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PHILOSOPHY IN THE TIME OF REVOLUTION

By **MARCI SHORE**

*This text explores the problem of alienation during the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. It discusses Hegelianism, Husserlian phenomenology, and Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky's idea of *ostranenie* [ostranenie, estrangement, defamiliarization] as attempts to resolve the problem of the distance between consciousness and being, of the subject's lack of connection to the world. Both Husserl and Shklovsky believed that alienation could be remedied through a purer, more vivid form of seeing. Could revolution be understood as an experience of ostranenie?*

Key words: Bolshevik Revolution, alienation, phenomenology, ostranenie [остранение], Hegel, pure seeing, Hegel, epistemological question

Petrograd, 1917. *Ten Days That Shook the World*. 'Adventure it was,' writes John Reed, 'and one of the most marvelous mankind even embarked upon, sweeping into history at the head of the toiling masses, and staking everything on their vast and simple desires.'¹

What was 'everything'?

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Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud agreed on little. What they did agree on, though, was profound: Man was unhappy in the modern world. He was unhappy by virtue of his alienation not only from the world, but also from himself. Thinkers as different as Hegel, Marx, Freud, Kafka, Lukács, Heidegger, and Arendt shared an understanding that the great problem of modernity was the problem of alienation. Modern philosophy was preoccupied with our estrangement from our own world, with our inability to ever fully know it. For Freud the problem went deeper: not only could we never fully know the world, but moreover we could never even fully know our own selves. The self was hidden from the self. What mattered most, Freud told us, was precisely what was concealed from consciousness. 'What have I in common with Jews? I have hardly anything in common with myself,' wrote Franz Kafka in January 1914.²

¹ John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 13.

² Franz Kafka, *The Diaries of Franz Kafka 1914-1923*, ed. Max Brod (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 11.

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The problem – Hannah Arendt believed – dated at least to Immanuel Kant, who destroyed the classical identity of thought and Being, thus rendering us bereft of anything to hold onto and any home in the world.³ Good intentions notwithstanding, Kant left us with a gaping abyss between the *Ding-an-sich* and the world as it appeared to us. The *Ding-an-sich* was, and would forever be, beyond the reach of Kant's '*Ich denke*.' How could we feel at home in a world that would ever remain at a distance?

Enlightenment rationality, with its promise of empirical groundedness in the natural world, ultimately failed to resolve the crisis of homelessness. To the young Emmanuel Levinas, who spent his childhood during the First World War in Kaunas and Kharkov, it felt as if 'the ascent of science toward the regions of pure objects [wa]s equivalent to a leap into nothingness.'⁴ Georg Lukács and his fellow members of Sunday Circle, young intellectuals in early twentieth-century Budapest, suffered painfully the impossible distance between subject and object. Lukács longed for totality and blamed nineteenth-century positivist science for fragmentation and relativism.⁵ His friend Anna Lesznai ascribed the 'inhumanity of individualistic, capitalist society' to 'the fact that its individual members are solitary atoms whose vital relationships are not with other men, nor with nature, but with abstract institutions.'⁶

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Lukács and Levinas found two very different resolutions to the problem of alienation. Lukács found Hegel, for whom alienation had its origins in the sin of individualism. To fail to be at one with the universe, to decline to self-identify with History, was to suffer from alienation. The philosopher Jay Bernstein argues that Antigone plays such a central role in *Phenomenology of Spirit* because she does what is forbidden: she asserts the individual against the universal and thereby alienates herself from the totality. Hegel promised the resolution of *Entfremdung* in a restlessly forward-moving *Geist*. '*Das Wahre ist das Ganze*': only from the perspective of wholeness could we arrive at truth. *Geist*, proceeding dialectically onwards and upwards, would eventually bring us to seamless reconciliation of subject and object. Arendt described *Phenomenology of Spirit*

³ Hannah Arendt, 'What Is Existential Philosophy?' in *Essays in Understanding 1930-1954*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), p. 163-187, quotation p. 172.

