

Janusz T. Hryniewicz

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7539-2331>

Institute of the Americas and Europe, University of Warsaw

The impact of processes of long duration on the cultural potential for economic development in the peripheries of the European Union

Streszczenie: Czynniki kulturowego potencjału rozwoju są: zamkniętość elity, styl kierowania, zaufanie i konserwatyzm. Opracowanie koncentruje się wokół dwu pytań badawczych: 1) Czy czynniki kulturowe mają wpływ na rozwój gospodarczy? 2) Czy czynniki kulturowe ważne dla rozwoju gospodarczego są efektem procesów długiego trwania, czy obecnego dostosowania się do pozycji w międzynarodowym podziale pracy? Badanie polega na porównaniu krajów, w których powstał kapitalizm (Anglia, Holandia) z krajami gospodarki folwarcznej (Czechy, Polska, Słowacja, Węgry). Wskaźnikami pozycji w międzynarodowym podziale pracy są: sektor usług biznesowych, przemysł i rolnictwo. Wskaźnikami rozwoju są: produktywność i PKB per capita. Badanie oparto na Europejskim Sondażu Społecznym (Round 6–8), danych OECD oraz Eurostatu. Czynniki kulturowe są skorelowane z rozwojem gospodarczym. Analiza regresji wykazała, że dla kulturowego potencjału prorozwojowego ważniejsza jest historia niż obecna pozycja w międzynarodowym podziale pracy. Wyniki badań wskazują na jednostronność teorii centrum–peryferie, która przeszacowuje siłę wpływu centrum na niedorozwój peryferii.

Abstract: The factors of cultural potential for economic development are: elite exclusion, management style, confidence, and conservatism. This study focuses on two research questions: (1) Do cultural factors affect economic development?; (2) Do cultural factors of significance to economic development derive from long-duration processes or from current adaptations within an international distribution of labour? The study compares countries where capitalism originated (United Kingdom, Netherlands) and historical manorial economies (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary). A country's position in the international distribution of labour is indicated by its business service sector, industry, and agriculture. Economic development is measured based on productivity and GDP per capita. The study is based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS Round 6–8), OECD, and Eurostat. Cultural factors correlate with economic development; a regression analysis demonstrates that in terms of development, history matters more for cultural potential than does the current position in the international distribution of labour. Survey results indicate that the core-periphery model is one-sided, overemphasising the influence the core has on the underdevelopment of the peripheries.



Słowa kluczowe: peryferie, kulturowy potencjał rozwoju, historia, międzynarodowy podział pracy

Keywords: peripheries, cultural potential for development, international distribution of labour

The purpose of the study and a description; of the key terms

The theoretical foundation for this study are the theories of core-periphery and of long-duration. Its purpose is to assess which of the two approaches best explains the relatively low *cultural potential for development* among the states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The first approach, called situational, ascribes the diminished cultural potential to the adaptation of the local elites to a peripheral role in the international distribution of labour. The second approach, dubbed cultural, treats the unfavourable distribution of cultural factors as a result of long-term historical tendencies shaping social attitudes in general. The cultural potential for development is defined as those elements of a culture that favour economic development (characterised further in the study).

The comparative nature of the study consists in applying a long-duration perspective and in comparisons between countries that developed manorial production institutions during the sixteenth century on the one hand, and Protestant states where capitalism and capitalist enterprises gained dominance on the other. Among the latter are England and the Netherlands.¹ As for historical manorial economies, the study discusses Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. (For a broader overview of the disparities between the two European economic models, see the section “The Position of States of Central and Eastern Europe in Core-Periphery Relations from the Perspective of Long-Duration Processes”.)

Current research identifies culture with concepts of significance for forming social behaviour. Thus, for instance, studies on the differences between national cultures of organisations have defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others”.² It should be noted here that this programming is historical in nature: “culture is passed on from one generation to another”.³ Meanwhile, according to Stefan Czarnowski, “culture is a common good and a common achievement, the fruit of the productive and reproductive efforts of countless generations”.⁴

¹ A. Mączak, *U źródeł nowoczesnej gospodarki europejskiej* (Warszawa, 1967), p. 88; J. Sachs, ‘Uwagi na temat nowej socjologii rozwoju gospodarczego’, in: *Kultura ma znaczenie*, ed. L.E. Harrison, S.P. Huntington, trans. S. Dymczyk (Warszawa, 2003), p. 91; J. Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną formą* (Kraków, 2011), p. 138.

² G. Hofstede, *Kultury i organizacje* (Warszawa, 2000), p. 375.

³ B. Malinowski, *Szkice z teorii kultury* (Warszawa, 1958), p. 30.

⁴ S. Czarnowski, ‘Kultura’, in: *Wiedza o Kulturze*, part 1: *Zagadnienia i Wybór Tekstów*, ed. G. Godlewski, L. Kolankiewicz, A. Mencwel, and M. Pęczak (Warszawa, 2001), p. 24.

The unification of behaviour within a culture takes place by way of patterns of action and value⁵ or through norms that define how one is supposed to act.⁶ Cultural patterns and values are expressed through attitudes and their aggregations, such as conservatism. From the perspective of research into economic behaviour, the most significant product of culture is its institutions – the rules that regulate and stabilise complex processes of exchange: “Institutions are man-made limitations that demand to be respected in every possible interpersonal interaction”.⁷ For the purposes of this analysis, the following definition will be applied: institutions are (formal and informal) social regulators of economic and political action that are deeply rooted in the past. The regulation of action takes place by way of inputs that define the extent of the margin of freedom individuals enjoy in pursuing their own goals.⁸ The effects of institutions include discrimination, privilege, autonomy, social distance, degree of power, methods of direction, equal opportunities, etc.

The theory of core–periphery (dependent development) and its current exponents. Criteria of centrality and peripherality in the European Union

The dependency theory (or core–periphery theory) is thought to have originated with the classic contributions of South American economist Raul Prebisch. Within the theory, dependency signifies that the contours and conditions of operation of economies of peripheral states are subjected to the demands of states of the centre. For the peripheries, relations with the core typically imply the primacy of the export sector as well as the exportation of raw materials and minimally processed products. The core seeks to establish a pricing structure that favours industrial states. The export sector of a peripheral state is of a *comprador* nature: separated from the rest of the country; it does not become an “engine” of economic development in the way that its counterparts in the core states do.⁹ International exchange is polarised – one side enjoys perpetual dominance and privilege, while

⁵ T. Parsons, *The Social System* (New York, 1951), pp. 15 and 46; A. Kłoskowska, *Socjologia kultury* (Warszawa, 1983), pp. 214 and 229; R. Benedict, *Wzory kultury*, trans. J. Prokopiuk (Warszawa, 1966), pp. 67–116.

⁶ F. Znaniecki, *Nauki o kulturze* (Warszawa, 1971), pp. 468–538.

⁷ D. North, ‘Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Performance’, *CATO Journal*, vol. 11, no. 3 (1992), 477–96 (p. 477); see also P.M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York, 1964), pp. 273–80.

⁸ Cf. D. Acemoglu, J.A. Robinson, *Dlaczego narody przegrywają. Źródła władzy, pomysłowości i ubóstwa*, trans. J. Łoziński (Warszawa, 2014), pp. 54 ff.

⁹ Cf. R. Prebisch, ‘Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries’, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, no. 2 (1959), 251–73.

the other is constantly dominated and disadvantaged.¹⁰ The dominance of the core is reinforced and expanded through international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, or the World Trade Organisation, as well as through international law.¹¹ The historical process of capitalist expansion has produced a stratified structure within which the capital city of a peripheral state and its export sector are dominated by the core but themselves serve, in turn, as a national centre for the surrounding territory.¹²

Control over the export sector and the national industries that contribute to it provides benefits to the elites of the periphery and reinforces the identification of their interest with the efficient exploitation of their country by the core. Members of the elites identify with the culture of the core, thus affecting its symbolic dominance. Actions that contribute to the welfare of the core are treated as the logical consequence of scientific truths. The culture of the peripheries, in turn, is typified by chaos. While the elites embrace the culture of the core, the rest of the population is under the influence of the products of a global infotainment sector that fosters aspirations which are impossible to fulfil in the native reality.¹³

Among the proponents of dependency theory, two perspectives have become established. The first, and also the dominant, proposes that the economic, political, and cultural hegemony of the core prevents the implementation of economic strategies of benefit to peripheral states, and, therefore, that peripheral states need to topple the hegemony of the core, extricate themselves from the world market with tariffs and trade barriers, and pursue a replacement of the extant export sectors with an expansion of industrial sectors of their own.¹⁴ The other minority perspective relies on the assumption that the dominance of the core is not complete and, thus, that elites in the peripheries retain the capacity to define their own behaviour in the world market. Here, the ideal is state-controlled industrial development based on group interests aligned with the demands of the development of the state without severing the link to the world market.¹⁵

During the 1980s, the limitations of productivity increases in the industry became apparent as the states of the core moved into the post-industrial era. Already in the 1970s, heavy industries began to lose their economic primacy, as exemplified by the decreases in their contribution to the domestic product in the states of the

¹⁰ T.T. Evers, P. von Wogau, “‘Dependencia’. Latynoamerykański wkład do teorii niedorozwoju”, trans. H. Szlajfer, in: *Ameryka Łacińska. Dyskusja o rozwoju*, ed. R. Stemplowski (Warszawa, 1987), p. 339.

