *Krajobraz społecznościowy – Polska 2014*. Warszawa.

[41] The set of issues discussed in this chapter is based on the responses to questions I asked only *current* NGDO activists. At the time of the interview, 20 of the 25 individuals I talked with, represented NGDOs. Only the question regarding respondents' opinion about the people involved in the NGDO sector in general was addressed to *all* research participants.

in global education and interviewed by Magdalena Kuleta-Hulboj likewise referred to the do-no-harm value[42].

Another recurring theme in the biographies of NGDO activists I interviewed was previous engagement in *Solidarity* by the respondents themselves or by their parents. As one of the research participants, who referred to his parents' engagement with grassroots and underground activism, recalled, *"I remember a lot of episodes of early-life learning, getting interested in social and political issues. Myself and my parents, too, we are inner-directed*[43]" (r18_16). Other respondents also referred to the underground activism of their parents. One of them said, *"my father died in the prison during Stalin's times, so I inherited anti-communism. . . . I got engaged in Solidarity afterwards and was myself imprisoned several times"* (r11_22). Other aid professionals also referred to the interest and active engagement in public life, though in a different context. One mentioned the need to rekindle the community spirit, *"in our Western world the pendulum has moved to the extreme; the rights of the individual [human being] have turned into egoism. . . . So I aim to recreate community, I believe [community] is a virtue*" (r1_8). Another research participant referred to underground Polish culture as the source of his engagement in development cooperation. He said that his social activism is derived from *"Polish culture, its romanticism. Even Polish positivism was romantic. I felt affinity with Giedroyc's*[44] *underground [journal] 'Kultura'"* (r22_36). Parents' previous engagement in social activism was however not as common among aid professionals I interviewed as it was among other NGO activists. It was another characteristic of NGDO activists' family life that was decisive about their vocational choice.

---

[42] M. Kuleta-Hulboj. 2016. "Global citizen as an agent of change. Ideals of global citizen in the narratives of Polish NGO employees", p. 232.

[43] In his seminal book *The Lonely Crowd* David Riesman argued that there are three types of social characters: tradition-directed, inner-directed, and other-directed (Riesman et al. 1961/1989). An inner-directed person is one guided by internalised values rather than external pressures.

[44] Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000) was a writer and politician of Polish-Lithuanian origins who founded and edited (in between 1947 and 2000) the Paris-based journal *Kultura* (http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/). The monthly became an island of non-conformism in the Cold War era and played an important role during the Polish uprisings of 1956, 1970 and 1980. (http://culture.pl/en/artist/jerzy-giedroyc).

Namely, several respondents underlined that their parents always supported them in their decision to work as aid professionals. This *unconditional support* those respondents' parents expressed for their kids' life choices did not always come with an understanding of what the job of being an aid professional actually entails. As one of the respondents, who appreciated her parents' unconditional support for her decisions, admitted, *"for many years my family didn't quite understand what I do to earn my living. . . . Now that we for example do crowdfunding to support our partners [in the Eastern Partnership countries], my family, aunts and cousins can see [and understand]. . . . Though I should also admit that for a long time I myself was not capable of explaining what my profession is. One time someone visiting my family asked me 'You don't produce anything, you don't sell stuff, you don't teach kids at school. What do you do actually? What are you paid for?'"* (r8_11). The participants of my research, who appreciated their parents' unconditional support for their vocational choice, were aware this encouragement comes at a prize. For example, these respondents' parents were concerned when their child travels to places (considered) unsafe. It seems, however, those aid professionals' parents opted for trusting them and letting them choose their way of life. Those aid professional parents' attitude to their children is the opposite of what has been known as helicopter parenting[45]. It is empowering to be supported unconditionally, yet left to take decisions and bear the responsibility for those decisions.

Aid professionals distance themselves from the presented above assumptions evident in the public perception of humanitarian workers. Unlike this stereotypical romanticised vision according to which the humanitarian worker is supposed to be a volunteer whose hobby is to go to dangerous places to save other people's lives, the actual aid professionals contested the idea that being an aid professional is a calling. One of them said, *"I do not approach aid, as some famous Polish humanitarian workers do, as my calling. I understand my job as assuming responsibility"* (r4_14). In a similar vein, other interviewees regarded their engagement in development cooperation as an attitude. Some of them admitted to have been the "school

[45] The term is used to describe overprotective or over-controlling behaviour on behalf of parents towards their children, which attitude ultimately results in limiting children's independence.

activist" type in their youth, *"someone who organises things all-round"* (r3_10). This "activism bug" took various forms. For example, during the martial law in Poland in the early 1980s, one interviewee initiated his own private humanitarian assistance. He said, *"I was seventeen, and together with another person, we started organising assistance for poor people living in rural areas. At that time Poland received humanitarian aid from abroad, which was then distributed by the church, but some people did not receive this aid for ideological reasons. Several parcels arrived daily, because I wrote letters to various organisations abroad, explaining to them what the situation in Poland was. So our home turned into a storage place for those parcels; my mom was mad at me because of this… I spoke English, so I just decided to write those letters and then distribute the parcels [I received] to people in need*" (r20_12). Unlike most aid professionals I interviewed, this respondent's case indicates that parents are not always supportive of their children's interest in development cooperation or humanitarian assistance.

Even if not all respondents' parents were enthused with the public activity of their children, a common feature for all NGDO activists is their professional attitude to their work. Professionalism is understood not only as possessing the necessary skills and experience, but also as assuming responsibility for one's work and for the people whose life will be affected by the development intervention. Other interviewees likewise distanced themselves from the stereotypical idea that working in development is for altruists. One of the respondents explained, "*It seems to me I am quite good at this job and it has been my professional choice, not the embodiment of some lofty ideals*" (r3_10).

Both the predominant cases where parents were supportive of their children's life choices and the one example, where parents did not demonstrate understanding for the son's initiative, are indicative of the fact that it is the *lack* of a family tradition of social activism that better describes aid professionals, rather than the adherence to a continuation of a family tradition in this respect. This counter-intuitive finding signals the significant occurrence of first-generational activism among aid professionals engaged in NGDOs. The same can be said about the relevance of the intelligentsia ethos for aid professionalism, i.e. this ethos describes just some of the cases of engagement in development cooperation. The positivistic intelligentsia ethos has been consistently found to be relevant to social activism in Poland since the

beginning of the transformation[46]. Its elitist yet democratising mission *noblesse oblige*[47] still explains why new generations of social activists keep joining civil society in the country. The values traditionally associated with the intelligentsia however represent just one of the trends discernible in the cohort of aid professionals. The participants in my research more often referred to professionalism and humanitarian values when describing their personal mode of engagement in development cooperation. The fact that the role models aid professionals admitted to inspire them are rather different than the role models of social activists I interviewed 15 years ago, also testifies to this contention.

When asked about their role models, social activist from NGOs I studied in 2002 referred most often to the late pope John Paul II, as well as to Mother Teresa or Ghandi. Those social activists admired self-made people, who in addition to striving after self-actualisation, contributed to the welfare of other people, or worked on behalf of the common good. Personal accomplishment, public recognition and work on behalf of the common good were the ideals those NGO activists' role models embodied[48]. A decade later, none of the NGDO activists I interviewed referred to the legacy of the late pope John Paul II, Mother Theresa, or Ghandi. In fact, not all NGDO activists I interviewed said they have role models. Those who were inspired by other people referred to Polish or foreign public figures alike. Importantly, most of those role models were individuals aid professionals I interviewed knew *personally*. Several of the research participants admitted to respect and draw inspiration from other aid professionals they had the opportunity to work with in the past. Such individuals are for example Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* or Robert Zduńczyk of the *Economic Foundation Poland and East Africa* (*Fundacja Ekonomiczna Polska-Afryka Wschodnia*). Other individuals, who inspired NGDO activists and with whom they had the opportunity to cooperate, were the

[46] See for example J. Koralewicz and H. Malewska-Peyre. 1998. *Człowiek człowiekowi człowiekiem;* G. Chimiak. 2006*. How Individualists Make Solidarity Work*; I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze o idei Trzeciego sektora w Polsce;* A. Bilewicz. 2015. "Odnowa etosu społecznikowskiego?"

[47] E. Mazur. 1999. *Dobroczynność w Warszawie w XIX wieku*. Warszawa, p. 137.

[48] G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*

distinguished Belarusian human rights activist Ales Belyatski, the previously mentioned founder of the *Nobody's Children Foundation* Alina Margolis-Edelman, the Russian human rights' activist Siergiej Adamowicz Kovaliov, the Russian dissident Ludmiła Michajłovna Aleksiejeva.

Public personalities like the Polish anti-communist dissidents Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik, the spiritual leader of Tibet Dalai Lama, the philosopher Bertrand Russell, the pope Francis, the humanist and activist Martin Luther King, the Czech writer, philosopher and dissident Václav Havel were mentioned by my research participants as role models, who were not only engaged in intellectual work, but were also actively engaged in impacting change. According to my interviewees, these multidimensional personalities were visionaries, who were also characterised by their readiness to promote and protect the well-being of others at the expense of their own well-being. Thus, unlike social activists I interviewed in 2001–2002, whose role models were world-known public figures, the aid professionals who took part in my latest research were mostly inspired by individuals they had the opportunity to work with and, less often, by public figures who promoted humanitarian ideas while being personally engaged in impacting change.

Whereas aid professionals' role models and the values they adhere to reveal the research participants' desired selves, NGDO activists' extant selves correspond to their self-definitions[49]. One set of responses to the question "Who am I?" revealed that aid professionals' self-definitions oscillate between viewing themselves as private persons and regarding themselves as professionals. Representatives of the former of those groups nonetheless insisted on widening their private self-definition to specify that *"I am a human being, who likes to learn and to work"* (r14_8), *"I am a person, who likes his job and who finds it interesting. I have a dream that my work makes a difference"* (r7_13), *"I am a person who finds the world and other people interesting and who likes challenges and learning new things*" (r2_7), *"I am a woman who is not afraid of challenges"* (r8_11), *"I am a woman who doesn't like to get bored"* (r3_10), or *"I am a human being aware of my*

[49] In accordance with the sociologist Morris Rosenberg's instrumentalisation of the notion of the self-concept, the self-concept can be empirically measured by looking at the individual's extent self and his/her desired self (Rosenberg 1979).

rights, but also of my duties towards my fellow human-beings" (r19_34). Some found it important to highlight that they have achieved work-life balance, *"I wouldn't say I am an activist. I am rather a person who has found his work-life balance"* (r5_8) and *"I am a happy human being, who views life with optimism and who manages to achieve harmony in life"* (r17_15).

Such self-definitions remain in contrast with the challenges aid workers (described by David Mosse and quoted in the beginning of this chapter) face. Even taking into account the declaratory nature of my research participants' statements, aid professionals I interviewed emerge as individuals who are *happy* with their vocation-related choices. The fact that NGDO activists claim to experience difficulties in their work, which is indeed mostly project-based and as such fails to provide income security and job predictability, does not prevent them from having an optimistic vision of themselves. This optimism most probably has to do with the opportunity to achieve self-actualisation by working in development. Actually, quite a number of my respondents' self-definition focused on their vocation, *"I am a humanitarian worker, I am a humanitarian aid specialist*" r4_14), *"I am a manager of humanitarian and development assistance"* (r10_17), *"I feel more like a social entrepreneur... entrepreneur in the sense of creating new modes of activity"* (r18_16) and *"I am a professional... a social professional, because I focus on creating social values"* (r1_8). Other respondents likewise identified with their vocation. However, they described it in different terms, *"I feel an activist. I wish I could call myself an educator, but I am aware I still lack the competencies [to be an educator]"* (r24_13), *"I am an inspirer and I think up various things... I am very creative"* (r2_7) and *"I like to think about myself as a builder of bridges, a neimar*[50]*"* (r22_36). These quotations are indicative of the relevance of the cultural brokerage for aid professionalism in Poland. The broker's role also surfaced when my research participants shared their understanding of citizenship.

It is important to mention that the comparison of the intrinsic definitions of citizenship of social activists and aid professionals also pointed to palpable differences between NGO activists and NGDO activists in Poland. The former predominantly understood citizen-

[50] "Neimar" comes from Ottoman Turkish. Neimar means an architect, a builder.

ship as taking active part in public life in one's local community. They also voiced their support for the *subsidiarity* principle (mentioned in Chapter Two) and for the liberal, individualistic notion of self-reliance[51]. The identification with their own country was not uncommon among aid professionals, too. Several aid professionals referred to the issue of European citizenship. One of them explained why it has been so important for him to think in terms of European citizenship, *"I feel Polish, but I would like to feel European. I am convinced [the European Union] is a political project that undergoes crisis and needs people who feel European. . . . Europe is the only place in the world, where there is a group of societies who cherish values, which are also important for me. It seems too many people are not even aware that Europe represents a value and it needs to be supported. . . . Europe's is the best system of protecting human rights*" (r24_13). This self-conscious attitude to the rights and duties of citizenship was also embraced by other respondents. One of them contended, *"being a citizen means trying to shape the public sphere in a way that is good for myself and for the majority [of people]. But also a very important aspect [of citizenship] is to participate in foreign affairs, also to promote the image of our country*" (r4_14). Not surprisingly for aid professionals, a number of respondents claimed they feel citizens of the world. One of interviewees, however, challenged the formal understanding of citizenship. He said, *"there is this labelling, everybody now says [they are] citizens of the world. This is outworn, I am no [country's] citizen. Formally I am a citizen, I have a passport"* (r20_12).

This only seemingly provocative statement is actually in tune with other aid professionals' attitude to citizenship. Namely, NGDO activists focus on the duties citizenship implies rather than on understanding the term as referring to being a national of a particular country. Theirs is a citizenship that signifies membership not (only) to the political body of their country, but to humanity as such. The element of exclusion inherent in the social understanding of citizenship, where plurality and difference are seen as a problem, is absent from aid professionals' intrinsic definition of citizenship. It is the political understanding of citizenship that NGDO activists adhere to. The political view of citizenship regards plurality and difference as values that need to be

[51] G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*, p. 246–251.

protected and cultivated[52]. Aid professionals I interviewed clearly subscribed under this latter understanding of citizenship.

This finding echoes the results of the analysis of the understanding of global citizenship of Polish NGO activists interviewed by Magdalena Kuleta-Hulboj[53]. Her research uncovered that the ideal global citizen is one that is aware of the interconnectedness and interdependence of the world we live in, while advocating for the deconstruction and critique of social norms, institutions and structures that reproduce inequalities. These two ideal types correspond to the social and critical global citizenship sub-types in the typology of global citizenship developed by Oxley and Morris[54]. Indeed, Kuleta-Hulboj argued that the predominance of the critical forms of global citizenship is rather on declaratory levels, as reportedly it was not accompanied by critical literacy or critical engagement.

Most of those NGDO activists also saw citizenship as an opportunity and mission to act as a broker among their fellow citizens and the wider world. One of them explained, "*I like my country. I love travelling, but my home is here. This is why it is so important for me to open other Poles to the world"* (r2_7). Another interviewee put it this way, *"I am a citizen of Poland and a Polish nationalist, as Gombrowicz would have said it. I wish [my fellow citizens] would stop dwelling on [their] Polishness, on celebrating their Polishness. . . . I am looking [instead] for liaisons between cultures*" (r18_16). A couple of interviewees insisted they feel citizens of their local community, of Poland, of Europe and of the world at the same time. The importance of this perspective was explained by one of the respondents the following way, *"One can be a Pole so the more if one understands what is outside of Poland. And the other way around. One should be rooted in the history of one's own country. Then one understands that Polish history is not only Polish history, but [it] is the history of the world"* (r9_12). This statement echoes the abovementioned concept of "rooted cosmopolitan" coined by Sidney Tarrow.

John van Willigen's concept of cultural brokerage is likewise useful in this context as it adequately describes the role of mediator played

---

52 G. Biesta. 2014. "Learning in Public Places: Civic Learning for the Twenty-First Century" in G. Biesta et al. (eds.). 2014. *Civic Learning, Democratic Citizenship and the Public Sphere*. New York and London, p. 2.

53 M. Kuleta-Hulboj. 2016. „Global citizen as an agent of change…".

54 Oxley and Morris 2013 in Ibid.

by aid workers, who link the funding agency and the community being impacted. Van Willigen is justified to argue that "the effective culture broker is necessarily culturally competent"[55]. Furthermore, cultural brokerage "substantially affects the service providers"[56]. The case of NGDO activists in Poland corroborates both observations, i.e. that aid professionals are both culturally competent and ultimately affected by their work. The humanitarian workers Sarah Lansky interviewed likewise saw their role as a "bridge between the giver and the recipient"[57]. Some participants in my research clearly viewed themselves and their organisations as the factors that bridge continents or different cultures. One of them said, *"when we [NGDOs] build a bridge between Poland and Africa, the business [cooperation] would follow"* (r1_8). Another interviewee referred to his experience in facilitating (re)establishment of contacts between ethnicities, *"It was not easy to heal this broken community. . . . We invited representatives of those ethnicities . . . and new quality [of communication] ensued. . . . I cannot bring this bridge to Mostar or Indonesia, but I can go and help the people there to find the material for building [their own] bridge"* (r22_36). Another respondent said that part of his work abroad has been to act as a *"liaison between local self-governments and social organisations"* (r17_15). Yet another interviewee claimed she has acted as a "facilitator" when implementing development cooperation projects abroad.

As far as the broker's role in development cooperation is concerned, it is worthwhile mentioning that the NGDOs' umbrella organisation *Grupa Zagranica* has itself acted as a mediator between "democratising" and "developmental" NGDOs. As one of the respondents recalled, a lot has changed since the initial years when the representatives of these two groups regarded each other with distrust, *"it changed over the years. A moment came when both sides could look each other in the eye and say with respect 'What you do is incredible, it makes sense'. . . . We started meeting each other [being part of Grupa Zagranica] and naturally we got to know each other better. This helped [the community of NGDOs] to change the way it works [now] . . . those who build water pipelines in Kirgizstan, they work with the local community, they utilise*

[55] J. van Willigen. 2002. *Applied Anthropology: an Introduction*. Third Edition. Westport, p. 129.

[56] Ibid., p. 130.

[57] S. Lansky. 2014. "My Brother Before Me," p. 31.

local democracy. On the other hand, those who work in development [in the Global South], understood that they should involve local people in decision making if they want to build a school in the village. . . . There are those things that we came to figure out, I guess it was a matter of maturing, and we have started to appreciate what the other [branch of NGDOs] does" (r8_11). Other respondents' opinions about the role *Grupa Zagrancia* has played over the years testify to this contention. The NGDOs' umbrella organisation consolidated the initially divided sector of NGDOs. Indeed, as indicated previously, there are some issues (like gender equality) that still represent a bone of contention for some of the organisations involved in providing aid. However, this lack of unanimity among the organisation can be explained by the fact that *Grupa Zagrancia* is open to and cooperating with a wide spectrum of organisations.

Interestingly, whereas the role of the mediator or broker is viewed in a positive way when the aid professional works for the NGDO sector, this same function stops being regarded as admirable once the aid professional moves to work for another sector. As one of my respondents admitted, *"I have this poignant experience, when I was working for an NGDO, I was like a midwife: [I was this] good, warm person, who brings well-being, who helps [other] people, even when some things don't work out [as planned]. And I changed this job for the job of a chopper*[58] *in a bus when I moved to work for the ministry. Nothing good is expected to come from me [any more]"* (r6_22). This last quotation well illustrates the challenges aid professionals face when they move between the sectors. As previously argued, individuals working in the NGDO sector were instrumental in speeding some of the processes related to the governmental Polish aid system. In some cases, apparently, this has come at a personal price. Nonetheless, given that most aid professionals I interviewed have had experience working in various sectors, the smooth movement between sectors seems to be inscribed in the nature of aid professionalism in Poland. This finding is in contrast with the above-mentioned research conducted by David Lewis. Perhaps the fact that Polish NGOs were recipients of official aid should be credited for the ease with which they built on this experience and continued their international cooperation. The overview of aid professionals' career paths will provide some further evidence on this contention.

[58] Colloquial term for a ticket inspector in bus or tram.