⁴ Emmanuel Levinas, 'Freiburg, Husserl, and Phenomenology' in *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 33.

⁵ Mary Gluck tells this story movingly in *Georg Lukács and His Generation 1900-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

⁶ Qtd. in Gluck, *Georg Lukács and His Generation 1900-1918*, p. 25.

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as the last great attempt to (re)unite thought and Being and thereby 'reconstitute a world now shattered into pieces.'⁷

For Lukács, it was Marxism that made explicit how to reach Hegel's promised land of reconciliation. 'It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality,' Lukács wrote, '...the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts.'⁸ For Marx, alienation in conditions of modern capitalism took on specific, tangible forms. Work on the assembly line had resulted in 'the work of the proletarians ha[ving] lost all individual character.'⁹ 'This fragmentation of the object of production,' wrote Lukács, 'necessarily entails the fragmentation of its subject.'¹⁰ Capitalism had effected a shift from use-value to exchange value. Wage labor had reified man into a commodity, a means of exchange. 'Man's own activity, his own labour becomes something objective and independent of him,' Marx explained.¹¹ As a result, 'a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity.'¹²

Marx and Engels subjected Hegel's dialectical metaphysics to a revision inspired by Enlightenment understanding of science. For Marx, both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat experienced the self-alienation caused by reification. The difference was that the bourgeoisie seemed not to mind and in fact felt comfortably affirmed, whereas the proletariat 'feels itself destroyed by this alienation and sees in it its own impotence and the reality of an inhuman existence.'¹³ In both cases, the problem was in some sense a technical one, engendered by the material conditions of industrial capitalism. And a technical problem allowed for a technical solution. Reconciliation could come about in only one way: the proletariat must acquire class consciousness, understand that no single problem could be solved without solving them all, rise up and overthrow the bourgeois, abolish private property, and eventually establish a classless society free of exploitation, in which everyone would work according to his ability and receive according to his need. At this point freedom and necessity, the 'is' and the 'ought,' subject and object would all be exquisitely synthesized. The Marxist utopia was the overcoming of all antinomies. The

⁷ Arendt, 'What Is Existential Philosophy?', p. 164.

⁸ Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), p. 27.

⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' in *Modern Europe: Sources and Perspectives from History*, ed. John S. Swanson and Michael S. Melancon (New York: Longman, 2002), p. 72-88, quotation p. 76.

¹⁰ Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 89.

¹¹ Qtd. in Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 87.

¹² Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 83.

¹³ Qtd. in Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 149.

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proletariat, Lukács believed, was destined by History to become the first 'identical subject-object of the historical process.'¹⁴

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Levinas sought a path to connect the self with the world through a phenomenology very different from Hegel's. Edmund Husserl shared Levinas's desire to revolt against the fanatical objectivity of the natural sciences: 'Positivism, in a manner of speaking, decapitates philosophy,' he believed.¹⁵ In Husserl's phenomenology Levinas found a method that 'wants to recover the lost world of our concrete life.'¹⁶ He was drawn by Husserl's slogan, '*Zu den Sachen selbst!*'¹⁷

'Back to experience, to seeing,' wrote Husserl in 1910.¹⁸ 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' clarified Husserl's ambition: the achievement of epistemological certitude. Husserl rejected the proverb that it was impossible to dance at two weddings at once. He wanted absolute truth – that is, he wanted both absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity. To Husserl, Kant's epistemological modesty was an existentially unbearable fatalism. Husserl's 'things' were perhaps not the same as Kant's 'things.' Understandings of just what *die Sache* were differed—the foundational questions, the physical objects in the world, our experience of these objects. Yet what mattered above all was that *die Sache* – unlike *das Ding* – was not beyond our reach.