¹¹ M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Imperium*, trans. S. Kołbaniuk, A. Kołbaniuk (Warszawa, 2005), pp. 23–30.

¹² A.G. Frank, ‘Rozwój niedorozwoju’, trans. H. Szlajfer, in: *Ameryka Łacińska. Dyskusja o rozwoju*, ed. R. Stemplowski (Warszawa, 1987), pp. 88–91.

¹³ J.A. Rodriguez, ‘Szlak poniewierki’, *Forum*, 16–22 June 2003.

¹⁴ D. Yergin, J. Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights. The Battle for the World Economy* (New York, 2002), pp. 232–44.

¹⁵ F.H. Cardoso, E. Faletto, *Zależność a rozwój w Ameryce Łacińskiej. Próba interpretacji socjologicznej*, trans. H. Siewierski, Z. Jakubowska (Warszawa, 2008), pp. 140 ff.

capitalist core, noted between 1975 and 1991. Relatively speaking, the greatest drops had been recorded in France (36.1 per cent to 21.2 per cent), the United Kingdom (26.5 per cent to 21.4 per cent), Italy (27.7 per cent to 22 per cent), and the United States (21.9 per cent to 17.4 per cent).¹⁶ Accordingly, the levels of employment in the industry lowered; for instance, within the G7, it had been 38.2 per cent in 1970 but only 23.7 per cent in 2007.¹⁷ *Meanwhile, business services (other than personal) took up the leading role.*

The contemporary world economy is undergoing transformations driven by a search for post-industrial sources of economic growth. Thus, Peter Drucker, author of the concept of 'knowledge economy' (or 'knowledge-based economy') believes that the factors of production – land, labour, and capital – have been supplemented with knowledge, not at the expense of capital, but in a primary capacity.¹⁸ According to the OECD, the term 'knowledge-based economy' describes the tendency among the developed states to assign an increasing role to knowledge, information, and high qualifications, accompanied by a rise in demand for these resources in the private and public sectors alike.¹⁹

The knowledge economy is exemplified by the 'learning organisation', that is, an organisation in any sector or branch of economy that enables and facilitates the intellectual development of its employees and consciously adapts itself and its surroundings.²⁰ Learning organisations develop with an increase in the knowledge and skills of the workers, achieved by way of an exchange of thoughts, ideas, and opinions about the pursuit of goals.²¹ It is thought that organisational knowledge is dispersed, possessed by all the members of the organisation. What this dispersal implies is that all employees must be involved in decision-making processes. The more successfully and comprehensively the given organisation embraces this employee involvement, the greater the use it will have of the knowledge resources of its employees. Learning organisations create unique organisational cultures, in which a key role is played by *the participatory style of leadership*. As the distance between the management and the subordinates decreases, a frank exchange of information is enabled, fostering favourable conditions for discussing errors on every level of hierarchy.²²

¹⁶ M. Klamut, *Ewolucja struktury gospodarczej w krajach wysoko rozwiniętych* (Wrocław, 1996), p. 169.

¹⁷ OECD Key ICT indicators 2009: OECD Dataset: ALFS Summary tables, 2009, http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ALFS_SUMTAB# (accessed: 26 Oct. 2010).

¹⁸ P. Drucker, 'Przyszłe społeczeństwo', *Przegląd Polityczny*, no. 62–63 (1999), 109–33.

¹⁹ OECD Knowledge-based economy, Definition (2005), <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6864> (accessed: 25 March 2009); B. Godin, 'The Knowledge-Based Economy: Conceptual Framework or Buzzword?', *Journal of Technology Transfer*, vol. 31 (2006), 17–30.


²⁰ M. Pedler, K. Aspinwall, *Przedsiębiorstwo uczące się*, trans. G. Waluga (Warszawa, 1999).

²¹ J.T. Hryniewicz, *Stosunki pracy w polskich organizacjach* (Warszawa, 2007), p. 246.

²² J. Rok, K. Olejniczak, 'Determinanty uczenia się i zarządzania wiedzą – synteza badań empirycznych', in: *Organizacje uczące się. Model dla administracji publicznej*, ed. K. Olejniczak (Warszawa, 2012), pp. 122–24.

The post-industrial transformation is followed by an unprecedented expansion of innovativeness. Thus, in 1985, 2,547 patent claims were made in the US; by 2013, that number increased to 58,944.

Fig. 1. Patent applications filed under the Patents Cooperation Treaty in selected countries.



Source: own calculations based on OECD data (OECD Patents, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PATS_IPC (accessed 10 March 2024)).

Together with globalisation, post-industrial transformations altered the hierarchy of importance of goods and sectors of the economy – without, however, altering the rules of the market exchange. The modernisation and the consequent universalisation of the core-periphery theory has been achieved thanks to Immanuel Wallerstein, who adapted arguments drawn from studies of South America during the industrial era to the study of contemporary global economic relations. Within the capitalist distribution of labour, one can distinguish between *core and peripheral production processes*. Peripheral production processes yield peripheral products; core production processes, in turn, account for core products. *Core products* are typified both by their novelty and by having a substantial share in the global trade exchange. For instance, during the eighteenth century, core processes produced textiles and steam engines; today, these have been displaced by electronic software and pharmaceuticals, as well as genetical engineering. Aside from the core and the periphery, Wallerstein also identifies semi-peripheral states in which the two types of production processes (of the core and of the periphery) exist to a relatively equal degree, such as South Korea or Brazil.²³ The lifespan of a core product is about 30 years; branches of industry that had once been prominent – such as textile or

²³ I. Wallerstein, *Analiza systemów światów. Wprowadzenie*, trans. K. Gawlicz, M. Starnawski (Warszawa, 2007), pp. 47–49.

steel production – eventually become sidetracked, decreasing productivity and moving into states of the periphery or semi-periphery.²⁴ Between 1967 and 1973, another stage of evolution of the capitalist world system began one in which major capitalists (in states of the core) moved their capital from production into finance. According to Wallerstein, this led core states to cease to function as centres of production and turn the focus to financial accumulation. As a result, financial speculation became a more important source of profit than production.²⁵

It follows from these observations that a new global distribution of labour is taking shape. The processes and products of industry become the processes and products of the periphery: they are handed over to rapidly industrialising states, the “factories of the world”. The emergence of new economies and the continuing demand for industrial products leads to the removal of industrial production into the peripheries. This is beneficial for the states of the core but also for those of the periphery, which experience greater long-term GDP increases than the former as a result.²⁶ What typifies the dominance of the core is a relatively high degree of development of the knowledge economy and the production of new, innovative goods in universal demand. The more the peripheries demand the products of the core that they cannot produce themselves, the greater the dominance of the core and its capacity to dictate prices.

These remarks suggest that *core-periphery status depends on innovativeness, the share of business services in employment, the share of agriculture and industry in employment, leadership style, GDP per capita, and productivity.*

Let us now see how the criteria of core-periphery status relate to long-duration processes.

In terms of key economic markers – GDP per capita and productivity – states with capitalist traditions rank above the EU average. This is accompanied by a very high placement in the innovativeness ranking and a substantial share of business services in the labour market. These facts justify the inclusion of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom among the core of post-industrial Europe. States with manorial traditions are a fairly homogeneous cohort, though Czechia ranks somewhat higher in terms of innovativeness, and Poland exhibits a slightly more archaic economic structure, with a relatively high share of employment in agriculture and industry. States in this cohort rank below the EU average in GDP per capita and productivity. As far as innovativeness and the share of employment in the business service sector are concerned, CEE countries lag behind the UK and the Netherlands, justifying their identification as the peripheries of the EU.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁵ I. Wallerstein, *Koniec świata jaki znamy*, trans. M. Bilewicz, A.W. Jelonek, and K. Tyszka (Warszawa, 2004), pp. 64 and 80–81.

²⁶ J.T. Hryniewicz, ‘Core-Periphery – An Old Theory in New Times’, *European Political Science*, vol. 13 (2014), 235–50.

Table 1. States that developed capitalist economies (United Kingdom, Netherlands) and manorial economies (Czechia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia) during the sixteenth century

	GDP per capita ⁱ	Placement in Global Innovation Index	Productivity (GDP per work-hour in euros)	Share of employment – business services ⁱⁱ (in per cent)	Share of employment – industry and agriculture ⁱⁱⁱ (in per cent)
Netherlands	46.7	5	67.7	45.1	19.9
United Kingdom	37.8	4	58.3	44.7	18.7
Czechia	20.9	24	42.0	28.8	32.0
Hungary	14.9	35	38.1	26.5	34.4
Poland	13.9	38	41.1	25.6	41.4
Slovakia	17.2	39	43.8	26.7	37.9
EU 28	32.8	-	54.3	-	-

ⁱ 2019 market prices in thousand euros.

ⁱⁱ Share of persons employed in (knowledge-intensive) business services in a representative national sample (ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016), in per cent (without personal services).

ⁱⁱⁱ Share of persons employed in agriculture and industry in a representative national sample (ESS Round 6–8).

