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**INTELLIGENTSIAS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMPIRE:  
THE ASSIMILATIVE FUNCTION OF THE CENTRAL  
COUNTER-ELITE\***

What impact did the imperial *context* exert on the intellectual elites of Eastern Europe of the last 200 years? How did the social and intellectual phenomenon of intelligentsia influence the history of the Russian Empire from the end of the 18th until the beginning of the 20th century? One single empire — ruled by the Romanov dynasty. And how many intelligentsias? Certainly not one. The imperial *context* was not the only one seeing the emergence of the phenomenon of intelligentsia. Other contexts were formed by distinct identities and national *projects*: Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Jewish and many others. Each of the intellectual elites responded to the challenges of modernization its own community had to face, however, each one of them could have had a different understanding of what this ‘own community’ meant — a group for which it felt a sense of responsibility. It did not necessarily imply a definition in ethnic or national terms. The community might have been interpreted irrespectively of or even in opposition to those categories, and the search for an *imagined community* might have gone beyond the boundaries of ethnic cleavages, and the divisions between different national *projects*. In such circumstances, how did the intelligentsia situate itself in relation to the Empire?

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Earlier I have made an attempt at reconstructing the attitude adopted by the Russian intellectual elites towards the idea of the empire and analyzing an example of the position a Russian intellectual (Vasilii Rozanov) took towards Polish intelligentsia and Poland — as a problem the Russian Empire had to face.<sup>1</sup>

## I PROPOSITION OF A NEW MODEL

This time I shall start with the theory of the empire. There is one structural assumption, which repeats itself frequently, if not most frequently, amongst hundreds of definitions of empire: a division between the centre and the periphery. Herfried Münkler summed up recently the essence of this division in the briefest possible way by defining it as a ‘power difference between centre and periphery’.<sup>2</sup> Even though core and periphery, presented for the first time as an interesting framework to analyze social phenomena some thirty years ago by Edward Shils, are no longer cutting-edge concepts but ‘thoroughly deconstructed and nuanced, they remain in frequent use’.<sup>3</sup> If we want to nuance these concepts within an imperial structure, we have to begin with a caveat: the relation between centre and periphery is not all about domination, it is also about collaboration. We have to add a few questions as well: Whose domination over whom do we have in mind? Whose collaboration with whom? Is the centre homogeneous? Are the peripheries homogeneous?

<sup>1</sup> Both texts were printed in Andrzej Nowak, *Historie politycznych tradycji. Piłsudski, Putin i inni* (Kraków, 2007): ‘Inteligent polski w oczach rosyjskiego: uwagi Wasilija Rozanowa’, 134–46 and ‘Ocalić Rosję, zbawić świat: mesjanizm inteligencji post-sowieckiej i jego historyczna narracja’, 147–78. The first one of the two is due to be shortly printed in Russian, the second has been published in Jan Kieniewicz (ed.), *Inteligencja, imperium i cywilizacje w XIX–XX wieku* (Warszawa, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Herfried Münkler, *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States* (Cambridge, 2007), 80.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Butterwick, ‘Peripheries and Enlightenment: An Introduction’, in Richard Butterwick, Simon Davies and Gabriel Sanchéz Espinosa (eds.), *Peripheries of the Enlightenment* (Oxford, 2008), 8. See also Edward Shils, *Centre and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago, 1975); *idem*, ‘Centre and Periphery: An Idea and its Career’, in Liah Greenfeld and Michel Martin (eds.), *Centre: Ideas and Institutions* (Chicago, 1988).

Norwegian radical political scientist, Johan Galtung proposed years ago a definition of imperialism, which paved the way for the answers to these questions. Galtung saw within the centre of the empire an internal division between a centre (the elite) and a periphery (let us call it for the working purposes *peoples of the centre*), and an analogical one in the periphery between a local centre (the local elite) and a periphery (*peoples of the periphery*). The imperial system works efficiently as long as: (1) there is a harmony of interests between the *centre* (elite) of the centre and the *centre* (elite) of the periphery, in other words between the central and the local elites; (2) when there is more disharmony of interest within the periphery than within the centre of the empire, and finally — (3) when there is disharmony of interest between the periphery ('peoples') of the centre and the periphery ('peoples') of the periphery.<sup>4</sup>

The concept of Galtung was revived some time later by an American political scientist, Alexander Motyl. He identified the internal centres — both in the centre and in the periphery — with the notion of elites (as we have just done). He underlined the crucial importance of mutually profitable collaboration of those elites. The Motyl model also takes into account a widely accepted circumstance defining the structure of the empire — that an imperial centre dominates over more than one periphery. The American scholar interprets the termination of collaboration between the peripheral and the central elites and the establishment of links between different peripheries as a crucial symptom of the crisis and the announcement of the approaching collapse of the empire.<sup>5</sup>

I am going to use the course of interpretation proposed in the Galtung–Motyl model and go a step further: towards the notion of 'intelligentsia' and its relevance in the process of development and the crisis of the empire. Where can it fit in the model? Before making an attempt at answering this question, I would like to draw attention to one more, along with the structural, aspect of

<sup>4</sup> See Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, viii (1971), 81–117; also in Peter J. Cain and Mark Harrison (eds.), *Imperialism: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies*, 3 vols. (London, 2001), ii, 59–108.

<sup>5</sup> See also Alexander J. Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York, 2001), 12–13.

the definition of the empire. The major imperial function consists not only of maintaining political control over the subjects, but also of a particular prestige and importance — both internationally as domestically. Some of the definitions of the empire consider the process of enhancing this prestige as a combination of factors of power and culture — a cultural hegemony. Other focus on analyzing the rites and the myth created by the imperial context. Other still speak about the specific ideology forming an indivisible part of the empire: the idea of a mission, which justified (frequently *ex post*) the imperial expansion and the rule over conquered territories. It does not necessarily have to be a mission in religious terms, it might have — and especially in modern times does have — a formally lay character: a mission of ensuring peace, a mission to bring *civilization* to the *barbarians*, a mission of accomplishing other great humanitarian tasks, to which the smaller communities are unequal. The smaller communities frequently tend to seem natural, whereas the empires need justifications (and ‘missions’ serve this purpose).<sup>6</sup>

If indeed the empires cannot do without ideological justifications, they not only require the recourse of bayonets and cannons, factories and navy but also the assistance of creative elites or, as we may put it, of the *interpretative elite*. This elite would ‘interpret’ for the benefit of the subjects of the imperial centre why they should renounce some of their short-term interests in the name of the great mission. The same elite will also combat all outside endeavours to undermine the sense of the empire: from the peripheries and their potentially dissatisfied elites and from any other external power, trying to reinforce this discontent.