In June 1917, during the chaotic period of 'Dual Power' following the February Revolution, the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened in Petrograd. There, with some pragmatic resignation, the Menshevik Irakli Tsereteli announced, 'В настоящий момент в России нет политической партии, которая говорила бы: дайте в наши руки власть, уйдите, мы займем ваше место.'¹⁹

¹⁴ Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 199.

¹⁵ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 9.

¹⁶ Levinas, 'Freiburg, Husserl, and Phenomenology,' p. 37.

¹⁷ 'Wir wollen auf die 'Sachen selbst' zurückgehen.' Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), p. 6.

¹⁸ Edmund Husserl, 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 71-147, quotation p. 96; Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009), p. 24. Originally published as 'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,' *Logos*, 1/1910-1911, p. 289-341. A Russian translation was published the same year: E. Husserl, 'Filosofiya kak stroгая nauka,' *Logos*, 1/1911.

¹⁹ 'At the present moment, there is no political party in Russia that would say: give power to us, go away, we will take your place.'

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Lenin, famously, interrupted: 'Есть такая партия!'²⁰

Lenin's 'Есть!,' while uttered in a context very different from a German university, captured the spirit of Husserl's answer to the epistemological question: Yes, we can!

Husserl's language was very visual; he was obsessed with *reines Sehen*. The task of phenomenology would involve learning to see clearly and distinctly. Its method was the 'phenomenological reduction.' This 'reduction' involved stepping outside of *die natürliche Einstellung*, the state in which we generally lived our lives, simply moving about the world without truly seeing it, un-self-reflectively assuming its existence. Instead we adopted *die phänomenologische Einstellung*, in which we put the objects of the world – including our own empirical ego – 'in brackets' (*Einklammerung*), suspending any convictions of, or skepticism about, their mind-independent reality. Once we had bracketed this realist-idealist question, we could concentrate on a precise description of our intuitions – that is, what we, as purified transcendental egos, saw.

Most of our lives we spent in the 'natural attitude,' seeing without truly seeing. 'We stand in the world as practically active beings,' wrote Adolf Reinach, Husserl's personable and gifted young assistant, shortly before the First World War. 'We see it, and yet we do not see it.'²¹ Nonetheless we could learn to *look*. What phenomenology promised was the possibility of truly seeing the world. 'And if we seek to go back to the things themselves [*die Rückkehr zu den Sachen selbst*], to pure, unobscured intuition of essences,' Reinach wrote, 'then this intuition is not meant as a sudden inspiration and illumination... it requires particular and great efforts to emerge from the distance at which we stand vis-à-vis the objects and attain a clear and distinctive apprehension of them.'²²

Reines Sehen was arduous, but possible. It was possible because consciousness was not only potentially self-conscious, but also transitive: consciousness always took an object. The very structure of consciousness was not solipsism but intentionality; and intentionality functioned as a kind of micro-teleology, or a string with a magnet attached. Consciousness was always reaching out to the world, apprehending the object. This experience of direct apprehension, of the givenness of the object, Husserl called *Evidenz*. The concept of *Evidenz*

²⁰ 'There is such a party!'

²¹ Adolf Reinach, 'Concerning Phenomenology,' trans. Dallas Willard, *The Personalist*, 1(2)/1969, p. 194-221, quotation p. 195 (lecture given in Marburg January 1914); Adolf Reinach, 'Über Phänomenologie,' in *Sämtliche Werke* Band 1: *Die Werke* (Munich: Philosophia, 1990), p. 531-550, quotation p. 531. 'Wir stehen als praktisch handelnde Wesen in der Welt – wir sehen sie und sehen sie doch auch nicht... Wir wissen, wie mühsam es ist, wirklich sehen zu lernen'; 'können wir schauen lernen' (p. 531, 532).