Source: ‘Gross domestic product at market prices’, 2019, Eurostat Data Browser, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00001/default/table?lang=en> (accessed: 20 Dec. 2020); Dutta S., Lanvin B., and Wunsch-Vincent S. (eds), *Global Innovation Index 2020: Who Will Finance Innovation?*, 13th edn, World Intellectual Property Organisation, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2020); OECD Data, ‘GDP per hour worked’, <https://data.oecd.org/lprdy/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm> (accessed 16 Dec. 2022); own calculation based on ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016.

Cultural aspects of the peripheral status of Eastern Europe

Globally speaking, Poland and other states of Central and Eastern Europe are semi-peripheral, but for the European economic core, they are its peripheries. A study review conducted by Erika Nagy and Judit Timár indicates that research into those states focuses on their peripheralisation primarily in terms of their post-Communist transformation and entry into the global capitalist system by way of European institutions. Peripherality is a complex notion that involves material phenomena, public discourse, and institutional practices.²⁷

²⁷ E. Nagy, J. Timár, ‘The (Re-)Production of Peripherality in Central and Eastern Europe’, *European Spatial Research and Policy*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2017), 5–16 (p. 10); I.T. Berent, B. Bugarcic, ‘Unfinished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’,

In the Eastern European discourse, the core is identified with the West. For the common people and elites of Eastern Europe alike, the conundrum that the West presents is that there are many things within it that Eastern Europeans would also want to possess. For Eastern European elites, the West is a challenge: how should one go about securing for one's own nation that which the people of the West already have? Attempts at an answer lead some of the elites to conclude that one must first create conditions that favour the production of that to which one aspires within their own state. For that to occur, more or less substantial changes have to take place in institutions as well as patterns of behaviour in the peripheral country. Other members of the elites are of the belief that such changes threaten the national identity and – as Nikolai Berdyaev, among others, has put it – that the West is the deathbed of the sacred symbolism of Europe's spiritual culture, which moves to the peripheries, due to their continuous ties to the Bible and to Jerusalem.²⁸

Owing to its wealth and the ever-changing ways of its multiplication, the elites of the West are required to implement ever more changes to increase efficiency in technology and institutions, which undermines established patterns of culture. Meanwhile, as Berdyaev puts it, “we detest the West *that we are always told to emulate*”;²⁹ a substantial section of Eastern European elites does not enjoy being relegated to the status of an “apprentice” and raise questions whether the “teachers” do not exploit their superiority to force those beneath them into adopting unfavourable solutions. According to this view, the low cultural potential for development is a result of pathological relations with the core.

For the purposes of this study, two research approaches will be distinguished. *The first, situational, claims that the cultural potential for the development of states in Central and Eastern Europe derives from their current rank within the international distribution of labour. The second, cultural, proposes that the current cultural condition is the result of processes of long duration.*

The culture of Central-European peripheries – situational approach

What the situational approach consists in is the belief that patterns of behaviour and values extant in Central and Eastern Europe are a product of the adaptation of the local states to their placement within the international distribution of labour – or, to the unequal relationship between the core and the peripheries.

Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 50, no. 4 (2015), 768–85; L. Faragó, K. Varró, ‘Shifts in EU Cohesion Policy and Processes of Peripheralisation: A View from Central Eastern Europe’, *European Spatial Research and Policy*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2016), 6–25.

²⁸ N. Bierdajew, *Głoszę wolność*, trans. H. Paprocki (Warszawa, 1999), pp. 154–55.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

The place of Central and Eastern Europe within the core-periphery system is defined by its subservience to the core. Among its features is the outsourcing of low-efficiency industrial production to Central and Eastern Europe. In this manner, the core helps reinforce an unfavourable economic structure and prolong the life of outdated production methods. For some scholars, these conditions justify a reading of Central and Eastern European realities in neo-colonial terms, as in Tomasz Zarycki's view of the Third Commonwealth of Poland as a colony of the West.³⁰ The core creates and maintains a network of economic relations that is beneficial for it, forcing the people of the peripheries to adapt.

What the situational approach promotes is a rejection of the notion that culture is typified by continuity – that patterns of behaviour established in the past can disrupt adaptation to contemporary economic relations, whereas lack of continuity would consist in unperturbed adaptation to the changing demands of the core. Serfdom, precarity, oppressive management style “constitute subsequent forms of adaptation of the peripheries to the structural position they occupy within the international distribution of labour”.³¹ For Kacper Pobłocki, on the other hand, a common fault in studies written from a cultural perspective is that they register analogies as continuities. The fact that two situations are similar does not indicate that one is a consequence of the other. “Human behaviour is the product of adaptation and learning from current experiences – which implies that, for instance, claims about the stigma of feudalism cannot be empirically verified”.³² (These issues will be addressed again in the section on the cultural approach.)

The cultural dominance of the core can take the shape of the so-called Orientalism or cultural imperialism. The latter consists in a uni-directional transfer of cultural patterns (from the core to the peripheries) that moulds the worldview of the elites based on the belief in the universality and superiority of Western economic, political, and cultural practices. For the rest of the population, the dominance of the core is exerted through products of Western culture industries.³³ The term ‘Orientalism’ was first applied to a diagnosis of relations between the West (core) and the Orient (periphery). According to Edward Said, it is a set of intergenerational theories and practices embedded in the consciousness of Western people as a system of knowledge about the Orient.³⁴ Orientalism is a Western tool for dominating, restructuring, and exerting power over the peripheries.³⁵ The notion complements the image of Western domination by combining economic and cultural supremacy; it can also

³⁰ T. Zarycki, *Peryferie. Nowe ujęcia relacji centro-peryferyjnych* (Warszawa, 2009), p. 207.

³¹ Id., ‘Modernizacja kulturowa i psychologiczna jako ideologia inteligenckiej hegemonii’, *Przegląd Socjologiczny*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2015), 45–68 (p. 51).

³² K. Pobłocki, *Kapitalizm. Historia krótkiego trwania* (Warszawa, 2017), p. 36.

³³ A. Srebrny-Mohammadi, ‘The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism’, in: *Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and The New International Order*, ed. P. Golding, P. Harris (London, 1997), pp. 49–68 (p. 49).

³⁴ E.W. Said, *Orientalizm*, trans. M. Wyrwas-Wiśniewska (Poznań, 2005), p. 36.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

prove useful in analyses of relations between Western Europe and its Central and Eastern European peripheries.³⁶

Within Europe's core-periphery system, Poland and other states of Central and Eastern Europe take on a para-colonial role, accompanied by a powerful cultural domination by the core, exemplified by the fact that the liberal elites in the peripheries identify the goals of the core as universal means for the emancipation of the peoples of the peripheries. As a result, the peripheral elites help the core exert cultural dominance over the inhabitants of the peripheries.³⁷

Reform projects of benefit to the core seem consistent with the interests of the elites in the CEE and present themselves as obvious consequences of scientific laws established and confirmed within the core. Ewa Thompson believes that the colonial mentality of the Polish elites is a deliberate choice made after 1989: the elites preferred to submit to a foreign hegemon rather than to engage in the arduous effort of constructing their own national identity.³⁸ Likewise, Wojciech Roszkowski affirms that the Polish power elites of 2005–2015 willingly subjected themselves to German interests.³⁹ The pro-Western tendencies and the rejection of national traditions in countries such as Poland resulted in the creation of unrealistic reform projects. What they produce is a dysfunction of political and economic institutions, corruption, and poverty. To avoid cultural chaos and the pathologies that it could breed, it is proposed that economic and political projects be rooted in local values and institutions, such as noblemen's republicanism, the ideals of the Solidarity Movement of 1980–1981, or the Church.⁴⁰

However controversial some of these claims may seem, they cannot be deemed entirely inadequate. It is beyond doubt that, for instance, prior to 2004, all of the countries in question engaged in an intense implementation of adaptation programmes based on cultural imitation, borrowing, or importation – something they continue to do, if less intensely. However, one must note that the symbolic dominance of the West over the elites and societies of Central and Eastern Europe is not all-encompassing: the populace is free to choose between the elites and their programmes. Thus, for example, Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes assert that the fact that the imitative programmes of Eastern-European elites not only forced the people to abandon their cultural mores but also failed to meet their expectations in terms of economic welfare, led the imitative elites to be ousted from power through elections in Poland as well as Hungary.⁴¹

³⁶ Zarycki, *Peryferie*; id., *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (London–New York, 2014).

³⁷ Zarycki, *Peryferie*, pp. 115 and 149.

³⁸ E. Thompson, 'Kolonialna mentalność polskich elit', *Europa*, no. 180 (15 Sep. 2007), <http://www.polishamericancongressnj.org/EwaThompson.htm> (accessed 16 Jan. 2021):8

³⁹ W. Roszkowski, *Kierunek targowica: Polska 2005–2015* (Kraków, 2019).

⁴⁰ Z. Krasnodębski, *Demokracja peryferii* (Gdańsk, 2003).

⁴¹ I. Krastev, S. Holmes, *Światło, które zgąsło. Jak Zachód zawiódł swoich wyznawców*, trans. A. Paszkowska (Warszawa, 2020).