The career paths of aid professionals

Existing research has shown that one of the most common career paths for people who work in development is the one where a volunteer in an NGO gets a paid job in the organisation, moves to NGO management and eventually into the world of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies[59]. Indeed, part of the current staff of the *Solidarity Fund* and the Polish MFA Department for Development Cooperation has had experience working for the Polish NGO sector. Nonetheless, in Poland the opposite development is likewise taking place very often, i.e. where a former employee of a national or international organisation is joining the NGDO sector. My research uncovered that quite a number of NGDO aid professionals joined the civic sector after working in development for other institutions. For instance, one of my interviewees was first affiliated with MFA in the area of development cooperation. Another one used to be a UN diplomat before deciding to establish an NGDO of his own. Two other respondents worked for the commercial sector prior to founding their own NGDOs. One of them decided to establish an NGDO to provide development assistance to Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries. The other founded an NGDO to implement projects in Africa. Two other interviewees were affiliated to academic institutions before deciding to establish NGDOs. One of them said, *"I've been engaged in development cooperation since 2001, when an idea came to my mind to establish an NGO, which could bring assistance to countries outside of Europe. [This decision] had to do with my privately-organised visit to Afghanistan, while the Taliban were still in power. . . . I witnessed terrible poverty and people dying of hunger. So, while still in Afghanistan, I thought that upon my return to Poland I should immediately establish an NGO to try and help them. That was before 9/11, so nobody back then thought the Taliban would [ever] be ousted"* (r20_12).

Yet another interviewee admitted to have given up on journalism for the sake of involvement in development cooperation. This respondent said, *"I used to work as a journalist. I wrote reports about the revolution in Romania in 1989, and then about the war on the Balkans in the 1990s. It was during the latter that I started doubting the mission of the media and journalism. I found it unethical to just observe how people die. . . . I was in the beleaguered Sarajevo a couple of times. So I started*

[59] D. Rajak and J. Stirrat. 2011. "Parochial Cosmopolitanism," p. 163.

working with the Polish Humanitarian Action. Because I wanted to do something palpable and see the effects [of my work], I didn't want to keep on describing the world, which anyway was attracting the attention of too many people" (r11_22). These aid professionals opted for establishing an NGO to deal with the particular issue that interested them. Their dissatisfaction from various aspects of their work in the other sectors explains why they decided to approach the problem that ailed them via engagement in a different type of institution. This observation echoes the case of Peter Eigen, who in 1990 was the regional director of the World Bank for East Africa. He had witnessed the destructive impact of corruption on development work and tried to tackle the issue via the institution he worked for. After he found it impossible to do this, he retired early and started searching for supporters for an initiative to fight corruption. By the end of 1992 a substantial group of adherents established *Transparency International*[60].

While some individuals move to an NGDO after working for other sectors, the opposite development is likewise taking place. Sometimes aid professionals' giving up on their work in the NGDO represents a reason for concern, because it amounts to brain-drain of the sector and is indicative of the discussed elsewhere in this book precarious situation of NGDO professionals. A couple of my respondents, who at the time of the interview were engaged in an NGDO, admitted to be planning to leave the civic sector. Their decision was spurred by their frustration work in the NGDO sector entailed. Indeed, they declared they intended to continue their involvement in development cooperation, albeit in the governmental or commercial sector, in the academia, or an international organisation.

The transfer of individuals among various entities involved in development cooperation proves that "aid professional" is a term that adequately describes individuals engaged in NGDOs in Poland. A specific to the post-communist world, situation, however, is where aid professionals have started their engagement in international cooperation due to their dissatisfaction with the previous regime. One of my respondents admitted, *"My first activity [in the field of international cooperation] sprang from my dissatisfaction with the socialist*

[60] F. Galtung. 2000. "A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The Experience of Transparency International" in A. Florini (ed.) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Tokyo and Washington.

system. . . . 'Solidarity' developed this appeal to the workers from the other countries. . . . I was emotionally attracted to this approach. . . . So I worked then as a sociologist. And after working day was over, I was active in the 'Solidarity' movement" (r19_34). Another interviewee said, *"In 1978 I was inspired by the vanguard art. . . . We wanted to rebuild the community [spirit]. . . . I lived in the homogenous Polish People's Republic, so I couldn't learn this from elsewhere and I had to discover this art by myself. Later on our activity spread to other countries, too. . . . Then I got engaged in underground activism. . . . After 1989 I realised we should change, we should leave the underground and become grassroots workers, and we decided to move east. So, when the whole country moved westwards, we moved in the opposite direction, to the east*" (r22_36). This theme of getting interested in countries, which the mainstream considered *passé* when Poland set on the road to transformation after 1989, recurred in other respondents' statements, too. It should be remembered that the "return to normalcy"[61] envisaged joining Western civilisation and, accordingly, giving up on the allegiance to the countries from the former communist bloc. In this respect, aid professionals' focus on cooperation with post-Soviet states and ODA recipients goes against the current.

The standard route to become an NGO activist, after first engaging as a volunteer, can be also witnessed among aid professionals I interviewed. Several of my respondents became committed to development cooperation by first working as volunteers for the *Polish Humanitarian Action* or *Amnesty International*. These two organisations appear to have been the incubators, which allowed quite a number of future aid professionals to learn by doing. A couple of interviewees admitted to have joined the *Polish Humanitarian Action* or *Amnesty International* by chance. Others were interested in international affairs prior to joining those organisations. Some of them simply found the NGOs' world attractive, *"I liked the NGO world. Being a young person, I did not want to work for some enterprise and bring profit. I wanted to work for ideas"* (r8_11) and *"I was positively taken by surprise by the people in the NGDO sector, they seemed so full of life, so joyous. . . . So it was then that I thought for the first time that this could be an idea for life*" (r2_7).

[61] A. Rychard. 1993. "Społeczeństwo w transformacji: koncepcja i próba syntezy," in A. Rychard, M. Federowicz (eds.). *Społeczeństwo w transformacji. Ekspertyzy i studia*. Warszawa.

Another interviewee, who – while in high school – worked as a volunteer for *Amnesty International*, said, *"I was looking for something interesting, I got engaged with Amnesty International, we organised campaigns, advocating for human rights in other countries. . . . My engagement in Amnesty [International], it was an alternative to scouting, for people who were questioning the status quo, who were more liberty-oriented"* (r24_13). This statement indicates that internationally-oriented and/or promoting human rights NGOs attracted individuals with certain predispositions. Also, it is important to note that volunteering for the *Polish Humanitarian Action* or for *Amnesty International* has emerged as an alternative to more traditional and well-established modes of civic engagement for young people such as the scouts' organisations. Although the tradition of scouting is still vibrant in Poland, organisations like the two mentioned above have also started to act as early-life recruiters into sustained engagement in public life.

Yet other respondents worked for the NGO sector *before* their organisations started to develop their international activity. As such, these interviewees' interest in international cooperation evolved along the development of their organisations' mission. Undoubtedly, the combination of chance with the predisposition to get involved in novel enterprises creates the most opportune conditions for long-term engagement in development cooperation. This finding is in tune with previous research on engagement in the civic sector[62]. Yet, in Poland it seems aid professionals' career path is not as one-directional as it is in Western countries. In Poland aid professionals appear to be moving more freely among sectors than seems to be the case in more established donor countries. This observation also refers to the world of national and internationally-oriented NGOs. It can be surmised this freedom of movement between the sectors makes the transfer of ideas natural and possible. As such, the case of Polish aid professionals stands in contrast with UK aid workers described above by David Lewis. On the other hand, the spontaneity of some people who became aid professionals came at a price. As one respondent, who admitted to have become involved in development cooperation by chance, said, *"I could witness how important it is to be really open to what the other person says and find a common ground… This became particularly evident when we started cooperating with African countries. There was*

[62] G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*

really a precipice there, and we jumped into this cooperation totally unprepared. There were no conflicts, but oftentimes we had to confront our own stereotypes. It turned out we only thought *we possess cultural sensitivity. It turned out it is a difficult job to fraternise with other people, one has to be careful"* (r14_8).

One issue I did not specifically seek to discuss with my respondents, yet came out repeatedly during the interviews, was their insistence that they are learning a lot in the process of being engaged on the donor side in development cooperation. This finding is in line with previous research on learning-by-doing inherent in social activism[63]. However, in the case of aid professionalism, this finding can be counter-intuitive, given that it is assumed that it is donors, who possess the know-how and provide the answers to development-related problems. As it turns out, the engagement in donor-recipient relationship is a rewarding – if challenging – experience for those engaged on the donor side, too. Indeed, some of the interviewees admitted to have become involved in development cooperation with the idea to expand their knowledge. Two of them, who have been working in Africa, admitted: *"I was not aware there's such industry as development cooperation. Even after we established our organisation, I was aiming at building my own knowledge*" (r1_8) and *"I learnt a lot [via my participation in development cooperation projects] and this has been a very positive experience for me"* (r3_10). Others likewise realised that working in development is a huge opportunity to learn by doing.

Examples of concrete aspects of learning identified by aid professionals refer to a number of aspects. One of them differentiated between the positive aspect of knowledge that *"empower you as a person, give you knowledge and hone your skills"* and the other, critical one, which has to do with *"the way development assistance is done, or rather how it shouldn't be done"* (r3_10). Other respondents likewise voiced their awareness that "*development cooperation is a business, a huge business*" (r16_10). The observation that international development has become a big business is the object of a number of critical studies[64]. Yet my

[63] J. Koralewicz and H. Malewska-Peyre. 1998. *Człowiek człowiekowi człowiekiem. Analiza wywiadów biograficznych działaczy społecznych w Polsce i we Francji*. Warszawa; G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*

[64] See for example Arjan de Haan's well-known book of 2009 *How the Aid Industry Works: An Introduction to International Development.*

respondents rarely picked up this issue. This could be explained by their constructive attitude to their work. Perhaps NGDO activists find it hard enough to continuously advocate for greater engagement of the Polish state and society in development cooperation. The public discussion of the sins of development assistance[65] could make sense if the public opinion is already well informed and well versed in development cooperation. As it is, it is understandable aid professionals focus on advocating for Polish society's greater involvement in global solidarity, while striving after implementing in their own work the state-of-the-art principles of development cooperation.

The variety of aspects this learning process encompasses can be best illustrated by providing some quotations from the interviews. One respondent explained her stance towards development assistance has evolved *"from theory and the naïve, scout-like delight that one can change the world to... Well, I was lucky, early on I could witness what it looks like in practice, so [this delight] is over"* (r3_10). However, not all aid professionals let themselves be disheartened by the failures of development cooperation. One of the interviewees explained his attitude to providing humanitarian aid the following way, *"I had to gain this professional numbness, which means I had to learn to look for the bigger good. . . . These are difficult choices to be made and sometimes I feel low about it, when I have to focus on the well-being of the whole group, and not on the individuals' well-being"* (r4_14). Janina Ochojska's view substantiates this argument. As mentioned before, she once admitted that providing assistance implies making pitiless choices. This aspect of working in development is rarely discussed publicly. Understandably, most often attention is paid to the threat to aid workers' security when they are in conflict-ridden areas. Yet, working in development can also take an emotional toll on aid professionals.

This underside of working in development notwithstanding, most respondents focused on the positives. Here are some of the issues ap-

[65] For example, in her paper *Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings* Nancy Birdsall critiqued donors' impatience with institution building, their failure to coordinate and evaluate their activities, donors' inability to exit from programs and countries where their aid is not helping, donors' mistaking partner participation for ownership, donors' lack of commitment to provide reliable transfers and their underfunding of global and regional public goods.

preciated by aid professionals, *"When I work with people from different cultures, I can understand the world better. And I can see our problems in Poland not only from our Polish perspective. . . . It is worthwhile to view our place in the world from a different perspective"* (r11_22), and *"I changed a lot, I learnt a lot about myself, too. . . . This has been an incredible, interesting experience"* (r2_7). The representative of one of the oldest NGDO in Poland observed, *"it all seems logical, from today's perspective . . . but [when we established the organisation] we did not know how Poland will change, whether the organisation will still be here in 3 or 5 years. The lesson is: you can't give up on your dreams. One should aim high and believe it will work out"* (r10_17). Another interviewee shared a similar observation, *"ever since 2006 I have been advocating for the idea that there is a huge potential for cooperation between Poland and Africa. . . . But at that time everybody was interested in the EU. . . . [Back then] when I talked to people about Poland's presence in Africa, they would regard me as an extra-terrestrial. . . . Whereas today I have this huge satisfaction, because many of those people come to me now and tell me: You were right"* (r1_8). Undoubtedly, aid professionals are trendsetters who have the potential to become change-makers, too. Whether they would be successful in actualising this potential or not, is a question of a constellation of circumstances. Undoubtedly, their motivation should be taken into account as well as the external factors that facilitate or limit the chances to bring about the change aid professionals aspire after.

Polish NGDO activists' motivation

The research analysed here also aimed at increasing our understanding as to why individuals decide to become aid professionals. Existing studies of particular types of engagement in development cooperation have identified a number of trends. For example, in the discussed in the beginning of this chapter research among international non-governmental professionals in the UK, David Lewis came to the conclusion that these professionals were motivated by factors as diverse as political solidarity, humanist compassion, an exploratory worldview, an interest in trying to escape one's own culture and family, a sense of religious or humanitarian mission[66]. According to the pre-

[66] D. Lewis. 2013. "Tidy Concepts, Messy Lives," p. 187.

viously mentioned study of global education practitioners working in small NGOs from 15 different countries, the motivation aiming at self-realisation was prevalent among those practitioners, in spite of the limited opportunities for professional development they faced[67]. These practitioners were attracted to their work by the drive to foster change through the means of global education. To see change happen was a need as well as a motivation and incentive for them. It should be remembered that local aid workers are aid professionals themselves. As it turns out, theirs is a distinct motivation. Sarah Lansky, who studied local aid workers employed in humanitarian agencies, concluded that they were motivated by a "moral fulfillment and pride at having an international status job" coupled with the notion of African hospitality[68].

In a study of Polish volunteers abroad, it was argued that their motivations did not differ significantly from other development workers'. According to the *Report on Returning Volunteers' Involvement in Global Education in Poland*[69], volunteers abroad strove to achieve personal and professional development via this engagement. They regarded their experience as an opportunity for self-actualisation. These outcomes are largely in tune with other research on volunteers' motivation[70]. Importantly, 42% of volunteers abroad have not been involved in development cooperation prior to their mission abroad. Being unprepared for work in development creates challenges for the volunteers themselves, irrespective of whether it was a secular or religious organisation that organised their volunteering experience. As Katarzyna Zych, who worked as a volunteer in an orphanage in Zambia run by the Congregation of the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, admitted, *"I could not understand why these kids' mothers are not with them? . . . I still can't figure out how people can live without electricity, without running water and surrounded by wild animals*"[71]. Not surprisingly, according to

[67] A. Skinner and M. B. Smith. 2015. *Reconceptualising global education from the grassroots*, pp. 25–27.

[68] S. Lansky. 2014. „My Brother Before Me," pp. 78, 85.

[69] *Raport o zaangażowaniu wolontariuszy po powrocie z misji zagranicznych*. 2013. Kraków.

[70] *Zaangażowanie społeczne Polek i Polaków. Wolontariat, filantropia, 1% i wizerunek organizacji pozarządowych. Raport z badania 2013*. 2014. Warszawa; G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*, pp. 109–123.

[71] K. Zych. 2016. "Afrykański sen" in *Echo z Afryki i innych kontynentów*, Vol. 5, pp. 18–21.

the *Report on Returning Volunteers' Involvement in Global Education in Poland*, volunteers who were not aware of the realities of the countries they were heading for, upon return tended to consider development cooperation pointless. This research result corroborates the argument that idealistic motivations without adequate skills and knowledge are not an asset as far as work in development abroad is concerned. Previous involvement in the work of an NGDO clearly emerged as the factor that commits returning volunteers to stay engaged with development cooperation in the Third sector in Poland.

As far as previous analysis of Polish NGO activists' motivations is concerned, self-actualisation via participation in the work of an NGO emerged as the most typical motivation. NGO activists I studied in 2001-2002 fulfilled their personal needs while contributing to the augmentation of the public good[72]. The seven *main* types of motivations characterizing those NGO activists were: *Intrinsic*: related to accomplishment, self-actualisation, self-esteem, competence achievement, satisfaction; *Axiological*: understood as responsibility, honour, service and community obligation, mission; *Extrinsic*: has to do with the social side of behaviour, affiliation, gregariousness; *Rational*: aiming after the acquisition of skills and knowledge, new learning experience, benefit; *Frustration*: acting out of guilt, solving personal problems, serving a protective function; *Allocentric*: acting out of compassion, selfless love, altruism; *Power-related*: aiming after the achievement of status, career, prestige, reputation, serving an instrumental function. The analysis of the research material I gathered in 2001-2002 showed that intrinsic and axiological types of motivation appeared to be most typical for social activists, whereas power-related and allocentric ones were the least characteristic[73]. The counter-intuitive finding that NGO activism does not equate altruism merits attention. Furthermore, as Sara de Jong convincingly argues, instead of attempting to label practices as altruistic or selfish, we should "critically investigate *under which conditions* altruism takes place"[74].

In a recent analysis of motivations of 70 activists engaged in

---

72 G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists*, pp. 190–219.

73 Ibid.

74 S. de Jong. 2011. "False Binaries: Altruism and Selfishness in NGO work" in A. Fechter and H. Hindman (eds.) 2011. *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers*, p. 37.

informal civic initiatives in Poland, the local context was emphasised as an important factor, and locality was identified as a distinct type of motivation[75]. Unlike social activists engaged in NGOs, those who opted for participating in un-institutionalised civic initiatives in Poland were mostly characterised by extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Similarly to NGO activists, a negligent share of those engaged in informal initiatives referred to allocentric motivation. Interestingly, unlike NGO activists, those participating in informal initiatives much more often declared to be driven by power-related motivation[76]. Likewise, extrinsic motivation appeared to be more typical of informal activism than for formal engagement. However, the need to socialise was more characteristic of women than of men. On the other hand, men were twice as likely than women to admit being driven by the intention to impact change in their immediate surroundings[77].

Like for the respondents in the studies mentioned above, the motivation most characteristic of NGDO activists turned out to be the intrinsic one. The following selected quotations well illustrate the point that striving after self-actualisation and aiming to achieve satisfaction are the best predictors of a person's propensity to become an aid professional, *"I noticed that this job, the work I do for the benefit of others, allows me to develop myself a lot, too"* (r1_8), *"I caught this bug. . . . I saw this work is so interesting. It stimulates my own personal development"* (r2_7), *"it was not that I felt I'd change the world and have a mission to fulfill in this respect. It was rather a pragmatic choice, that this is something interesting, something that I am interested in and would like to be part of. . . . I knew early on I wouldn't want to work in a corporation. Plus, I knew I wouldn't handle it if I had a boss. . . . So it took me a while to figure out what kind of job that would be"* (r3_10), *"I think that by doing development, I fulfill myself as a person"* (r11_22), "*I must admit, maybe this is too egoistic to say, but the work I do now really gives me a lot. It demands a lot, but I don't think any other work would have given me the opportunity to learn so much about the world in such a short time. I always believed that travelling is education. But now I can*

[75] D.V. Polanska. 2015. "Motywacje osób niezinstytucjonalizowanego sektora społecznościowego" in G. Chimiak and K. Iwińska (eds.) *Krajobraz społecznościowy Polska 2014*. Warszawa.

[76] Ibid., p. 39.

[77] Ibid., pp. 41–42.

see that meeting people, whose life is so different from our life, and who nonetheless try to do something for their communities, gives you twice as much to think about [compared to travelling] and makes you establish the right priorities in your head" (r14-8), *"This may sound silly, but I was made to do this job. It is vocationally rewarding, . . . but I also feel rewarded personally"* (r4_14). The selected quotations clearly illustrate the argument that striving after self-actualisation is the most typical motivation characterising *all* social activists, including those engaged in NGOs and those involved in informal initiatives like urban movements, cooperatives, etc.