²² Adolf Reinach, 'Über Phänomenologie,' p. 531-550, quotation p. 550. 'und wenn wir die die Rückkehr zu den Sachen selbst anstreben, zur zur reinen, unverdeckten Intuition der Wesenheiten, so ist Intuition dabei nicht gedacht als eine plötzliche Eingebung und Erleuchtung. Ich habe es ja heute fortwährend betont; es bedarf eigener und großer Bemühungen, um aus der Fernstellung, in der wir an sich zu den Objekten stehen, herauszukommen zu ihrer klaren und deutlichen Erfassung.'

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(‘self-evidence’) was intrinsically relational. For Husserl, in the beginning was the relationship: the relationship between subject and object preceded its parts.

(Lukács, decades after the Bolshevik Revolution, described Husserl’s phenomenology as a quixotic attempt at a ‘third way’ – that is, an attempt to claim that rather than deriving subject from object or object from subject, we could begin with the fundamental relatedness of subject and object. Lukács rejected this idea: One had to choose, he insisted, between idealism and materialism.²³)

For Husserl the epistemological question was a Kierkegaardian Either/Or: either the attainment of absolute truth, or consignment to the madhouse. In his eulogy for Husserl, Lev Shestov explained that his friend had always understood the stakes as all or nothing. For Husserl, Shestov wrote, ‘[s]elf-evidence reveals the eternal structure of being, laid bare by the phenomenological reduction.’²⁴ Shestov translated Husserl’s *Evidenz* into Russian as очевидность, a translation arguably superior to the original: ‘visible to the eye’ was precisely what Husserl had in mind. Shestov himself rejected Husserl’s philosophy, yet to the end retained not only a deep respect, but also a deep empathy for Husserl’s passionate struggle to reach truth: ‘Either self-evidence is the ultimate court of appeal, at the bar of which the human spirit receives its full and definitive satisfaction, or else our knowledge is illusory and false, and sooner or later a realm of chaos and madness will appear on earth.’²⁵

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Husserl spent the years of the First World War in Germany. On the other side of the war, in Russia, literary theorist Viktor Shklovsky shared Husserl’s understanding of the natural attitude, although he did not use this phrase. ‘We do not sense the familiar, we do not see it, but recognise it,’ Shklovsky wrote in 1914. ‘We do not see the walls of our rooms, it is so hard for us to spot a misprint in a proof – particularly if it is written in a language well known to us, because we cannot make ourselves see and read through, and not ‘recognise’ the familiar word.’²⁶ Words ‘fossilize;’ fossilization deadens sensation. ‘Now we have callouses on our souls,’ Shklovsky wrote.²⁷

²³ Georg Lukács, ‘Existentialism or Marxism?’, in *Existentialism versus Marxism: Conflicting Views on Humanism*, ed. George Novack (New York: Delta, 1966), p. 133-153.

²⁴ Lev Shestov, ‘Mémorial of Husserl’, in *Russian Philosophy* vol. III, ed. James Edie, et al, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), p. 248-276.

²⁵ Shestov, ‘Mémorial of Husserl’, p. 260.

²⁶ Viktor Shklovsky, ‘The Resurrection of the Word (1914)’, trans. Richard Sherwood, *Russian Formalism: A Collection of Articles and Texts in Translation*, ed. Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), p. 41-47, quotation p. 41-42.

²⁷ Shklovsky, ‘The Resurrection of the Word’, p. 44.

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Shklovsky shared, too, Husserl's dissatisfaction with the natural attitude: the failure to see clearly was intolerable. Husserl feared the abyss of a life without certitude of truth. Shklovsky feared the abyss of nihilism – not the catastrophic nihilism of war and revolution, but rather the dull nihilism of sleepwalking: 'And so, held accountable for nothing, life fades into nothingness. Automatization eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our wives, and at our fear of war.'²⁸ It was art that could save us, that could 'restore to man sensation of the world.'²⁹ Art could redeem us from nihilism through fracturing familiarity and disrupting recognition. The language of poetry was 'difficult, 'laborious,' impeding language.'³⁰ This language jarred us, made things strange, alienated us from what had been familiar, and in this way disrupted our habitual (non)perception of the world. 'And so, in order to return sensation to our limbs, in order to make us feel objects, to make a stone feel stony,' Shklovsky wrote, 'man has been given the tool of art.'³¹ This process of making the familiar feel alien Shklovsky called *остранение*, a concept that embraced both the sickness and the cure. *Ostranenie* described a problem – our estrangement – but also the means to overcome it.

