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BRITISH MEMORANDA ON CHANGING THE CURZON LINE IN 1944*

In Polish–British relations January 1944 was a consecutive time of pressure exerted by London on the Stanisław Mikołajczyk government to accept the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet border in return for the opportunity of going back home and assuming power. Leaders of the Western powers, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, consented to this frontier during the Teheran Conference held with the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin (27 November — 1 December 1943)¹. The settlement was kept secret, although in talks with representatives of the Polish government the British expressed in increasingly unambiguous terms their support for the conception of concessions envisaged as a price for Mikołajczyk's return to Poland². From 19 January 1944, the task of convincing the Polish Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues was also performed by Churchill, who came back to London after a two month–long absence³.

*English sources maintain the original spelling of names.

¹*Teheran–Jalta–Poczdam. Dokumenty konferencji szefów rządów wielkich mocarstw (Teheran–Yalta–Potsdam. Documents from the Conferences of the Heads of Great Power Governments)*, Warszawa 1972, pp. 81–83, 86–87.

²Talks held by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Eden and S. Mikołajczyk on 20 and 22 December 1943 and 11 January 1944: *Documents on Polish–Soviet Relations 1939–1945* (further as: *DOPSR*), vol. II: 1943–1945, London 1967, pp. 114–121, 134–136. Even the British ambassador O. O. Malley, favourably inclined towards Poland, joined this campaign of his own volition, and persuaded Mikołajczyk to concede as regards the eastern frontier, *ibidem*, pp. 122–123.

³The absence was caused by the Teheran meeting with Stalin and Roosevelt. The stay was prolonged due to pneumonia which Churchill contracted in North Africa, see: M. Gilbert, *Road to Victory, Winston S. Churchill*, London 1989, pp. 606–613; talks held by Churchill and Mikołajczyk on 20 January, 6 February and 16 February 1944, *DOPSR*, vol. II, pp. 144–149, 165–171, 180–187.

The appearance of the Red Army on the territory of the Second Republic (4 January 1944) meant that the Polish–Soviet conflict became distinctly more accentuated on the public arena and assumed the form of an exchange of declarations; having obtained the Teheran agreement of Churchill and Roosevelt to the Curzon Line, Moscow made its territorial claims in an increasingly brutal manner⁴. At the same time, Stalin conducted a policy of *faits accomplis* on terrains which, in the light of international law, belonged to the Polish state and were occupied by Soviet soldiers.

In those circumstances, on 12 February 1944 Professor Arnold Toynbee⁵, Head of the Research Department⁶ at the Foreign Office, presented Frank Roberts, Head of the Central Department (responsible for Polish affairs) with a memorandum entitled *Possible Adjustments of the Curzon Line*. In an enclosed brief note, Toynbee mentioned that he had been thinking for some time about eventual modifications of the Curzon Line which could help in achieving a Polish–Soviet agreement on the recognition of the Line as the foundation of a state frontier. Prior to the ultimate preparation of the memorandum, Toynbee consulted its contents with the Soviet and Polish sections of the Research Department

⁴Polish government declaration of 11 January 1944 on the crossing of the Polish border by Soviet troops, TASS communiqué of 11 January 1944, response of the Polish government of 14 January 1944, TASS declaration of 17 January 1944, *Sprawa polska w czasie drugiej wojny światowej na arenie międzynarodowej. Zbiór dokumentów (The Polish Question during World War II on the International Arena. Collected Documents)*, Warszawa 1965, further as: *Sprawa polska*, pp. 452–458.

⁵Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889–1975), graduate of Oxford University, member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (Near Eastern affairs), Professor at London University in 1919–1924, Head of the Foreign Research and Press Service and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1939–1943, Head of the Research Department in the Foreign Office in 1943–1946, member of the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. Author, i.a. of a multi-volume *A Study in History and the Survey of International Affairs*, initiated in the 1930s. His only publication on Poland is: *The Destruction of Poland; a Study in German Efficiency*, London 1916; a visit to Poland in April 1928 left pleasant impressions, see: *Toynbee papers*, Bodleian Library, Oxford, *Report by Prof. Toynbee on a Visit to Poland, Latvia and Lithuania*; for a bibliography of his works see: *A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee*, com. by S. Fiona Morton, Oxford 1980.

