

*Włodzimierz Wesolowski, Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, and  
Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow*

## **Introduction: Identity, Trust, and Sociopolitical Contexts**

### **The IntUne Project**

The chapters of this volume are based on the international project *IntUne*, a euphonious acronym for *Integrated and United*, with a more telling subtitle: *A Quest for Citizenship in "Ever Closer Europe."* In the official description of this European Union-funded project, its initiators wrote: "The major aim of this research is to study the changes in the scope, nature and characteristics of citizenship presently underway as an effect of the process of deepening and enlargement of the European Union" (IntUne Project Description 2006: 3). The project focuses on how processes of integration, at both national and European levels, affect the three major dimensions of citizenship: identity, representation, and governance. The multidisciplinary nature of the project calls on scholars and practitioners from different fields of study: political science, sociology, social psychology, linguistics, public policy, media, and communication.

The project was conducted under the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6) designed to study citizenship in the context of European Union expansion (Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421)).<sup>1</sup> Coordinated by the University of Siena, Italy, it was composed of several collaborating institutions from across Europe.<sup>2</sup> Maurizio Cotta was project coordinator, Pierangelo Isernia was project deputy coordinator, Elisabetta De Giorgi was project manager.

The IntUne project employed a multimethod strategy for data gathering and analysis, comprising surveys of public opinion from elites and the general public, official documents produced by the elites, and a content analysis of television and

newspaper news and reports. In this volume the authors explore only one kind of IntUne primary data: from surveys of elites and the general public. The first wave of interviews was carried out in 2007, the second wave—a replication of the same questionnaire among the same categories of respondents—in 2009. For the data description, see the Appendix at the end of this volume.

Of the sixteen countries participating in the IntUne project, some are “old” countries of the European Union and some are “new”—countries of the West as well as newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe. Admission of new members to the European Union was a hot topic during the IntUne planning stage in 2006. This was a time of high optimism, a sanguinity that influenced the project title and the phrasing of its goals and research agenda.<sup>3</sup> People expected the EU’s gradual political evolution to lead—in small, confident steps—to ever higher stages of unification. Today we are more aware of national, international, and even world-system obstacles in the progress toward a more integrated Europe. Yet, IntUne maintains its diagnostic significance, and the issues raised in this research have enduring value.

The IntUne project involves, directly and indirectly, research questions designed to reveal the dynamics of European integration, focusing on “formative attitudes” toward further advancement of the unification process of an “Ever Closer Europe.” This begs the question: Is there, among the elites or among the masses, a substantial potential for integration? The idea that this potential could be revealed and estimated influenced the content of the interview questionnaires, as the project planners devoted a number of items to national and European identity, trust in national and European institutions, and prospects for further integration. This volume is not limited to these issues; it extends to parliamentarians’ aspirations and their opinions on matters discussed in the EU context, such as the protection of women’s political participation and the treatment of immigrants.

At the outset, we designed the edited volume to maximize substantive and methodological diversity by deliberately placing few constraints on the authors. The main constraint was that Poland must figure prominently in the theory and empirical analyses, either as a focal or comparative point, and also in light of its unique place as both a post-communist country and EU member. In addition, we encouraged authors to use a comparative framework, across time and/or across nations, and statistical techniques suitable to survey data analysis. As a result, the book contains a diverse collection of social science studies about competing national and European influences on Poland and EU policy.

## **National Elites: Parliamentarians as Representative Leadership**

The IntUne project intended to include national elites that could be considered crucial for European integration. In the first wave in 2007, interviews were conducted with members of national parliaments and with members of top business circles. Two years later, in 2009, in addition to the parliamentarians, representatives of mass media and trade unions were also interviewed. In both waves, parliamentarians constituted the major sample, a relatively large one.

In this volume, the political elite is restricted to parliamentarians, treated as representative leadership.<sup>4</sup> A parliamentary body forms “the intersection point of two sets of relations: on the one side, relations with society (the input side), on the other side, the decision-making processes of democracy and their outcomes (the output side)” (Best and Cotta 2000: 9). The approach adopted by the IntUne researchers is structural and functional. It is structural because it links legislators with polity and focuses on the positions in society that reflect past, and direct future, political action. The approach is also functional because political elite refers to those who perform the management tasks of common ordinary affairs in specific societies. A high level of expertise and responsibility is treated as a necessary condition for the satisfactory fulfillment of such tasks. Although restricting the political elite to parliamentarians within the structural and functional approach narrows the focus, it also has a great advantage: the population is delineated in an exacting manner.