It is a perfect role to be played by intellectual elite as a source of ideas. How can intelligentsia, in its *canonical* sense, support the authority? Can it participate in building the imperial ideology? Or — let us reverse the question — should it always stand against the authorities? The sheer number of studies devoted to the

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<sup>6</sup> See definitions of the empire that take into consideration these factors: Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500 — c. 1800* (New Haven and London, 1995), 17–18; Svyatoslav Kaspé, *Imperiia i modernizatsiia. Obshchaia model' i rossiiskaia spetsifika* (Moskva, 2001), 26–7; Chris J. Chulos and Johannes Remy (eds.), *Imperial and National Identities in Pre-Revolutionary, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Russia* (Helsinki, 2002), 10–11; Münkler, *Empires*, 80–4.

phenomenon of intelligentsia, and most particularly to its Russian example is probably as impressive as that of the papers dedicated to the question of the empire.<sup>7</sup>

In reference to this scientific output and also to the discussion held presently in Russia over the sense of intelligentsia, in the above mentioned text<sup>8</sup> I have tried to justify the thesis according to which intelligentsia is not and has never been homogenous in the choices it made as regards the imperial idea. Without its participation, the imperial ideology would have never lasted and adopted itself to the new challenges of modernization at the end of the 18th century and most certainly all along the 19th century. And most importantly, it was the involvement of the intelligentsia that determined the fall of the empire. The intellectual elites seem to play here a twofold part. But what kind of intelligentsia are we talking about? At the moment we focus on the Russian intelligentsia, or — in other terms — on the intellectual elites of the imperial centre. Let us reiterate again that along with them, there were other intellectual elites in the Romanov Empire, among which — simultaneously developed or even slightly advanced in time — the intelligentsia of the *Polish periphery*. The intellectual elites of other communities — peripheries of the Empire — were also emerging. The elites, which created on these peripheries *national projects* or at least were capable of creating them — the projects without which no modern nations could have emerged in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century.

If we put the intelligentsia in the scheme outlined by the structural model of Galtung–Motyl, then the picture we get is far more complex. In the centre we have the elite of power, which may partly be formed by the central intelligentsia (in this case: Russian), whereas another part of the same intelligentsia can also form a counter-elite

<sup>7</sup> An interesting attempt at summing up these present discussion over the sense of intelligentsia in Eastern and Central Europe can be found in a volume: Fiona Björling and Alexander Pereswetoff-Morath (eds.), *Words, Deeds, and Values: The Intelligentsias in Russia and Poland during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Lund, 2005), there especially: Andrzej Walicki, 'Polish conceptions of the intelligentsia and its calling', 1-22; see also a new synthesis of the Polish intelligentsia: Jerzy Jedlicki (ed.), *Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 2008); *idem*, 'Autocréation de l'intelligentsia', in Chantal Delsol, Michel Masłowski and Joanna Nowicki (eds.), *Mythes et symboles politiques en Europe Centrale* (Paris, 2002).

<sup>8</sup> See Nowak, 'Ocalić Rosję, zbawić świat' (see footnote 1 to the present text).

in opposition to the authorities. And similarly in the peripheries: the presence of the local elites of power, which can collaborate with the elites of power in the imperial centre is accompanied by a kind of idea-forging elite, which can aim at representing the local *people*, raising their awareness or — possibly — can denounce the collaboration of the local elites of power with the central elite of power if the imperial centre is considered oppressive. However, this local, peripheral intellectual counter-elite could also come to an agreement with the central counter-elite — with the ‘rebellious’ fraction of the central intelligentsia. The collaboration of the central and peripheral elites and the assimilation of the latter into the former can run in parallel to the collaboration of the intellectual counter-elites and the assimilation of the ‘rebellious’ peripheral intelligentsia into the revolutionary (counter-)centre of the empire. An agreement of the elites is based on common interests and can also gain an ideological framework in a form of a mission, which brings them together (in the name of the social order, cultural mission, etc.). An agreement of the counter-elites (counter-elites of the centre and of the peripheries), due to its typically intellectual character is based more on ideological grounds: on the idea of the liberation struggle. The overthrow of the central authorities is potentially the strongest common point of their programme and actions between the central counter-elites and the peripheral counter-elites. This may well serve as a basis for a tactical agreement — valid until the overthrow of the common enemy in the centre, or a beginning of permanent assimilation of the peripheral counter-elites by the central ones, if the latter develops the idea of ‘great liberation mission’, more stirring and attractive than that of the ‘small’ idea of liberation of a given periphery and forming a concrete *national project*. This idea, however, and let us underline this from the very beginning, could not have found any response outside the centre had it not been for the imperial existence and mechanisms: not only as a negative point of reference (the ‘common enemy’), but also as a space of encounter for the central and peripheral counter-elites and as a provider of the means of communications between them (such as common language).

The problem of impact exerted by the imperial centre over the peripheries (and vice versa) can be more easily grasped if we tend to consider such questions as cultural domination, assimilation, acculturation and collaboration not only in the system of relations

between the central and peripheral power elites, but also taking into account the involvement of the intellectual counter-elites and the mutual relations between these counter-elites. Those relations have an impact on the pace and the success of the processes of modern nations formation — both in the centre and on the peripheries. They impinge on the relations decisive in the 19th century between the elites and the people — a potential nation, both in the centre and in the peripheries. This is the essence of the modest proposal of completing the Galtung–Motyl model with a factor of imperial central and peripheral intellectual counter-elites.<sup>9</sup>

## II

### ATTEMPT AT PRACTICAL APPLICATION

After having delivered this dry, concise albeit tiring lecture on the theoretical proposal, I would like to venture a few examples