⁶The Research Department in the Foreign Office was established in April 1943 as a result of merging the Political Intelligence Department and the Foreign Research and Press Service, Public Record Office, London (further as: PRO), FO 371/39457, C 3239/140/44, circular by Eden of 29 June 1943 (Crown-copyright material in the PRO is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office).

and introduced slight corrections to the project. Nonetheless, he stressed that the whole text reflected his personal views⁷.

The memorandum was not written upon the direct request of British political authorities. The intention of the Research Department was to prepare material pertaining to assorted problems, including those concerning frontiers, which should be resolved in such a manner as to avoid territorial conflicts and the outbreak of another war⁸. Toynbee was familiar with the course of current events and tried to anticipate the potential requirements of his superiors, probably counting on the fact that the Poles would accept the Soviet conditions, commended by their British ally. His chief conception of leaving Lvov to Poland concurred with the stand accepted by the Research Department in the memorandum *Poland's Eastern Frontier* of 19 November 1943⁹, and with the views of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, presented on the eve of the Teheran Conference in a memorandum addressed to the War Cabinet (22 November 1943) and entitled *Possible Lines of a Polish-Soviet Settlement*¹⁰.

Among British politicians, as time passed, the concept of the Curzon Line assumed a certain mythical meaning. Apparently, Toynbee too, despite considerable knowledge about Central European issues, concluded that the Line was a just border, and, moreover, delineated in accordance with the ethnic criterion. The Line, which on 11 July 1920 Lord Curzon described in a telegram to Grigori Chicherin, the People's Foreign Affairs Commissar of Bolshevik Russia, as a truce line, coincided in the former Russian Empire with a project for a provisional Polish eastern frontier, proposed by the Supreme Council on 8 December 1919¹¹. The latter suggestion, however, did not take into consideration ethnographic conditions, and left numerous cohesive concentrations

⁷PRO, FO 371/39456, C 2049/140/55, memorandum of 12 February 1944.

⁸On the activity of the Foreign Research and Press Service, predecessor of the Research Department, see: R. H. Kesserlingk, *Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-1943 and Its Post-war Plans for South-east Europe*, "Journal of Contemporary History", vol. 21, 1986.

⁹PRO, FO 404/30, C 1482/1551/55, memorandum *Poland's Eastern Frontiers* of 19 November 1943.

¹⁰*The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941-1945. A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins*, ed. by A. Polonsky, London 1976 (further as: Polonsky), p. 160.

¹¹*Dokumenty z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej 1918-1939 (Documents from the History of Polish Foreign Policy 1918-1939)*, vol. 1: 1918-1932, Warszawa 1989, pp. 499-503.

of the Polish population outside Poland. The declaration of the Western powers, albeit made under the impact of Russian anti-Bolshevik politicians and in the conviction that the reconstruction of Russia, ruling over non-Russian nations, was indispensable for European political balance, guaranteed Poland the right to make claims as regards territories to the east of the proposed heretofore border.

The note signed by Curzon contains two contradictory truce lines in Galicia. The first, coordinated on 10 July 1920 during talks held in Spa by the Polish Prime Minister Władysław Grabski with representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, was to run along the front which at the time of the truce was occupied by the armies of both sides¹². Without obtaining the agreement of the Polish government, the Curzon telegram included a proposal of recognising that the truce line in Galicia would be the so-called "A" Line, suggested by the Commission on Polish Affairs during the Paris Peace Conference as a frontier between Poland and autonomous Galicia¹³. H. B a t o w s k i was correct when he wrote that the conference never made a formal decision which of the Lines — "A" or "B" — was to comprise the eastern Polish border in Galicia¹⁴. This fact was the outcome of the *a priori* assumed alternative nature of the lines. It is impossible to agree, therefore, with the thesis accepted by the Foreign Office many years later, in February 1944, that Line "A" constituted a frontier between Poland and Eastern Galicia, because such a view ignored an essential fact, namely that in this situation autonomous Eastern Galicia would have been part of the Polish state.