## **Three types of comparisons**

The IntUne project offers three types of comparisons, which are applied in this volume, where relevant, to the Polish case:

- (1) Political elite vs. general public comparison. In what ways and to what extent are political elite and mass opinions similar in attitudinal orientation?
- (2) Cross-country comparison. In what ways and to what extent does Poland differ from other countries in this regard?
- (3) Time-comparison. To what extent did the results change between 2007 and 2009?

The IntUne project planners surmised that differences in perceptions and opinions between the elites and the general public are crucial. Any collective action on the state level requires some agreement between the rulers and the ruled: a weak agreement could reinforce a weak legitimization of the regime; harmonious perceptions of opportunities and benefits brought by EU membership likely influence the pace and direction of European integration.

Attention to the intercountry differences is grounded in the belief of a deep divide between Western Europe, on the one hand, and Central and Eastern Europe, on the other. Their histories are very different, a fact that influences the “delayed” entry of Central and Eastern countries into the process of European integration, and, perhaps, differences in current elite and mass attitudes toward further European unification.

Let us briefly consider the origins and impact of the divergent historical paths of Eastern and Western Europe. Since the beginning of the fifteenth century, a fast-spreading market economy coupled with rapidly growing cities led to a new, dynamic capitalist economy. For some European countries, this also led to higher standards of living. For all, this was the bellwether of great strife and wars of domination by states seeking world-power status. During this time of radical social change, democratic transformations appeared to be the most beneficial for ordinary people—the “masses”—and other ideological breakthroughs occurred in the outlook on the new world order.

Central and Eastern Europe participated in these processes only in a limited way. A few powerful imperia, for which the most important thing was to protect their nondemocratic regimes, ruled many conquered nationalities. Although the masses of these “dependent” countries yearned for national independence and democratic regimes, European cultural and political heritage was distorted by the domineering powers and new totalitarian ideologies.

While the view that Central and Eastern Europe is “different” from Western Europe is fully justified and brings out certain interpretive issues, historical divergence itself does not lead to a single, obvious explanation for the divergent attitudes toward European integration and unification. We suggest two opposite lines of reasoning.

The first one refers to the early troublesome experience of small and mid-size nations of Central and Eastern Europe in dealing with their larger, stronger, superpower-status-seeking neighbors. This experience seems to be the original source of Central and East European aversion to supranational and interstate political organisms, potentially also of the European Union. The Central and East European newcomers might suspect the EU hierarchy of protecting, now and forever, the interests and aspirations of their “largest” members.

The second line is quite different. After World War II, the large states clearly rejected domination and the use of force within Europe, and sought instead to encourage confidence and trust through declarations of building a peaceful world order. Instead of wars and longing for dominance among the powerful member countries, the European Union became a guarantor of peaceful compromise. As a consequence, the EU also guarantees the sovereignty of midsize

and small countries, protecting them from military or political domination by “old” Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, this way of thinking focuses on the benefits of the European Union and serves as an argument for integration and unification.

With IntUne data, the time comparison is limited to only two time cross-sections: 2007 and 2009. The first of these years ends the period of admission of “new” Europe to the EU structures. In 2004 the three Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU; two years later, Romania and Bulgaria did. Most of these countries are represented in the IntUne project: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

When analyzing time changes, it is important to note that new parliamentary elections took place in the period between two waves of the IntUne project in most of the countries covered in the study. Only in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, and Slovakia was the sample of parliamentarians drawn from the same list. In other countries, the list differed between waves, although some may appear on both lists.

In 2008, all over Europe stock markets fell and large financial institutions collapsed or were bought out. The economic crises became apparent even in the wealthiest countries. Thus, looking at the IntUne data, we can ask a question concerning the extent to which the economic crises affected the elites and the general public in their thinking about and attitudes toward European integration.