Unlike other social activists, however, aid professionals working in development cooperation, humanitarian assistance or global education are also driven by a new type of motivation which can be named *curiosity*. Curiosity, which can be associated with an exploratory worldview and openness to other cultures, appeared to be the type of motivation popularity of which is only second to intrinsic motivation. The following quotations well illustrate the exploratory worldview of aid professionals, *"because [work in development cooperation] is so fascinating, interesting, innovative"* (r7_13), *"I gave up on pursuing PhD studies . . . [because] this work [in NGDOs] is so attractive"* (r14_8), *"This is what interests me: the wider world"* (r9_12), *"I was always interested in what lays to the east of Poland. I felt it hasn't been well described, well understood. . . . This is just so interesting. . . . Plus, I like languages. . . . I was allured by this novelty; this work just turned out so attractive. . . . It was only later on that I came to rationalise [my vocational choice], that here in Poland we would be better off if we know what is going on in these [neighbouring] countries"* (r13_20), *"I was always interested in Africa"* (r5_8) and *"I always wanted to live in Africa"* (r3_10). These quotations are indicative of the argument that in addition to the strive after self-actualisation, the exploratory worldview and interest in particular regions or in the wider world, constitute the attitude that many aid professionals share. In some cases, the unspecified early interest in other regions of the world preceded the engagement in development cooperation. In other cases, the opportunity to work in development assistance was an eye opener and further committed the interviewees to keep working in development.

A third characteristic feature of the motivational underpinnings of NGDO activists I interviewed was their intention to bring about change or forwarding an agenda they felt strongly about. This motivation also

appeared among other NGO activists and those involved in informal civic initiatives. However, striving after change in the case of aid professionals turned out to be a more important incentive than it was for other types of social activists. The following quotations are illustrative of this type of motivation, *"the awareness of the existing injustices motivates me. I think that since so many people in the world live in worse conditions, this has to change. It is not their fault"* (r8_11), *"One cannot leave the world as it is; there are important things, and things that are more important. . . . This reality has to be changed"* (r24_13), *"This bug to change the world . . . has always been inside me"* (r17_15), *"I am looking for ways to impact the reality, to change it"* (r9_12), *"I have this feeling of disagreement, I can't accept the way [the world] functions now. I cannot accept the disproportions which keep growing"* (r5_8), *"I couldn't agree with [the Batory Foundations'] withdrawal from the East. . . . So I wanted to change something [in this respect] and continue our involvement in the East"* (r13_20) and *"the issue [our foundation is addressing] takes place everywhere in the world, so we have to make use of our experience [in Poland], not to waste it"* (r21_10). Undoubtedly, the awareness about the existence of huge inequalities and injustices in the world characterises many people. However, this awareness does not become behaviorally committing for most of them. What makes aid professionals take this road, given that the majority of humanity is more focused on its own or, at best, on their own community's wellbeing?

The relevance of axiological and allocentric motivations for engagement in development cooperation seems to be one of the factors that triggers the will to impact change on reality. The following quotations represent examples of axiological motivation, *"I need to share the talents I have. . . . I have this need to reach out"* (r1_8), *"We need to pay back the debt we took out from the West"* (r17_15), *"I have this feeling we are not only for ourselves; each of us has to do something for the others, and each of us has to choose, whether it will be working on behalf of your local community, or helping the disabled, or engaging in education, etc."* (r5_8) and *"when I see poverty, or people suffering, this also affects me"* (r20_12). Allocentric motivation surfaced less often. One of the interviewees said, *"Each of us has this need, to reach out to the other human being. We just don't always know how to do this"* (r22_36). It seems, then, aid professionals are individuals who have the skills and know-how needed to reach out. As one of the interviewees told me, *"I am better off at selling an idea than at selling a product"* (r1_8).

Aid professionals therefore emerge as social entrepreneurs who are willing to share their vision with others. In fact, the understanding of social entrepreneurs as autonomous agents in a globalising world has been gaining prominence. Social entrepreneurship has been argued to be a phenomenon specifically relevant to globalisation as it connects and mediates between the global and the local[78].

Indeed, the previously mentioned function of cultural brokerage aid professionals fulfill echoes this observation. The interviewees, who referred to rational motivation, likewise highlighted this aspect of work in development cooperation. One of them said, *"Development cooperation is not just about the transfer of money. It is also a transfer of various other things, like skills and knowledge"* (r20_12). The opportunity to hone one's skills and learn was mentioned by other interviewees, too. Extrinsic motivation is also to be found among aid professionals. Here are some quotations to illustrate this type of motivation, *"This has been very important to me, to be part of this group of people, with whom I share similar values; we embrace the same ethos. So, it is not only our activities that matter. It is the gathering of a community of people, who want to change the reality, who are convinced they can do this"* (r24_13), *"I wanted to do interesting things; but, most of all, to work with great people, interesting people. This has been my main motivation, not just what we do, but whom you work with is also important"* (r18_16). Apparently, the opportunity to hone one's skills while working with people one likes are factors that likewise explain NGDO activists' professional choices. Indeed, extrinsic motivation is not among the pivotal reasons for the engagement of aid professionals, as it is for activists in informal initiatives. And rational motivation is not as typical for aid professionals as it is for other NGO activists. Interestingly, power-related motivation was mentioned only once by the NGDO activists I interviewed. By contrast, power-related motivation was very important for activists in informal civic initiatives. And finally, two very different types of motivation, frustration and free time, are virtually irrelevant for aid professionals. Unlike aid professionals, activists engaged in other NGOs were sometimes motivated by the availability of free time.

[78] P. Grenier. 2006. "Social Entrepreneurship: Agency in a Globalizing World" in A. Nicholls (ed.) *Social Entrepreneurship: New Models of Sustainable Social Change*. Oxford.

To sum up, the intrinsic motivation (related to accomplishment, self-actualisation, competence achievement, satisfaction) and the new type of motivation identified in this research, curiosity (related to an exploratory worldview and openness to other cultures), emerge as the most typical motivational underpinnings of NGDO activism. Striving after change was likewise characteristic of a significant share of aid professionals I interviewed. NGDO activists furthermore clearly enjoy each other's company. Theirs is a constructive and well-informed reaction to global problems, which is why they are not frustrated with their work in development cooperation. This is not to say that NGDO activists are not critical about the reality of aid. Research participants have identified a number of circumstances they consider encumbering their work in NGDOs. The limitations of work in NGDOs notwithstanding, aid professionals themselves are aware engagement in these organisations is not for everyone. The following responses to the question regarding the opinions research respondents had about *other* NGDO activists illustrate this point.

Here are the explanations two interviewees provided, *"You don't opt for working in an NGO to make money. You make this choice, because you want to do something good, be satisfied with one's own humaneness"* (r11_22) and *"Work in NGOs is meant for people who manage to make use of restlessness"* (r9_12). Aid professionals, who currently work for other than NGOs institutions, also had a positive opinion of the NGDO community. They said, *"The ideological motivation dominates, I would say, the positive one. I know people who still work in the NGDO sector, and they are still idealists"* (r12_9) and *"There are many young, sympathetic people, who are fascinated by development cooperation and they work for NGOs, often for small remuneration and they want to keep working [there]. This is not a closed, unpleasant, fossilised community. It is worthwhile to be part of it"* (r7_13). The general public likewise has respect for and admiration for the work done by NGDOs. This is evidenced in the previously mentioned study on the myths society entertains about humanitarian workers.

NGDO activists I interviewed were however not oblivious to various side-effects work in development entails. As one of the respondents recalled, *"there is one aspect no one is willing to talk about. When I go to Africa, being a white woman, quite well educated, there everything comes much easier for me, than it would have been here in Poland or anywhere in the West. You enter this community [in Africa], this society*

and by default you have a higher status. This is an outcome of social inequalities. . . . One can develop a whole post-colonial theory [on the basis of this experience]. . . . For my colleagues [in Africa] I am a woman from Europe, and I am immediately better off [than women who are from Africa]. . . . Upon my arrival there, I become part of the upper class. . . . It is hard to admit this, but [being in Africa] I can achieve more, I have a bigger capacity, there are more opportunities there for me. The impact I could have there is many times bigger than what I could do in Poland. In Poland I am but one of a million; there, I am one of a few" (r3_10). Although this statement indicates the underside of development cooperation, i.e. that it reinforces social inequalities in the recipient countries, it also points to an unforeseen side effect of professional aid. Namely, the impact of aid professionals' work in the Global South can be manifold higher, due to the status they enjoy. This quotation is also indicative of the self-critical, open-minded attitude of NGDO activists to development cooperation and their own role in it.

Another interviewee drew attention to another rarely publicly addressed aspect of the engagement of Poles in development cooperation. He said, *"I wouldn't like to be judgmental, but I have met people who work in the East because they want to share their experience, who truly believe that the crux of activism is to help others, who are worse off [than us]. These are people who have this need for [bringing] justice. Unfortunately, I also met people, who work in the East, because this is how they heal their complexes. These are people, who are not respected here [in Poland], but who are regarded in the East as known experts, who are treated as heroes [there]. Of course, I have met such people rather rarely, maybe they also go for this work because these are easy money. None of us is devoid of lowly incentives, there is this vanity in each of us. I would like to believe the positive traits are dominant"* (r17_15). The very idea to provide technical assistance by sending consultants to Ukraine was contested by the *Solidarity* activist Zbigniew Bujak. He voiced the argument that providing support by funding consultants' work with national agencies in partner countries is at best ineffective. He illustrated this contention with the support Poland, among other countries, provides to Ukraine[79]. Bujak did not question the capacities of

[79] Zbigniew Bujak's speech at the international mid-term ESA RN36 conference *25 years after the communism: East and West of Europe in search for solidarity*. Gdańsk, 18.10.2014.

the consultants themselves. He called into question the very approach of providing development cooperation via the so-called technical assistance mode. Rather than sending over consultants to help introduce new legal regulations, Bujak argued it would be much more effective to work with Ukrainian partners to change the norms, i.e. the administrative culture in their country.

Apparently, development cooperation is not a field immune to the weaknesses of the human nature. Yet NGDO activists face those problems squarely and they should be credited for this. Next comes an overview of other challenges and opportunities aid professionals have encountered during their work.

Using opportunities, facing challenges

When asked about the factors that in their opinion facilitated engagement in NGDOs, aid professionals I interviewed identified a couple of circumstances, which had enhanced their involvement in development cooperation. A couple of interviewees simply said they could afford to work as aid professionals. One respondent admitted, *"I am in this comfortable situation that I do not have mortgage. After all, in Poland the reality is that one has to fight for survival. . . . I think this [having mortgage or other financial responsibilities] also explains why not many people [in Poland] are engaged in larger issues. In Western Europe . . . they just don't need to work more than 8 hours/day [to make a living]"* (r9_12). The opinion of another respondent substantiates this view, *"When I started my career as an aid professional, I earned good money, which is a very important circumstance. There are many people in Poland who want to work in development NGOs. Hats off to them! However, they quickly realise that the remuneration [they could receive working in an NGDO] is not comparable to that in corporations or in international organisations. So, they either go for the money, or stay [in the NGDO sector] and become really good professionals. . . . On the other hand, those who opt for working in international organisations, have no family life"* (r4_14). Some other respondents also noted that the fact that they have no obligations towards family members makes their vocation choices easier, *"I have no family, no kids, so I do not have this dilemma. I am alone, so I can just pack my luggage and leave. It is much easier this way, than if you have a family to cater to"* (r3_10) and *"my country is where my shoes are"* (r3_10). Another cir-

cumstance regarded as facilitating engagement in an NGDO and mentioned by NGDO activists was their previous work for other sectors also related to development cooperation. The insiders' perspective they gained certainly helps aid professionals working in NGDOs in their cooperation with relevant international organisations or governmental institutions.

In spite of the previously discussed problematic aspects working in aid entails, NGDO activists I interviewed commented on the positive change of attitudes towards development cooperation in the society they had been observing. Moreover, this process refers to assistance for both Eastern Partnership countries and ODA recipients, *"[T]here has been a change of thinking in Poland. . . . There is a greater openness, which has become evident for example in programs like Go Africa*[80]*. . . . This attitude, 5 or 7 years ago, was unthinkable"* (r5_8) and *"there has been increasing understanding and support [for development cooperation and global education] in Poland, and this is a factor that is conducive to our work"* (r5_8). The greater public support for raising and addressing issues related to development assistance and international cooperation as such has its financial aspect, too, *"Certainly the fact that there are funds [to support our engagement] in the East [is important]. . . . If there were no such [public] funds, we would have been involved there anyway, but on a smaller scale"* (r17_15). The involvement of Poland in development cooperation has started to bear fruit also for the partner countries. As some respondents noted, the fact that their organisation's project results' are recognisable in Ukraine or in Mongolia for example, are indicative of a *"rate of return"* (r6_22) of development assistance that started to be provided by Polish NGOs even *before* Polish aid kicked off. These quotations are illustrative of two trends. On the one hand, the society and state institutions have matured to appreciate and support the engagement of the country in development assistance. On the other hand, the process of brand recognition of Polish NGDOs and Polish aid has been under way, too.

When asked about the circumstances that enhance their participation in development cooperation, most interviewees from NGDOs

[80] The aim of the governmental Go Africa project, which kicked off in 2013 and is currently implemented by the Polish Ministry of development, is to support commercial exchange between Poland and African countries. See www.goafrica.gov.pl.

referred to the work of aid professionals itself. The following quotations testify to this contention. One respondent, whose organisation implements projects in post-Soviet countries, said, *"one really has to like this job, because it is a rather hard work"* (r13_20). Two other interviewees admitted that work in NGOs as such enchanted them, *"When I go to work, I do not think in terms of 'work'. I go to do interesting stuff, cutting-edge. . . . One doesn't treat [it] as work. It is rewarding. Furthermore, one gets to know languages, [foreign] cultures. One gets to travel, which is very pleasant. There are difficult moments, indeed. Bureaucracy is a case in point"* (r18_16) and *"getting to know other cultures is interesting for me. This is an added value [of this work]. . . . Now all those formal and informal initiatives have become rather common in Poland. But when I started working [for an NGO], by pure chance, it was such a discovery I made. . . . I like this feeling that we can do stuff ourselves; that no one is planning for us, that there is no quota you have to meet. [The flip side is,] one needs to have an idea [what to do], and also be responsible for the outcomes of one's work"* (r14_8). In an interview Janina Ochojska gave in 2014, she likewise admitted that she felt needed doing her job, which was not to be equated with having clear conscience[81]. These quotations testify to the observation that in spite (or because?) of the challenging conditions work in an NGO entails, especially the lack of financial security and job predictability, a positive selection is under way where creative, committed, and responsible individuals opt for staying in the NGDO sector.

Finally, the opportunity to work with people is another factor interviewees considered supportive in their choice of vocation. The following quotations illustrate this point, *"I always liked to work with people, I wouldn't have made it if I had to sit behind the desk 8 hours/day. . . . Also, I go to visit different places in the world and each day brings new challenges."* (r10_17), and *"interpersonal ties are important. This is the key point . . . here in Poland as well as abroad. . . . One needs to have colleagues here who support you and understand you, and whom you can trust. . . . The same when you are abroad, one needs to establish a common ground for understanding, partnership"* (r20_12). Apparently, the need to establish communication with people from differ-

[81] "Janina Ochojska. Czy jesteś dobrym człowiekiem?" 2014. Grzegorz Sroczyński talking with Janina Ochojska of the Polish Humanitarian Action in *Gazeta Wyborcza, Duży Format*, 07.08.2014.

ent cultures is a challenging, yet rewarding experience that aid professionals find attractive. The public recognition of the aid profession in Poland is certainly also a factor that NGDO activists appreciate. As one of the interviewees admitted, his son is always proud to talk about his father's job as his colleagues at school find this vocation attractive and admirable. And last but not least, some individuals can also regard challenges as opportunities. In the interview given in 2014, Janina Ochojska said having polio was an opportunity for her[82] as it exposed her to the world of giving.

The factors facilitating work in the aid profession bear some similarities to the outcomes of my previous study among NGO activists[83]. Contemporary NGDO activists and people engaged in NGOs in the beginning of the millennium declared they enjoyed their involvement in the civic sector and felt good with the people they worked with. The recognition and admiration their engagement invoked among their fellow-citizens was also a factor enhancing engagement. Unlike NGO activists, however, aid professionals seem to encounter more challenges. The issue of projectisation of work in NGOs in Poland has recently attracted more public debate. The phenomenon is relevant for NGDOs, too, although it is hard to estimate whether aid professionals working in NGOs are more – or less – vulnerable to projectisation than other NGO activists. Yet, aid professionals do face more challenges than other NGO activists, as the former's job often implies travelling abroad and sometimes working in potentially insecure places. It seems it is a more daunting task for aid professionals to achieve work-life balance, than it is for NGO activists engaged locally or nationally. Whereas the circumstances identified as enhancing work in NGO and NGDOs appear comparable, the conditions regarded as obstacles for engagement in an NGDO are different than those declared by social activists I interviewed in 2002.

Predictably, when asked about the factors that inhibit their engagement in development cooperation, NGDO activists mention the limited financial resources available to NGDOs. In the words of my respondents, "*the basic problem of Polish aid, is that the funds are thin and measly"* (r12_9), but also *"an instrument to provide for NGDOs' own contribution needed to access EU funds hasn't yet been developed in Poland. The lack*

82 Ibid.

83 G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*, pp. 221–227.

of such tool is responsible for the limited use of Polish NGDOs' potential. Also, NGDOs cannot develop [organisationally]" (r10_17). Another criticised aspect of the system of state funding for NGDOs' activity is that *"this system is not NGDOs-friendly. The pseudo-tender competition formula is not conducive to sustainability [of projects], and it also does not take into account the experience and institutional capacity of NGDOs. It is a grants' jackpot"* (r25_18). This last argument seems to be corroborated by other interviewees, who admitted that it has happened that their organisations won more bids than they could handle. One of them said, *"I told myself I don't need as many as 6 projects to implement next time"* (r2_7) and *"I do not want to have 5 projects to implement; once 3 or 4 project proposals we submitted received granting, and we were overcome with administrative work"* (r1_8). Undoubtedly, the necessity to apply for grants each year makes NGDOs submit more project proposals they could possibly handle afterwards, in the hope that at least some of those proposals would be successful. At the same time, NGDOs cannot build their institutional capacity, because most of them cannot afford to keep, i.e. pay, a team that could implement more projects. Here the issue of the lack of funds to support the institutional capacity of NGDOs surfaces again. NGDOs have to balance between not submitting more projects they could handle and "zero hours" contract survival strategy.

Ultimately, this sanctioned limited capacity of NGDOs obstructs the further development of the Polish aid system itself. Given that NGDOs remain the main partner for Polish aid and the Solidarity Fund, by inadvertently limiting NGDOs' potential, those state institutions might find it challenging to have partners to implement projects in development, especially should the volume of Polish aid increase significantly. At the same time, NGDOs are not successful in accessing EU funds, because they cannot secure support for their "own contribution"[84]. This in turn keeps NGDOs dependent on governmental funding only. The problem is, NGDOs have very limited chances to provide funding for their activities by using alternative fundraising strategies. As a couple of re-

[84] For example, under the 2015 rules for projects submitted in the area of Development Education and Awareness Raising, a 1 million euros' project would require an NGO to bring in 50,000 euros of its own funding. (D. Kramers. 2015. *EU-13 NGOs want to raise awareness, but struggle with Brussels financing*).

spondents noted, Corporate Social Responsibility for development cooperation is non-existent in Poland. Furthermore, *"it is very difficult to tap other fundraising resources. The Polish society is not aware of those issues, and the businesses are not interested [in supporting us]"* (r2_7). As mentioned before, in Poland support from the wealthy to NGDOs is non-existent, too. There have been some successful attempts to raise funds for development assistance, but the scope of this support has been very limited. For example, the *Education for Democracy Foundation* has managed to raise some resources via crowdfunding. In 2014 the foundation raised funds to buy three cows for Tadzhiks' women's clubs[85]. However, public fundraising for development cooperation is still highly problematic in Poland. The umbrella organisation *Grupa Zagranica* has tried to address the problem by organizing in 2016 training for NGDOs "Fundraising in development cooperation".

Some entrepreneurs do support NGDOs' activities, but this assistance as well has its glass ceiling. A respondent, whose organisation advocates for counteracting child abuse, admitted companies do not want to be associated with negative issues; they would rather have their company's brand being related to smiling, happy children. This observation is in tune with the argument whereby oftentimes issues addressed by NGDOs exist on the margins of public debate. As one of the respondents noted, *"we [Poles] are rather Eurocentric and Polonocentric. In fact, we tend to focus on issues that only interest us [Poles]. . . . The support for Poland's engagement in development assistance is on a declaratory level only. Therefore politicians are not interested, and the media are not dealing with the issues, too"* (r12_9). According to one of the aid professionals who has been observing the process of cooperation between NGDOs and the line ministry, *"it is remarkable that in [NGDOs'] advocacy work the argument that Poland has benefited from foreign funds and it is time to give back, hasn't been used at all. This argument should make us feel ashamed, that we received so much, and we act so mean now. This could be used as an argument to sparkle public debate"* (r12_9). This is not to say that aid professionals are not vocal about the need to give back.