This leads to the conclusion that a description of the relationship between culture and economic development (or underdevelopment) based on the analysis of the adaptation of the elites to core-periphery relations requires the addition of a fairly representative overview of popular attitudes because, in a democracy, the people choose their elite based on the cultural orientation that it exhibits. Furthermore, though parameters of participation in core-periphery relations, such as efficiency, labour, transformation of enterprises into learning organisations, innovativeness, rationalisations, or methods of management, depend on the attitudes of the elite, they do so all the more on the everyday decisions of millions of workers and managers.

Let us now turn to an account of the relationship between culture and placement in the international distribution of labour. For this purpose, we will first consider the results of research by Ronald Inglehart, which encompassed over a hundred countries between 1981 and 2014.⁴² What they indicate is the existence of a fairly clear correlation between popular attitudes and the economic development of a country. Economic development favours such personality traits as individualism, self-sufficiency, intellectual self-development, autonomy, and an aspiration to partake in decision-making processes at work and in public life. In states of the economic core, these attitudes occur in relative abundance.⁴³ What helps achieve this situation is a feature typical for knowledge economies: an economic structure in which traditional industries and agriculture contribute little while business services dominate, side by side with positions involving complexity and creativity. Studies into the features of work indicate that complexity furthers the acquisition of traits such as high moral standards, confidence, non-conformity, high self-assessment, and low proclivity for neuroses.⁴⁴ This implies that a high share of persons employed in the business service sector will correlate with increased levels of individualism, confidence, openness, and decreased levels of conservatism within the populace of the given state.

At its core, the situational approach rests on the assumption that the position of a country in the international distribution of labour shapes the culture of that country. One key and obvious indicator of a country's position in the international distribution of labour is the structure of sectors and employment in the economy of that country. Thus, one can expect that CEE countries of the same economic and employment structures as countries of the core would share a similar cultural potential for development.

⁴² R.F. Inglehart, *Cultural Revolution: People's Motivation are Changing and Reshaping the World* (Cambridge, 2018), p. 5.

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁴ M.L. Kohn, K.M. Słomczyński, *Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland* (Cambridge, 1990).

The cultural approach to questions of economic development

Although the cultural approach does not negate the claim that the economy affects culture, it does stress that the sphere of culture is autonomous from the economy and could exert an influence in the opposite direction, as well. Cultures can have an impact on the emergence of institutions and patterns of behaviour that favour development. Let us consider a few examples. The influx of American bullion to Europe in the sixteenth century resulted in prolonged stagnation in Spain and economic expansion in England and the Netherlands. During the same century, Poland and Sweden were both peripheral states with a comparable position in the international distribution of labour, but while Poland remained wedded to the apotheosised Sarmatian pastoralism, Sweden underwent a cultural change (adopting Protestant faith) and is now a leading knowledge economy. Italy's medieval capitalism waned, but it developed and expanded in the Netherlands and England following the spread of Protestant religions – though capitalist behaviours were already a part of the lifestyle and ethics of the local burghers.

According to Maria Ossowska, the lifestyle and morality of a group reflect its position and interests.⁴⁵ The religious precepts of Protestantism, specifying how one should live to achieve salvation, aligned with the demands of burgher morality, lending sacred legitimacy to specific class interests. A lifestyle sanctioned by religion became an argument in the struggle for power and prestige. It also served as an integrating principle for the nascent bourgeoisie, contributing to its sense of distinction.⁴⁶ New religious ideas – the cult of thrift, competition for salvation, asceticism, hard work, the requirement of individual study of the Bible (which contributed to the development of education and to intellectual flexibility) – endowed pro-market attitudes with the esteem of God's own decrees, valid for everyone, regardless of social class.⁴⁷

However, religion is not the only causal factor. In the eighteenth century, England and France represented similar degrees of industrial innovation.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it was in England, and not in France, that the rapid growth of further innovation occurred, their spread leading to the period known as the Industrial Revolution. In this case, the primary factors were: a cultural climate conducive to individual achievement;⁴⁹ the presence of institutions safeguarding individual freedom;⁵⁰

⁴⁵ M. Ossowska, *Moralność mieszczańska* (Wrocław, 1985).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ M. Weber, 'Asceza i duch kapitalizmu; Osobliwości kultury zachodniej; Drogi zbawienia i ich wpływ na sposób życia', in: *Szkice z socjologii religii – Max Weber*, transl. J. Prokopiuk, H. Wandowski, ed. S. Kozyr-Kowalski (Warszawa, 1984); id., *Etyka protestancka a duch kapitalizmu*, transl. J. Miziński (Lublin, 1994).

⁴⁸ G. Clark, *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World* (Princeton–Oxford, 2007), p. 304.

⁴⁹ D.S. Landes, *Bogactwo i nędza narodów*, trans. H. Jankowska (Warszawa, 2000), pp. 217ff.

⁵⁰ N. Ferguson, *Civilization. The West and The Rest* (New York, 2011), pp. 145 and 246.

a relative absence of privilege, political monopoly, and class barriers, or limitations on access to the market; and a progressive outlook among the elites.⁵¹ Evidently, in certain situations, cultural factors can strengthen or weaken the position of a state in the international distribution of labour. The case of Meiji-era Japan shows that a top-down cultural change driven by the local elites may significantly improve the economic situation of a country. These examples show that countries on a similar level of economic development could undergo substantial transformations, but they could equally as well remain wedded to tradition and forfeit the leadership role in the global economy.

These transformations can be enforced, as had been the case in Japan, but they can also take root of their own accord if the ground is fertile – such as the interests and ethics of burgher elites during the rise of Protestantism. Similarly, knowledge economies spread more widely during the 1980s, after the individual attitudes that favoured them became more common. Creativity, understood as a quantitatively meaningful personal orientation, had emerged during the 1960s, at a time when individualism, autonomy, and freedom clearly gained significance while conformist industrial virtues, such as obedience and duty, lost traction.⁵²

It should be noted that within Europe, the status of the core correlates with the development of the capitalist economy. In the seventeenth century, only England and the Netherlands had achieved that status. History shows that some countries abandon their peripheral status quickly, while others – such as Poland or Spain, both of whom were considered very wealthy in the sixteenth century – sink ever deeper into it. This indicates that the contents of a culture of the given peripheral state are more than just a set of patterns and values regulating the conditions of the state's adaptation to the demands of the core.

The position of states of Central and Eastern Europe in core–periphery relations from the perspective of long-duration processes

It is a peculiarity of states of Central and Eastern Europe that the development of their national economic cultures was disrupted by Communist organisational patterns for a period of over forty years, but the disruption proved to have been insignificant (Wittenberg 2015). The position of states of Central and Eastern Europe on the cultural map of Europe is a synthesis of two long-duration processes. One was the division of Europe between two cultural spheres – the Protestant and the Catholic – which began in the sixteenth century (with the Orthodox cultural

⁵¹ Acemoglu, Robinson, *Dlaczego narody*, pp. 86ff.

⁵² J.T. Hryniewicz, 'Gospodarka i osobowość w epoce przełomu postindustrialnego', *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 2 (205) (2012), pp. 81–100.

sphere developing earlier, in the eleventh century). The other consisted in the development of separate economic systems: while the Protestant countries of Western Europe became a breeding ground for capitalist enterprises, lands east of the Elbe saw an expansion of manorial farms. In the vast majority of the territory of the states discussed here, cultural patterns and institutions regulating manorial behaviours began to take shape and expand, fusing with patterns characteristic of the Catholic cultural sphere.

Scholars of institutional economics believe that the essential distinction between Eastern and Western Europe rests in the relatively high level of contiguity between the nobility's monopoly in economics and politics in the East, the difference being most apparent in the persistence of serfdom. According to the authors cited below, the economic and political differences began to gain prominence during the fourteenth century and intensified throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵³ In states of Central and Eastern Europe, serfdom persisted until the mid-nineteenth century. Jan Sowa, in turn, claims that the paths of progress of Western and Eastern Europe diverged due to factors that informed disparate forms of Medieval feudalism in the two regions. In Eastern Europe, there were no autonomous cities and no hierarchy to the noble estate.⁵⁴

The concept of Central and Eastern Europe signifies the presence of certain disparities within the region of Eastern Europe. Thus, Jerzy Kłoczowski believes that in the sixteenth century, Central and Eastern Europe was comprised of the territory of three kingdoms: Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian.⁵⁵ Hungarian scholars argue for the existence of perceivable differences between the Byzantine and 'Westernised' parts of the Eastern-European economic complex.⁵⁶ Within this diagnosis, the eastern part of the region consists of Russia, Romania, and Serbia, while their 'Westernised' neighbours are East Germany, Bohemia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states. Similar conclusions can be drawn from analyses by Samuel Huntington, for whom the boundary between Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity is a civilisational barrier.⁵⁷ For the purposes of this study, Central and Eastern Europe will be identified with the lands of four countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. The Baltic states are omitted due to the absence of studies on popular attitudes within them.

What case can be made concerning the cultural similarities among the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe? As far as this study is concerned, the focus will be on economic behaviours – within the countries in question, it was the manorial farm and the practice of serfdom that defined them. The people had to adapt to

⁵³ Acemoglu, Robinson, *Dlaczego narody*, pp. 126ff.