The phrase, “Polish political elite in comparative perspective,” used in the subtitle of this volume, has a different meaning in each of the contributions to this volume and provides readers with a variety of approaches. Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński (Chapter 2), in their analysis of national and European identity, focus on the elite vs. general public comparison, although they also comment on the extent to which the results for Poland are similar to those obtained for other countries. Justyna Nyćkowiak (Chapter 3) devotes her attention to the issue of effects of Polish parliamentarians’ careers on their attitudes in two time instances, 2007 and 2009. The same time contrast is used by Katarzyna Walentynowicz-Moryl (Chapter 4) in her investigation of aspirations held by Polish parliamentarians regarding the European Union. Jacek Haman’s (Chapter 5) study of trust in political institutions centers on Polish elites vs. Polish general public comparisons but, in addition, comments on differences between “Poland and the rest of Europe.” In presenting the relationships between identity, trust, and social policies, Sandra Marquart-Pyatt (Chapter 6) uses a framework similar to Haman’s, focusing on the Polish case. Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Dorota Woroniecka’s study (Chapter 7) contains some comparisons of the IntUne 2009

data on Polish parliamentarians with a similar set of non-IntUne data for 2005, regarding opinions on gender quotas. Carolyn Smith Keller (Chapter 8) analyzes, in cross-national perspective, the opinions of Polish parliamentarians on immigration. Bogdan W. Mach (Chapter 9) deals with the opinions of parliamentarians and the mass supporters of two major political parties in Poland, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, on specific political issues pertaining to the European Union. Finally, Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Irina Tomescu-Dubrow (Chapter 10), using the IntUne data for 2009 as well as data from other sources, apply an international framework.

Contributions to this volume differ with respect to both methodology and substance. In terms of methodology, the common ground is a comparative perspective—“elite–masses,” cross-national, or temporal—in which the issue of equivalence of indicators and constructs is particularly important.<sup>5</sup> In substantive terms, although the contributions differ with respect to coverage, “identity” and “trust” placed in their sociopolitical contexts constitute the core of the volume.

## Identity

During the routines of everyday life, identity often goes unnoticed. One senses one’s identity, is aware of “being oneself,” in social situations when an individual suddenly feels apart from others. At that moment, one feels strongly connected with the group of people one thinks of as “we,” or “us.” Beyond “us” is “them.” “We” may feel indifferent, or distant, or even conflicted with “them.” A feeling of continuity of one’s own identity, or one’s own life experience, or one’s own personality, manifests itself in the deep conviction that one is a permanent member of a group. Group stability reaffirms this continuity of “me” just as it reaffirms the continuity of “us.”<sup>6</sup>

In Europe, the nation as a cultural unit or an organized state is a strong reference framework for “we” and “us.” The creation of a European Union provoked discussions of supranational and super-state identities. Would a single European identity emerge? If so, would it replace national identity or complement it?

The IntUne project initiators assumed the existence of national vs. European identity, intending to compare each identity type for political elites and the general public. Tables 1 and 2 present these differences for Poland, for the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, and for Western and Southern Europe, 2007–2009.<sup>7</sup>

**Table 1.** National Identity Among Political Elites and Mass Publics in Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, and Western and Southern Europe, 2007 and 2009

In your view, how important is each of the following to being a [national]? <sup>c</sup>	Year	Poland		Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup>		Western and Southern Europe <sup>b</sup>	
		Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public
		Percentage of those who responded “important” <sup>c</sup>					
To be a Christian	2007	76.2	74.3	44.1	59.3	27.3	49.2
	2009	72.6	68.1	40.4	59.1	27.2	43.6
To share [country’s] cultural traditions	2007	98.8	93.5	95.9	87.9	82.5	86.6
	2009	98.8	91.5	94.7	88.1	84.0	84.5
To be born in [country]	2007	77.5	82.2	52.5	75.2	48.6	64.6
	2009	72.6	77.4	51.4	75.7	49.5	64.5
To have [national] parents	2007	86.2	83.6	68.2	79.4	51.7	62.8
	2009	89.3	80.0	63.8	79.7	51.1	61.9
To respect the [national] laws and institutions	2007	94.9	93.2	93.0	92.1	96.4	94.6
	2009	97.6	92.1	95.1	92.1	94.7	95.0
To feel [national]	2007	93.8	97.0	94.0	93.1	86.1	86.9
	2009	100.0	94.6	92.6	92.2	87.9	86.9
To master the language(s) of the country	2007	89.9	97.3	89.0	94.1	92.2	94.2
	2009	95.3	95.8	89.1	92.7	93.5	93.6

<sup>a</sup>We include the following countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia.

<sup>b</sup>We include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>c</sup>The questionnaire item reads: “People differ in what they think it means to be [national]. In your view, how important is each of the following to being [national]?” The table displays the percentages of those who responded “very important” or “somewhat important” on a standard four-point scale.