Thus, the head of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* Janina Ochojska is among the most recognisable – and most vocal about the need to

[85] See https://polakpotrafi.pl/projekt/dla-tadzykistanu (accessed 08.04.2016).

give back – individuals engaged in humanitarian assistance. In the 1980s she received medical help in France, where she also established contacts with EquiLibre, a humanitarian organisation that provided support to Poland during the martial law. Hence Janina Ochojska views her engagement in running an NGO that provides humanitarian assistance and development cooperation as a way of giving back. She is justified to be proud of the achievements of the organisation she established, "half a million people in Africa has access to water, because over the last twenty years we managed to do as much. So I can feel my own power. I did change part of the world"[86]. Indeed, a strategy to significantly increase the volume of Polish aid would imply the popularisation of the issue of giving back.

Another interviewee's observations were equally bitter, *"It is not true that good intensions suffice. . . . Polish NGDOs have to be supported by public funds, because Polish society is very unwilling to support projects in development cooperation. A very convenient for Poles concept, that Poland is a poor country, prevails. They'd rather think about themselves, that they are the ones who need support. They don't seem to notice that Poland is among the 30 most affluent countries in the world. . . . It is very difficult to be among people who have such mentality . . . whose thinking is tribal, that support should go only for their fellow-countrymen. . . . Likewise, some of the international volunteers treat their volunteering experience as a great opportunity to spend their vacation. Polish volunteers consider volunteering tourism"* (r20_12). Empirical research appears to substantiate the argument about the limited public support for humanitarian aid provided abroad. According to the 2013 *Klon/Jawor* survey, 8% of Poles have provided funds or gifts for victims of natural disasters *in Poland and abroad*, whereas 61% have supported the *Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity*[87]. Indeed, as many as 85% of respondents in this survey declared to be familiar with the activity of the *Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity*, which can explain their support for this annual fundraising initiative. Yet, as many as 49% of respondents were aware of the activity of organisations providing hu-

[86] "Janina Ochojska. Czy jesteś dobrym człowiekiem?" 2014.

[87] *Zaangażowanie społeczne Polek i Polaków. Wolontariat, filantropia, 1% i wizerunek organizacji pozarządowych. Raport z badania 2013*. 2014. Warszawa, p. 69.

manitarian relief in the country and abroad[88]. Apparently, familiarity with the activity of NGDOs does not translate into a need to support this type of activity. No doubt, sustained, on-going public support for humanitarian aid is more challenging behaviourally than supporting once per year an organisation which focuses on problems in Poland. This is not to stigmatise the work done by the *Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity*, but to explain why Poles find it more challenging to keep responding to calls to support causes in distant countries, than engage in one-off annual events which "return rate" is palpable.

The issue of voluntourism was briefly referred to in Chapter Two. This phenomenon should be understood against the background of the bigger problem, which is the lack of public awareness of issues regarded as fundamental by aid professionals. As one of the respondents said, *"the society has this, how to say, strange, unfair attitude to some issues, such unintended stereotyping, or one could say stupidity. I am talking about this basic statement, that people are equal and everyone deserves to be respected. This is the gist, and when I see that it doesn't work, [I become aware there is] all this grassroots work that needs to be done [at home]"* (r14_8). Like many other aid professionals who took part in my research, this respondent came to the conclusion that homework, i.e. development education, needs to be done before or simultaneously with engaging in development cooperation abroad. So the more that greater openness, understood as the ability to travel and meet representatives of other cultures, as such does not automatically translate into real understanding and respect for The Other. As one of the interviewees put it, *"the festivalisation of culture . . . doesn't help to build the community . . . people enjoy listening to gypsy songs when those are performed on the stage, but they are not interested in getting to know their immediate neighbours [from countries Poland shares border with]. . . . Father Rydzyk also travelled and he brought his ideas from Germany. . . . [Thus,] openness can create conditions for the spread of fundamentalism"* (r22_36). To address this issue, some Polish NGDOs are involved in promoting, *inter alia*, responsible tourism.

Other interviewees were concerned about the lack of sustained engagement in development cooperation. One of them said, *"we are now dealing with scarcity of people, who would be ready to do this job, so that it wouldn't be a one-off engagement"* (r13_20). Another respondent

[88] Ibid., p. 76.

admitted that it has been mostly women that work in her organisation. She said, *"this is a problem, when we announce a job offer, no men apply. . . . Ours is a women's field, because of funds, we don't make much money in foundations and men think they should earn more"* (r21_10). As indicated earlier, the most worrying tendency is that even some of those, who are engaged in NGDOs, eventually give up on their jobs in the sector. A research participant, who admitted to have given up on applying for funds to public institutions, explained why this happened, *"applying for these one-year projects, it just doesn't pay off in the long run. It takes a huge effort, all this reporting . . . whereas the effectiveness of small NGOs, in my opinion, is low. . . . For beginners, for those who want to learn how to write reports, this is good. But I do not want any more of this. Professionally one cannot subsist on Polish aid [only]. It is a waste of time. It is more of an administrative work than a field work"* (r23_11). These quotations testify to the graveness of staff fluidity in NGDOs.

Another circumstance that research participants identified as inhibiting has been the lack of spectacular, palpable effects of their work. As one of the interviewees engaged in global education put it, *"the effects of our work are difficult to discern. Sometimes I think it should be nice to build a house or to be a carpenter. In our work you can't witness the immediate results, and one has to learn to live with this"* (r5_8). And finally, a couple of interviewees regarded various circumstances, related to the countries where they implement their projects, as representing an obstacle. Some of these circumstances relate to security issues, *"sometimes they have a mess there, for example in Kenya there were attacks and I couldn't send volunteers there, it is a matter of security"* (r1_8). Other interviewees admitted, *"we had to put to standstill our project, because a civil war erupted there"* (r3_10) and *"the reality there is unpredictable"* (r2_7). Another respondent felt embarrassed by the scale of problems her organisation's partners in Ghana had to deal with on a daily basis. She said, *"I have this awareness how unjust it is. . . . I know that when we finish this common project, I will go back to the reality in my country, where there aren't those problems [our partners in Africa face], and they will go back to their life. Although I cannot feel guilty that I was born here and not there, there is this feeling of dissonance"* (r14_8). This quotation only seemingly echoes the situation where Western consultants, who came to provide technical support to Polish institutions in the beginning of the transformation, ended up being disparagingly called the Marriott brigades. The above-quoted respondent

is aware that the problems partner countries experience are to a significant extent a result of global inequalities and a consequence of the history of the country. She is furthermore aware that it was a matter of luck, not of entitlement, that she was born in the Minority World. Aid professionals' emphatic attitude bodes well for the cooperation between Polish NGDOs and their partners in ODA recipient countries.

Like other NGO activists, aid professionals I interviewed were concerned with the scarcity of financial resources for their activities. NGO activists I studied in 2002 identified as inhibiting factors the lack of skills to apply for grants and the lack of qualifications needed to interpret the laws relevant to their NGOs' field. Furthermore they had to cope with the lack of coordination and mutual information between NGOs dealing with similar issues[89]. The most recent *Klon/Jawor* survey largely corroborates these findings, as financial difficulties, bureaucratisation, increased competitiveness among NGOs, and the limited involvement of constituencies in the work of the NGO are still considered as the most significant barriers to these organisations' work[90]. Unlike NGO activists, aid professionals engaged in NGDOs did not identify the lack of skills, know-how and qualifications as factors inhibiting their work. In terms of the lack of sufficient financing, NGDOs are rather concerned with the difficulties in obtaining funds for their organisations' own contribution to access EU funds and with the lack of institutional grants for NGDOs. Also, development cooperation appears to be a much more daunting field of activity to attract financial support from individuals or companies, than issues addressed by local and/or national NGOs. The critical opinions of NGDOs concerned with their cooperation with the relevant state institutions are also reflected in the evaluations conducted by the MFA itself[91]. Those evaluations also identified other areas that need to be addressed in future development cooperation supported by the Polish state.

It is not surprising many of the NGDO activists I interviewed were initially more interested in and/or engaged with development cooperation abroad, only to come to the conclusion that there is work to be done at home, too. On the one hand, this realisation was caused by those aid professionals' first-hand experience with doing develop-

89 G. Chimiak. 2006. *How Individualists…*, pp. 227–234.

90 *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015.* 2015. Warszawa, p. 18–19.

91 See https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Ewaluacja,2097.html.

ment and observation of other donors' engagement in development cooperation. Namely, they noticed that aid does not (always) address the root causes of poverty in the Majority World. Development assistance can even perpetuate poverty by making partner countries dependent for example on food aid from donors or allowing conflicts to fester by providing humanitarian aid to displaced persons. On the other hand, aid professionals become aware that policy coherence for sustainable development may be a more effective tool in the long run to help individuals and communities become self-sufficient and raise themselves from poverty. The next step from this realisation is that development education should take place in the donor countries, too, to enhance understanding of the real, i.e. global, causes of inequalities that cause poverty.

The discussion so far has identified a number of stages aid professionals have passed through in their work. Some of them have gained expertise working in development in international institutions or the academia. Others have moved on to work in the governmental sector after gaining capacity in the NGDO sector. Yet others have developed their activity in the direction of global education. The dynamics of aid professionals' engagement is indicative of the evolving character of work in development. As argued before, some of my respondents admitted to be on the verge of giving up on their work in the NGDO sector. In this respect, the question about the future of NGDO activists' engagement in development merits attention, too.

What the future holds

On the basis of the discussion of the identified by aid professionals' barriers to working in development, a question arises as to the future of development cooperation interventions provided by NGDOs and supported by Polish aid. An observer of the relationship between these stakeholders noted that *"one of the unintended consequence of the current policy can be to discourage people [currently involved in development cooperation]. The state's policy to support democratisation is politically motivated; hence, the solidarity with the poor, with the underprivileged, this support based on humanitarian values is absent. . . . The politicisation of aid can bring about its degradation, decline in public support and decline of civic engagement in this area"* (r12_9). Another respondent's opinion provides further arguments why development

cooperation policy should stop being politicised, *"very few studies in the field of development are conducted in Poland. . . . Of course, Poland is not a developing country, but our Polish experiences are totally different than those of Western Europe. We are the losing side in legal processes initiated by American, Dutch, German, French companies. In Europe we share the fate of developing countries. . . . It is very important that Polish development cooperation starts being evidence-based, rather than a propeller of current political interests"* (r9_12). In fact, drawing public attention to the fact that Poland still shares common fate with countries currently receiving aid can actually be used as a counter-argument to increasing the volume of Polish aid. It might be indeed twice as difficult to convince the public opinion that Poland should pay its moral debt by increasing the volume of its aid, while simultaneously communicating that the country still has not overcome its legacy of *mis*development.

Another respondent argued for a different direction Polish aid should take. He namely contended for increasing the ownership of development initiatives by the partner countries. He said, *"These programmes should be developed there [in the partner countries]. . . . Polish NGOs somehow monopolised the dialogue [with the MFA]. . . . In the world, development assistance is becoming de-centralised, but not in Poland. . . . It shouldn't be [Polish] NGOs who decide [what kind of projects should be implemented], with all my respect for their work. In fact, Polish NGOs are most often the ones who implement aid projects, which is of course in line with the law. . . . But when one day the volume of Polish aid increases, NGOs will say 'we don't have the capacity'. This means the state would have to look for other aid modalities. . . . Polish development cooperation should move on to the next stage. It shouldn't be done by simply increasing the volume and number of development interventions"* (r7_13). It could be implied from this last quotation that what is still considered as the strength of Polish development cooperation, i.e. the support provided by and for NGDOs, is becoming obsolete. As the Polish aid system develops, it should move on to involving new aid modalities and focus on increasing the ownership of development processes by the partner countries. In fact, this idea does not entail a decline of cooperation between Polish NGDOs and Polish aid. It actually implies that the increase of the volume of Polish aid should be accompanied by a diversification of its aid modalities. The argument that NGDOs have limited capacity to absorb funds, should the share of

GDP Poland earmarks for development cooperation increase, cannot be used as a justification for not increasing the aid volume.

The need to diversify Polish aid's modalities notwithstanding, an effort has to be made to invest in building the capacity of Polish NGDOs. The fact is that some of the aid professionals I interviewed either have already left the NGDO sector or admitted to be planning to leave it. One of them admitted, *"we had to take a decision, we either keep working off-the-clock, which was becoming more and more exhausting, or we move on to doing our job full-time and for remuneration, . . . so our organisation will become a consulting firm"* (r3_10). Another respondent likewise admitted that *"I am afraid of burn-out, because I work a lot, me and my colleagues [at the NGDO], we are overtired"* (r4_14). Also an interviewee, who was engaged for fifteen years in development assistance, said *"after conducting an analysis of what the opportunities in Poland are, I have decided to give up on working in the NGDO I established. I will be engaged in human rights promotion, but I do not know yet what shape this activity would take"* (r20_12). The disappointment of this respondent was related to the discouraging experience he had with accessing public funds to provide development cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His organisation likewise tried, without success, to raise funds for their work in these countries by other means. The lack of support by individuals and state institutions alike convinced him to terminate his work in the NGDO he established. Similarly, another research participant, who used to conduct projects in Belarus supported by Polish public funds, admitted at the time of the interview she would be giving up on this activity, as it had been taking up too much time and effort. She decided to move on to work in journalism. Another interviewee admitted that he was considering transferring his duties in the foundation he helped co-establish to younger people.

In spite of the worrying tendency, where experienced aid professionals are leaving the NGDO sector, there are also some optimistic trends. Some respondents admitted their organisations are working towards diversifying their sources of funding, *"we came to the conclusion we don't want to be dependent on projects-implementation only. We decided our foundation would also offer paid services. We want to diversify our sources of funding. Besides, more does not mean better. I'd rather implement two big projects, than 10 small ones"* (r2_7). Another interviewee said that *"to survive, one needs to have diverse sources of funding, so we are now trying to address individual donors. We have*

started to cooperate with one Polish company, too" (r21_10). Other aid professionals referred to expanding their activities to take into account recent developments, like for example counteracting the spread of cyberbullying or culture-based conflicts. It is commendable that some NGDOs are continuously evolving to adapt. However, there are reasons to believe that without sustained support from the state, the NGDO sector is still too vulnerable to be left on its own devices.

On the other hand, Polish NGDOs' almost total dependence on Polish aid conditions their limited ability to impact the state policy in regard to development. The tying of Polish aid to the national budget's special purpose reserve has been a bone of contention for years now. At the same time, the need to produce expense reports, invoice processing and other reporting, are an administrative burden many smaller NGDOs cannot handle. As one respondent argued, *"it shouldn't be so that people who have an initiative, who have good ideas, have to drown in [writing down] all those goals, results, and 20 more other fields to fill in"* (r8_11). Yet the same respondent admitted that *"we should fight for increasing the quality of our work [in the NGDO sector]. . . . I do not wonder at the opinion Solidarity Fund and MFA had about our sector; some 50% of the project proposals our organisation receives [for re-granting] were rather weak"* (r8_11). This opinion was substantiated by another interviewee who argued that *"NGDOs should professionalise and the MFA won't help them in this respect. They [NGDOs] should break through this glass ceiling that annual projects represent. If they don't access funds from other sources, they will keep staying in lethargy. They have already professionalised, they are not amateurs, but should move on"* (r5_8).

Perhaps a good idea for moving forward is the idea suggested by another respondent, *"I think [engagement in] global revolution is our future, . . . we should give up on this divide between environmental and developmental and social NGOs. . . . There are some processes, like the endorsement of the Sustainable Development Goals that indicate such changes are already happening. We should regard issues related to development and those related to environmental protection together. I think it would be a huge advantage if we start thinking this way. . . . This is the future. . . . [Polish NGDOs] lack somehow common roots, but we should work towards establishing a common ground"* (r14_8). These statements nicely sum up the unquestionable achievements of the NGO sector and identify a direction the sector as a whole could move on to.

Conclusion

To recapitulate what was discussed earlier, my research uncovered a couple of trends that were not identified in previous studies. As far as NGDO activists' cultural capital is concerned, it turned out that a characteristic feature of aid professionals is that one or both of their parents were teachers. Whereas the family tradition of social activism explains some of the engagement in the NGO sector as a whole, participation in NGDOs turned out to be less contingent on aid professionals' parents' previous engagement in social activism. NGDO activists' parents, even if not always understanding, were always supportive of their children's interest in international affairs and development assistance. These findings are also is in tune with the research of national participation in internationally-oriented NGOs, according to which "world citizens are more likely to be people who have resources . . . and cultural capital"[92]. Yet, in the case of Poland, these resources were not so much of material nature. A cult of knowledge, unconditional support and trust, openness and acceptance of novel ideas appear to best characterise the families NGDO activists grew up in.

The set of values guiding my respondents are indicative of Polish aid professionals' egalitarian nature. This finding confirms that Polish NGDO activists are not just aid professionals, but are exercising world citizenship. World citizenship is "strongly egalitarian"[93]. Indeed, the values Polish aid professionals adhere to are of a declaratory nature. However, interviewee's other statements are in tune with these reported values. They treat their partners in the Majority World with respect and are aware that living in a privileged part of the world does not entitle them to paternalise people in other countries. The fact that the issue of learning is one of the most characteristic features of aid professionals' motivation also substantiates this argument. Polish NGDO activists are interested in expanding their knowledge and honing their skills, and are openly admitting that their coopera-

[92] J. Boli, T. A. Loya and T. Loftin. 1999. "National Participation in World-Polity Organisation," in J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875.* Stanford, p. 74.

[93] J. Boli and G.M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organisation of World Culture" in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, p. 40.

tion with partners from the Majority World is a win-win situation. Although the name of the Polish bilateral programme is *Polska pomoc*, i.e. Polish aid, NGDO activists are involved in actual *cooperation*. The aim to learn and upgrade one's skills is a recurring theme that furthermore corroborates the argument that professionalism and adherence to humanitarian values better characterise contemporary NGDO activists than the traditional image of the social activist as a bearer of the intelligentsia ethos. Indeed, some NGDO activists are engaged in development education, while others are planning to expand their activity in this direction. Yet, it is the role of an "educator" that NGDO activists aspire after, rather than the role of the enlightener of the nation.

The analysis of NGDO activists' role models and self-definitions is indicative of the congruence between Polish aid professionals' desired selves and extant selves, namely, NGDO activists look up to people who are both engaged in intellectual work and striving to impact change. At the same time, aid professionals' self-definitions oscillate between their private selves and their commitment to their work. The outcomes of my research are congruent with the conclusions of other relevant studies regarding the role of cultural broker aid professionals play. Interestingly, this process of cultural brokerage is oftentimes *against* the tide of the modernisation of the country. Particularly, whereas the Cold War category of the West still represents a point of reference, aid professionals turn to exploring other regions and countries. Theirs is not the interest of the tourists visiting "exotic" places. Aid professionals are open and willing to learn from their partners in the Majority World and to promote awareness-raising in Poland regarding the interdependence of the world we live in.

The analysis of the motivational underpinnings of NGDO activists' engagement in development cooperation indicates that aid professionals are successful in emulating their role models. The focus on striving after impacting change while achieving self-actualisation coupled with an open-eyed curiosity about the world equally well describe my research participants and the individuals they identified as role models. At the same time aid professionals are not blind to the privileged position they have found themselves in, once they put on the shoes of representatives of a donor country. Some of them manage to use this privileged position to multiply the effect of their work in development.