<sup>9</sup> We intend to treat this proposal as a specific one to the Russian Empire, because within a historical context of this particular empire only a phenomenon of intelligentsia (or intelligentsias) developed itself in its 'canonical' form. Or, to put it in a milder way: there are numerous studies of this phenomenon in the Russian Empire while neither the Habsburg Empire nor the Ottoman Empire intelligentsias are studied sufficiently (in their relations between the centre and peripheries) to risk any deeper comparative reflection with the model proposed here. One can mention only a few interesting academic ventures in this direction, based in historical material taken from non-Russian, Eastern (or Central) European Empires, for example Larry Wolff's studies — 'The Traveler's View of Central Europe: Gradual Transitions, Degrees of Difference, and the Shadows of Influence', *Comparare: Comparative European History Review* (2003), 18–35; *idem*, 'Dynastic Conservatism and Poetic Violence in Fin-de-Siècle Cracow: The Habsburg Matrix of Polish Modernism', *The American Historical Review*, 106, 3 (June 2001), 735–64; or Selçuk A. Somel, 'Osmanaika imperiia: mestnye elity i mekhanizmy ikh interpretatsii, 1699–1914', in Aleksei Miller (ed.), *Rossiiskaia imperiia v sravnitel'noi perspektive* (Moskva, 2004), 177–206; see also Solomon Wank, 'The Disintegration of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires: A Comparative Analysis', in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, NY, 1997), 119–38.; *idem*, 'Dinasticheskaia imperiia ili mnogonatsionalnoe gosudarstvo: razmyshlenia o nasledii imperii Gabsburgov v natsionalnom voprose', in Tafik M. Islamov and Aleksei Miller (eds.), *Avstro-Vengriia. Opyt mnogonatsionalnogo gosudarstva* (Moskva, 1995), 5–24; Andrei S. Markovits, 'Empire and Province', in Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 1–22.

and comments on the margins of the history of the *Polish issue* in the Russian Empire. Obviously they are related to the place and existence of intelligentsia within the imperial structure. Let us clarify from the beginning that in the Romanov Empire already since the mid-19th century without any shade of doubt intelligentsia formed the core of the emerging counter-elite of the centre and also that of those peripheries where the social structure was well-developed, the process of modernization advanced and the formation of modern nations had already begun. The intelligentsia cannot be fully identified with the counter-elites, still its participation had a decisive importance for their survival, given the social and cultural circumstances of the era.

Let us trace back the history of intelligentsia and its place in the Empire since the very beginning. The Enlightenment and the rule of Catherine II mark the starting point. At the time there is no intellectual counter-elite in the Russian Empire. But there is already an idea of imperial mission, based on the secular models — of enlightenment, preserving order, liberating neighbours from the barbarian slavery. The court poets support and enhance this idea — Mikhail Kheraskov, Vasilii Petrov, Mikhail Lomonosov, Gavrila Derzhavin and others.<sup>10</sup> However, its chief author was Catherine herself. The introduction to the *ukase* on the nobility of 1785 is a monument to this idea. The two principal ideological lines of the text are: the emphasis on the grandeur of the Empire and the stress on the special link between the Empire and the Russian Nation.

The Russian Empire can be distinguished from the whole world due to the extent of ITS dominions, which stretch from the Eastern frontiers of Kamchatka to the river and beyond the river of Dvina [Daugava] ... encompassing a hundred and five degrees of longitude. And from the estuary

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<sup>10</sup> See excellent analyses of the imperial notes of this poetry in Vera Proskurina, *Mify imperii. Literatura i vlast' v epokhu Ekateriny II* (Moskva, 2006), 147–94; Harsha Ram, *The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire* (Madison, 2003), 28–120; Andrei Zorin, *Kormia dvuglavogo orla... Literatura i gosudarstvennaya ideologia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII — pervoi treti XIX veka* (Moskva, 2001), 149–52; see also Jan Orłowski, *Z dziejów antypolskich obsesji w literaturze rosyjskiej. Od wieku XVIII do roku 1917* (Warszawa, 1992), 39–46 (including e.g. the description of an ode of Gavrila Derzhavin, *Na vziatie Varshavy* or Mikhail Kheraskov, *Osvobozhdennaia Moskva*).



of the Volga River, the Kuban River, the Don River and the Dnieper River, which flow into the Caspian, Azov and Black Seas, and to the Arctic Ocean they stretch over thirty two degrees of latitude. ... Therefore in real fame and grandeur of the EMPIRE we taste the fruits and see the results of actions of subordinated to US, obedient, brave, fearless, courageous and powerful Russian Nation, which is prompted nobly by the faith in God and faithfulness to its Throne, in which the busy character and love for the Fatherland join forces and aim at common good ...<sup>11</sup>

Part of the territories of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had already been (since 1773) annexed to the Empire — together with the local privileged nobility class, which was the addressee of the *ukase*. The Empire was formally open to this new part of the class elite: the fact that the quoted *ukase* was issued by the Senate's printing facility as a bilingual, Russian–Polish text proves the point. The Empire did not carry out on its Western periphery any particular assimilation policy — at least not linguistically speaking and directed at the noble elite — regarding its new, Western periphery. However, could the members of the Polish (Lithuanian) nobility class immediately get a sense of brotherhood with the *great Russian nation*, whose exceptional destiny was openly underlined in the *ukase*? Could they identify themselves with ‘the most nobly born Russians’ — whom the *ukase* addressed with a special stress? Could they, responding to the appeal to the faithfulness to the throne — in the same way as the Russians — consider the Empire as their fatherland? And were the Russians willing to share their fatherland with the new subjects of the Empire?

The imperial *gordost'* — pride, so stressed by the propaganda of the era of Catherine II had a proto-nationalist dimension. The Russian elites, the intellectual elites of the centre, expressed by the voices of the mentioned poets, could refer to this pride in order to perceive in the great Empire their own, proper, indivisible heritage.<sup>12</sup>

When during the following two partitions of Poland new territories were added to the Empire and — after 1815 — ultimately also

<sup>11</sup> *O dvorianstve / O szlachectwie* (*ukase* of Catherine in bilingual — Russian/Polish — edition) (Saint Petersburg and Moscow, 1785), introduction, unnumbered pages.

<sup>12</sup> See also Proskurina, *Mify impierii*, 187–9.

the central Poland came under the control of Romanov dynasty, the problem grew serious and acute. Apart from the *old, Russian* elite the Empire also possessed *new, Polish* elite, formally equal in rights. The latter was more numerous than the former. And it could count on more people educated in a modern way and in its national language. In 1815 under the rule of Alexander I more people could write and read in Polish than in Russian. The secondary and higher education modernized by the National Education Commission in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth produced between 1773 and 1792 more than 100,000 graduates. Since 1804 the modern education in Polish continued under the Russian rule in the whole former educational district of Wilno, which embraced most of the territories of former Commonwealth under Alexander I's sceptre. The schools established in the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw were succeeded in their Polish educational mission in the Congress Kingdom of Poland (1815–31). It is worth noticing that still at the end of the 19th century, after a few decades of the Russification policies on the 'Annexed Territories' (Lithuanian-Ruthenian *guberniyas*), as much as 30 per cent of the landowners declared Polish as their native language.<sup>13</sup>