⁵⁴ Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało*, pp. 112ff.

⁵⁵ J. Kłoczowski, *Młodsza Europa* (Warszawa, 1998), p. 116.

⁵⁶ G. Konrád, I. Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York–London, 1979).

⁵⁷ S. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego*, trans. H. Jankowska (Warszawa, 1997).

both institutions; for this reason, they gradually developed cultural patterns of behaviour, distinct for landowners and stewards on the one hand, and working men on the other. Since the manorial farms operated in a similar fashion in all the countries in question, so did the cultural patterns share broad similarities.

Studies of long-duration processes (from the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century) pursued by Fernand Braudel illustrate the endurance across centuries of institutions and patterns of behaviour in countries of the Mediterranean Basin.⁵⁸ In Central and Eastern Europe, this endurance is marked by backwardness, a regional process of long duration.⁵⁹ A reading of the results of Jan Sowa's application of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic framework to the persistence of ideas and behaviour patterns across centuries leads to the conclusion that the behaviour patterns characteristic of a given national community are retained in the group subconscious even in the absence of the relevant institutions, as well as of group memory of their existence.⁶⁰ It takes a mere impulse, the initiative of a relatively small elite, for them to regain their power.

The emergence of economic dualism meant that the first experiences of suprafamilial economic cooperation took place in enterprises in the West, but in manorial farms in the East. Thus was the structure of fundamental ideas about group work established. These earliest experiences were a pre-recognition of reality and led to the formation of a set of axioms that shaped the cognition and understanding of new economic phenomena.⁶¹ These archetypes underwent historical evolution and a series of modifications consisting, in addition to, the deep and old experiences of new, unprecedented ones. Archetypes are transmitted as psychological methods of experiencing different situations or objects. What is heritable in them is a synthesis of the experiences in the shape of a generalised pattern of behaviour.⁶² The involvement of archetypes in inter-generational socialisation can lead to an eruption of original experiences and modes of action within radically different systemic conditions.

According to Andrzej Leder, the group conscious and the group unconscious contain complexes of archaic, extremely durable images. These images converge in a semantic field that enables a community to identify new events with what had happened in the past.⁶³ The Polish symbolic field justifies the dominance of the nobility, as well as that of the military and bureaucratic elites, and it recurs today in the shape of the manorial mentality found in enterprises and corporations.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ F. Braudel, *Historia i trwanie*, trans. B. Geremek (2nd edn, Warszawa, 1999).

⁵⁹ A. Sosnowska, *Zrozumieć zacofanie. Spory historyków o Europę Wschodnią (1947–1994)* (Warszawa, 2004), p. 19.

⁶⁰ Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało*.

⁶¹ Cf. C.G. Jung, *Psychologia przeniesienia*, trans. R. Reszke (Warszawa, 1997), pp. 5–14.

⁶² J. Prokopiuk, 'C.G. Jung, czyli gnoza XX wieku', in: C.G. Jung, *Archetypy i symbole. Pisma wybrane*, trans. and ed. J. Prokopiuk (Warszawa, 1993), p. 21.

⁶³ A. Leder, *Prześlona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej* (Warszawa, 2014), p. 12.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 91–100.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from studies based on behavioural approaches. Thus, Wojciech Morawski registers a clear tendency in Communist political and economic institutions to drift toward a feudal model.⁶⁵ The analysis of the position and attitudes of the popular classes in Poland between the fourteenth and twenty-first century conducted by Adam Leszczyński justifies the assertion that both mechanisms of power-wielding and behaviours of workers are fairly similar, whether in a manorial farm, a pre-war enterprise, a socialist workplace, or a private company in the Third Commonwealth.⁶⁶

These studies indicate quite unambiguously that *the aforementioned cultural continuity takes the shape of similar group reactions in similar economic, political (etc.) conditions. The cultural approach does not negate the impact of international economic relations on the cultural potential for development in the peripheral states. However, this approach contends that the endogenous cultural processes have a greater impact.*

Neo-manorial patterns of behaviour, such as large distances from power, autocratic tendencies, lack of confidence, worker apathy, collectivism, or distaste for market solutions continue to figure in the activities and organisational practices within countries of Central and Eastern Europe.⁶⁷ As Adam Leszczyński's long-term analysis suggests, one indelible component of the formation in question that has persisted since the fourteenth up to the twenty-first century is the endurance of exclusionary institutions separating the elite from the rest of the society. First, it was separation between the estates, and then social distances that reinforced class boundaries and minimised chances of access to the elite. This is accompanied by a pronounced conservatism across all social strata. Labour relations are typified by a significant distance between the managers and the workers, lack of mutual confidence, and a top-down style of leadership.⁶⁸

Long-term studies on the significance of institutions for development and welfare indicate that a key role is played here by inclusive institutions, which influence the intensity of circulation of individuals between social positions, as well as of ideas, combine high qualifications with high social standing, and enable the exploitation of talents and skills. Meanwhile, exclusionary institutions minimise chances for equality and reinforce privilege and discrimination.⁶⁹ The persistence of class and status boundaries in group work organisations results in the isolation of groups, diminished flow of personnel and ideas, and mutual doubt and distrust. This is accompanied by a mutual lack of confidence between the workers and the managers, autocratic leadership, absence of worker initiative

⁶⁵ W. Morawski, *Socjologia ekonomiczna* (Warszawa, 2001), p. 162.

⁶⁶ A. Leszczyński, *Ludowa historia Polski* (Warszawa, 2020), pp. 528.

⁶⁷ J.T. Hryniewicz, *Polska na tle historycznych podziałów przestrzeni europejskiej oraz współczesnych przemian gospodarczych, społecznych i politycznych* (Warszawa, 2015), pp. 89 ff.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Acemoglu, Robinson, *Dlaczego narody*, pp. 477ff.

(improvements), and lack of exploitation of worker qualifications.⁷⁰ Increased work efficiency is achieved through top-down initiatives that typically draw resistance from the workers.

The analysis and preliminary overview of the data on the countries in question indicate that *the elements of culture that deserve further attention include: the exclusiveness of the elites; leadership style; and conservatism. The sum of these factors defines the cultural potential for development.*

Methodology

Research Questions

The above description of the two approaches leads to the following research questions:

1. Is there a relationship between specific cultural factors and economic development?
2. Do cultural factors of significance for economic development derive from the placement in the international distribution of labour, or are they rather the product of long-duration historical processes?

The answer to the former question will consist of a calculation of the relations between cultural factors and markers of economic development, using the Pearson correlation coefficient. To answer the latter question, factors of cultural potential for development among employees in the business service sector will be compared to that of the others. A similarity in these factors in CEE countries to analogous factors in the business service sector in traditionally capitalist countries will testify to the primacy of adaptation to the placement in the international distribution of labour over long-duration historical processes. The absence of such a similarity will serve as proof for the claim that long-duration historical processes have a greater significance.

The SPSS data set

Calculations will be based on data from the European Social Survey and supplementary economic data. The SPSS data set, containing the results of the European Social Survey, Rounds 6–8, contains data for the six countries under consideration, derived and weighted (design + population size), and supplemented with markers for economic development.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Hryniewicz, *Stosunki pracy*, pp. 186ff.

⁷¹ ESS 1–9, European Social Survey 2002–2022, <https://ess.sikt.no/en/?tab=overview> (accessed: 20 Dec. 2022).

The set contains over 30,000 observations. Information concerning GDP per capita in market prices was drawn from the Eurostat database,⁷² and data on productivity was derived from the OECD database.⁷³

The selection of countries under analysis and the operationalisation of cultural factors

Since the cultural approach focuses on long-duration processes, one needs to identify countries that took divergent paths of development at a similar moment in time. The comparison will involve countries that developed manorial production institutions in the sixteenth century on the one hand and Protestant countries in which capitalism and capitalist enterprises took root during that period on the other. The former include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia; the latter – England and the Netherlands.⁷⁴ The choice of countries was determined by the accessibility of information on socio-cultural factors in international databases.

For the purpose of measurement of the relevant phenomena, several variables have been determined.

1. The first is the conservatism-openness variable. The operationalisation of conservatism is based on the findings of Richard Florida, who studied the innovativeness of cities in the US. In his research, he established that innovativeness results from a ‘peculiar social mobility’ consisting in the emergence of communities with a high degree of intellectual openness, curiosity, and susceptibility to new ideas and lifestyles.⁷⁵ This openness is of an integral character and consists in the willingness to entertain new ideas in various parts of life, a tolerance for diverse sexual or religious behaviours, and other behaviours. In addition, members of progressive communities believe that immigrants provide a necessary source of the labour force and that newcomers from diverse cultures are not a threat but a benefit to the local culture.⁷⁶ Similar results were obtained by Katarzyna Wojnar in her study of the Polish creative class.⁷⁷ One should add here the self-explanatory assumption that conservative people tend to exhibit a relatively strong attachment to tradition.

These findings provide a foundation for the establishment of a scale of conservatism-openness. The several potential indicators have been subjected to a factor

⁷² ‘Gross domestic product at market prices’, 2019, Eurostat Data Browser, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00001/default/table?lang=en> (accessed: 20 Dec. 2020)

⁷³ OECD Data, ‘GDP per hour worked’, <https://data.oecd.org/lprdy/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm> (accessed 16 Dec. 2022).