Table 2. European Identity Among Political Elites and Mass Publics in Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, and Western and Southern Europe, 2007 and 2009

In your view, how important is each of the following to being a European? <sup>c</sup>	Year	Poland		Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup>		Western and Southern Europe <sup>b</sup>	
		Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public
		Percentage of those who responded “important” <sup>c</sup>					
To be a Christian	2007	64.6	61.0	35.4	43.0	28.0	38.8
	2009	59.0	51.7	30.0	42.5	19.9	37.3
To share European cultural traditions	2007	92.5	81.1	94.0	77.2	72.4	71.7
	2009	91.7	77.8	90.7	70.5	79.0	70.5
To be born in Europe	2007	64.6	74.6	44.6	67.6	51.6	60.0
	2009	57.6	69.6	41.3	67.8	43.5	59.9
To have European parents	2007	72.2	67.8	47.0	66.1	47.8	54.0
	2009	62.4	63.9	41.6	67.4	42.5	54.3
To respect the European Union’s laws and institutions	2007	85.9	86.9	94.0	88.8	84.1	88.0
	2009	88.2	86.5	92.5	86.1	92.5	88.3
To feel European	2007	98.7	84.9	95.5	84.8	85.2	75.0
	2009	96.4	84.0	93.3	83.7	92.1	74.9
To master a European language	2007	88.5	86.5	90.1	85.3	83.0	88.9
	2009	91.6	84.3	86.9	82.3	92.7	88.1

<sup>a</sup>Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia.

<sup>b</sup>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>c</sup> The questionnaire item reads: “People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following to being a European?” For the general public, the question is, “And for being truly European, how important do you think each of the following is...?” For the general public in the item “To respect the European Union’s Laws and Institutions,” the word “laws” is replaced with “norms.” The table displays the percentages of those who responded “very important” or “somewhat important” on a standard four-point scale.

As regards national identity, there are large differences between political elites and the general public. Across regions and time, political elites and masses differ



most in assessing how important certain factors are for national identity: “being Christian,” being born in a given country, and having parents who originate from this country. Elites less frequently consider these identity markers important. For example, in 2009 in Central and Eastern Europe, 40 percent of the political elite considered being a Christian an important feature of national identity, while up to 59 percent of the general public felt this way. A difference of similar magnitude is found in Western and Southern Europe. Although the difference between the Polish elite and the Polish general public is much smaller, it is still significant.

The relative importance of European identity markers does not differ much from that of national identity markers. In particular, the parliamentarians and the general public in predominantly Catholic Poland are much more likely than the rest of Europe to believe that Christianity is important for both national and European identity. Another striking detail is that across all regions of Europe, the percentages for each of the identity markers are higher for national identity than for European identity. Three items—respecting laws and institutions, feeling like a national, and mastering the language—reveal very little variation across regions. And for all items, we observe a relative stability of frequencies for 2007 and 2009.

The items presented in Tables 1 and 2 are used in different ways by contributors to this volume since the issue of national and European identity is placed in specific theoretical frameworks. For example, for Shabad and Słomczyński (Chapter 2) the distinction between items pertaining to ascriptive, cultural, and civic aspects of identity is essential, while Marquart-Pyatt (Chapter 6) justifies ethnic and civic identity components, and Słomczyński and Tomescu-Dubrow (Chapter 10) employ only indicators of civic-European identity. Using either exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis, these authors identify dimensions of identity without a strong a priori preconception.

To provide a contrast we refer to Michael Bruter’s (2005) study on European identity. Bruter focuses on “political identity,” defined primarily by such “symbols” or markers as the euro, the European passport (issued by an EU member country and signed by EU authorities), the European flag and anthem, and finally, a positive attitude toward Europe Day. The selection of these symbols is meant to closely link political identity to the daily experience of ordinary people. The conclusion of Bruter’s study is straightforward: European identity already exists. People identify with the European Union as a system of relevant institutions that refer to rights, obligations, and freedoms. A problem with Bruter’s study is that the concept of European political identity is given much more attention than the concept of cultural identity.