During World War II, when first the Soviet Union and then Great Britain began using the Lord Curzon telegram of 11 July 1920 to justify the territorial demands made by Stalin¹⁵, diplomats, historians and publicists grew interested in the reason for

¹²*Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, ed. by L. Woodward and R. Butler (further as: *DBFP*), series I, vol. VIII, London 1958, pp. 524–530.

¹³*DBFP*, series I, vol. III, London 1949, Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs no. 3 of 17 June 1919. Problem of Eastern Galicia on pp. 829–843. Here also a map showing the course of Line "A" and "B".

¹⁴H. B a t o w s k i, *Linia Curzona a była Galicja Wschodnia (The Curzon Line and Former Eastern Galicia)*, "Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich", 1968, vol. 3, pp. 173–174.

¹⁵Z. Z a k s, *Problem Galicji Wschodniej w czasie wojny polsko-radzieckiej (The Problem of Eastern Galicia during the Polish-Soviet War)*, "Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej". 1972. vol. VIII. p. 99.

such a considerable departure of the British from the original decisions made in Spa as regards the truce line in Eastern Galicia. Theoretically, British diplomacy, or rather the Research Department at the Foreign Office, should have been closest to determining the truth. Assorted studies, however, do not show that it tried to seek that truth, satisfying itself with a confirmation of the fact that the Lord Curzon note mentioned two divergent truce lines in Eastern Galicia¹⁶.

The contents of the Prof. Toynbee memorandum and the enclosed map demonstrate that their author treated Line "A" as a prolongation of the Curzon Line in Galicia¹⁷. The course of the Curzon Line was discussed at the Teheran Conference where Eden argued in favour of Line "B", i.e. leaving Lvov and the Drohobycz–Borysław basin to Poland, but did not win the support of Churchill or Roosevelt. During the plenary debates of the Big Three on 1 December 1943, the British Prime Minister declared that: "He was not going to break his heart about [...] Lvov"¹⁸. Although a precise division of Galicia was not performed at Teheran, Stalin could have gained the impression that his territorial demands were accepted by the Anglo–American leaders.

Toynbee proposed two changes of the Curzon Line — in the north and south. The first implied that Poland would hand over to the Soviet Union an area bordering directly on the river Niemen as well as the town of Grodno. The British analyst did not mention the precise size of this terrain, and limited himself to saying that the whole basin of the Niemen should be located within Soviet frontiers, while the region of Suwałki was to remain part of Poland. He overlooked the fact that the latter area was also situated in the Niemen basin.

In return, Poland was to receive part of Galicia with Lvov, and the border would run along Line "B" to a point where it met the Dniestr; from here, it would follow the river to the west and subsequently its left-bank tributary Strwiąg to the place where it was crossed by Line "A", and then along the Line to the Carpa-

¹⁶PRO, FO 371/47696, N 5862/154/55, Toynbee to Allen, 22 May 1945, a *White Book* project.

¹⁷Maps are not published. The first map showed the course of the Curzon Line on Polish territory and distinguished Line "A" and "B" in Galicia. The second map shows only Galicia with Line A as the Curzon Line, PRO, FO 371/39456, C 2049/140/55.

¹⁸Polonsky, pp. 165–169.

thian Mts. Toynbee took into consideration the possibility of handing over to Poland the whole area between Line "A" and Line "B" (i.e. also the Drohobycz-Boryslaw basin) but was dubious about the realisation of this conception since it would be unfavourable both to the Soviet Union and his own original proposals.

Toynbee supported an exchange of the Ukrainian population living in territories which were to remain in Poland for the Polish population in Eastern Galicia and the region of Vilna. He had not doubts that the chances for keeping Vilno in Poland were minimal although he noticed the Polish character of the town¹⁹.