⁷⁴ Mączak, *U źródeł*, p. 88; Sachs, ‘Uwagi’, p. 91; Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało*, p. 138.

⁷⁵ R. Florida, ‘The Rise of the Creative Class: Why Cities Without Gays and Rock Bands Are Losing the Economic Development Race’, *Washington Monthly*, 1 May 2002, <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2002/05/01/the-rise-of-the-creative-class/> (accessed 17 March 2024).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ K. Wojnar, *Polska klasa kreatywna* (Warszawa, 2016), pp. 163 and 215.

analysis, which indicated that the greatest accuracy is achieved with variables gained from answers to four questions:

- In your opinion, is the fact that people from other countries come to live in this country generally beneficial or detrimental to the economy of this country?
- In your opinion, is the fact that people from other countries come to live in this country generally beneficial or detrimental to the cultural life in this country?
- Should homosexual people, gays and lesbians, enjoy the freedom to regulate their own lives according to their beliefs?
- To what degree is each of these persons similar or dissimilar to you? The person attaches great significance to tradition. They try to act in accordance with religious or family traditions.

The variables were standardised and added together. Then, the resulting variable was inscribed on a centile scale (1–10). This scale was confronted with the innovativeness ranking of 238 European regions. Among them, the 25 ranked highest for innovativeness place below the average for conservatism. Meanwhile, the 25 regions ranked least innovative place above that average.⁷⁸

2. The second variable measures the exclusiveness of the elites, defined as inequality of opportunities in access to the highest wages. This is marked by a disproportionately high incidence of persons whose fathers were managers or specialists among the wealthy elite. A high value reflects the presence of barriers between the upper classes and the rest of the society and the heritability of privilege. The exclusiveness of the elites is a synthesis of cultural differences, social distances, and tensions between different classes and strata. The measure will be described as an “indicator of the exclusiveness of the earnings elite”. The focus is on the positions occupied by the fathers of the respondents when they were 14 years old. The guiding assumption is that equality of opportunities occurs when the percentage of a given group in the highest (10th decile) earning bracket is the same as the percentage of that group in the population of the fathers. For specific countries, the persons in the 10th decile of earnings whose fathers were managers or specialists are counted separately, the percentage of their contribution to the earnings elite being divided by the share of their group in the population of the fathers.

3. Confidence in people (and their honesty) and national institutions (the parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, and parties). The relationship between confidence and economic development has been meticulously recorded through international studies, such as that conducted by Francis Fukuyama.⁷⁹ Answers to the questions (on a 0–10 scale) have been added together, resulting in a variable of 0 to 70.

⁷⁸ Own calculations based on: European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, *Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2019*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, p. 18 (accessed: 13 Feb. 2021); and ESS round 6–8.

⁷⁹ F. Fukuyama, *Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu*, trans. A. Śliwa (Warszawa–Wrocław, 1997).

4. Leadership style variable. The significance of leadership styles consists in their decisive impact on the capacity to form knowledge organisations: a top-down leadership style limits it, while a participative style based on the involvement of subordinates in decision-making processes increases it. In addition, participative leadership styles favour individual initiative among the workers and improve efficiency.⁸⁰ The variable adds together responses to two questions (on a 1–10 scale): whether the respondent has an influence on the organisation of daily work; and whether their own opinion is taken into account in the organisation's policy.

Markers of economic development:

5. GDP per capita, market-value adjusted.

6. Productivity (worker efficiency) – GDP value per work hour.

Variable defining the placement in the international distribution of labour:

7. Employment in the business-service sector (without personal services) or industry/agriculture.

Relationship between cultural factors and economic development

The table presented below illustrates a relatively strong relationship between cultural factors and economic development.

Table 2. Cultural and structural factors and economic development. Factors of Pearson correlation.

Cultural factors	Indicators of economic growth	
	Productivity (worker efficiency)	GDP per capita
Conservatism-openness	.374*	.211*
Leadership style	.253*	.179*
Exclusiveness of the elites	-.743*	-.381*
Confidence in people and national institutions	.270*	.278*

* Correlation is significant at 0.01 (two-tailed).

Source: own calculations based on ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016; and OECD Data, 'GDP per hour worked', <https://data.oecd.org/lprdyt/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm> (accessed 16 Dec. 2022).

Cultural factors are more significant for efficiency than for the GDP. High productivity requires a low degree of conservatism and lessened social distances,

⁸⁰ Hryniewicz, *Stosunki pracy*.

while GDP benefits the most from lessened distances, greater confidence in people and national institutions, and low conservatism.

It must be stressed that correlation does not automatically imply a cause-and-effect relationship. The connection between economic development and cultural factors is interactive. This leads to the question of which of the vectors of interaction is more significant – from culture to the economy or from the economy to culture? At the root of this analysis is the belief that among the cultural factors described here, the vector from culture to the economy explains a far greater extent of human behaviour than does the other. What follows is the argument for this case.

Let us assume that our task is to explain the degree of divergence in development between two groups of countries, A and B, among which, the population of A-countries is more conservative than that of B-countries. The fundamental elements of economic development are improvement, rationalisation, and innovation, without which there can be no productivity or GDP increase. Which of the countries will see more innovations? Obviously, the less conservative B-countries. Thus, culture precedes innovation and economic development.

Table 3. Cultural potential for development of traditionally capitalist countries and post-manorial economy countries (averages)

Countries	Leadership style (0–20 scale; low value = low worker involvement in decision-making)	Exclusiveness of elites	Confidence in people and national institutions (0–70 scale)	Conservatism- openness (1–10 scale; low value = high conservatism)
Czech Rep.	8.2	3.1	28.9	3.9
UK	11.5	2.1	33.4	5.6
Hungary	6.7	8.4	29.8	3.6
Netherlands	11.3	2.1	39.1	6.6
Poland	8.8	6.5	23.7	4.9
Slovakia	7.2	3.1	23.2	3.4
Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Slovakia	7.9	5.6	27.6	4.1
Netherlands, UK	11.4	2.1	36.0	6.1

Source: own calculations based on ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016.

Let us now assume that A-countries mostly exhibit a top-down model of leadership, whereas B-countries see more participative approaches. Studies of Polish enterprises indicate that the less efficient departments tend to be led more autocratically than the more efficient departments. In addition, the autocratic style of leadership prevents the workers from engaging in rationalisation.⁸¹ Is it possible that, *ceteris paribus*, the departments increase efficiency before the leaders change their leadership styles? If so, then to a very limited degree. The vast majority of cases align with the thesis that the departments are less efficient because of the autocratic leadership style. The same is true for other cultural factors.

The distribution of all cultural factors of significance for economic development is clearly unfavourable in post-manorial economies. However, certain peculiarities deserve attention. For instance, the level of conservatism is clearly lower in Poland than in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In turn, the level of exclusiveness of the elites is surprisingly low in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, compared to other CEE states. The core-periphery disparities, though readily apparent, are not dramatic.

Cultural factors significant for economic development – are they the effect of placement in the international distribution of labour, or rather a historical sediment of culture?

The tables below provide the constituent elements of the answer to the question of *whether cultural factors significant for economic development are the effect of placement in the international distribution of labour or rather the product of long-duration historical processes*. To that end, averages will be calculated of variables describing the cultural potential for development among employees of the business service sector in traditionally capitalist countries and in post-manorial economies. For the sake of clarity, “national” values are also included. Should it transpire that the average of a variable in the business service sector is similar in both groups of countries, it will signify that work in the business service sector equalises the level of cultural potential for development in the countries in question. If, however, the average values of the variables in the business service sector are disparate in the two groups of countries, the most likely conclusion will be that long-duration historical processes have a greater significance for the cultural potential for development.

In post-manorial economies, workers in the business service sector are almost as conservative as other workers. In traditionally capitalist countries, the difference is more apparent. Placement in the international distribution of labour does not explain the disparities in levels of conservatism among the two studied groups of countries.

⁸¹ Hryniewicz, *Stosunki pracy*, pp. 116 and 166.

Table 4. Values of the variable conservatism-openness (1–10 scale) among the cohort of all workers and workers in the business service sector in traditionally capitalist countries and post-manorial economies.

	Traditionally capitalist countries	Post-manorial economies
All workers	6.1	4.1
Workers in business service sector	6.5	4.2

Source: own calculations based on ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016.

Table 5. Values of the variable for leadership style (0–20 scale) among all workers and workers in the business service sector in traditionally capitalist countries and post-manorial economies.

	Traditionally capitalist countries	Post-manorial economies
All workers	11.4	7.9
Workers in business service sector	11.9	8.7

Source: own calculations based on ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016.

In both groups of countries, the leadership style is comparatively less autocratic in the service sector. The bottom row of the table indicates that managers in CEE countries are relatively more autocratic in every sector. Long-duration historical processes affect leadership styles to a far greater degree than does the placement in the international distribution of labour.

The connection between confidence and the exclusiveness of the elites on the one hand and sectors of the economy on the other is not apparent in CEE countries. This suggests that placement in the international distribution of labour has no impact on a substantial portion of the cultural potential for development.