We argue that playing down the cultural aspect in the formation of identity while stressing just its political aspect presents, at best, a partial picture of Eu-

ropean identity. In reality, a new political identity may still feed on old cultural resources. Recently, the European Commission proposed a definition of the EU's identity based on civic features that link it to the concept of democracy (Bee 2008). There is nevertheless room in this definition for invoking European cultural heritage, from philosophy to fine arts. After all, for a large majority of both parliamentarians and the general public, "to be European" means sharing European cultural traditions.<sup>8</sup>

## Trust

Items pertaining to trust in European Union institutions reveal hopes as well as anxieties regarding future European integration. Generally, the past process of integration can be viewed as a partial success story. Five years after the European Coal and Steel Community, originally formed by six countries in 1951, the successor European Economic Community was launched. The European Union, established in November 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht, was signed by sixteen countries of Western and Southern Europe. From that time the program of economic integration of Europe evolved into a program of political and cultural "integration and unity," eventually extending to Central and Eastern Europe. It is worth noting that the IntUne research project borrowed a politically charged phrase "integration and unity," although in the context of the European Union as a whole this phrase has been used more as a promise than a description of reality. Europe is still far from unity.

Nonetheless, the establishment of the European Union constitutes an important step forward in the process of European integration. Intergovernmental agreements are now supplemented by permanent EU institutions, in particular, the European Parliament and the European Commission. In the IntUne project an interest in trust in these institutions is reflected in the questionnaire items. In Table 3 we provide basic information on trust in both the European Parliament and the European Commission on the part of political elites and masses in Poland, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western and Southern Europe.<sup>9</sup>

In 2007 and 2009 in Western and Southern Europe the elites, on average, trusted the European Parliament and the European Commission more than the general public did. In Central and Eastern Europe the opposite occurred: the masses were more trustful than the elites, with the exception of trust in the European Parliament in 2009. Generally, as Table 3 shows, for both elites and the general public the measure of trust in all subpopulations is above the midpoint of the scale. This is an important result in view of criticism of the European Parlia-

ment and European Commission as inefficient and overbureaucratized entities. Elites and the general public trusted these institutions even when the economic crisis materialized.

Table 3. Trust in European Parliament and European Commission Among Political Elites and the General Public in Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, and Western and Southern Europe, 2007 and 2009

Personal trust <sup>c</sup>	Year	Poland		Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup>		Western and Southern Europe <sup>b</sup>	
		Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public
		Mean values <sup>c</sup>					
European Parliament	2007	5.10	6.64	5.64	6.24	6.40	6.13
	2009	5.31	6.39	5.84	5.49	6.35	6.02
European Commission	2007	5.08	6.78	5.54	6.16	5.56	6.34
	2009	5.24	6.60	5.60	5.64	5.50	6.22

<sup>a</sup>Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia.

<sup>b</sup>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>c</sup>The questionnaire item reads: “On a scale of 0–10, how much do you personally trust in each of the following EU institutions to usually make the right decisions. 0 means that you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.” For the general public, the question is essentially the same but the scale ranges from 1 to 10. The table displays adjusted mean values for the common scale.

European democracy, whether in the national or EU context, depends significantly on the extent to which ordinary citizens trust each other and the institutions that govern them. Haman (Chapter 5) finds that, in comparison with the countries of old Europe, the general public in Poland and its sister states of the former communist bloc score low on all dimensions of trust, whether interpersonal or trust in democratic institutions at home or abroad. Haman also finds that populations in countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 usually have greater trust in EU institutions and attribute greater levels of competence to EU decision makers than in their home countries. While in Poland the “trust gap” between national and EU institutions is both large and stable, the trust gap between old and new Europe becomes smaller.

The trust gap can also be conceptualized as one between elites and masses. Sandra Marquart-Pyatt (Chapter 6) investigates the foundations and policy consequences of identity and trust for the Polish elite and the masses. She categorizes two types of national and European identity, ethnic and civic, and finds that Polish elites and masses are similar across these dimensions. While some determinants are also similar for these dimensions—in particular, religiosity is important for both—notable differences exist: education and leftism are critical factors for ethnic identity, while age matters for civic identity. Consequences are measured by support for policies that strengthen the role of the EU in Europe and trust in the national and European institutions that govern them. Here, the differences between the masses and elites, and for different identity dimensions, are apparent: for the masses, ethnic Polish national identity negatively influences support and institutional trust, while civic Polish national identity has a positive influence on support, but constitutes an insignificant factor in the case of trust. Simultaneously, for Polish political elites, neither national nor European identity affects support for policies, and only European identity shows some influence on institutional trust.