The analysis of the factors NGDO activists identified as enhancing their engagement in development cooperation are in tune with their motivations. Specifically, NGDO activists declared they enjoyed their profession and the people they get to work with as circumstances facilitating involvement. However, those who opt for staying in the NGDO sector are sometimes individuals who are not limited by obligations the majority of people cannot afford to overlook. Whether not having to secure stable, higher income to be able to pay one's mortgage, or being single, i.e. without the need to attend to family commitments, aid professionals are fully aware of the circumstances that limit many other individuals to work in the NGO sector. My respondents appreciated the availability of financial funding and the increasing public recognition and support for development-related issues. Not surprisingly, though, these two circumstances were at the same time identified as barriers. Aid professionals explained why the current system of funding of development cooperation projects does not enhance the capacity building of NGOs and also makes NGOs submit more project proposals they could handle, should they win the bid. The non-existent CSR and marginal individual support for development cooperation initiatives was identified as an additional factor exacerbating NGDOs' dependence on state funding. At the same time, aid professionals are aware theirs is a difficult field, which also explains why it is hard to convince the society about the justification of development cooperation. That is, on the one hand, development intervention's results are more difficult to measure and demonstrate, especially as far as "soft issues" like education are concerned. Furthermore, some of the regions where development cooperation takes place are sometimes dangerous. Interestingly, unlike other NGO activists, aid professionals I interviewed did not regard the lack of skills, know-how or adequate qualifications as factors inhibiting their work. This finding corroborates the argument that the term "aid professional" best describes NGDO activists in Poland.

The professionalism of NGDO activists is certainly one of the most significant assets of the Polish development cooperation system. Yet, as some NGDO activists admitted themselves, there are also rather weak project proposals prepared by NGOs willing to work in development. Undoubtedly, such practices sully the image of the NGDO sector. Such NGOs should work on continuously to increase the quality of their work. The whole NGO sector as such could strive towards con-

solidation, thus multiplying the effects of its work. The professionalism and know-how of NGDOs should be recognised as an asset by the other stakeholders in development cooperation, who could nonetheless likewise move on to diversify the Polish aid modalities with the increase of the volume of aid. A challenge faced by all stakeholders engaged in development cooperation in Poland is the need to engage even more in development education and awareness raising initiatives at home.

Conclusion: When solidarity is not enough. From solidarity to reflection and action

The plane was full of people from NGOs and journalists: ship of fools[1]

The study presented in this book aimed to answer the following research question: *Which factors determined the growth of NGDOs in Poland and what has been NGDOs' role in the evolution of the Polish aid system?* Supplementary research questions were presented in the beginning of each of the five chapters. Chapter One deals with the supranational factors that impacted the growth of internationally-oriented civil society initiatives and organisations. In addition to examining the influence of exogenous factors – like globalisation and the spread of neoliberalism – the chapter discusses the theoretical approaches accounting for the ascendance of non-state actors in international affairs and the theories of motivations accounting for engagement in the civic sector. It also analyses the specific case of post-communist transformation and the justification of external support for indigenous civil

[1] Marta Kaszubska is a humanitarian professional. In 2015 she was granted the Superhero award by *Wysokie Obcasy*. Marta Kaszubska coordinated the humanitarian aid delivered by the *Polish Humanitarian Action* to Nepal after the earthquake in April 2015. In an interview (*Wysokie Obcasy,* no 38 (847) 26.09.2015) p. 24), she referred to the group of people on board of the plane to Katmandu as "ship of fools". *Ship of Fools* is a 1962 novel by Katherine Anne Porter. The novel is an allegory of the search for utopia in the face of the rise of Nazism.

societies. Chapter Two focuses on the historical determinants of grassroots self-organisation in Poland and examines the roots of the idea of internationalisation of solidarity. The role foreign funding played in supporting the development of the civil society sector, especially after the toppling of the previous regime, is critically analysed. The actual impact of this support is then illustrated with an overview of selected aspects of the development of the NGO sector after 1989. Chapter Three presents the history of the international cooperation of Polish NGOs. The evolution of this cooperation from trans-border exchange of experiences to providing humanitarian aid, development assistance, and global education are discussed. The applicability of the development vs. democratising divide in the contemporary NGDO sector is then analysed. This chapter also juxtaposes the various views regarding the comparative advantage of Poland in development cooperation.

Chapter Four deals with the evolution of the Polish development cooperation system. Evidence is presented to the argument that the initially separate paths of engagement in development assistance taken by the state and civil society eventually started to converge in the beginning of the century. This change was facilitated by EU accession, which necessitated the creation of a governmental aid programme. The dynamics of the relationship between these two major stakeholders in development cooperation in Poland is then put forward. Finally, Chapter Five focuses on NGDO activists themselves. It examines the social and cultural capital of aid professionals, their career paths and motivational underpinnings, and concludes with a discussion of the challenges and opportunities they face.

Contribution to theoretical thinking

As indicated in the Introduction to this book, the primary theoretical inspiration for this research has been the second generation of constructivist theories. This study focused on private international governance as exercised by Polish NGDOs. The amply presented in the book research evidence substantiate the argument that NGDOs exercise moral authority in global governance and national public life alike. For one thing, Polish NGDOs have been engaged in providing expertise to the line ministry and other relevant stakeholders, thus exercising the authority of authorship identified by second-generation constructivists. Secondly, secular Polish NGDOs' status has been neutral and dis-

associated from state interests and self-interest alike. As such, these Polish NGDOs can be argued to enjoy the authority of the referee. And last but not least, secular Polish NGDOs proved to represent socially progressive worldview and as such enjoy normative moral authority as described by second-generation constructivists.

The findings from this research are also largely in tune with the supply-side economic theories of non-profits. The pivotal role of aid professionals' motivations and background proved to be important factors explaining the growth of the NGDO sector and its impact on the Polish aid system. The importance of individual aid professionals notwithstanding, it is states and state institutions that keep being the most powerful stakeholders in development cooperation. Yet even their power is being continuously challenged by recent developments. The dispersal of state power has been discussed in Chapter One. The growth of non-state actors in international relations and national politics alike has been documented in empirical studies and accordingly reflected in theoretical thinking also presented in Chapter One. It was also suggested that – unlike Western nations – state power has not been undermined in this part of the world. The dynamics of the relationship between NGDOs and state institutions responsible for development cooperation is indicative of both these processes. On the one hand, unlike their counterparts in established donor countries, Polish NGDOs have been the entities instrumental in supporting the relevant state institutions in the appropriation of development cooperation-related norms and practices, rather than the other way around. The indirect influence of foreign funders, which assisted the NGDO sector and MFA in the field of development assistance, should be recognised, too. Yet, on the other hand, in spite of the initially leading – in terms of capacity and know-how – role of Polish NGDOs in the area of development cooperation, over time that role started to wane leaving NGDOs in the position traditionally assumed by non-state actors, i.e. that of partners and sub-contractors of services. Nonetheless, Polish NGDOs continue to play an important role as norm entrepreneurs as they strive after implementing state-of-the-art norms and principles of development cooperation while monitoring whether Polish aid abides by these principles, too.

Hence, while allowing for the growing importance of various non-state actors and the accompanying dispersal of power as we used to know it, states remain the dominant actors in development coopera-

tion. This observation should not however blind us to the reality of aid. As one recent investigation demonstrates, the corporate takeover of aid – understood not only as having businesses co-finance projects with aid donors, but also as having large corporations involved in the design and delivery of projects, moulding policy and setting the agenda – has been under way[2]. Undoubtedly, NGDOs' role and influence on the way aid is delivered is different than that of corporations. The activity of Polish NGDOs is in tune with the "globalist" school of thought presented in Chapter One. By becoming increasingly engaged in global education, aid professionals also put into practice the tenets of the previously mentioned world-polity theory developed by John Boli and George Thomas. The unquestionable contribution of Polish NGDOs to development cooperation and the commitment of aid professionals notwithstanding, the findings from this research also suggest that the growing supply of credentialed professionals was also a factor accounting for the growth of NGDOs in Poland. Hence the hypothesis tested by Edward Turner and presented in the Introduction also holds true for the case of post-communist nations. This finding should not be regarded as questioning the civic nature of the engagement of aid professionals. It actually indicates the high level of proficiency and professionalism in the area of development cooperation, humanitarian aid and global education of Polish NGDO activist.

Finally, referring to David Korten's seminal categorisation of development-oriented NGOs presented in detail in the Introduction, Polish NGDOs' evolution proves to be taking place in a more accelerated manner. That is, whereas in established donor countries Korten noted the gradual evolution of the strategies NGDOs employed, in Poland these processes are taking place in a parallel fashion. In Poland the simultaneous functioning of organisations belonging to the four generations identified by Korten ("doers", "mobilizers", "catalysts" and "activists/educators") has been observed. Clearly, aid professionals engaged in NGDOs rather quickly realise that these functions of NGDOs actually complement each other and that the final and highest stage of engagement has to do with combining activism and spreading reflection. The dialogical relationship between reflection and action will be addressed further on.

---

[2] M. Kennard and C. Provost. 2016. *How Aid Became Big Business – Los Angeles Review of Books.*

Brief overview of the empirical findings from the research

It has been argued in this book that the dominance of neoliberalism reconfigured the roles of the state and the market worldwide and it also impacted on the function ascribed to civil society. What became the leading discourse of development, viewed social capital as the missing link. By identifying the shortages of social capital as the main culprit for the discrepancy of the level of development of different countries, exogenous factors such as globalisation, the Cold War, or colonisation and their impact on the nations in question, remained overlooked. Thus, donor support for civil society and the social capital it was meant to produce was intended to make up for the alleged deficiencies of underdeveloped and *mis*developed countries. In the context of post-communist nations, the support for civil society also aimed at enhancing democratisation processes. Independently of these external efforts to support civil society, in Poland grassroots activism and the solidarity principle it promoted had an international stance early on. Accordingly, since the 1980s, Polish civil society has been oriented towards establishing contacts with other nations. It should be highlighted that unlike the direction of modernisation understood as joining the Western world taken by the political and economic elite, Polish civil society has been oriented towards (re)establishing contacts with its immediate neighbours and the so-called Majority World.

To this end, Polish NGOs benefited from foreign public and private aid alike. In the early 1990s some of this support was destined for co-operation with other nations undergoing transformation. The findings from my research are in tune with the outcomes of previous studies, which were critical about the applicability of some of the priorities established back then by foreign funders to the problems identified by Polish NGOs. In a similar vein, those of the respondents who have cooperated with foreign funders in the early 1990s, likewise spoke about the incompatibility of some of these foreign experts' advice to Polish realities. Polish NGDO activists who used to be beneficiaries of official aid have built on this experience and are aiming at working closely with foreign partners in establishing the priorities they should address jointly. Furthermore, Polish NGDO activists and especially those engaged to the east of the country, claim they are more credible

to their partners than experts from Western nations, who have not lived under communism nor have first-hand experience in transformation. My research did not find confirmation to the widely spread conviction that foreign funders prioritised supporting individuals and organisations with liberal and/or leftist views. This issue is discussed and illustrated in Chapter Two of this book. On the contrary, in the beginning of the transition American foundations assisted leftist and rightist, secular and religious groups alike. At best, external assistance was indiscriminate as far as the worldviews promoted by respective organisations was concerned. Foreign funders also supported Polish NGOs' international cooperation with other countries undergoing transformation. Yet, it has been the authentic interest in and openness towards these regions exhibited by Polish aid professionals that sustained their involvement in these countries even after those foreign donors graduated from the country.

Over time, this exchange of experiences evolved towards providing development assistance. In accordance with the experience of Polish NGDOs in this respect, their strengths lay in the legacy of *Solidarity*, their hands-on experience with transformation and cooperation with foreign funders, and the ensuing credibility of Polish aid professionals. The still relevant community of fate with other nations, who continue to live under a totalitarian system, keeps fuelling this cooperation. Whereas existing literature is in tune with these findings, the neutral image of Poland in the world and its in-between developmental status have not been identified so far as factors accounting for the legitimacy and integrity of Polish aid.

Unlike Polish civil society, which did not have the opportunity to freely engage in international cooperation during the communist times, the Polish state participated in the then aid system as a donor when it was a COMECON member. After 1989 both state and non-state entities benefited from external Official Aid. The first Polish state-funded projects in development cooperation implemented by Polish NGOs date back to 1998. However, it was with EU accession that the state established its own development cooperation programme. In 2013 Poland became an OECD DAC member, thus finalising its transformation from an aid recipient to a full-fledged donor. Hence it can be said that there have been two parallel histories of Polish engagement abroad, which have finally converged when Poland joined the EU and the Polish aid system was established. The grassroots history of

internationalisation of solidarity evolved from underground through cross-border cooperation and humanitarian aid towards democratisation assistance, development cooperation and global education as of late. On the other hand, the state history in development cooperation started with engagement as a donor in the Cold War era, through being a recipient of Official Aid, towards becoming a rising donor and finally becoming a full-fledged OECD-DAC donor in 2013. Nonetheless, the country is still to fulfill its commitments regarding the share of GNI it should dedicate to development cooperation. It has been suggested, however, that when this happens, the Polish NGDO sector might not have the capacity to absorb more funds, which would in turn necessitate the resorting to other aid modalities. To prepare all stakeholders for the future increase of funds earmarked for bilateral cooperation, measures could be taken to strengthen the capacity of the NGDO sector, engage Polish local authorities in development cooperation, and envisage direct cooperation with local partners (state administration, local governments, local NGOs).

Regarding the role NGDOs played in the evolution of the Polish aid system, it transpired that whereas in the initial process of "socialisation" of decision-makers, NGDOs seem to have played a very important role in informing Polish aid policy priorities, later on NGDOs' role changed. This is not to say that their role diminished. In accordance with constructivist, non-state perspectives, non-state actors such as NGOs are distinct agents of change engaged in normative "socialisation"[3]. Polish NGDOs have been successful in "socialising" the relevant state institutions and the public at large by bringing to their attention issues of development cooperation and global justice. NGDOs developed a watchdog function, too. As far as the governmental aid programme is concerned, were it not for a relatively well-developed, possessing know-how and capacity NGDO sector to be in place when the Polish aid system was established, the country would have had to resort to other aid modalities, like for example budget support, i.e. giving money directly to a recipient country government. Polish NGDOs were furthermore instrumental in prioritising democratisation over traditional development assistance. Yet, to have 2/3 of the Polish bilateral aid earmarked to support the

[3] H.P. Schmitz and K. Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights" in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London, p. 523.

nation's eastern neighbours and some other selected countries, it took the acceptance of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009. Hence, unlike internationally-oriented NGOs in advanced industrial donor countries, which development was to a significant extent facilitated by the establishment of multilateral and bilateral aid programmes, NGDOs in Poland developed prior to the founding of Polish aid. Foreign funders undoubtedly supported the cross-border cooperation of Polish NGOs. However, Polish civil society was oriented internationally prior to this support. Therefore, it was the internationalisation of solidarity as initiated by the *Solidarity* movement that should be primarily credited for the initiation of trans-border cooperation. Foreign funding was auxiliary in this respect.

Yet none of the above-mentioned external circumstances would have sufficed for the development of the NGDO sector, were it not for the individuals who became aid professionals. The analysis of my research material indicated that interviewees' parents' unconditional support for their children's life choices, coupled with a cult of knowledge, characterises best the social capital aid professionals have inherited. Previous engagement on social activism was not uncommon among the families of origins of aid professionals; however, it was not always decisive about their choice of profession. By working in development, aid professionals admit to hone their skills and learn in the process of international cooperation. Unlike the majority of the society, aid professionals are aware of their privileged situation as citizens of the Minority World. Yet, it is Polish aid professionals' affinity with their partners from the Global South, borne from the in-between nature of the country as a nation, which faced various social problems and benefited from Western assistance, as well as their first-hand experience in living under totalitarian system, that represents their real comparative advantage of the nation as a participant in the development cooperation system. Polish aid professionals are furthermore interested in regions that do not conform to the official direction of modernisation of the country. They make good use of the privileges available to citizens of the Minority World to strive after impacting change in the Majority World. Polish aid professionals possess the necessary skills and qualifications needed in this process. However, a recurring theme in the interviews was NGDO activists' comprehension that their work in development cooperation abroad has to be supplemented by educational and awareness raising activities at home.

Unlike NGDO activists in established donor countries with colonial past, Polish aid professionals working in the Third sector can and do freely move between sectors. This movement of people also facilitates the travel of ideas and know-how, which in the long run serves the overall development of all stakeholders engaged in development co-operation. Upon leaving the NGDO sector, though, aid professionals experience a drawback. When moving to work for the government, former NGDO activists are likely to be viewed with distrust. As one of the respondents illustrated this process, from being like a midwife while working in the NGDO sector, he came to be regarded as a chopper when he joined a state institution.

Another important finding from my research is the greater relevance of professionalism and adherence to humanitarian values for aid entrepreneurs, than the ethos of the intelligentsia still characterising social activism in the country. Aid professionals act as cultural brokers between communities and nations. Yet, in accordance with the above-mentioned juxtaposition of the midwife and the chopper functions, the role of a mediator between cultures is "reserved" for NGDO activists only. Aid professionals emerge as trendsetters who have the potential to become change-makers, too. As much rewarding professionally and personally work in development appears to be, it comes at a price. Especially humanitarian professionals have to learn to make "pitiless choices", i.e. focus on the benefit of the community, which sometimes equals disregarding the needs of individual recipients of aid. And finally, international volunteering – which is one of the routes for sustained engagement in development cooperation – has emerged as an alternative for scouting, as far as young people are concerned. It is a sad realisation, however, that as much popular international volunteering is among young people in Poland as well as in other affluent countries that send volunteers abroad, this open-minded attitude to other nations and people is not reflected in widespread attitudes to refugees and, by extension, to all other groups that stand for The Other[4].

[4] The cultural critic Edward Saïd in his seminal book *Orientalism* (1978) discussed the process of Othering, which culturally justifies the domination and subordination of those identified as The Other, while indicating the superiority of mainstream members of the community.

The internationalisation of solidarity: successes and challenges

Indeed, solidarity as an imperative that can address the ills of modern life is so the more topical nowadays when the world is facing a refugee crisis of an unprecedented scope. This crisis is indicative of the practical difficulties the extension of solidarity to other peoples encounters. The internationalisation of solidarity appears to face less resistance when it concerns people with whom the average citizen would not have first-hand contact. Furthermore, as Zygmunt Bauman insightfully put it, contemporary capitalism is antithetical to solidarity in the everyday as well as in the workspace as capitalism favours competition and distrust over mutual dependence and the promotion of synergy between private interests and the common good[5]. Just as neoliberalism has permeated spheres of life other than the economy and has long time ago crossed over national borders, the action that could offer remedy to the underside of modern capitalism should have transnational dimension. The principle of solidarity as postulated by the social movement and trade union *Solidarity* in Poland in the 1980s promoted this universal aspect of grassroots activity.

In fact, the principle of solidarity has been described to cover six different meanings, which are identity, substitution, complementarity, reciprocity, affinity and restitution. The second of these, substitution, is exemplified by international development cooperation[6]. To understand how *Solidarity* of the 1980s could have evolved to global solidarity initiatives, the floor has been given to contemporaries of the described events. Some of the aid professionals I interviewed have been involved in civic activism and international cooperation since the 1980s. Others, who were too young to participate in *Solidarity* in the 1980s, nonetheless referred to the legacy of the movement and felt strong identification with other people trying to improve their lives and democratise public life in their countries. The legacy of *Solidarity* of the 1980s goes beyond the actual people who were part of it.

---

[5] Z. Bauman. 2013. "Solidarity: A word in search of flesh" in *New Eastern Europe,* no 2.

[6] P. Waterman (2001: 236) in R. Kössler and H. Melber. 2007. "International civil society and the challenge for global solidarity" in *Development Dialogue*, November 2007, p. 32.

The very fact that Poland was the country where *Solidarity* was born provides credibility to Polish initiatives in the area of development co-operation. The *Solidarity* movement of the 1980s symbolises the will and the possibility to achieve change when opportune circumstances arise.

The attitude embodied by the Polish champions of the Third sector during the first decade of the transition was also one of the "intellectual who heralds change"[7]. Jakub Wygnański claimed in 2005 that in terms of solidarity, spontaneity and selflessness, Polish civil society was stronger prior to 1989[8]. The previously mentioned empirically observed ousting of the communitarian model of self-organisation by the individualistic one testifies to this contention. However, as researchers who tested the validity of the world polity theory found out, "world citizens are more likely to come from cultural milieu structured around individualistic social theories and institutions that generate a 'dense' civil society with a good deal of autonomy from the state"[9]. In other words, the still predominant individualistic type of engagement in civil society in Poland should not necessarily be lamented, as it creates propitious conditions for the exercise of global solidarity. Furthermore, nowadays solidarity has acquired a wider and more urgent meaning, than that of a moral postulate. Solidarity has become a political requirement, as human survival in our interconnected world is increasingly contingent on the spread of the ethics of sharing and the safeguarding of some social cohesion worldwide[10]. The emergence of a cohort of aid professionals in Poland is indicative of the actualisation of this ethics in the society. Polish aid professionals are characterised by their commitment to contribute to what Piotr Sztompka called "agentially driven social change"[11] by working in a couple of interrelat-

---

[7] I. Iłowiecka-Tańska. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze o idei Trzeciego sektora w Polsce.* Warszawa, p. 57.