Results of studies support the conclusion that placement in the international distribution of labour offers a fairly weak explanation for disparities in the cultural potential for development among the two studied groups of countries. Even if countries of the core and those in CEE shared an identical economic structure, the cultural potential for development of CEE countries would still be lower.

Summary and conclusion

The adaptation of the core-periphery theory to modern times consists in a redefinition of the position of the core. What marks it out today is its primacy in

fostering the knowledge economy. A combination of the core-periphery theory and long-duration analysis has led to the establishment of the category of cultural potential for economic development.

The analysis of the data has indicated the existence of a clear and fairly strong relationship between cultural factors (exclusiveness of the elites, confidence in people and national institutions, leadership style, and conservatism–openness) and economic development. These factors contribute to the cultural potential for development, which is evidently higher in core countries than in peripheral countries. The low cultural potential for development in CEE countries is affected by their placement in the international distribution of labour only to a minor degree. Of far greater significance are the long-duration cultural processes. The legacy of the manorial farm is still in evidence in the countries discussed here.

The category of cultural potential for development is applicable beyond the attitudes of people within enterprises. For instance, studies on the use of developmental aid from the European cohesion policy show that the knowledge and technological advancement that contributed to the development of many economies are not easily replicated in other cultural and social contexts.⁸² This applies to some of the applications of European funds in CEE countries.⁸³ Occasionally, they are used for purposes unaligned with the developmental needs of the states.⁸⁴ Where they tend to be expended is for improvements to conditions of life and of the biological environment, but their impact on development is far more limited.⁸⁵ Ambitious goals of innovation formulated in the Lisbon strategy are replaced on the state level with more easily achievable ones, restricted to expansions to the infrastructure.⁸⁶ It has to be stressed that the allocation of funds depends on the decision of entities within the recipient country, from individual enterprises up to the national government.

The aforementioned conservatism results in the allocation of EU resources for CEE countries according to the industrial paradigm of development and a failure to address the demands of an innovative knowledge economy. Thus, the ‘Research and Innovation’ goal for 2014–2020 received 18.8 per cent of EU funds in Estonia and 16 per cent in Slovenia and Slovakia, while in other CEE countries, that value was in the 5–11 per cent range. In the Netherlands, expenses toward the same goal account for 34.7 per cent of the EU funds allocated, in Luxembourg – 24.7 per cent,

⁸² D. Wojtowicz, *Pomoc rozwojowa. Sukces czy porażka?* (Warszawa, 2019), p. 61.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 232ff.

⁸⁴ G. Medve-Bálint, ‘The Cohesion Policy on the EU’s Eastern and Southern Periphery: Misallocated Funds?’, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2018), 218–38.

⁸⁵ G. Gorzelak, ‘Wykorzystanie środków Unii Europejskiej dla rozwoju kraju – wstępne analizy’, *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*, vol. 57, no. 3 (2014), 5–25 (pp. 18ff.).

⁸⁶ M. Kozak, ‘Deklarowane a rzeczywiste priorytety rozwoju’, in: *Polska europejska czy narodowa?*, ed. M. Jarosz (Warszawa, 2014), pp. 143–52.

in Germany – 21.7 per cent, and in Denmark – 22.2 per cent.⁸⁷ Clearly, as had been the case during the sixteenth century, the wealth floating into Poland and other CEE countries is not put to full use.

Discussion

The key problem in core-periphery relations is that the core produces a vast array of quality objects that the inhabitants of the periphery would like to own. As a result, the CEE countries discussed here follow an imitative model of development. Optimal results are achieved when the imitative model is combined with endogenous factors. However, solutions drawn from abroad do not always yield the desired effects due to cultural maladaptation. The degree to which it is a factor depends on the cultural distance between the core and the periphery. Results presented in Table 3 indicate that the differences between CEE countries and countries of the core as regards such cultural factors as leadership style, confidence in people and institutions, and conservatism are far from dramatic. As a consequence, the imitative model of development adopted in CEE countries does not eventually lead to anomie and adapts fairly well to the existing cultural framework. Thus, studies into the role of administration in the implementation of cohesion policies in CEE countries show that the efficiency of the administration increased at a greater pace than expected by many commentators.⁸⁸

The core-periphery theory would become more useful if scholars focused more on explaining the developmental potential of the peripheries. Further research should adopt a progressive attitude by diagnosing economic and cultural disparities. That would serve as a good point of departure for establishing whether endogenous factors of development are sufficient and if external interventions are required.

Abstract

The theoretical background for further considerations will be the theory of the centre-periphery and the theory of long-term processes. The aim of the study is an attempt to assess which of the two research approaches better explains the relatively low cultural development potential of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The first, situational approach says that the low cultural development potential is a consequence of adapting to the contemporary peripheral position in the international division of labour. The second, cultural approach says

⁸⁷ 'Breakdown of the Available Funds by Thematic Objective by MS for 2014–2020', Cohesion Open Data Platform, European Commission, <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2014-2020/Breakdown-Of-The-Available-Funds-By-Thematic-Objec/3sv6-s5nd/data> (accessed: 20 Nov. 2018).

⁸⁸ J. Bachtler, C. Mendez, and H. Oraže, 'From Conditionality to Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe: Administrative Performance and Capacity in Cohesion Policy', *European Planning Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4: *Spatial Planning in the Baltic States: Impacts of European Policies* (2014), 735–57.

that the state of cultural factors, which are unfavourable to development, is a consequence of long-term historical trends that shape the attitudes of the general population.

The comparative perspective will consist in referring to the processes of long duration and comparing the countries that developed farm production institutions in the sixteenth century with the Protestant countries in which capitalism and capitalist enterprises arose and spread. Such countries are England and the Netherlands. The countries of the farm economy are: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Position indicators in the international division of labour are: business services sector, industry and agriculture. The indicators of development are; productivity and GDP per capita. The cultural potential of development is created by: low level of conservatism, openness of the elite, management style, trust in people and institutions. The study was based on the European Social Survey (Round 6-8), OECD and Eurostat data. Calculations showed that cultural factors are correlated with economic development. History is more important to the cultural development potential than the current position in the international division of labour. The research results indicate one-sidedness of the centre-periphery theory, which overestimates the strength of the centre's influence on the underdevelopment of the periphery.

References

- Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A., *Dlaczego narody przegrywają. Źródła władzy, pomyślności i ubóstwa*, transl. J. Łoziński (Warszawa, 2014).
- Bachtler J., Mendez C., and Oraže H., 'From Conditionality to Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe: Administrative Performance and Capacity in Cohesion Policy', *European Planning Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4: *Spatial Planning in the Baltic States: Impacts of European Policies* (2014), 735–57.
- Benedict R., *Wzory kultury*, transl. J. Prokopiuk (Warszawa, 1966).
- Berend I.T., Bugarcic B., 'Unfinished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 50, no. 4 (2015), 768–85.
- Bierdziejew N., *Głoszę wolność*, trans. H. Paprocki (Warszawa, 1999).
- Blau P.M., *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York, 1964).
- Braudel F., *Historia i trwanie*, trans. B. Geremek (2nd edn, Warszawa, 1999).
- 'Breakdown of the Available Funds by Thematic Objective by MS for 2014–2020', Cohesion Open Data Platform, European Commission, <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2014-2020/Breakdown-Of-The-Available-Funds-By-Thematic-Objec/3sv6-s5nd/data> (accessed: 20 Nov. 2018).
- Cardoso F.H., Faletto E., *Zależność a rozwój w Ameryce Łacińskiej. Próba interpretacji socjologicznej*, trans. H. Siewierski, Z. Jakubowska (Warszawa, 2008).
- Clark G., *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World* (Princeton–Oxford, 2007).
- Czarnowski S., 'Kultura', in: *Wiedza o Kulturze*, part 1: *Zagadnienia i Wybór Tekstów*, ed. G. Godlewski, L. Kolankiewicz, A. Mencwel, and M. Pęczak (Warszawa, 2001).
- Drucker P., 'Przyszłe społeczeństwo', *Przegląd Polityczny*, no. 62–63 (1999).
- Dutta S., Lanvin B., and Wunsch-Vincent S. (eds), *Global Innovation Index 2020: Who Will Finance Innovation?* 13th edn, World Intellectual Property Organisation, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2020).
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, *Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2019*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2019 (accessed: 13 Feb. 2021).
- ESS Round 6–8, European Social Survey Cumulative File (ESS 1–8), Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, 2016, doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS-CUMULATIVE.