Attention should be drawn to arguments in favour of compulsory population resettlements, appearing in the memorandum. Toynbee supported the presentation to the Soviet Union of terrains with a population dominated by Ukrainians and Belorussians, and the transference of such a population from regions to be received by Poland to the Soviet Union so as to prevent the creation of population enclaves providing political backing for anti-Soviet "irredentists". In his opinion, the Kremlin was also to receive a sizable part of the Baltic coastline, from the Bay of Finland to Königsberg. This would denote a complete acceptance of the annexation of the Baltic states and part of Eastern Prussia by Moscow, a fact with which Churchill and Eden already came to terms²⁰.

Despite frequent references to ethnographic aspects, it is clear that the author of the memorandum wished to satisfy the territorial demands made by Stalin with minimum consideration for Polish interests and by neglecting the national interests of the Ukrainians and Belorussians. The new frontier was not supposed to become a source for future Soviet complaints, and prime importance was attached to its durability.

¹⁹On 26 February 1944, Toynbee wrote on the margin of the Polish memorandum *Vilno and North-Eastern Poland* that although Vilna was the centre of Polish culture this was not a factor decisive for solving its affiliation. He added that if Lithuania was to be in Soviet possession then its inclusion into Poland would be impossible, PRO, FO 371/39457, C 2374/140/55, note by Toynbee of 26 February 1944. On a visit paid to Lithuania in 1928 Toynbee noticed the profits of a "Lithuanian corridor" for the existence of an independent Lithuania, and wrote that "Lithuania is fortunate in having no common frontier with the USSR", *Toynbee papers*, Bodleian Library, Oxford, *Report by Prof. Toynbee on a Visit to Poland, Latvia and Lithuania*.

²⁰PRO, PREM 3, 399/6, Churchill to Eden, 16 January 1944, Eden to Churchill, 25 January 1944.

It seems worth noting the reactions caused by the Toynbee memorandum within the Foreign Office. David Allen, one of the Central Department officials dealing with Polish affairs, doubted whether the Russians would agree to the proposed territorial solutions. His view was shared by Frank Roberts, who in a note of 15 February 1944 spoke in favour of leaving Lvov to Poland but did not assume that Moscow would consent. He was of the opinion that after reaching a suitable moment in Polish–Soviet negotiations, i.e., presumably after coaxing Mikołajczyk to agree to the Curzon Line, there would emerge conducive conditions for exerting pressure on Stalin as regards Lvov²¹.

Toynbee continued to sustain his point of view and on 26 February 1944 wrote on the margin of a Polish paper on *Lwów and South-eastern Poland*, presented to the Foreign Office, that the most just solution would be a division of Galicia, combined with an exchange of the population between Poland and the Soviet Union²².

The memorandum of 11 February 1944 lacks annotations indicating that the contents were studied by other high ranking Foreign Office officials: Permanent Under Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan, his deputy Orme Sargent or the the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden²³. This is not to say that the ideas launched by Toynbee were not presented to them by Roberts. After all, the professor was one of the most best recognised and influential authorities working for the needs of British diplomacy and shaped the image of countries about which the British diplomats knew so little²⁴.

²¹PRO, FO 371/39456, C 2049/140/55, notes by Allen of 16 February and Roberts of 19 February 1944.

²²PRO, FO 371/3 9457, C 2374/140/55, notes by Prof. Toynbee of 26 February 1944.

²³Nonetheless, at the beginning of February 1944, Eden found the time to read a curious memorandum written on 28 January 1944 by Henry Beaumont, formerly of the Foreign Office and a British member of the Kwidziń commission during the plebiscite held in Warmia and Mazuria in 1920. Beaumont proposed to limit the territory of Poland to the area of the Kingdom of Poland and regarded prewar Poland to be the victim of the policy pursued by the French Prime Minister, G. Clemenceau, interested in creating a powerful eastern ally for France. Allen considered the conceptions proposed by Beaumont to be useless. Although Toynbee was less critical, he was of the opinion that Poland could not be deprived of her ethnic western territories, PRO, FO 371/39457, C 1393/140/55, memorandum by H. Beaumont.