The question was how to preserve the loyalty of the central elites of the Russian Empire and win the loyalty of a new and so numerous peripheral elite? Moreover, located on the most important strategically and culturally route to Europe. The imperial nationalism, which inspired the loyalty of the central elite on the basis of a specifically interpreted *national* pride, in 1795 and ever more after 1812 had to face a challenge in form of a problematic loyalty of the elite of the Polish periphery. This challenge was linked to yet another, which the French Revolution of 1789 posed for the ideology of the Enlightenment mission of the Empire. The logic of the Empire under the rule of Paul I dictated an attempt to go back to the pre-national, 'neo-medieval' rhetoric of the centre of imperial power. Alexander I searched for a way out of this dilemma launching his Polish *idée favorite* and the conceptions of 'ecumenical' imperial religious policy.<sup>14</sup> These endeavours, which have provided the historians with ample material to reflect upon,

<sup>13</sup> Avenir P. Korelin, *Dvorianstvo v poreformnoi Rossii 1861–1904* (Moskva, 1979), 40 and 48–9.

<sup>14</sup> See two excellent complementary monographs: Elena Vishlenkova, *Zabotias' o dushakh poddanykh: religioznaia politika v Rossii pervoi chetverti XIX veka*

should not be analyzed as whims of the Catherine's grandson, but as a result of the impact of the *imperial logic* on the social, cultural and religious policy of the centre in confrontation with the challenges of the new (under Alexander's rule not only Polish, but also Finnish and Transcaucasian) peripheries.

The central elite of the Empire reacted to this new situation by splitting. For the first time the imperial policy faced ideologically-motivated critics of a considerable parts of the central elite. The first expression of these critics — 'the opinion of a Russian citizen', and let us stress that — *a citizen* — and *not a subject*, was the statement of Nicholas Karamzin against the 'Polish policy' of Alexander I.<sup>15</sup> Alexander started to slowly back away from his experiments and his successor, Nicholas I, returned, in a modified form, to the conception of building the Empire on the basis of loyalty inspired by an imagined identity<sup>16</sup> and the interests of the Russian centre. The Polish periphery, most particularly, had to adapt itself to this programme.

However, the split in the central elite, in the Russian elite, initiated in the era of Alexander I did not disappear. The first anti-tsar organizations and ideas of a coup d'état germinated in the 1820s as an expression of revolt of the new generation of Russian elite against the policy of Alexander precisely over the Polish issue. The most important experience for the new generation of this elite was the victorious confrontation with Napoleon in 1812 — the defence of the Fatherland, and then a triumphant march into the heart of Europe, Paris. For the representatives of that generation the *Polish periphery* represented simultaneously a defeated all-time enemy (like for Karamzin, the historic instruc-

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(Saratov, 2002); Anna Barańska, *Między Warszawą, Petersburgiem i Rzymem. Kościół a państwo w dobie Królestwa Polskiego* (Lublin, 2008).

<sup>15</sup> See on the subject Andrzej Nowak, '„Oświecony” rosyjski imperializm i Polska. Od Piotra I i Katarzyny II do Karamzina i Puszkina', in *idem*, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733–1921)*, 2nd edn (Kraków, 1999), 11–38; *idem*, 'Jan Potockii, Tadeusz Chatskii, Nikolai Karamzin i drugie: rozmyshlenia o politicheskom i ideinom kontekstie polsko-rossiiskogo nauchnogo sotrudnichestva v pervoi chetverti XIX v.', in Vladimir K. Volkov (ed.), *Rossiisko-polskie nauchnye sviazi v XIX–XX vv.* (Moskva, 2003), 71–90.

<sup>16</sup> See Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1995), i, chap. x–xii (in the Russian edition: *Stsenarii vlasti. Mify i tseremonii russkoi monarkhii* [Moskva, 2004], i, 336–526).

tor for the generation of the Decembrist Revolt) and a barrier on the Russian road to Europe.

The ideology of the Catherine empire used to offer to the *enlightened* centre of the Russian elite the prospect of simultaneous modernization and *nationalization* (Russification). The short rule of Paul seemed to put away both the expectations of modernization/westernization (after 1789 and especially following the execution of Louis XVI a very dangerous process for the centre of the imperial power for obvious reasons), and *nationalization* — which, on the basis of the French example, was analyzed as one of the elements of modernization. In Alexander's era — and especially during the first part of his reign — the expectations were back, however, after 1815 they were once again damped down. Since 1825 we can certainly talk about a presence of a rebellious counter-elite within the Russian centre, which would revive these expectations — against the tsar. Despite having quashed the Decembrist Revolt the myth perpetuates — the founding myth to which the following generations of rebelling intelligentsia would refer time after time.

The tsar's rule no longer ensured a road to modernity, however, since the reign of Nicholas I it took over a *national Russian outfit* and gradually gave up the policy of *buying* the loyalty of the peripheries, and most particularly the Polish periphery, by granting them concessions regarding the cultural differences and political traditions. In 1825 the imperial centre sees the emergence of a new pattern in which the main objective of the counter-elite is no longer the nationalization of the Empire, but the modernization, irrespectively of the tsar's rule and ultimately over its dead body; the vision that becomes wider and wider and increasingly ambitious and universal in spirit. It would lead to an opening making possible an encounter with the intellectual counter-elites of the imperial peripheries.

Let us focus now on the *Polish way* to this rapprochement. After an amazing renewal of the public debate and accelerated modernization of the Polish political thought during the Four-Year Sejm (1788–92) and the Kościuszko Uprising (1794), came the shock of the final partition of Poland. The period between 1788 and 1794 sharpened the sensibility of the Polish public opinion as regards the loyalty and treason towards fatherland (i.e. Poland, the

Commonwealth). The difficulty of the question of the 'new fatherland' was accurately expressed by Franciszek Ksawery Branicki (one of the leaders of the pro-Russian Targowica confederation in 1792), who in 1812 confessed 'I am not a Muscovite, because I was born as a Pole, I am not a Pole, because Poland is no more'. The intellectual groups suggested various solutions to this problem. Under the sceptre of a Russian tsar, it proved possible to make reference to the idea of Slavic solidarity. A slogan of devotion to the universal cause of Enlightenment and culture has emerged. According to Franciszek Ksawery Dmochowski (an opinion mirrored by Jan Śniadecki and many other eminent personalities of the Polish Enlightenment): 'The Greeks have perished, the Romans have perished, / but Homer and Virgil live an eternal life'. These two issues were summed up by Stanisław Staszic, at the threshold of the Congress Kingdom of Poland (under Alexander I's sceptre), when he encouraged to accept the Russian political domination in the name of the Enlightenment mission which the Polish thought should conduct in respect to their Slavic brethren from the North: 'Let us bond with Russia, let us enlighten, let us take [intellectually] over its power, let it take our Enlightenment ... The nations die, do not let the civilization die'.<sup>17</sup>