- European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), UK Data Service (2018), <https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=200014> (accessed: 20 May 2018).
- Evers T.T., Wogau P. von, "Dependencia. Latinoamerykański wkład do teorii niedorozwoju", transl. H. Szlajfer, in: *Ameryka Łacińska. Dyskusja o rozwoju*, ed. R. Stemplowski (Warszawa, 1987).
- Faragó L., Varró K., 'Shifts in EU Cohesion Policy and Processes of Peripheralization: A View from Central Eastern Europe', *European Spatial Research and Policy*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2016), 6–25.
- Ferguson N., *Civilization. The West and The Rest* (New York, 2011).
- Florida R., 'The Rise of the Creative Class: Why Cities Without Gays and Rock Bands Are Losing the Economic Development Race', *Washington Monthly*, 1 May 2002, <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2002/05/01/the-rise-of-the-creative-class/> (accessed 17 March 2024).
- Frank A.G., 'Rozwój niedorozwoju', transl. H. Szlajfer, in: *Ameryka Łacińska. Dyskusja o rozwoju*, ed. R. Stemplowski (Warszawa, 1987).
- Fukuyama F., *Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu*, trans. A. Śliwa (Warszawa–Wrocław, 1997).
- Godin B., 'The Knowledge-Based Economy: Conceptual Framework or Buzzword?', *Journal of Technology Transfer*, vol. 31 (2006).
- Gorzela G., 'Wykorzystanie środków Unii Europejskiej dla rozwoju kraju – wstępne analizy', *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*, vol. 57, no. 3 (2014), 5–25.
- 'Gross domestic product at market prices', 2019, Eurostat Data Browser, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00001/default/table?lang=en>. (accessed: 20 Dec. 2020).
- Hardt M., Negri A., *Imperium*, transl. S. Kołbaniuk, A. Kołbaniuk (Warszawa, 2005).
- Hofstede G., *Kultura i organizacje* (Warszawa, 2000).
- Hryniewicz J.T., *Stosunki pracy w polskich organizacjach* (Warszawa, 2007).
- Hryniewicz J.T., 'Gospodarka i osobowość w epoce przełomu postindustrialnego', *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 2 (205) (2012), 81–100.
- Hryniewicz J.T., 'Core-Periphery – An Old Theory in New Times', *European Political Science*, vol. 13 (2014), 235–50.
- Hryniewicz J.T., *Polska na tle historycznych podziałów przestrzeni europejskiej oraz współczesnych przemian gospodarczych, społecznych i politycznych* (Warszawa, 2015).
- Huntington S., *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego*, transl. H. Jankowska (Warszawa, 1997).
- Inglehart R.F., *Cultural Revolution: People's Motivation are Changing and Reshaping the World* (Cambridge, 2018).
- Jung C.G., *Psychologia przeniesienia*, trans. R. Reszke (Warszawa, 1997).
- Klamut M., *Ewolucja struktury gospodarczej w krajach wysoko rozwiniętych* (Wrocław, 1996).
- Kłoczowski J., *Młodsza Europa* (Warszawa, 1998).
- Kłoskowska A., *Socjologia kultury* (Warszawa, 1983).
- Kohn M.L., Słomczyński K.M., *Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland* (Cambridge, 1990).
- Konrad G., Széleyni I., *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York–London, 1979).
- Kozak M., 'Deklarowane a rzeczywiste priorytety rozwoju', in: *Polska europejska czy narodowa?*, ed. M. Jarosz (Warszawa, 2014).
- Krasnodębski Z., *Demokracja peryferii* (Gdańsk, 2003).
- Krastew I., Holmes S., *Światło, które zgasło. Jak Zachód zawiódł swoich wyznawców*, trans. A. Paszkowska (Warszawa, 2020).
- Landes D.S., *Bogactwo i nędza narodów*, transl. H. Jankowska (Warszawa, 2000).
- Leder A., *Prześlona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej* (Warszawa, 2014).
- Leszczyński A., *Ludowa historia Polski* (Warszawa, 2020).
- Malinowski B., *Szkice z teorii kultury* (Warszawa, 1958).

- Mączak A., *U źródeł nowoczesnej gospodarki europejskiej* (Warszawa, 1967).
- Medve-Bálint G., ‘The Cohesion Policy on the EU’s Eastern and Southern Periphery: Misallocated Funds?’, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2018), 218–38, doi:10.1007/s12116-018-9265-2.
- Morawski W., *Socjologia ekonomiczna* (Warszawa, 2001).
- Nagy E., Timár J., ‘The (Re-)Production of Peripherality in Central and Eastern Europe’, *European Spatial Research and Policy*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2017), 5–16, doi:10.1515/esrp-2017-0006.
- North D., ‘Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Performance’, *CATO Journal*, vol. 11, no. 3 (1992), 477–96.
- OECD Knowledge-based economy, Definition (2005), <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6864> (accessed: 25 March 2009).
- OECD Dataset: ALFS Summary tables, 2009, http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ALFS_SUMTAB# (accessed: 26 Oct. 2010).
- OECD Patents, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PATS_IPC (accessed 10 March 2024. This platform and its APIs have reached their end of life and will be switched-off at the end of May 2024. Data are not updated anymore).
- OECD Data, ‘GDP per hour worked’, <https://data.oecd.org/lprdy/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm> (accessed 16 Dec. 2022).
- Ossowska M., *Moralność mieszczańska* (Wrocław, 1985).
- Parsons T., *The Social System* (New York, 1951).
- Pedler M., Aspinwall K., *Przedsiębiorstwo uczące się*, trans. G. Waluga (Warszawa, 1999).
- Pobłocki K., *Kapitalizm. Historia krótkiego trwania* (Warszawa, 2017).
- Prebisch R., ‘Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries’, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, no. 2 (1959), 251–73.
- Prokopiuk J., ‘C.G. Jung, czyli gnoza XX wieku’, in: C.G. Jung, *Archetypy i symbole. Pisma wybrane*, trans. and ed. J. Prokopiuk (Warszawa, 1993).
- Rodriguez J.A., ‘Szlak poniewierki’, *Forum*, 16–22 June 2003.
- Rok J., Olejniczak K., ‘Determinanty uczenia się i zarządzania wiedzą – synteza badań empirycznych’, in: *Organizacje uczące się. Model dla administracji publicznej*, ed. K. Olejniczak (Warszawa, 2012).
- Roszkowski W., *Kierunek targowica: Polska 2005–2015* (Kraków, 2019).
- Rutkowski J., *Wież europejska późnego feudalizmu XVI–XVIII w.*, ed. J. Topolski (Warszawa, 1986).
- Sachs J., ‘Uwagi na temat nowej socjologii rozwoju gospodarczego’, in: *Kultura ma znaczenie*, trans. S. Dymczyk, ed. L.E. Harrison, S.P. Huntington (Warszawa, 2003).
- Said E.W., *Orientalizm*, trans. M. Wyrwas-Wiśniewska (Poznań, 2005).
- Sosnowska A., *Zrozumieć zacofanie. Spory historyków o Europę Wschodnią (1947–1994)* (Warszawa, 2004).
- Sowa J., *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną formą* (Kraków, 2011).
- Srebrny-Mohammadi A., ‘The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism’, in: *Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and The New International Order*, ed. P. Golding, P. Harris (London, 1997), pp. 49–68.
- Thompson E., ‘Kolonialna mentalność polskich elit’, *Europa*, no. 180 (15 Sep. 2007), <http://www.polishamericancongressnj.org/EwaThompson.htm> (accessed 16 Jan. 2021).
- Wallerstein I., *Koniec świata jaki znamy*, trans. M. Bilewicz, A.W. Jelonek, and K. Tyszka (Warszawa, 2004).
- Wallerstein I., *Analiza systemów światów. Wprowadzenie*, trans. K. Gawlicz, M. Starnawski (Warszawa, 2007).
- Weber M., ‘Asceza i duch kapitalizmu; Osobliwości kultury zachodniej; Drogi zbawienia i ich wpływ na sposób życia’, in: *Szkice z socjologii religii – Max Weber*, transl. J. Prokopiuk, H. Wandowski, ed. S. Kozyr-Kowalski (Warszawa, 1984).

- Weber M., *Etyka protestancka a duch kapitalizmu*, transl. J. Miziński (Lublin, 1994).
- Wojnar K., *Polska klasa kreatywna* (Warszawa, 2016).
- Wojtowicz D., *Pomoc rozwojowa. Sukces czy porażka?* (Warszawa, 2019).
- Yergin D., Stanislaw J., *The Commanding Heights. The Battle for the World Economy* (New York, 2002).
- Zarycki T., *Peryferie. Nowe ujęcia relacji centro-peryferyjnych* (Warszawa, 2009).
- Zarycki T., *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (London–New York, 2014).
- Zarycki T., 'Modernizacja kulturowa i psychologiczna jako ideologia inteligentnej hegemonii', *Przegląd Socjologiczny*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2015), 45–68.
- Znaniecki F., *Nauki o kulturze* (Warszawa, 1971).

Janusz T. Hryniewicz, prof.; director of the Institute of the Americas and Europe at the University of Warsaw; employee of the Center for European Regional and Local Studies (EUROREG). Author of 220 scientific publications, including the authorship or co-authorship of 12 books. He conducts research in the field of management, sociology of economy and regional studies as well as multiculturalism and human rights. The main research fields are: economic culture, knowledge-based global economy, international economic relations, inequalities and research on political systems and their relationship with the economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe.

His most important publications: *Polityczny i kulturowy kontekst rozwoju gospodarczego* (Warsaw, 2004); *Stosunki pracy w polskich organizacjach* (Warsaw, 2007); *Polska na tle historycznych podziałów przestrzeni europejskiej oraz współczesnych przemian gospodarczych, społecznych i politycznych* (Warsaw, 2015).
(j.hryniewicz@uw.edu.pl)

Submitted 30 May 2021; accepted 21 Sep. 2022