This idea of estrangement suited futurism, the literary spirit of the moment. 'The aim of Futurism,' Shklovsky wrote, 'is the resurrection of things – the return to man of sensation of the world.'³² This was especially true in revolutionary Russia. In May 1913 the Italian futurist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti had announced the slogan '*parole in libertà*': words were to be liberated from syntax. The following month Apollinaire published '*L'Antitradition Futuriste*, calling for '*mots en liberté*.'³³ The Russian futurists Aleksei Kruchenykh and Velimir Khlebnikov went a step further: they announced that the future belonged to *slovo kak takovoe*, 'the word as such.'³⁴ Now words were to be liberated not only from syntax, but also from their referents. This was just at the moment when the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure had declared that the relationship between signifier (*signifiant*) and signified (*signifié*) was an arbitrary one.³⁵ In 1919 Shklovsky's friend Roman Jakobson gave a lecture to the Moscow Linguistic Circle on Khlebnikov's poetry. Form became primary; it conditioned content. This new poetry self-consciously drew attention to its own construction through

²⁸ Viktor Shklovsky, 'Art as Device' in *Theory of Prose*, trans. Benjamin Sher (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), p. 1-14, quotation p. 5.

²⁹ Shklovsky, 'The Resurrection of the Word', p. 46.

³⁰ Shklovsky, 'Art as Device', p. 13.

³¹ Shklovsky, 'Art as Device', p. 6.

³² Shklovsky, 'The Resurrection of the Word', p. 41-42.

³³ Guillaume Apollinaire, 'L'Antitradition Futuriste', in Mary Ann Caws, *Manifesto: a century of isms* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).

³⁴ See Vladimir Markov, ed., *Manifesty i programmy russkikh futuristov* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1967), p. 53-58.

³⁵ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in on General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally, Albert Echehaye and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Roy Harris (Chicago: Open Court, 1996).

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the обнажение of the device: 'Здесь ясно осознана поэтическая задача, и именно русские футуристы являются основоположниками поэзии 'самовитого, самоценного слова,' как канонизованного обнаженного материала.³⁶ Shortly thereafter Jakobson left for Prague and articulated the Prague Linguistic Circle's thesis that '*the organizing feature of art by which it differs from other semiotic structures is an orientation toward the sign rather than toward what is signified.*'³⁷ Poetic language was language self-conscious of itself: it was words that drew attention to themselves as signifiers. The self-referentiality was intentionally unsettling.

Husserl, Shklovsky and Jakobson shared an uncanny ability to keep philosophy and literary theory in the foreground and the First War World in the background, even as they found themselves in the center of that war, even as they lost friends and family, even as the world around them went up in flames.³⁸ In other respects they were radically different personalities. Husserl was the serious German professor, with a wife who waited on him and kept order in the house. Shklovsky and Jakobson were young bohemians, filling their lives with sex and vodka and cavalier disregard for bourgeois convention. Yet their attempts to resolve the problem of alienation through an intensification of experience were remarkably close. The most striking kinship is that between Husserl's phenomenological reduction and Shklovsky's *ostranenie*. The divergent technicalities are less essential than the shared desire to affirm the reality of our experience of the world. The relationship between the 'natural attitude' and the 'phenomenological attitude' was in essence the relationship between recognition (узнавание) and seeing (видение). The aim of *ostranenie* was the aim of Husserl's bracketing: to shake us out of our habituatedness to the world, to make us self-conscious about the contents of our own consciousness, to bring us to awareness of our experience. Husserl and Shklovsky were optimists: both believed that alienation could be remedied. For Shklovsky the solution to alienation was paradoxically another kind of alienation: we must be thrown off, disoriented, shaken.