The considerable part of the traditional Commonwealth elites, which found themselves under the rule of the Russian Empire, did not require any kind of ideological justification. The pragmatic approach dictated by land property issues (worry over lost heritage could easily overshadow the loss of the country), in higher aristocratic classes — the post-Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and in the lower classes (including the *potential* intelligentsia) a search for new protectors, tsarist officials, who would open the career perspective, and finally the closure of the *old Polishness* to the domestic sphere and its immediate neighbourhood — all these elements facilitated the adaptation to the new political domination. Did the imperial education imply a shift in the axiological

<sup>17</sup> Kajetan Koźmian, *Pamiętniki*, ed. Juliusz Willaume *et al.*, 3 vols. (Wrocław, 1972), ii, 197 (Stanisław Staszic to Kajetan Koźmian in 1815); other quotes from: Jarosław Czuby, *Zasada 'dwóch sumień'. Normy postępowania i granice kompromisu politycznego Polaków w sytuacjach wyboru (1795–1815)* (Warszawa, 2005), 110, 112 (the whole monograph is an excellent analysis of the attitudes of the Polish elites at the turn of the 19th century as regards the imperial power and after the fall of Poland).

orientation of the subordinated individuals? It could have well encouraged this process. Daniel Beauvois in his study of the Polish education system under the Russian rule quotes numerous examples of how the groups related to the educational institutions on the Lithuanian–Ruthenian territories ‘hung in to the rich system of distinctions created by the Russian authorities’.<sup>18</sup>

A race for the prestige, medals and official uniform was not accepted by all the elite of the Polish periphery without reservations. It was a fact, a representation of real attitudes — however, these attitudes were contested by part of this elite. It gave rise to a new internal split related to the imperial challenge — to some extent corresponding to a split that was taking place in the elite of the imperial centre in respect to the challenge arising from the periphery — the Polish periphery. The attitude of adjustment and new tsarist loyalty was an object of criticism since the moment of the partitions of Poland. We should remember that a part of the political–intellectual elite awakening in the last days of the Commonwealth chose emigration. Very quickly it gained a possibility to undertake practical actions. It would later find support — in its opposition to the choice of the Russian Empire — in the Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon. In confrontation with these alternative elite searching for independence from the three powers that divided the Commonwealth, the imperial service, and even an education within the imperial structures, which still used Polish language could lead to criticisms.<sup>19</sup>

The fall of the Duchy of Warsaw, the failure of the pro–Napoleonic orientation, the end (for a while, as it proved) of the emigration, and also the *benevolence* of the victorious Alexander I seemed to create conditions to remove this tension and to facilitate an adaptation of the Polish peripheral elite to their status — the

<sup>18</sup> Daniel Beauvois, *Szkolnictwo polskie na ziemiach litewsko–ruskich 1803–1832*, 2 vols. (Lublin, 1991), ii, 435. See also a typical example of adjustment of a representative of close elite of the former Commonwealth to the ideological–cultural framework of the Empire: Seweryn Potocki as a school superintendent in the Kharkov educational district and a protector of the Russian Academy of Arts, and a sponsor of competitions for the best picture illustrating the patriotic Russian subjects. He approved such subjects as ‘the heroic deed of the Prince Pozharsky’ or ‘Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich raising a tomb for Kuzma Minin’, see Irina Svirida, *Mezhdú Peterburgom, Varshavoi i Vilno. Khudozhnik v kulturnom prostranstve, XVIII — seredina XIX v.* (Moskva, 1999), 127.

<sup>19</sup> See Czubyaty, *Zasada ‘dwóch sumień’*, 263–4.

Polish elite of a benevolently treated but still a periphery... However, it did not last long. The tension was soon back: both due to the pressure of the Russian central elite, which felt directly threatened by the *Polish policy* of Alexander, and following the formation of a new, young counter-elite on the Polish periphery, which rejected this peripheral status. Its voice was expressed by Maurycy Mochnacki, who created the programme of intellectual revolt and justified its necessity.

For those, *who think* [stressed by AN] Poland does not exist ... We are a province of a neighbouring power, occupied, governed by the pro-consuls, severely oppressed, where ... actions aimed at the annihilation of our family and name relentlessly take place.<sup>20</sup>

It is worth noticing that among the factors, which contributed to the popularization of this way of thinking, were the direct results of the anti-imperial cooperation between the first counter-elite of the Russian imperial centre issued from the Decembrist conspiracy and a budding independence movement of the Polish periphery: the Patriotic Society. The attempted agreement between the two had a tactical character — of a combat against a common enemy, the tsar. There was no deeper understanding on the level of programmes. The central and peripheral counter-elites talked different languages (also literally — French was the common language of communication; the Poles did not yet have to learn Russian). In the same time the findings of the Saint Petersburg Investigative Commission, in its endeavour to discredit the Russian counter-elite, deliberately stressed the importance of its collaboration with the rebels from the Polish periphery plotting

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<sup>20</sup> Maurycy Mochnacki, 'Głos obywatela z Poznańskiego do senatu Królestwa Polskiego z okazji Sądu Sejmowego', in *idem, Powstanie narodu polskiego*, ed. Stefan Kieniewicz, 2 vols. (Warszawa, 1984), i, 341. The fact that Mochnacki expressed a popular view — also among the Poles from the Polish-Ruthenian territories is confirmed by the report of the III Section of 1828, *Kratkii obzor obshchestvennogo mnenia v 1828 godu*: 'Polaki schitaiut sebia pariami v Rossiiskoi Imperii ... oni prolivaiut slozy o tom, chto v Rossii oni odni nakhodiatsia v sostoianii ugnetenia' ('The Poles consider themselves as the pariahs of the Russian Empire ... they shed tears over the oppression they suffer from'), in Margarita V. Sidorova and Elena I. Shcherbakova (eds.), *Rossiiia pod nadzorom. Otchety III otdelenia 1827-1868* (Moskva, 2006), 40.

against the whole Empire. It stressed this 'compromising' aspect not without success.<sup>21</sup>