Chapter 10, by Słomczyński and Tomescu-Dubrow, focuses on the relationship between the extent to which democracies are developed, on the one hand, and European identity and trust in European institutions, on the other. Assuming that individuals are “nested” in countries of varying degrees of democracy, the authors performed hierarchical linear modeling and found that democracy does matter for trust in political European institutions. People living in countries that score higher on the index of democracy (published by the Economist Intelligence Unit) tend to be more trustful of European institutions than those who live in countries that score lower on this index. It was also found that European identity is conducive to trust in European institutions.

One could argue that, due to the actual and perceived behavior of EU institutions, trust in them would be universally low. Many observers voice concerns about the European Commission as an overbureaucratized organization. In addition, instead of the originally planned European Constitution, the EU was only able to enact the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced a very complex system of decision making by prime ministers of member states and created the positions of president of the whole EU and foreign minister, both of relatively weak power. The context of the Treaty of Lisbon matters: reluctance toward building a “super-state government” emerged at the time of economic crisis, a time that prioritized the decisions made by prime ministers of member states over those made by the EU agencies. Consequently, the EU decided to bail out the government of Greece as well as to approve national retrenchment activities by the governments of member states supporting national companies and banks. These events

demonstrated that, despite expectations to the contrary, the process of European integration is proceeding on a long, bumpy road.

## **Sociopolitical contexts**

### ***Elites and their attitudes and aspirations***

Noting that between 1985 and 2007, more than 800 Polish parliamentarians served at least two terms, Nyćkowiak (Chapter 3) examines how different professional career pathways—that is, political and nonpolitical career characteristics—influence Polish political elite support for policies that strengthen the role of the EU in Europe. She finds that the fact of having been a business owner or manager before becoming a parliamentarian strengthens this support, while having held a top governmental position weakens it. Moreover, support depends more on current activities than on political experience prior to becoming a parliamentarian. Walentynowicz-Moryl (Chapter 4) finds that between 2007 and 2009, the percentage of those who aspired to an EU career decreased. While characteristics of the Polish political elite such as level of education, knowledge of foreign languages, personal experience abroad, and professional contacts abroad improved, their effect on EU career aspiration differed by IntUne wave year: in 2007, education and knowledge of foreign languages shaped aspirations, while in 2009, it was personal experience and professional contacts abroad.

Nyćkowiak places these findings in context: between 2007 and 2009, the percentage of those holding a top governmental position prior to being a parliamentarian doubled, the percentage of those holding an executive position increased substantially, and the percentage of those who had never before been a parliamentarian decreased. Overall, Nyćkowiak and Walentynowicz-Moryl show that from a variety of career paths, in Poland a stable, professional political elite has emerged, which increasingly prefers to influence the EU from the outside rather than from the inside.

### ***Attitudes Toward Gender Inequality and Immigrant Discrimination***

In planning the Polish part of the IntUne study on parliamentarians, the investigators at the Polish Academy of Sciences decided to add some items to the common international questionnaire, specifically items that deal with gendered political inequality in Poland. The reason for including additional items on gender quota is grounded in the recent historical situation. Since the fall of communism in 1989, the proportion of women in the Polish parliament ranged from a low of 9 percent to a “high” of 20.4 percent. Of the major political parties during this time, only

two had a partisan gender quota. Since 2004, Poland has been officially, but not necessarily wholeheartedly, part of EU gender mainstreaming policy designed to enhance women's representation and influence how European organizations approach gender parity.

Dubrow and Woroniecka (Chapter 7) investigate these factors in a study of the determinants of Polish parliamentary support for gender equality and gender quotas. They ask: Do Europeanist orientation and contact with EU institutions and European interest groups influence opinions on gender equality in parliament and gender quotas? Are these factors as important as the gender and political ideology of the parliamentarian? Dubrow and Woroniecka find that while women were far more likely to support gender equality in the parliament, when accounting for political ideology, they were no more likely than men to support party gender quotas. By themselves, leftism and strong Europeanist orientation lead to support for equality and quotas, but Europeanist orientation is not significant when accounting for gender and political ideology. European contacts are positively associated with pro-equality, but not with pro-quota, attitudes. Between 2005 and 2007, support for parity remained stable across two different parliaments while support for quotas decreased. Overall, Dubrow and Woroniecka show that Poland's deepening involvement with the EU has yet to fast-track women's political equality.