[8] J. Wygnański 2005 in Ibid., p. 81.

[9] J. Boli, T. A. Loya and T. Loftin. 1999. "National Participation in World-Polity Organization," in J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875.* Stanford, p. 75.

[10] R. Kössler and H. Melber. 2007 "International civil society and the challenge for global solidarity" in *Development Dialogue*, November, pp. 35–36.

[11] P. Sztompka. 1993. *The Sociology of Social Change*. UK, p. 274.

ed fields: development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, global education, and support for democratisation.

Whereas most of the activities that fall under the category of development cooperation are directed to other countries, global education targets the citizens of Poland. After all, to quote from the classic work of the philosopher and pedagogue Paulo Freire, "Solidarity requires that one enter into the situation of those with whom one is solidary. . . . True solidarity is found only . . . in its praxis"[12]. Praxis, however, should not be limited to action only. Freire understands praxis as the "reflection and action that truly transform reality"[13]. Indeed, as Stepher McCloskey argues, action without reflection is "mere activism devoid of thought"[14]. An example of the argument that in the case of development, action and reflection should be the two sides of the same coin, is the observed by McClosky dissociation of development education and development aid in the practices of some NGOs. He envisages the roots of this dissociation in the "creeping depoliticisation" of NGOs involved in development education. NGOs' depoliticisation has been the result of a trade-off whereby those NGOs have "narrowed their policy engagement" to development aid, at the expense of advocating for and working on behalf of enhancing public understanding of the causes of global poverty[15].

This argument should be understood as a word of warning for NGOs in other countries, and at the same time as an endorsement of the role more and more Polish NGDOs are assuming, i.e. that of educators. After all, as indicated earlier, public opinion polls present a positive picture of Polish society's support for development cooperation. However, this optimistic view coupled with the public's decreasing familiarity with the actual engagement of Polish governmental and non-state actors in development cooperation[16] is creating

---

[12] P. Freire. 2005. (1970) *Pedagogy Of The Oppressed*. New York, pp. 49–50.

[13] Ibid., p. 100.

[14] St. McCloskey. 2015. *Are we Changing the World? Reflections on Development Education, Activism and Social Change*. Belfast, p. 7.

[15] J. Hilary. 2013. "Putting the Politics Back In: Radical Education and Action in the Cause of Social Justice" in *Policy and Practice: A Development Education Review*, Vol. 17.

[16] A. Leszczyński. 2015. "Solidarni, byle niedrogo" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17–18.10.2015.

a situation where "Polish activists are trapped between holding onto the illusion of nation-wide support for the development paradigm and the lack of interest from the public in development matters"[17]. Unlike the general public, aid professionals exemplify both an interest and a belief in the need and the possibility to impact change by engaging in development cooperation abroad and in global education at home. Their commitment to these causes is in tune with the outcome of the Special Eurobarometer conducted in 2014, which concluded that individuals "who are positive about the importance of helping people, and believe that aid should be increased, are also more likely to be positive about other aspects of development, such as an individual's ability to influence change. Those who are generally positive about overcoming poverty in the world often see this as an issue that transcends different areas of life: politics, charity and personal behaviour"[18]. Indeed, only the synergetic effect of action and reflection can contribute to exerting the change aid professionals strive after. The fact that aid professionals are inspired by individuals who embody these qualities (reflection and action) bodes well for their commitment to the causes and to their jobs.

Critics of the postulate to keep increasing the engagement of Poland in supporting other nations voice the opinion that the country has not yet solved its own most pressing problems. However, the argument about the unaddressed internal social problems could be constructively used as a justification for providing aid abroad. As the executive director of *War on Want*[19] John Hilary argued, it is necessary to "explore the potential for new forms of 'solidarity' based not on colonialist intervention on behalf of the Other, which has been the driving force for so much development education and global justice campaigning in Britain, but on the construction of a political project to build awareness of (and action against) a common enemy at home

[17] E. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka. 2011. *The Emerging Powers and the Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation. Public Perceptions of Development Cooperation*. Summary Paper 3: POLAND.

[18] *The European Year for Development – Citizens' views on development, cooperation and aid*. S*pecial Eurobarometer 421*. 2015. European Commission, p. 63.

[19] *War on Want* distances itself from most NGDOs by claiming it is a political organisation, not a charity.

and abroad"[20]. Indeed, Poland and other recent donor countries do not have a history of colonisation. However, European rising donors have been encouraged to learn from other more experienced Western donors, many of which motivated their support for particular countries by their common, i.e. colonial, history. John Hilary is right to argue that the austerity policies imposed on European nations mirror those that have long been inflicted on the peoples of the Global South by international financing institutions. This fact actually offers a unique opportunity to join up domestic struggles with those in other parts of the world. The Sustainable Development Goals are an example of an inclusive agenda in this respect. Aid professionals have an important role to play in this process. Their work should be supported, but also given greater publicity in an attempt to multiply its effect.

Lessons learnt and future research

Lessons learnt from this research indicate that there is an added value in studying the development branch of the NGO sector in Poland. The differences among aid professionals and other NGO activists were already addressed. Given that at present NGDOs are Poland's best export brand, as far as the internationalisation of solidarity is concerned, their role as important civil society actors and continuators of the mission of *Solidarity* of the 1980s should be recognised and endorsed by researchers and decision-makers alike. Political championship could be crucial in achieving some of the postulates related to the funding of NGDOs' activities that have been repeatedly raised by the civic sector. At the same time, it should be recognised that at present Polish NGDOs face additional challenge. They have been seminal partners for Polish aid especially in the area of democratisation. Indeed, it was argued that given the international reception of recent governmental reforms, Polish NGDOs' integrity as entities with high democratisation capacity could be undermined[21].

This word of warning notwithstanding, the NGDO sector has long proved its policy independence in development assistance and there are no reasons to question its reliability as a partner in democratising and developmental cooperation alike. In any way, as the analysis of

[20] J. Hilary. 2013. "Putting the Politics Back In…".

[21] K. Zalas-Kamińska. 2016. *Polska pomoc rozwojowa – co dalej?*

the interviews indicated, the work of NGDOs in both Eastern Partnership countries and traditional development partners, have elements of democratisation while oftentimes addressing basic human needs. Perhaps it could be the experience under communism and being a former aid beneficiary, rather than the transformation know-how, that should inform future policies of aid programming. In accordance with the research material presented here, these are the most important advantages of Polish aid, according to its end users in partner countries. The professionalism of NGDO activists coupled with their credibility in the eyes of their partners is the most important asset of Polish development cooperation.

Future research could continue exploring the relationships between NGDOs and Polish aid by further studying the dynamics of their cooperation. In line with the growing involvement in development education activities on behalf of aid professionals and NGDOs, attention should be paid to these initiatives and their congruence with the development cooperation projects these organisations implement abroad. Having in mind the observed lack of unanimity regarding the values organisations involved in development cooperation should represent and promote, an analysis should be made of the role of Roman Catholic missionaries in development cooperation and the compatibility of the principles that propel their activity with the principles endorsed by the secular international community engaged in development cooperation and global education. Opportunities to reconcile the diverging opinions of secular and religious organisations providing aid on issues like gender rights can be sought. Future research can also incorporate the relationship between the refugee crisis and the role of NGDOs in addressing this issue, for example by providing global education and awareness raising initiatives at home.

Finally, in light of the growth of nationalistic and xenophobic movements in the affluent world, future research should focus on the threat of their rhetoric and action for the success of the development cooperation and global education agendas.

Bibliography

Adler, Emanuel. 2008. "Constructivism and International Relations" in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: SAGE, pp. 95–118.

Aid At A Glance. Flows of official development assistance to and through civil society organisations in 2011. OECD. (accessed 19.06.2015 at http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Aid%20for%20CSOs%20Final%20for%20WEB.pdf).

Allen, Tim and Alan Thomas (eds.). 2000. *Poverty and Development in the 21st century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Archer, Clive. 1992. *International Organisations* (2nd ed.). London and New York: Routledge.

Badelt, Christoph. 1997. "Entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 8, no 2, pp. 162–178.

Bagiński, Paweł. 2009. "Ewolucja pozycji Polski w międzynarodowej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju" in Paweł Bagiński, Katarzyna Czaplicka and Jan Szczyciński (eds.) *Międzynarodowa współpraca na rzecz rozwoju*. Warszawa: PWE, pp. 188–212.

Bailer, Stefanie, Thilo Bodensteinet and V. Finn Heinrich. 2008. "What Makes Civil Society Strong? Testing Bottom-up and Top-down Theories of a Vibrant Civil Society" in Heinrich Volkhart and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.) *CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Comparative perspectives*. USA: Kumarian Press, pp. 235–254.

Bales, Kevin. 1996. "Measuring the Propensity to Volunteer" in *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 30, no 3, pp. 206–226.

Banaszak, Ada. 2015. *Projektariat Ma Dość!* (accessed 08.04.2016 at http://notesna6tygodni.pl/?q=projektariat-ma-do%C5%9B%C4%87).

Bankole, Adeyinka. 2008. "Actions for Development: From Local to Global and Vice-Versa" in Adeyinka Bankole and Elżbieta Puchnarewicz (eds.) *NGOs, International Aid and Development in the South*. Warsaw: UW, pp. 11–23.

Barder, Owen, Mikaela Gavas, Simon Maxwell and Deborah Johnson. 2010. "Governance of the aid system and the role of the EU". Paper presented at the *Conference on Development Cooperation in Times of Crisis and on Achieving the MDGs*, 9–10 June 2010, Madrid (accessed 13.11.2014 at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6236.pdf).

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2013. "Solidarity: A word in search of flesh" in *New Eastern Europe,* 2.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2012. *Straty uboczne. Nierówności społeczne w epoce globalizacji*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, pp. 179–192.

Beck, Ulrich. 2005*. Władza i przeciwwładza w epoce globalnej. Nowa ekonomia polityki światowej*. Warszawa: Scholar.

Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Berkovitch, Nina. 1999. "The Emergence and Transformation of the International Women's Movement" in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 100–126.

Bernhard, Michael. 1996. "Civil Society after the First Transition" in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 29, no 3, pp. 309–330.

Biesta, Gert. 2014. "Learning in Public Places: Civic Learning for the Twenty-First Century" in Gert Biesta, Maria De Bie and Danny Wildemeersch (eds.) *Civic Learning, Democratic Citizenship and the Public Sphere*. New York and London: Springer, pp. 1–14.

Bilewicz, Aleksandra. 2015. "Odnowa etosu społecznikowskiego? O inteligenckim charakterze niezinstytucjonalizowanych inicjatyw społecznych" in Galia Chimiak and Katarzyna Iwińska (eds.) *Krajobraz społecznościowy – Polska 2014*. Warszawa: Collegium Civitas and Stowarzyszenie CAL, pp. 47–76.

Bilewicz, Aleksandra and Dominika Potkańska. 2013. "Jak kiełkuje społeczeństwo obywatelskie? Kooperatywy spożywcze w Polsce

jako przykład nieformalnego ruchu społecznego" in *Trzeci Sektor,* no 31 (3), pp. 25–44.

Birdsall Nancy. 2005. *Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings*. Center for Global Development. Working Paper Number 50 (accessed 05.04.2016 at http://www.cgdev.org/files/2737_file_WP50_rev12_05_2.pdf).

Boli, Jonh and George M. Thomas. 1999. "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture", in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 13–49.

Boli, John, Thomas A. Loya and Teresa Loftin. 1999. "National Participation in World-Polity Organization" in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 50–80.

Brockington, Dan. 2014. *Celebrity Advocacy and International Development*. New York: Routledge.

Brzeziecki, Andrzej. 2013. "Niezbędna proteza" in *Tygodnik Powszechny*. 24.07.2013 (accessed 24.03.2015 at http://tygodnik.onet.pl/niezbedna-proteza/pp3dp).

Chabbott, Collette. 1999. "Development INGOs" in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 222–248.

Chimiak, Galia and Katarzyna Iwińska (eds.) 2015. *Sektor społecznościowy – Polska 2014*. Warszawa: Collegium Civitas and Stowarzyszenie CAL.

Chimiak, Galia. 2015. "Wpływ kwestii bezpieczeństwa na rolę organizacji pozarządowych w teorii i praktyce rozwojowej" in Wojciech Misztal, Artur Kościański and Galia Chimiak (eds.) *Obywatele wobec kryzysu: uśpieni czy innowatorzy?* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, pp. 155–175.

Chimiak, Galia. 2014. "The Rise and Stall of Non-Governmental Organisations in Development" in *Polish Sociological Review,* no 1, pp. 25–44.

Chimiak, Galia. 2014. "Między Zachodem a Globalnego Południa: Innowacje Odwrotne w Polsce" in *Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja,* no 16, pp. 17–33.

Chimiak, Galia. 2012. "Lengyel Álom a civil társadalomról" in *Civil Szemle*, no 1, pp. 91–102.

Chimiak, Galia. 2006. *How Individualists Make Solidarity Work*. Warszawa: MPiPS.

CIVICUS. 2014. *An Open Letter to our Fellow Activists across the Globe: Building from below and beyond borders* (accessed 03.09.2015 at http://blogs.civicus.org/civicus/2014/08/06/an-open-letter-to-our-fellow-activists-across-the-globe-building-from-below-and-beyond-borders/).

Clarke, Ross and Araddhya Mehtta. 2015. *5 trends that explain why civil society space is under assault around the world*. Oxfam's Knowledge Hub on Governance and Citizenship (accessed 04.09.2015 at http://linkis.com/oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/1tqnA).

Cofer, Charles N. and Mortimer H. Appley. 1964. *Motivation: Theory and Research*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Coleman, James. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital" in *the American Journal of Sociology*, no 94, pp. 95–120.

Curry, Andrew. 2010. "Poland's New Ambitions" in *Wilson Quarterly,* no 34/2, pp. 38–42.

Czubek, Grażyna (ed.) 2002. *Social Diplomacy. The Case of Poland. International activity of Polish NGOs and their dialogue with government*. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation (accessed 18.02.2016 at http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/diplomac.pdf).

Czyżewski, Krzysztof. 2014. "Culture and solidarity" in *New Eastern Europe*, no 3.

de Haan, Arjan. 2009. *How the Aid Industry Works: An Introduction to International Development*. USA: Kumarian Press.

de Jong, Sara. 2011. "False Binaries: Altruism and Selfishness in NGO work" in Anne-Meike Fechter and Heather Hindman (eds.) *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers. The Challenges and Futures of Aidland*. Sterling: Kumarian Press.

Dekhtiarova, Oksana, Anna Kendrick and Natalia Mileszyk. 2009. *"We Are Not Scouts": The Reality of Polish Development Cooperation* (accessed 23.06.2015 at http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/67-we-are-not-scouts-the-reality-of-polish-development-cooperation).

Dobranowska, Magda. 2003. *Inauguracyjne posiedzenie Rady ds. współpracy z organizacjami pozarządowymi przy Ministrze Spraw Zagranicznych [relacja]* (accessed 16.02.2016 at http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/40393.html).

Domber, Gregory F. 2008. "Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development: Poland 1980–1989". Center on Democ-

racy, Development and the Rule of Law Working Papers no 88 (accessed 07.11.2014 at http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/No_88_DomberPoland.pdf).

Domingues, Jose Maurico. 2011. *Global Modernity, Development, and Contemporary Civilisation*. *Towards a Renewal of Critical Theory*. New York and London: Routledge.

Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka, Elżbieta. 2015. "Poland: Attempts at Defining Aid by Solidarity, Democracy and Development" in Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (eds.) *Development Cooperation of the 'New' EU Member States. Beyond Europeanisation*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 43–63.

Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka, Elżbieta. 2013. "From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Development Cooperation" in *Human Organisation*, vol. 72, no 1, pp. 65–75.

Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka, Elżbieta. 2011. *The Emerging Powers and the Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation. Public Perceptions of Development Cooperation.* Summary Paper 3: POLAND (accessed 24.11.2015 at http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/foreignaidperceptions/summaries/poland.pdf).

Dudkiewicz, Ignacy. 2015. *Razem dla świata, osobno dla siebie? MSZ a organizacje* (accessed 20.10.2015 at http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/1649657.html).

Dudkiewicz, Magdalena. 2004. "Dwie wizje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w świadomości ludzi trzeciego sektora" in Piotr Gliński, Barbara Lewenstein and Andrzej Siciński (eds.) *Samoorganizacja społeczeństwa polskiego: III sektor i wspólnoty lokalne w jednoczącej się Europie.* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Edukacja globalna w polskiej szkole. Raport z badań wśród nauczycielek i nauczycieli III etapu edukacyjnego. 2013. Warszawa: Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej (accessed 27.12.2015 at http://www.ceo.org.pl/sites/default/files/news-files/raport_edukacja_w_polskiej_szkole.pdf).

Elliott-Buckley, Stephen. 2009. "Democracy(tm): Challenging the Hyper-Individualism of Packaged Democracy". International Studies Association Conference Papers, March 29, 2008 San Francisco (accessed 17.11.2014 at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/3/8/pages254380/p254380-1.php).

European Commission. 2015. *The European Year for Development – Citizens' views on development, cooperation and aid*. Special Euro-

barometer 421 (accessed 02.02.2015 at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_421_en.pdf).

European Commission. 2006. *The European Consensus on Development*. European Commission (accessed 14.03.2016 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2006%3A046%3A0001%3A0019%3AEN%3APDF).

Fechter, Anne-Meike and Heather Hindman (eds.) 2011. *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers. The Challenges and Futures of Aidland*. Sterling: Kumarian Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 1999. "Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State Violence" in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 149–165.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" in *International Organization*, no 52(4), pp. 887–917.

Fox, Jonathan. 1996. "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico" in *World Development,* Vol. 24, no 6 (accessed 04.11.2014 at http://jonathanfox-ucsc.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/fox_how_does_civil_society_thicken_1996.pdf).

Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, John W. Meyer, Evan Schofer and Nancy Brandon Tuma. 1999. "The Rationalization and Organization of Nature in World Culture" in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 81–99.

Freire, Paulo. 1970/2005. *Pedagogy Of The Oppressed*. New York: Continuum (accessed 03.09.2015 at https://libcom.org/files/FreirePedagogyoftheOppressed.pdf).

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End Of History and the Last Man.* New York: Macmillan. (accessed 15.11.2013 at http://www.revalvaatio.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/fukuyama-the_end_of_history.pdf).

Fundacja Solidarności Międzynarodowej. 2016. *Jak grantobiorcy ocenili współpracę z FSM w 2015 r.?* (accessed 04.04.2016 at http://www.solidarityfund.pl/pl/nowosci-2/135-news-projekty/wsparcie-demokracji-2015/947-jak-grantobiorcy-ocenili-wspolprace-z-fsm-w-2015-r).

Galtung, Fredrick. 2000. "A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The Experience of Transparency International" in Ann Florini (ed.) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Tokyo and Washington, pp. 17–47.

Gawin, Dariusz. 2015. "Solidarność i kryzys. Społeczeństwo obywatelskie lat 70. i 80." in Wojciech Misztal, Artur Kościański and Galia Chimiak (eds.) *Obywatele wobec kryzysu: uśpieni czy innowatorzy?* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Gawin, Dariusz. 2013. *Wielki zwrot. Ewolucja lewicy i odrodzenie idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego 1956–1976*. Kraków: ZNAK.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (selected essays by Clifford Geertz). New York: Basic Books, pp. 3–30.

Gębura, Rafał. 2013. *Sektorowy rachunek sumienia [relacja]* (accessed 23.02.2016 at http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosci/923237.html).

Gilbert, Jane. 2005. "Self-knowledge is the prerequisite of humanity: personal development and self-awareness for aid workers" in *Development in Practice* (February 1), no 15, 1, pp. 64–69.