Already some time earlier, at least from 1822–3 we can observe a beginning of significant shift of the imperial policy towards this part of the Polish periphery which had been directly annexed to the Empire — i.e. the Lithuanian–Ruthenian territories. It began with a planned termination of a situation of Polish cultural superiority on these territories and the closure of Polish institutions in view of their replacement by the Russian structures. The imperial centre launched a *Kulturkampf* on its western borderlands. Was this combat aimed just at acculturation or assimilation — change of identity (language and religion policy — removal of the followers of the Union of Brest on the Ruthenian territories)? Who was it aimed at — the local elites or the local *people*? Since when — 1823, 1831 or 1863? These questions still remain unanswered.<sup>22</sup> Undoubtedly already since the mid 1820s the traditional elites of that part of the Polish periphery ceased to be considered as a resting point of the imperial policy in the region. Collaboration was still possible, however, its threshold of difficulty had been raised. Those who were unable to overcome it, were likely to fall victim of the imperial oppression. They could as well become partners for the new combative anti-imperial Polish counter-elite. The traditional elite within the Congress Kingdom of Poland still loyally collaborated with the Imperial Centre, however, the drastic shift in the policy regarding the Lithuanian–Ruthenian territories put this loyalty to the test.

The counter-elite took over the initiative in November 1830 — and was followed by a considerable part of the elite of the Polish periphery, disappointed with the results of its loyal collaboration

<sup>21</sup> See a wider interpretation of the situation: Andrzej Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją. Studium politycznej wyobraźni i postaw Wielkiej Emigracji wobec Rosji* (Warszawa, 1994), 31–45 (chap.: 'Polityczna edukacja powstańczego pokolenia').

<sup>22</sup> These questions have been tackled by Aleksei Miller, *Impieria Romanovykh i natsjonalizm* (Moskwa, 2006), 54–95; *idem*, „Identychność” i „lojalność” v iazykovoj politike vlastei Rossijskoi imperii”, in Andrzej Nowak (ed.), *Russia and Eastern Europe: Applied 'Imperiology'* (Kraków, 2006), 131–43, and regarding the later period — Darius Staliunas, *Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863* (Amsterdam and New York, 2007). See also on this subject: Leszek Zasztowt, *Kresy 1832–1864. Szkolnictwo na ziemiach litewskich i ruskich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa, 1997).



with the tsar. The November Uprising was a declaration of an attempted move forward in a process of formation of a modern nation — an alternative to the Empire. But it was only a declaration: the revolutionary elite did not reach the *people*, and did not find among them many followers to its cause. Still the mere declaration was already important, certainly for the imperial authorities. After the uprising, the imperial centre tried not only to ensure the loyalty of the Polish elite in the Congress Kingdom of Poland, but also started to consider to range a combat to win the identity of the people in this periphery — a combat against the Polish elite as a carrier of Polish tradition and culture. For the first time Nicholas I launched a project of *Cyrillization* of the Polish language. The minister of Education, Sergey Uvarov, felt obliged to persuade his monarch, in the most delicate way, not to undertake such radical actions — which ultimately undermined the possibilities of loyal collaboration of the old Polish peripheral elites with the imperial centre. Nicholas I had undoubtedly in mind using the Cyrillic alphabet as an instrument, which could have an impact on the consciousness not only of the elites, but also of the people of the Polish periphery when the delicate moment of its alphabetization would come.<sup>23</sup>

At the time Nicholas abandoned this attempt — of a trial of forces: between the Empire and the most advanced, albeit still unfinished national project taking place on the strategically crucial periphery. From the Polish perspective the Great Emigration after 1831 served as a training ground for this trial. There that new models for the Polish counter-elite regenerated and developed.<sup>24</sup> In the same time the country itself — under the Russian rule — was subject to a real policy of enforcing loyalties, with an increasing use of institutional instruments interfering with cultural, national and religious identity of the subjects living on the Polish periphery.

Therefore the Empire, unwillingly, paved the way to the encounter between the Polish counter-elite, which was to regenerate gradually in the form of intelligentsia (its rebellious part)

<sup>23</sup> See Boris A. Uspenskii, 'Nikolai I i polskii iazyk (Iazykovaia politika Rossiiskoi imperii v otnoshenii Tsarstva Polskogo: voprosy grafiki i orfografii)', in *idem*, *Istoriko-filologicheskie ocherki* (Moskva, 2004), 123–55.

<sup>24</sup> See a wider approach on the subject: Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, 79–266.

and a new counter-elite, ultimately emerging from the disclosed ideological ferment of the imperial centre in Russia. What did this way look like?

Let us illustrate it with a concrete example. According to the *ukase* from 1822 the inhabitants of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, who graduated abroad *without government permission* were deprived of the right to fill in the official posts. After the November Uprising the Polish universities were closed down — both in the Congress Kingdom of Poland and, more obviously, on the Annexed Territories. However, for the Empire this preventive measure against any potential disloyal behaviour of the new Polish subjects of the tsar implied also a problem of human resources. In order to confront it, already in 1832 the authorities issued a ‘Highest Decision on sending to the Russian universities, especially in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, annually and for a period of 6 years candidates for teachers from the Congress Kingdom of Poland, who have successfully completed the whole course of secondary education in the Congress Kingdom of Poland and distinguished themselves on moral grounds’. The logic of the Empire can be fully appreciated in the reservations, that the application of this *ukase* raised in a responsible official from the Russian centre. It was expressed by the school superintendent in the Moscow educational district, Sergey Stroganov, in his letter dated October 1835 to his namesake, the minister of Public Education, count Uvarov: ‘young Poles who have completed the secondary education would enter our universities imbued to certain extent with the principles and opinions of their nation, which are extremely detrimental to the public prosperity’. The schools superintendent went on saying that it would prove ‘far more profitable’ to send the Polish youth first to the Russian schools, starting with the 5th or 6th form, and only afterwards to allow them to enter universities – ‘already in harmony with the spirit, which the government considers appropriate to inculcate in schools by means of its loyal instructors’. It was indeed the logic of a total assimilation — in this case via educational institutions — as the only effective means to win loyalties. Despite these reservations the programme of sending ‘the pupils from the Congress Kingdom of Poland’ to the central imperial universities was carried out

(we know for example that between 1836 and 1847 the Moscow university had 76 such students).<sup>25</sup>

What were the effects of this programme? The pupils who have completed Polish secondary education received Russian higher education. They learnt Russian and entered the student community of the Russian imperial centre, listened and gradually — at least part of them — participated in the intellectual debates, which formed the spiritual identity of the new Russian elite. And to a great extent — of the new intellectual counter-elite. One of the participants of this programme, Romuald Świerzbieński, related the impact of such an influence. He completed his secondary education in Sejny and Suwałki, studied law in Moscow between 1842 and 1845, and after the return took up a job in the Warsaw Correction Police (he was one of the main founders of a conspiracy organization in 1848 in the Congress Kingdom of Poland and subsequently one of its main traitors: during the trial he betrayed 55 people — was remunerated with 300 roubles and permission to fill a post outside the Congress Kingdom of Poland). At the University of Moscow he witnessed the first confrontations between the Slavophiles and the Westerners from the Russian intelligentsia.