If the future of the EU depends on a shared European identity (see Shabad and Słomczyński, Chapter 2), what is the role of immigration from outside the EU? As the European Union expands eastward and the aftershocks of the economic crisis continue, the political elite's perceptions concerning immigrants are among the critical factors that will shape the future. Examining political elites in twelve EU countries, Smith Keller (Chapter 8) investigates the micro- and macro-level factors that influence their views on immigration from non-EU countries. Smith Keller finds that 40 percent of all political elites see immigration as a threat. Also, when examining gender differences, she finds that women's participation in parliament extends beyond standing up for women: women are less likely than men to view immigration from non-EU countries as a threat. Using multilevel models, Smith Keller shows that, even accounting for the East/West divide, party affiliation matters: parliamentarians from centrist and leftist parties are less likely to consider non-EU immigration a threat. As Croatia, Turkey, and Ukraine seek EU membership, their future may depend on women from parties of the political left and center.

### ***European Integration and the Division Among Poland's Major Political Parties***

A useful gauge of how post-accession Poland contends with competing national and European influences is the power struggle between its two major rival political parties: Law and Justice and Civic Platform. As the conflict involves questions concerning Poland's role in the EU, the outcome of this struggle has wide-ranging implications. Mach (Chapter 9) investigates this conflict by asking three critical questions: (1) How different are Law and Justice and Civic Platform in their party platforms? (2) How much do their political elites differ in opinion on the EU, and how have these opinions changed over time? and (3) To what extent has the political scene become polarized?

Through a creative analysis of party platforms and IntUne data, Mach concludes that many of the differences between Law and Justice and Civic Platform with respect to the EU are real and growing, but the interparty gap is based not on the issue of European integration in general, but on the details of how it will proceed. Polarization among the lawmakers is stronger than among those who voted for them. Moreover, the growing negative attitudes of Law and Justice lawmakers toward further unification increasingly push them away from their electorate. However, the Civic Platform legislators, by promoting the placement of Polish foreign affairs at the EU level, also increase their ideological distance from their supporters. In light of the domination of the Polish political scene by these two rival titans, what Law and Justice and the Civic Platform parliamentarians and their party supporters think matters more for domestic policy than for further integration with the EU.

### ***IntUne Project and the Future of the European Union***

The European Union came into existence as a pragmatic organ of cooperation between states whose histories are filled with conflict and intra-Europe domination. In the 1990s it was reasonable to assume that gradual steps, small but persistent, were a good way of developing, coordinating, and broadening interstate cooperation. Politicians correctly interpreted prevailing social attitudes and adequately defined the potential for supranational political organisms in the contemporary world. However, at present, the leaders and technocrats of the "European project" are not so future-oriented. Moreover, an additional serious disadvantage is that leaders are reluctant to answer the troublesome question "where do we go from here?"

IntUne data on parliamentarians and the general public include items on four possible developments in the European Union a decade from now: (1) a unified

tax system for Europe, (2) a common system of social security, (3) a single foreign policy, and (4) more help for regions experiencing economic difficulties. Table 4 presents the data for Poland, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western and Southern Europe.

Table 4. Attitudes Toward the Future of the European Union Among Political Elites and the General Public in Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, and Western and Southern Europe, 2007 and 2009

The character of the European Union in ten years <sup>c</sup>	Year	Poland		Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup>		Western and Southern Europe <sup>b</sup>	
		Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public	Political elite	Mass public
		Percentage of those in favor <sup>c</sup>					
A unified tax system for Europe	2007	57.0	67.1	58.5	50.8	60.8	54.8
	2009	55.4	62.3	55.3	54.2	56.6	54.5
A common system of social security	2007	65.0	83.0	73.7	71.6	68.9	69.4
	2009	65.5	77.8	77.7	70.9	61.9	69.9
A single foreign policy	2007	73.8	75.2	86.3	69.4	87.2	68.8
	2009	87.1	71.9	85.5	71.0	84.2	67.7
More help for regions with difficulties	2007	98.8	89.9	96.5	85.1	87.6	81.6
	2009	97.6	86.3	95.8	84.2	84.4	82.4

<sup>a</sup>Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia.

<sup>b</sup>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>c</sup>The questionnaire item reads: “Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years, are you in favor of or against the following...?” The table displays the percentages of those who responded “strongly in favor” or “somewhat in favor” on a standard five-point scale.