Gliński, Piotr. 2006a. *Style działań organizacji pozarządowych w Polsce. Grupy interesu czy pożytku publicznego?* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Gliński, Piotr. 2006b. "The Self-Governing Republic in the Third Republic" in *Polish Sociological Review*, no 1, pp. 55–74.

Gliński, Piotr. 1999a. "O społeczeństwie obywatelskim w Polsce: teoria i praktyka" in Dariusz Gawin (ed.) *Homo eligens: społeczeństwo świadomego wyboru*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Gliński. Piotr. 1999b. "The Development of the Third Sector in Poland", manuscript of the paper presented at the 1999 *Voluntas* symposium in Prague, the Czech Republic.

Goodall, Richard. 2000. "Organising cultures: voluntarism and professionalism in UK charity shops" in *Voluntary Action*, Vol. 3, no 1, pp. 43–57.

Grenier, Paola. 2006. "Social Entrepreneurship: Agency in a Globalizing World" in Alex Nicholls (ed.) *Social Entrepreneurship: New Models of Sustainable Social Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grenier, Paola. 2004. "The New Pioneers: The People Behind Global Civil Society" in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2004/5*. London: Sage, pp. 122–157.

Grenier, Paola. 1997. *Social Entrepreneurs – Vision and Action*, unpublished MA thesis. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Grimley, Naomi. 2016. "Identity 2016: 'Global citizenship' rising, poll suggests" in *BBC News*, 28.04.2016 (accessed 28.04.2016 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-36139904).

Grootaert, Christiaan. 1998. "Social capital: the missing link?", Social Capital Initiative Working Paper no 3 (accessed 03.11.2014 at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-03.pdf).

Gruca, Gzregorz. 2011. "History and Challenges of Polish Aid: The Polish Humanitarian Action Case" in Konrad Pędziwiatr, Patryk Kugiel and Aleksander Dańda (eds.) *Current Challenges to Peacebuilding Efforts and Development Assistance.* Kraków: Tischner European University, pp. 29–40.

Grupa Zagranica. 2015a. *Polska współpraca rozwojowa. Raport 2014*. Warszawa.

Grupa Zagranica. 2015b. *Polskie MSZ bezskuteczne we wspieraniu polskich organizacji pozarządowych zajmujących się współpracą rozwojową* (accessed 03.03.2015 at http://www.zagranica.org.pl/aktualnosci/polskie-msz-bezskuteczne-we-wspieraniu-polskich-organizacji-pozarzadowych-zajmujacych).

Grupa Zagranica. 2013. *Polska współpraca rozwojowa. Raport 2012*. Warszawa.

Grupa Zagranica. 2012. *Demokracja i rozwój w perspektywie polskich organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa: Grupa Zagranica (accessed 26.01.2016 at http://www.zagranica.org.pl/sites/zagranica.org.pl/files/attachments/Publikacje/NGOs/raport_demokracja_i_rozwoj_grupa_zagranica.pdf).

Grupa Zagranica and MamPrawoWiedziec.pl. 2015. *Kandydaci/tki w wyborach parlamentarnych o współpracy rozwojowej*. (accessed 19.11.2015 at http://zagranica.org.pl/aktualnosci/kandydacitki-w-wyborach-parlamentarnych-o-wspolpracy-rozwojowej).

Guć, Michal. 1996. *Razem. O współpracy samorządu terytorialnego z organizacjami pozarządowymi*. Gdynia: Urząd Miasta Gdyni.

Gugerty, Mary Kay and Michael Kremer. 2000. "Does development assistance help build social capital?", Social Capital Initiative Working Paper no 20 (accessed 04.11.2014 at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-20.pdf).

GUS. 2013. *Trzeci sektor w Polsce. Stowarzyszenia, fundacje, społeczne podmioty wyznaniowe, samorząd zawodowy i gospodarczy oraz organizacje pracodawców w 2010 r.* Warszawa.

Haaland, Hanne and Hege Wallevik. 2014. "Spotlight presentation: What's happening in Norway?" at *the First European Conference on Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity*. Brussels (30–31.01.2014).

Hall, Rodney Bruce. 2014. "Constructivism" in Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (eds.) *International Organisation and Global Governance*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 144–156.

Handy, Charles. 1998. *Understanding Voluntary Organisations.* London: Penguin Books.

Hansmann, Henry. 1987. "Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organisation" in Walter W. Powell (ed.) *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*. New Haven-Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Haratyk, Karol. 2011. "Polskie globalne społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Negocjowania znaczenia oraz istnienia" in Wojciech Misztal and Artur Kościański (eds.) *Rozdroża praktyki i idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, pp. 93–132.

Harriss, John. 2002. *Depoliticizing Development: the World Bank and social capital*. London: Anthem Press.

Hart, Gillian. 2001. "Development debates in the 1990s: Culs de sac and promising paths" in *Progress in Human Geography,* no 25, pp. 605–614.

Heins, Volker M. 2014. "Global Cooperation and Economies of Recognition: The Case of NGOs", Global Cooperation Research Papers 5. Duisburg.

Hénon, Sarah. 2014. *Measuring private development assistance: emerging trends and challenges*. Development initiatives report. (accessed 17.12.2015 at http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Measuring-private-development-assistance1.pdf).

Herbst, Krzysztof and Marta Żakowska. 2013. *Ruchy nieformalne a kierunki rozwoju ekonomii społecznej. Rekomendacje dla polityk publicznych*. Warszawa: MPiPS.

Hilary, John. 2013. "Putting the Politics Back In: Radical Education and Action in the Cause of Social Justice" in *Policy and Practice: A Development Education Review*, Vol. 17, pp. 9–26.

Horký, Ondřej. 2012. "The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European 'Transition Experience' to the South: Myth or Reality?" in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 13, no 1, pp. 17–32.

Howell, Jude and Jeremy Lind. 2009. *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society Before and After the War on Terror*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Howell, Jude, Armine Ishkanian, Ebenezer Obadare, Hakan Seckinelgin and Marlies Glasius. 2006. *The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror*. Civil Society Working Paper no 26, London School of Economics.

Huberman, A. Michael and Mathew B. Miles. 2000. *Analiza danych jakościowych*. Białystok: Trans Humana.

Huberman, A. Michael and Mathew B. Miles. 1994. "Data Management and Analysis Methods" in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: SAGE, pp. 428–444.

Hudock, Ann C. 1999. *NGOs and Civil Society. Democracy by Proxy?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Iłowiecka-Tańska, Ilona. 2011. *Liderzy i działacze o idei Trzeciego sektora w Polsce*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Jedynak, Marek. 2014. *Niezależni kombatanci w PRL. Środowisko Świętokrzyskich Zgrupowań Partyzanckich Armii Krajowej "Ponury"––"Nurt" (1957–1989)*. Kielce–Kraków: Wydawnictwo BARBARA and Instytut Pamięci Narodowej.

Ingebritsen, Christine. 2002. "Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics" in *Cooperation and Conflict*, no 37:1, pp. 11–23.

Iriye, Akira. 2002. *Global Community. The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Iwankiewicz-Rak, Barbara. 2002. "Słabe Państwo – silny trzeci sektor? Wybrane problemy rozwoju i funkcjonowania organizacji pozarządowych" in Piotr Gliński, Barbara Lewenstein, and Andrzej Siciński (eds.) *Samoorganizacja społeczeństwa Polskiego: Trzeci sektor*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, pp. 121–132.

James, Estelle. 1987. "The non-profit sector in comparative perspective" in Walter W. Powell (ed.) *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*. New Haven–Connecticut: Yale University Press.

James, Estelle and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 1986. *The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economics*. Chur (Switzerland): Harwood Academic Publishers; Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics series 9.

James, P.J. 1995 *Non-governmental voluntary organisations. The true mission*. Kottayam: Mass Line Publications.

"Janina Ochojska. Czy jesteś dobrym człowiekiem?". 2014. Grzegorz Sroczyński talking with Janina Ochojska of the *Polish Humanitarian Action* in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Duży Format*, 07.08.2014 (accessed 08.05.2015 at http://wyborcza.pl/duzyformat/1,139945,16438335,Janina_Ochojska__Czy_jestes_dobrym_czlowiekiem_.html).

Jasiecki, Krzysztof. 2013. *Kapitalizm po polsku: między modernizacją a peryferiami Unii Europejskiej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Jasikowska, Katarzyna. 2012. "Globalizacja a rozwój – międzysektorowa debata na temat globalnej edukacji w Polsce" in Galia Chimiak and Marcin Fronia (eds.) *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski*. Warszawa: Scholar. pp. 170–194.

Johannes, Tabi Atemnkeng. 2009. "Does Social Capital determine Poverty? Evidence from Cameroon Household Survey", paper presented at GLOBELICS conference (accessed 14.11.2014 at https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/36695/Paper%20Globelics.pdf).

Kaca, Elżbieta. 2011. *Pomoc demokratyzacyjna w polskiej współpracy rozwojowej*. Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych (accessed 17.03.2016 at http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/filemanager/Program%20Europejski/Polska%20i%20niemiecka%20rozwojowa-/3Polskapolitykarozwojowa10042013final.pdf).

Kaczmarek, Filip. 2014. Presentation during the workshop "Jaką rolę powinny pełnić organizacje pozarządowe zajmujące się współpracą rozwojową w kształtowaniu polskiej pomocy rozwojowej?" at the VII National Forum of Polish Non-Governmental Organisations, Warsaw, 15.09.2014.

Kaldor, Mary. 2000. "Eastern enlargement and democracy" in Catherine Hoskyns and Michael Newman (eds.) *Democratising the European Union: Issues for the Twenty-first Century*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, pp. 139–155.

Karli, Barry D. 1998 "Volunteers and Professionals: Many Histories, Many Meanings" in Walter W. Powell and Elisabeth S. Clemens (eds.) *Private Action and the Public Good*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 245–257.

Kaźmierkiewicz, Piotr. 2008. "Eastern Promises and Achievements. Poland's Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities" in Jacek

Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (eds.) *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement*. Praga: PASOS, pp. 81–113.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Kennard, Matt and Claire Provost. 2016. *How Aid Became Big Business – Los Angeles Review of Books* (accessed 24.05.2016 at https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/aid-became-big-business/).

Kennedy, David. 2005. *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Khan, Samia and Robert VanWynsberghe. 2008. "Cultivating the Under-Mined: Cross-Case Analysis as Knowledge Mobilisation" in *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, no 9(1), Art. 34.

Kharas, Homi. 2009. *Development Assistance in the 21st Century*. Contribution to the VIII Salamanca Forum The Fight Against Hunger and Poverty, July 2–4 2009 (accessed 17.12.2015 at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/11/development-aid-kharas/11_development_aid_kharas.pdf).

Kinsbergen, Sara. 2014. *Behind the Pictures. Understanding Private Development Initiatives*. PhD thesis defended at Radboud University, Nijmegen.

Kopiński, Dominik. 2012. "Visegrád Countries' Development Aid to Africa: Beyond the Rhetoric" in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 13, no 1, pp. 33–49.

Kopiński, Dominik. 2011. *Pomoc rozwojowa. Teoria i polityka*. Warszawa: Difin.

Kosiewski, Piotr. 2003. "Lata doświadczeń i perspektywa europejska" in *Polska-Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, pp. 7–15.

Kössler, Reinhart and Henning Melber. 2007. "International civil society and the challenge for global solidarity" in *Development Dialogue*, November, pp. 29–39.

Koralewicz, Jadwiga and Hanna Malewska-Peyre. 1998. *Człowiek człowiekowi człowiekiem. Analiza wywiadów biograficznych działaczy społecznych w Polsce i we Francji.* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ISP PAN.

Korten, David C. 1990. *Getting to the 21st century: voluntary action and the global agenda*. USA: Kumarian Press.

Kramers, Diederik. 2015. *EU-13 NGOs want to raise awareness, but struggle with Brussels financing*. 26.02.2015 (accessed 24.02.2016 at https://www.devex.com/news/eu-13-ngos-want-to-raise-awareness-but-struggle-with-brussels-financing-85570).

Krasteva, Lilia. 2010. *The EU New Member States 2004, challenges and patterns in providing Official Development Assistance, policy implications for the EU New Member States 2007*. MA Professional Graduation Project – Research paper defended at Ohio University.

Król, Marcin. 2012. *Europa w obliczu końca*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Czerwone i Czarne.

Krzemińska, Katarzyna. 2011. "The Polish DE Consensus process: towards a strategy, ending up with an agreement" in *DEAR matters - Strategic approaches to development education in Europe*. Brussels: DEEEP and CONCORD, pp. 24–28.

Krzyszkowski, Jerzy. 2007. "Poland" in Helmut Anheier and Siobhan Daly (eds.) *The Politics of Foundations: A Comparative Analysis*. USA: Routledge.

Kucharczyk, Jacek and Jeff Lovitt. 2008. "Re-energising Europe to Champion Democracy. The Visegrád Four bring fresh transition experience to the donors' side of the table" in Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (eds.) *Democracy's New Champions. European democracy assistance after EU enlargement*. Praga: PASOS, pp. 15–27.

Kuleta-Hulboj, Magdalena. 2016. "Global citizen as an agent of change. Ideals of global citizen in the narratives of Polish NGO employees", in *The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, Vol. 14, no 3, pp. 220–250.

Kupchan, Charles A. 2012. *No One's World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Kurczewska, Joanna, Katarzyna Staszyńska and Hanna Bojar. 1993. "Blokady społeczeństwa obywatelskiego: czyli słabe społeczeństwo obywatelskie i słabe państwo" in Andrzej Rychard and Michał Federowicz (eds.) *Społeczeństwo w transformacji. Ekspertyzy i studia*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, pp. 84–96.

Kurczewski, Jacek. 2010. "PS. Socjologia Solidarności" in Jacek Kurczewski and Joanna Kurczewska *Konflikt i "Solidarność" 1980/1981*. Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Lecha Wałęsy, pp. 127–141.

Lansky, Sarah R. 2014. "My Brother Before Me: The Role and Experience of Local Humanitarian Aid Workers in Eastern Cameroon". Anthropology Honors Projects. Paper 22 (accessed 03.12.2015 at http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=anth_honors).

Lesińska, Magdalena and Renata Stefańska. 2015. "Wpływ organizacji pozarządowych na politykę migracyjną Polski i jego uwarunkowania" in *Trzeci Sektor*, no 35, 2, pp. 40–53.

Leszczyński, Adam. 2015. "Solidarni, byle niedrogo" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17–18.10.2015, pp. 32–33.

Leś, Ewa. 1994. *The Voluntary Sector in Post-Communist East-Central Europe*. Warsaw: CIVICUS.

Lewis, David. 2013. "Tidy Concepts, Messy Lives: Defining Tensions in the Domestic and Overseas Careers of U.K. Non-Governmental Professionals" in David Mosse (ed.) *Adventures in Aidland. The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. New York/ Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 177–197.

Lewis, David and Nazneen Kanji. 2009. *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development.* London and New York: Routledge.

Lightfoot, Simon. 2010. "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies: The Case of Central and Eastern European States" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 62, no 2, pp. 329–350.

Lightfoot, Simon and Irene Lindenhovius Zubizarreta. 2011 "The Emergence of International Development Policies in Central and Eastern European States" in Paul Hoebink (ed.) *European Development Cooperation: in between the Local and the Global*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 2005. "Global Civil Society and Global Governmentality: or, the Search for Politics and the State amidst the Capillaries of Social Power" in Michael Marnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.) *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229–248.

Madon, Shirin. 2000. "International NGOs: Networking, Information Flows and Learning", Development Informatics Working Paper Series. University of Manchester.

Majchrzak, Grzegorz. 2011. „Niebezpieczny dokument. Posłanie do ludzi pracy Europy wschodniej" in Europejskie Centrum Solidarności, *Wolność i Solidarność. Studia z dziejów opozycji wobec komunizmu i dyktatur*, no 2, pp. 95–102.

MamPrawoWiedziec.pl and Grupa Zagranica. 2015. *Współpraca rozwojowa w debacie sejmowej VII kadencji Sejmu (2011-2015)* (accessed 19.11.2015 at http://zagranica.org.pl/sites/zagranica.org.pl/files/attachments/Publikacje/Sejm/wspolpraca-rozwojowa-2011-2014.pdf).

Maslow, Abraham H. 1970. *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper Row.

Marody, Mirosława. 1999. "Od społeczeństwa drugiego obiegu do społeczeństwa obywatelskiego" in *Studia Socjologiczne*, Vol. 4, pp. 35–53.

Martens, Kerstin. 2002. "Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organisations" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 13, no 3, pp. 271–285.

Material World: a research report on our have-it-all culture. 2000. London: Volunteer Service Overseas.

Mazur, Elżbieta. 1999. *Dobroczynność w Warszawie w XIX wieku*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IAE PAN.

Mazur, Joanna. 2013. *Bilateralna pomoc rozwojowa jako praktyka neokolonialna – ujęcie globalistyczne*. Warszawa: Warsaw University, manuscript of BA thesis.

McCloskey, Stephen. 2015. *Are we Changing the World? Reflections on Development Education, Activism and Social Change*. Belfast: Centre for Global Education.

McMahon, Patrice C. 2002. "International actors and women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary" in Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn (eds.) *The Power and Limits of NGOs. A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 29–53.

Mead, Herbert. 1972. (1934) *Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Charles W Morris ed.). Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Merrill, Barbara and Linden West. 2009. *Using Biographical Methods in Social Research*. London: SAGE.

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015a. *Plan współpracy rozwojowej w 2016 r*. (accessed 01.12.2015 at http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/714259ce-0feb-4589-84ba-915cfb72211f:JCR).

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015b. *Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020*. (accessed 27.11.2015 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Dokumenty,i,publikacje,83.html).

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2015c. *Zestawienie zgłoszonych uwag i odpowiedzi*. *Podsumowanie konsultacji społecznych dot. projektu Wieloletniego programu współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2016-2020*. (accessed 07.07.2015 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Podsumowanie,konsultacji,,spolecznych,dot.,projektu,Wieloletniego,programu,wspolpracy,rozwojowej,na,lata,2016-2020,2282.html).

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2014. *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2013.* Warszawa.

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 2013. *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2012*. Warszawa.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. *Support for democracy in Poland's foreign policy. First Report Poland's Democratisation Agenda 2014 – 2015*. Warsaw.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. *Poles on Development Assistance*. (accessed 24.11.2015 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Public,Opinion,Polls,197.html).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. *Poland's Development Cooperation. Annual Report 2012.* Warsaw.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. *Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015*. (accessed 27.11.2015 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Documents,and,Publications,208.html).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2006. *Poles about development assistance*. (accessed 24.11.2015 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Public,Opinion,Polls,197.html).

Miszlivetz, Ferenc and Katalin Ertsey. 1998. "Hungary: civil society in the post-socialist world" in Alison Van Rooy (ed.) *Civil Society and the Aid Industry.* London: Earthscan, pp. 71-103.

Moran, Michael. 2014. "Global Philanthropy" in Thomas G. Weiss and Rodren Wilkinson (eds.) *International Organization and Global Governance*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 372-384.

Morawski, Witold. 2012. Discussion during the promotion of the book *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski* (eds. G. Chimiak and M. Fronia). Warsaw, 30.05.2012.

Mosse, David. 2013. "Introduction. The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in International Development" in David Mosse (ed.) *Adventures in Aidland. The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 1–31.

Naím, Moisés. 2013. *The End of Power. From Boardrooms To Battlefields And Churches To States, Why Being In Charge Isn't What It Used To Be*. New York: Basic Books.

Nałęcz, Sławomir and Karolina Goś-Wójcicka. 2012. "Stowarzyszenia, podobne organizacje społeczne i fundacje w epoce funduszy strukturalnych i 1%", presentation during the conference "Społeczeństwo obywatelskie – kapitał społeczny". Warsaw, 6.09.2012.

Nimu, Andrada. 2015. *From* "*Counter-culture*" *to* "*Contract-culture*"*? Effects on implementing external funded projects on women based and LGBT rights NGOs in Romania and Poland*. Manuscript of PhD thesis defended at the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest, Romania.

Ochojska, Janina. 2015. "Woda i polityka" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 19.03.2015, p. 8.

Ociepka, Beata. 2014. "Public Diplomacy in the European Union: Models for Poland", PISM Policy Paper, no 5 (88) (accessed 24.03.2015 at http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=16515).