The idea of the Slavic brotherhood, common to both parties, became the general political faith. Under its influence the friendship and sympathy displayed towards us by the Russians, with whom we attended the law and the literary courses, annihilated the remains of the historical hatred. We considered them as compatriots, with whom it was worth living without losing our own nationality. ... In this way we arrived at the conclusion about a necessity of a federal union of the Slavs. And we came back to the Congress Kingdom of Poland with this political faith.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> All quotes in this paragraph and the analysis of the concept following: Galina Makarowa, „Wychowankowie Królestwa Polskiego” — studenci Uniwersytetu Moskiewskiego w latach trzydziestych i czterdziestych XIX w.’, in Władimir Dżakow, Stefan Kieniewicz and Wiktoria Śliwowska (eds.), *Wiosna Ludów w Królestwie Polskim. Organizacja 1848 roku* (Wrocław, 1994), 62–5.

<sup>26</sup> Deposition of Romuald Świerzbieński from the Warsaw Investigative Commission, 16/28 Feb. 1850 — 15/27 May 1851, in Dżakow, Kieniewicz and Śliwowska (eds.), *Wiosna Ludów*, 226; wider information about Świerzbieński see Wiktoria Śliwowska, *Zesłańcy polscy w Imperium Rosyjskim w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku* (Warszawa, 1998), 619–20.

He was a member of Polish intelligentsia: by necessity a student of a Russian university, he chose an official career, however, prepared a conspiracy — a revolt of the *Polish periphery* against the imperial centre. This, and to a lesser extent the further history of Świerzbieński since the beginning of the trial, exemplifies a new model of life career and the dilemma related to the formation of new Polish intellectual counter-elite in the Romanov Empire. Let us stress this once again: it was the Empire, which by its instruments and policy created a situation of an encounter of the representatives of this new peripheral counter-elite with new central counter-elite. What were the possible results of such encounter? Mutual recognition, an attempt of understanding. A strictly tactical agreement was possible, like earlier had existed between the representatives of the Southern Union, future members of the Decembrist Revolt, and the emissaries of the Polish Patriotic Society. However, a deeper understanding was also possible: and it might have taken two forms. The one implied the acceptance by the Russian counter-elite of the national programme of the peripheral elite. An approval for carrying out the national programme on the periphery and a launching of an analogical programme in the centre — implemented by the central counter-elite: the programme of forming a modern Russian nation, which would be more open to the people rather than lead to an attack on the Winter Palace. The second option consisted of impressing the representatives of the peripheral counter-elite with the grandeur of the ideological projects launched in the imperial centre — by the central counter-elite. This way led to the abandonment of the national project of the periphery on the benefit of an ambitious utopia or real struggle for power in the very centre of the Empire.

Of course theoretically there was still a third possibility of making use of enforced (to certain extent) encounters in the educational (or administrative or military) institutions of the centre. It was the possibility of establishing contact and possible understanding — against the centre — between the representatives of various peripheries. However, to make it possible it was necessary that more than one of these peripheries had achieved a level of advancement in the process of formation of a modern nation, of development of the political programme for the given periphery

and of maturity of the intellectual counter-élite. This situation practically did not exist until the end of 19th century.<sup>27</sup> In the centre the Polish peripheral national programme could encounter the programmes created by the Russian central intelligentsia.

It is worth noticing one more aspect or one more result of the *imperial logic*. Now one of its manifestations would be a gradual and — following the defeat of the following uprising, in 1863 — an abrupt closure of the imperial centre of the collaboration with the Polish peripheral elite. It would take the form of the abolishment of the Polish primary and secondary educational system, including in the Congress Kingdom of Poland. Especially after 1863 the struggle for *souls*, that is the identity of the peasants on the Polish — ethnically Polish — periphery exacerbated. The Polish member of intelligentsia lost chance of any career in the institutions of the imperial centre. He could only count on a limited career in the institutions of the Russian province of the Vistula. His existence on the Lithuanian–Ruthenian territories was meant to disappear completely. He was to be replaced by the member of a Russian intelligentsia. This political line was most distinctly expressed by the successor of Mikhail Muravev at the post of General–Governor of Wilno, gen. Konstantin Kauffman — in a letter to the Minister of War, Dimitrii Milutin dated on 22 June 1865: *Do tekh por krai etot ne budet' uprochen za nami, poka intelligentsiia zdes' nie budet' russkaia* ('This country will not be ours safely as long as the intelligentsia here is not Russian').<sup>28</sup>

The member of Polish intelligentsia was taught — already by default — in Russian, and felt rejected by the elite of the centre. As rightly pointed out Aleksei Miller, after 1863 the imperial authorities showed a different willingness to accept the assimilation of a Ruthenian, Tartar, Kalmyk, German, Jew and a Pole (of course not a peasant). Most probably those at the beginning of the list were the

<sup>27</sup> The tsarist authorities feared that it might happen, and observed for example the contacts between the Polish students and the students from Siberia at the universities of Saint Petersburg before 1863. The latter absorbed — among others also via a popular among the intellectuals Herzen's *Kolokol* — the concept of nationality, based on the Polish example and the idea of a 'colony' exploited by the centre. It was the beginning of separate identity of Siberia, a disturbing for the authorities concept. See Iuri Slezkine, *Arkticheskie zerkala. Rossiia i malye narody Severa* (Moskva, 2008), 134–5.

<sup>28</sup> Quote from: Henryk Głębocki, *Kresy Imperium. Szkice i materiały do dziejów polityki Rosji wobec jej peryferii (XVIII–XXI wiek)* (Kraków, 2006), 206.

ones most accepted, and those from the end — the least accepted. All the more important proved in this context the willingness of the Russian intelligentsia, the counter-elite of the central Empire, to accept of 'even a Pole.' A visitor from the Polish periphery could sometimes feel his cultural or political 'superiority' in comparison with the representatives of other imperial territories and simultaneously could all the more suffer the results of the rejection, degradation in the institutional hierarchy to a place behind the inhabitants of Ruthenia/Ukraine or a Tartar Kazan. The discrimination policy carried out by the imperial elite probably triggered an unexpected and undesired result in a form of an increased assimilation potential of the Russian intellectual counter-elite.