³⁶ Roman Jakobson, *Noveyshaya russkaya poeziya* (Praga: Politika, 1921), p. 9. [Here there is a clear consciousness of the poetic task, and precisely the Russian futurists have emerged as founders of the poetry of the 'self-sufficient, self-valuing word' as canonized, laid-bare material.]

³⁷ The Prague Linguistic Circle, 'Theses Presented to the First Congress of Slavic Philologists in Prague, 1929', in *The Prague School: Selected Writings, 1929-1946*, ed. Peter Steiner, trans. John Burbank et al. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 3-31.

³⁸ Viktor Shklovsky, 'Sentimental'noe puteshestvie: vospominaniia 1917-1922', in '*Eshche nichego ne konchilos' . . .*', ed. V.P. Kochetov (Moscow: Propaganda, 2002), p. 21-266. In English: Viktor Shklovsky, *A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs, 1917-1922*, trans. Richard Sheldon (Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2004); Roman Jakobson, *My Futurist Years*, ed. Beng Jangfeldt and trans. Stephen Rudy (NY: Marsilio Publishers, 1992); Roman Ingarden, 'Moje wspomnienia o Edmundzie Husserlu,' *Studia Filozoficzne*, 29, 2(183)/1981, p. 3-24. Galin Tihanov argues for the importance of the First World War in shaping Shklovsky's thought in 'The Politics of Estrangement: The Case of the Early Shklovsky,' *Poetics Today*, 26(4)/2005, p. 665-696.

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Revolution is a moment of *ostranenie*. The familiar becomes strange. Values appear as *Evidenz*, suddenly seen with disconcertingly lucidity. Time is transformed, as if one were experiencing temporality for the first time. John Reed's *Ten Days That Shook the World* remains an unsurpassed account of the Bolshevik Revolution for enabling a kind of *Nacherleben* of this jolting vividness.³⁹

In January 2014, as Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych responded to protests with violence and repression, activist Victoria Narizhna began to feel a need to do *что-то яркого*, something flamboyant, something vivid, something that could be seen clearly.⁴⁰ The protests she organized became part of the Ukrainian revolution now called by the name of the main square in Kyiv, 'Maidan.' Never in her life had she experienced the emotions she felt during those months of revolution, Victoria said, 'never. That there could at once be such astonishing joy, astonishing sensations, relationships, insights into what – as it turns out – people are capable of.'

'In revolutionary times the limits of what is possible expand a thousandfold,' wrote Lenin in 1917.⁴¹

For Jean-Paul Sartre the present was less a dimension of time than a limit, the border between the *en-soi* and the *pour-soi*. The limit of the determinate past was the border of the present, which was the moment of the beginning of the *pour-soi*. 'In contrast to the Past which is in-itself, the Present is for-itself,' he wrote.⁴² Revolution is the *obnazhenie* of this border between the *en-soi* and the *pour-soi*; it shakes us into awareness of this border-crossing, illuminates the moment when we pass from the realm of facticity into the realm of the possibility of negating facticity – that is, into the realm of transcendence. This is what Hannah Arendt calls natality.⁴³ It is a revelation of the human capacity to begin something new, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen.

³⁹ On *Nacherleben*, see Wilhelm Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics,' trans. Frederic Jameson, *The New Literary History*, 3(2)/1972, p. 229-244.

⁴⁰ I tell this story in the chapter 'Black Lizard on Red Square' in *The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), p. 190-196.

⁴¹ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 'Letters from Afar,' in *Revolution at the Gates*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2002), p. 15-55, quotation p. 40.

⁴² Jean Paul Sartre, 'Phenomenology of the Three Temporal Dimensions' in *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washing Square Press, 1956), p. 107-129, quotation p. 120.

⁴³ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 247.