Ociepka, Beata. 2013. "New Members' Public Diplomacy" in Mai'a K. Davis Cross and Jan Melissen. (eds.) *European Public Diplomacy. Soft Power at Work*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 39-56.

OECD. 2015. *Development Co-operation Report 2015. Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action*. OECD Publishing. (accessed 04.03.2016 at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/development-co-operation-report-2015_dcr-2015-en#page254).

OECD. 2014. "Poland" in *Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development*. OECD Publishing. (accessed 23.06.2015 at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-48-en).

Olson, Mancur. 1995. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Groups and the Theory of Groups*. London: Harvard University Press.

Omoto, Allen M. and Mark Snyder. 1995. "Sustained Helping without Obligation: Motivation, Longevity of Service, and Perceived Attitude Change Among AIDS Volunteers" in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 68, no 4, pp. 671–686.

Patton, Michael Quinn. 1990. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park: SAGE.

Pawłak, Mikołaj and Patrycja Matusz-Protasiewicz. 2015. "Organizacje pozarządowe wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce – od pomocy doraźnej do upowszechnienia Europejskiej ramy polityki integracyjnej" in *Trzeci Sektor*, no 35, 2, pp. 11-21.

Pearce, Jone L. 1993. *Volunteers. The Organizational Behavior of Unpaid Workers.* London: Routledge.

Pearce, Jone L. 1983. "Job Attitude and Motivation Differences Between Volunteers and Employees From Comparable Organisations" in *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 68, no 4, pp. 646–652.

Pełczynski, Zbigniew A. 1988. "Solidarity and 'The Rebirth of Civil Society' in Poland, 1976–81" in John Keane (ed.) *Civil Society and the State*. London: Verso, pp. 361–380.

Piechota, Grażyna. 2015. "Legislation on Financing Public Benefit Activities from Tax Designation in Poland" in *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, Vol. 17, no 1, March, pp. 86–91.

Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. USA: Harvard University Press.

Pinder, Craig C. 1985. "Needs, Cognitive Factors, and the Motivation to Volunteer" in Larry F. Moore (ed.) *Motivating Volunteers. How the Rewards of Unpaid Work Can Meet People's Needs?* Vancouver: Vancouver Volunteer Centre.

Pisarska, Katarzyna. 2008. *The role of the new Member States in the developing of the EU's Eastern agenda in the years 2004-2007 – perceptions of EU officials*. Pulaski Report 1/2008 (accessed 19.06.2015 at http://pulaski.pl/images/publikacje/raport/Pulaski_Report_No_1_08_English.pdf).

Polska Akcja Humanitarna. 2014. *Sześć mitów o pracownikach humanitarnych* (accessed 12.11.2015 at http://www.pah.org.pl/naszedzialania/12/4968/szesc_mitow_o_pracownikach_humanitarnych).

Pollet, Ignace et al. 2014. *The Accidental Aid Worker: A Mapping of Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity in Europe*. Leuven and Nijmegen: HIVA-KU Leuven/CIDIN.

Polletta, Francesca and M. Kai Ho. 2006. "Frames And Their Consequences" in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2015. 2015. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor (accessed 22.01.2016 at http://fakty.ngo.pl/files/fakty.ngo.pl/public/kondycja_2015/PolskieOrganizacje2015.pdf).

Polanska, Dominika V. and Galia Chimiak. 2016. „Organizing without organizations: on informal social activism in Poland" in *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 36, Issue 9/10, pp. 662–679.

Polanska, Dominika V. 2015. "Motywacje osób niezinstytucjonalizowanego sektora społecznościowego" in Galia Chimiak and Katarzyna Iwińska (eds.) *Krajobraz społecznościowy Polska 2014*. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie CAL and Collegium Civitas, pp. 27–46.

Pospieszna, Paulina. 2014. *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Potocki, Rodger. 2008. "The National Endowment for Democracy" in *Pomoc zagraniczna – tendencje, wyzwania, doświadczenia. Raport końcowy*. Warszawa: Europejski Instytut na rzecz Demokracji.

Przewłocka, Jadwiga. 2013. *Polskie organizacje pozarządowe 2012*. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor.

Puchnarewicz, Elżbieta. 2003. "Darczyńcy – niezrozumienie kontekstu działania" in Elżbieta Puchnarewicz (ed.) *Organizacje pozarządowe w krajach rozwijających się i Europie Wschodniej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Puffer, Sheila M. and James R. Meindl. 1992. "The congruence of motives and incentives in a voluntary organisation" in *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 13, pp. 425–434.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. New Jersey: Princeton.

Quigley, Kevin F.F. 1997. *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson.

Rajak, Dinah and Jock Stirrat. 2011. "Parochial Cosmopolitanism and the power of Nostalgia" in David Mosse (ed.) *Adventures in Aidland. The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 161–176.

Raport The Economist*: Bogaci stają się bogatsi, a biedni biednieją. Można z tym skończyć*. 2012. (accessed 15.11.2014 at http://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/makroekonomia/raport-the-economist-bogaci-staja-sie-bogatsi-a-biedni-biednieja-mozna-z-tym-skonczyc/).

Raport o zaangażowaniu wolontariuszy po powrocie z misji zagranicznych. 2013. Kraków: Salezjański Wolontariat Misyjny MŁODZI ŚWIATU (accessed 19.05.2015 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/Aktualnosci2013/raport%20-wolontariusze%20-%20tresc.PDF).

Regulska, Joanna. 1998. "Building Local Democracy: The Role of Western Assistance in Poland" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 9, no 1, pp. 39–57.

Reinalda, Bob. 2001. "Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory" in Bas Arts, Math Noortmann and Bob Reinalda (eds.) *Non-State Actors in International Relations*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 11–40.

Reykowski, Janusz. 1979. *Motywacja: postawy prospołeczne a osobowość*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Rieff, David. 2002. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Riesman, David with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney. 1961/1989. *The Lonely Crowd*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Risse, Thomas. 2008. "Transnational Actors and World Politics" in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: SAGE. pp. 255–273.

Risse, Thomas. 2000. "The Power of Norms versus the Norms of Power: Transnational Civil Society and Human Rights" in Ann M. Florini (ed.) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 177–209.

Rosenau, James N. 2002. "Governance in a New Global Order" in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.) *Governing globalisation. Power, authority and global governance*. USA: Polity Press, pp. 70–84.

Rosenberg, Morris. 1979. *Conceiving the Self*. New York: Basic Books.

"Rozmowa z wiceministrem Konradem Pawlikiem". 2015. PAP (accessed 04.02.2015 at polskapomoc.gov.pl).

Rychard, Andrzej. 1993. "Społeczeństwo w transformacji: koncepcja i próba syntezy" in Andrzej Rychard and Michał Federowicz (eds.) *Społeczeństwo w transformacji. Ekspertyzy i studia*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Sadowski, Zdzisław. 1993/2005. *Transformacja i rozwój. Wybór prac*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PTE.

Salamon, Lester M, Helmut K. Anheier, Regina List, Stefan Toepler, Wojciech Sokolowski and Associates. 1999. *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.

Salamon, Lester and Wojciech Sokołowski. 2001 "Volunteering in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence from 24 Countries", Working Papers of the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no 40. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.

Schartau, Mai-Brith and Romina Rodela. 2013. "Political Culture: One of the Conditions for Participatory Governance. The case of Poland" paper discussed during the workshop *Polish Civil Society through Swedish Lenses. Mutual Learning in Practice*. Warsaw, 17.10.2013.

Schervish, Paul G. and John J. Havens. 1997. "Social participation and charitable giving: a multivariate analysis" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 8, no 3, pp. 235–260.

Schmitz, Hans Peter and Kathryn Sikkink. 2008. "International Human Rights" in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: SAGE, pp. 517–537.

Scholte, Jan Aart. 2014. "Civil Society and NGOs" in Thomas G. Weiss and Rodren Wilkinson (eds.) *International Organisation and Global Governance*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 322–334.

Scholz, Bettina R. 2015. *The Cosmopolitan Potential of Exclusive Associations. Criteria for Assessing the Advancement of Cosmopolitan Norms*. London: Lexington Books.

Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Helen Wallace. 1997. "Policies Towards Central and Eastern Europe" in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds.) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (3rd edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 353–387.

Sharkov, Damien. 2015. "Russia draws up list of 'undesirable' NGOs to be banned" in *Newsweek* 7/8/15 (accessed 04.09.2015 at http://europe.newsweek.com/russia-draws-first-list-undesirable-ngos-be-banned-329983).

Siedlecka, Ewa. 2015. "NIK: Uchodźcy integrowani tylko zasiłkiem" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13.11.2015, p. 7.

Siegel, Daniel and Jenny Yancey. 1992. *Odrodzenia społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Rozwój sektora organizacji pozarządowych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej a rola pomocy zachodniej*. Warszawa: Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Simpson, Erin. 2007. "From Inter-Dependence to Conflation: Security and Development in the Post-9/11 Era" in *Canadian Journal of Development Studies,* no 2(28), pp. 263–275.

Singleton, Royce, Bruce Straits and Margaret Straits. 1993. *Approaches to social research*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Skinner, Amy and Matt Baillie Smith. 2015. *Reconceptualising global education from the grassroots: the lived experiences of practitioners*. Brussels: DEEEP (accessed 11.12.2015 at http://deeep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/DEEEP4_QualityImpact_Report_2015_web.pdf).

Skinner, Amy. 2014. "Understandings of what it means to be a 'global citizen" (accessed 07.04.2014 at http://movement.deeep.org/com-

munity/blog/view/10382/understandings-of-what-it-means-to-be-a-global-citizen#.U0Jpjfl_vaU).

Smith, Nicholas Ross. 2011. "Europeanisation Through Socialisation? The EU's Interaction With Civil Society Organisations in Armenia" in *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratisation*, Vol. 19, no 4, pp. 385–404 (accessed 03.04.2014 at https://www.academia.edu/854758/Europeanisation_through_Socialisation_The_EUs_Interaction_with_Civil_Society_Organisations_in_Armenia).

Smoczyński, Wawrzyniec. 2009. "Myślą i rządzą" in *Polityka*, no 40 (accessed 14.04.2015 at http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/303153,1,raport-o-think-tankach.read).

Sokołowski, S. Wojciech. 2000. "The Discreet Charm of the Nonprofit Form: Service Professionals and Nonprofit Organizations (Poland 1989–1993)" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 11, no 2, pp. 141–159.

Sokołowski, S. Wojciech. 1996. "Show me the way to the next worthy deed: towards a microstructural theory of volunteering and giving" in *Voluntas*, Vol. 7, no 3, pp. 259–278.

Stanowski, Krzysztof. 2002. "Z kart historii współpracy polskich organizacji pozarządowych w III RP a partnerami zagranicznymi" in Grażyna Czubek (ed.) 2002. *Międzynarodowa działalność polskich organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.

Stark, David, Balazs Vedres and Laszlo Bruszt. 2006. "Rooted transnational publics: Integrating foreign ties and civic activism" in *Theory and Society,* no 35 (3), pp. 323–349.

Stasiak, Dorota. 2012 "'Pomiędzy', czyli gdzie? Polskie think tanki w poszukiwaniu recepty na siebie" in Tomasz Bąkowski and Jakub H. Szlachetko (eds.) *Zagadnienie think tanków w ujęciu interdyscyplinarnym.* Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG.

State of Civil Society Report 2015. 2015. CIVICUS (accessed 11.12.2015 at http://civicus.org/images/StateOfCivilSocietyFullReport2015.pdf).

Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor. 2013. *Podstawowe fakty o organizacjach pozarządowych. Raport z badania 2012.* Warszawa.

Strategia Polskiej Współpracy Na Rzecz Rozwoju. 2003. Warszawa: MSZ (accessed 13.03.2015 at http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/25bbbbef-404c-43ec-93d6-b2477645338a:JCR).

Suleiman, Lina. 2013. "The NGOs and the Grand Illusions of Development and Democracy" in *Voluntas,* Vol. 24, pp. 241–261.

Sussman, Gerald. 2010. *Branding Democracy. U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Szacki, Jerzy. 2002. *Historia myśli socjologicznej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Szacki, Jerzy. 1997. "Wstęp. Powrót idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego" in Jerzy Szacki (ed.) *Ani książę, ani kupiec: obywatel.* Kraków: ZNAK.

Szent-Iványi, Balázs and Simon Lightfoot. 2015. *New Europe's New Development Aid*. London and New York: Routledge.

Sztompka, Piotr. 1993. *The Sociology of Social Change*. UK: Oxford.

Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. USA: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work" in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, no 2, pp. 389–397 (accessed 13.11.2014 at http://people.duke.edu/~wz5/abc/tarrow.pdf).

Thakur, Ramesh. 1999. "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations" in Paul F. Diehl (ed.) The *Politics of Global Governance. International Organisations in an Independent World.* Boulder CO. and London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, pp. 247–267.

Turowski, Jan. 1993. *Socjologia Małe Struktury Społeczne*. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL.

The Economist. 2014. "Forget the 1%", 8.11.2014 (accessed 15.11.2014 at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21631129-it-001-who-are-really-getting-ahead-america-forget-1).

The European Year For Development – Citizens' Views On Development, Cooperation And Aid. Special Eurobarometer 421. 2015. European Commission (accessed 24.11.2015 at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_421_en.pdf).

The European Transition Compendium Report. 2010. European Commission (accessed 19.05.2015 at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/study-european-transition-compendium-report-20101125_en.pdf).

Thompson, Ewa M. 2010. "Whose discourse? Telling the story in post-communist Poland" in *The Other Shore*, no 1, pp. 1–15 (accessed 06.11.2013 at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~ethomp/THE%20OTHER%20SHORE,%20vol.1.pdf).

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1850/1969 *Democracy in America* (ed. by J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner). New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

Trialog. 2014a. *Trialog in the enlarged EU. 15 years supporting civil society to engage in development.* Vienna (accessed 19.02.2016 at http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/trialog_15_years_supporting_cso_to_engage_in_development.pdf).

Trialog. 2014b. *A Decade of EU13 Civil Society Participation in European Development Cooperation Projects*. Vienna (accessed 03.03.2015 at http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/a_decade_of_eu13_civil_society_participation_in_european_development_cooperation_projects.pdf).

Trialog. 2014c. A *Decade of EU13 Civil Society Participation in European Humanitarian Actions.* Vienna (accessed 03.03.2015 at http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/a_decade_of_eu13_civil_society_participation_in_european_humanitarian_actions.pdf).

Trialog. 2014d. *A Decade of EU13 Civil Society Participation in European Development Education and Awareness Raising Projects*. Vienna (accessed 03.03.2015 at http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/trialog_study_eu13_ec_dear_final.pdf).

Trialog. 2014e. *European Year for Development 2015.* Policy Digest no 10, November 2014 (accessed 03.03.2015 at http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/trialog_policy_digest_eyd2015_final.pdf).

Turner, Edward A. L. 2010. "Why Has the Number of International Non-Governmental Organisations Exploded since 1960?" in *Cliodynamics*, no 1(1), pp. 81–91 (accessed 12.10.2012 at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/97p470sx).

United Nations. 2004. *We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance. Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations – Civil Society Relations* (accessed 12.10.2012 at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/Final%20report%20-%20HLP.doc).

USAID. 2014. *The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia* (accessed 14.04.2015 at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/E%26E%202013%20CSOSI%20Final%2010-29-14.pdf).

USTAWA z dnia 16 września 2011 r. o współpracy rozwojowej. 2013 (accessed 15.01.2016 at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/Ustawa_o_wspolpracy/Ustawa%20o%20Wspolpracy%20Rozwojowej%20-%20tekst%20ujednolicony.pdf).

van Willigen, John. 2002. *Applied Anthropology: an Introduction*. Third Edition. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey.

Verhaeghe, Paul. 2014. "Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us" in *The Guardian*, 29.09.2014 (accessed 07.10.2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/29/neoliberalism-economic-system-ethics-personality-psychopathicsthic).

Wedel, Janine R. 2001. *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave.

Weisbrod. Burton A. 1977. "Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy" in Burton A. Weisbrod (ed.) *The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector. An Economic Analysis*. Toronto: Lexington Books.

Wesołowski, Włodzimierz. 1995. "The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland after Solidarity" in John A. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society. Theory, History*, *Comparison*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 110–135.

Wiełowieyski, Andrzej. 2015. "Gra o 'Solidarność'" in *Ale Historia, Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16.02.2015.

Witkowski, Jędrzej. 2015. *Dialog obywatelski w polskiej polityce rozwojowej – studium uwarunkowań*. Manuscript of PhD thesis defended at *Uniwersytet Szkoła Wyższa Psychologii Społecznej* in Warsaw.

Witkowski, Jędrzej. 2012. "Strategie organizacji pozarządowych działających na rzecz rozwoju międzynarodowego. Socjologiczna analiza kontekstu polskiego" in Galia Chimiak and Marcin Fronia (eds.) *Globalizacja a rozwój. Szanse i wyzwania dla Polski*. Warszawa: Scholar, pp. 195–217.

World Bank. 1992. *Governance and Development.* Washington: World Bank.

Wróbel, Anna. 2003. "Wspólne problemy, wspólne działania" in *Polska-Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych*. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, pp. 16–24.

Wyka, Anna. 1993. *Badacz społeczny wobec doświadczenia*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.

Zaangażowanie społeczne Polek i Polaków. Wolontariat, filantropia, 1% i wizerunek organizacji pozarządowych. Raport z badania 2013. 2014. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor (accessed 12.04.2016 at http://fakty.ngo.pl/files/wiadomosci.ngo.pl/public/civicpedia/publikacje_okladki_LAST/20140407_RAPORT_final.pdf).

Zalas-Kamińska, Katarzyna. 2016. *Polska pomoc rozwojowa – co dalej?* (accessed 11.02.216 at http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/1894856.html).

Zalas-Kamińska, Katarzyna. 2013. "The role of Polish non-governmental organisations in development aid and the Polish model of public diplomacy" in Heather Allan and Simona Gembická (eds.) *International Conference Booklet 10 years of SlovakAid: A Vision Of Development Cooperation For A Changing World*. Bratislava: Slovakia, pp. 169–178 (accessed 24.03.2015 at http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/data/files/Booklet_SA_2013.pdf).

Ziółkowski, Marek. 2015. "Fulfilled promises and unexpected results: Solidarity's double-edged legacy" in Andrzej Rychard and Gabriel Motzkin (eds.) *The Legacy of Polish Solidarity. Social Activism, Regime Collapse, and Building of a New Society.* Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, pp. 115–133.

Znaniecki, Florian. 1968. *The Method of Sociology*. New York: Octagon Books.

Zych, Katarzyna. 2016. "Afrykański sen" in *Echo z Afryki i innych kontynentów*, Vol. 5, pp. 18–21.

This book addresses the important and so far under-researched problem of the emergence of the sector of non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) and their impact on Poland's foreign policy. In view of her research experience and involvement in these issues, the author has the competences required to address these topics.

The cooperation between NGDOs and the respective state institutions is regarded as a significant aspect of the Polish model of development assistance. The life experience of Polish NGDO activists, their professionalism, but also the legacy of "Solidarity", the lack of colonial heritage and the neutral image of the country represent our comparative advantage in development cooperation. Poland has the potential to play a more important role in development cooperation than her economic capacity would suggest, given the nation's lack of imperial past, its positive record in striving after freedom and strong NGO sector,

The author is right to point at the relationship between NGOs' role and overall trends, like the decreasing role of government in all areas of life. The importance of the ethos of the Polish NGO sector for processes addressed in this book is likewise accounted for. One should positively assess the proposed explanation whereby the emergence and consequent moulding of Polish aid is considered a socio-cultural phenomenon closely related to the origins of Polish civil society. In a similar vein, the geographical focus of this assistance on our eastern neighbours cannot be rationalised by geo-political factors only, but should be explained by the organisational culture of the Polish NGO sector.

The overview of literature in the bibliography indicates that both Polish and foreign studies have been consulted. To sum up, the book focuses on a so far little understood segment of reality, is based on own research, goes beyond simple description, and strives after presenting the relationship between the country's involvement in development cooperation and the organisational culture of Polish NGOs. The book situates the outcomes of the research in the wider perspective of the development of civil society in Poland.

Prof. dr hab. Jerzy Bartkowski
(review)

ISBN 978-83-7683-133-6