This elite obviously had to achieve a certain level of development. It had to reinforce its position within the imperial social structure, it had to increase the appeal of its ideological offer, which was perhaps most important. This advancement coincided with a new, dramatic momentum of the imperial discrimination policy of Poles — at the time of the January 1863 Uprising and immediately afterwards. After such *messiahs* of the new intelligentsia as Chernyshevsky and Herzen, in the 1860s the heroic example of the first, since the era of the Decembrist Revolt, members of the anti-imperial organizations from the Russian centre (beginning with the *Zyemla i Volya* organization) played an important role. They would be followed by an important fraction of intelligentsia. They would be joined by the *exiled* from the Polish intelligentsia.

Who were they? How did they come? Not all of them resembled Felix Dzerzhinsky. There were legions of them. I will illustrate it with one final example, taken from the family history of the Shostakoviches (Szostakowicz). The great grandfather of the most illustrious member of the family, the great composer, Dmitri Dmitriyevich Shostakovich, was born in Wilno in 1808. Piotr Szostakowicz graduated there at the Medical-Surgical Academy (with Polish language instruction) and had been deported to Yekaterinburg for his participation in the 1830 Uprising. His wife followed him in exile. They settled down at first in Kazan and then in Tomsk. At home both of them and their sons, Bolesław (1845–1919) and Władysław, spoke only Polish. Bolesław got involved in the *Zyemla i Volya* organization, and more precisely

with a group of radical socialists, led by a Pole, Paweł Majewski. He organized the escape of Jarosław Dąbrowski (the leader of the Polish radical underground) from the Moscow prison; arrested in 1866 in Kazan — was sentenced to permanent exile in Tomsk for providing shelter to the plotters of a coup against Alexander II. There he married his companion of struggle, Varvara Shaposhnikova. The couple had 7 children, including Dmitri. In 1875 he would move to Saint Petersburg, where he graduated at the Nature Department and as engineer–chemist found an employment in the local Office of Measures and Weights. He would speak fluent Polish until his death in 1922. In 1903 he married Sofia Vasilyevna Kokoulina from Siberia. In their home in Saint Petersburg they cultivated Siberian traditions (so called Siberian *soirées*). In 1906 Dmitri Dmitriyevich was born — one of the greatest composers of the 20th century and the pride of Russian music.<sup>29</sup>

Did it turn to the advantage of the Romanov Empire? When one thinks about 1917 — the answer is — rather not. This way, illustrated here by individual examples, led to the reinforcement of the counter–elite of the imperial centre: it was fortified by the influx of some of the discontented representatives of the peripheral elites or counter–elites, excluded from the access to central elite or who considered such an act as treason. However, joining the counter–elite of the centre was not an act of treason or at least was not automatically considered as such, but as a new and

<sup>29</sup> Krzysztof Meyer, *Dymitr Szostakowicz i jego czasy* (Warszawa, 1999), 19–21; Elizabeth Wilson, *Shostakovich: A Life Remembered*, new edn (London, 2006), 3–9; Sofia Khentova, *V mire Shostakovicha* (Moskva, 1996), 50–9. Another example of a family way to Russian consciousness, facilitated to certain extent by the imperial policy, illustrated the case of Igor Stravinsky. He was the descendant of the senatorial family of Strawiński, coat of arms Sulima, whose 18th century ancestors served as castellans of Brześć, Mińsk and Witebsk. The grandfather of the composer, Ignacy — was of course a Catholic; father: Fyodor, was already an Orthodox. Ignacy married an Orthodox Russian, Alexandra Skorokhodova, and according to the imperial law in mixed religious marriages, children had to be brought up as Orthodox. Fyodor, Igor's father, although having spent part of his life on the territories of the old Commonwealth — as a pupil of *dворянское училище* in Mozyrz, a student of law in Odessa and Kiev — became a Russian (in 1874 in Kiev he married Anna Kholodovska — and in 1882 in Oranienbaum Igor — the future composer of *Petrushka* — was born). See Stephen Walsh, *Igor Stravinsky: A Creative Spring. Russia and France 1882–1934* (London, 1999), 1–15.

more efficient phase of struggle against the odious Empire. The counter-elite of the centre got reinforced whereas — to different extent — the peripheral elites (or counter-elites) capable of forming modern nations got weakened.

While the main result of this process seems to be a deepening crisis within the heart of the Empire, this aspect, illustrated by the above mentioned example, is also worth notice. The descendants of the rebellious intellectual counter-elite of the centre could ultimately — in the second or third generation — get to the elite of the centre: intellectual, cultural and even official. Such a gap was easier to bridge than making a similar 'leap' from the peripheral counter-elite (or in some cases even the elite). And so the family line of Bolesław — a revolutionist and Polish rebel, brought about Dmitri — the Russian composer.

Let us reiterate once again what can be clearly seen on this example: the policy of segregation and repression, carried out by the imperial centre on the peripheries, combined with elements of imperial policy aimed at unifying the cultural context (language) facilitated in reality the reinforcement of the central (Russian) counter-elite. The Russian school and tsarist deportation orders (*ssylka*) acted likewise. The deportees from the peripheries, separated for years from their *natural* background, faced a dilemma of a loyalty to the old identity versus a search for a way of adaptation, also of an adaptation of their rebellion to a new, overwhelmingly Russian society.

What results did it ultimately bring? Let us sum up once again. Without the exiles from — at least potential — *Polishness* (the Polish national project), *Latvianess*, *Jewishness* (Zionism), *Georgianess* etc. the central counter-elite would not have proved capable of abolishing the tsar in 1917. Without them, the Bolsheviks would soon fall short of forces (resources) to control the revolutionary chaos and organize the Empire anew — on new principles. The ultimately created new empire differentiated from the previous by the non-emergence of the central intelligent counter-elite, which proved impossible to reproduce the mechanism of understanding between the central and peripheral counter-elites. The latter — at least as actors playing an active part in the public life — appeared only at the beginning of 1989 during the elections for the Congress of the Peoples Deputies



in the USSR.<sup>30</sup> Probably the totalitarian character of the Soviet system, a character that the Russian Empire was devoid of, was also not without significance.

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<sup>30</sup> The most thorough analysis of the phenomenon of the Soviet intelligentsia can be found in Włodzimierz Marciniak, *Rozgrabione imperium. Upadek Związku Sowieckiego i powstanie Federacji Rosyjskiej* (Kraków, 2001), 12–146.