The most striking result presented in Table 4 is that the majority of parliamentarians and the masses favor each of four possible features of the European Union in ten years. Differences between parliamentarians and the masses pertain to specific decisions that the EU would yet have to make if it intends to keep proceeding toward higher levels of integration. In Western and Southern Europe, members of the political elite are more frequently in favor of a unified tax system, a single foreign policy, and more help for regions with economic difficulties than the general public. Poland differs from this pattern while the rest of Central and



Eastern Europe is essentially similar to Western and Southern Europe. This “special case” of Poland is evident in the item “a common system of social security” where parliamentarians support this solution considerably less frequently than the masses, while in the rest of Europe the intergroup differences are small. In general, however, the results reveal a positive climate for a businesslike discussion on the further development of the European Union.

In a sense, agreement between parliamentarians and the masses comes as a surprise because the usual view considers the political elite as leading the masses toward European integration. However, parliamentarians as a chosen body also reflect the opinions of their electorate. In addition, there are various reasons for the social cohesion built into European tradition, which overcome differences stemming from location in the social structure. Consensus on the “European issues” is a learned lesson because the project of integrated Europe is juxtaposed to a Europe divided and torn by wars. In Poland strong pro-European integration attitudes were present before accession to the European Union.<sup>10</sup>

We end this introduction with more questions than answers regarding the relationship between the general public and the elite. It seems that building democratic forms of participation across state borders and improving state economic systems should be a tremendous impulse reviving the whole European *demos*. Yet, currently politicians prefer “demoses” on the scale of each country. Is the creation of one European *demos* and one pool of candidates to the European Parliament too risky for national political elites?

Central and East Europeans enjoy receiving subsidies and living in a peaceful Europe. Many are happy with relatively unrestricted travel throughout Europe and enjoy access to the job market in other countries and regions of Europe. What kinds of political and economic crises could disrupt this happiness? Under what conditions can EU political elites ensure that ordinary people will accept European “integration and unity?” And will the leadership for further “integration and unity” come from Poland, Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, or the West?

## Notes

1. FP6 is a financial instrument for the funding of projects to establish a European Research Area, described as a European internal market for science and technology. Funding allotment for such projects is in the “tens of millions of euros” (European Union Sixth Framework Programme).
2. To coordinate the research project, IntUne held twenty meetings, starting October 2005 at the University of Siena. The last conference took place in Brussels, Belgium, in November 2009; <http://www.intune.it/misc/events> (accessed May 17, 2010).

3. The IntUne project followed large-scale research supported by the European Commission (EURONAT 2004).
4. Arguments on the importance of parliamentarians as political elites is well presented in Norris (1997). Recruitment processes are described in Best and Cotta (2000); see also Olson and Crowther (2002). On the formation of the Polish political elite, see Wesołowski (1997).
5. This issue is not thoroughly discussed in particular chapters because the authors have discussed it in the working papers, which demonstrated the high level of equivalence of their indicators and constructs. Due to the redundancy of these conclusions, we have omitted them in this volume (with the exception of Chapter 5 by Jacek Haman). On this issue, see Harknes et al. (2010).
6. See Gellner (1987), Taylor (1992), Smith (1991), and Boksański (2002); for review of research on identity formation, see Cerulo (1997).
7. In the IntUne project, the questionnaire items capture two aspects of identity: affective and cognitive. The *affective* component pertains to the *degree* to which individuals feel “attached” to a particular collectivity. The *cognitive* component pertains to what individuals regard as *constitutive* of being “a Pole” and “a European” (for elaboration on this distinction, see Chapter 2 by Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński). In this chapter, we comment only on the cognitive component of national and European identity. For a general work on the relationship between national and European identity, see Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004); Karolewski and Kaina (2007); Checkel and Katzenstein (2009); also Duchesne and Frogner (2008); Carem (2007); and Pichler (2008).
8. Edensor (2002) examines how national identity is represented, performed, and materialized through popular culture and in everyday life. Some of his arguments apply to European identity as well.
9. The IntUne questionnaire for parliamentarians also included an item on the European Council. Table 3 does not contain this item because there are no data for the general public. Within the IntUne project some papers deal with trust directly: Abts, Heerwegh, and Swyngedouw (2009); Segatti (2007).
10. For evidence, see, for example, Mach (1998); Grabowska, Kosęła, and Szawiel (1998); Słomczyński and Shabad (2003); Skotnicka-Illasiewicz (2009).

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