²⁴The Foreign Office lacked specialists on the U.S.S.R.; see: M. Kitchen, *British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War*, New York 1986, p. 158.

The solution proposed by Toynbee was certainly much more favourable for Poland than the Polish–Soviet border defined in the agreement signed by the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) with the Soviet Union on 26 July 1944, and later in the treaty about the Polish–Soviet frontier of 16 August 1945²⁵. In the political situation prevalent in February 1944 neither the Poles nor the Kremlin wished to talk on the level proposed by Toynbee. Stalin demanded that the Polish government capitulate as regards the frontier, while Mikołajczyk tried to defend the Polish stand by resorting to international law and the Constitution which forbade any changes of frontiers without parliamentary approval. On 15 February 1944, the Polish government agreed to a demarcation line to the east of Lvov and Vilna²⁶.

Stalin rejected this readiness to a compromise. In the face of such a course of events there was not chance to realise the conceptions suggested by Toynbee. The question is whether in a changed situation, i.e. after Mikołajczyk's eventual consent to the Curzon Line, the British politicians would be willing to implement Toynbee's proposals and put pressure on Moscow so that Lvov would be retained by Poland. Such a possibility appears highly unlikely. True, speaking in the House of Commons on 22 February 1944 Churchill expressed his approval for the Curzon Line as the Polish–Soviet border, without delineating its precise course in Galicia²⁷, but in talks with Mikołajczyk held in January and February 1944 he did not seem to back the conception of conceding Lvov to Poland²⁸.

²⁵*Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich (Documents and Material to the History of Polish–Soviet Relations)*, vol. VIII, Warszawa 1974, pp. 158, 580–582.

²⁶*Sprawa polska*, pp. 474–475.

²⁷*Poland in the British Parliament 1939–1945*, ed. by W. Jędrzejewicz, vol. II, New York 1959, pp. 339–342. The Soviet ambassador in London, F. Gustev, informed Moscow that the speech given by Churchill comprised a large step forward; he perceived in it the first public recognition by the British of Soviet rights to “Western Belorussia” and “Western Ukraine”, *Sovietko-anglijskije otnosheniya vo vremia Velikoy Otkheshstvennoy Voyni 1941–1945*, vol. 2, Moscow 1983, p. 39.

²⁸*DOPSR*, vol. II, p. 148, 168. Only on 16 February 1944, during his talks with the Polish Prime Minister did Churchill recognise the possibility of discussing the status of Lvov, although he noted simultaneously that Gdańsk was a town more valuable for Poland.

Francis Bourdillon²⁹, an official dealing with Polish affairs in the Research Department, spoke with Professor Toynbee about his February memorandum and, encouraged by David Allen, presented the outcome of his reflections in a memorandum entitled *Lwow*, which he forwarded to the Foreign Office on 25 July 1944, i.e. already after the establishment of the PKWN and on the eve of an agreement signed by this puppet government with Stalin and the first visit paid by Mikołajczyk to Moscow³⁰.

Toynbee concentrated predominantly on wider aspects of regulating the Polish–Soviet frontier while Bourdillon dealt chiefly with the borderline in Galicia. His earlier experiences as regards Galician affairs dated back to the days of the Paris Peace Conference when he was a member of a special sub-commission in the Commission on Polish Affairs, whose task was to examine the internal status of Galicia. In 1944, an analysis of historical, geographical, economic and ethnographic factors inclined him to support the notion of the retention of Lvov by Poland. He did not conceal his views from Polish diplomats, and in a conversation held on 15 June 1944 with Władysław Kulski, counsellor of the Polish embassy in London, he presented his point of view but spoke in favour of turning Vilna over to the Soviet Union. In return, Poland was to receive compensation at the cost of Germany, i.e. territories which in Silesia were to reach the Nysa Kłodzka at most³¹. In a discussion on the economic ties between Lvov and the surrounding region, the Bourdillon memorandum concluded that natural economic relations with the Drohobycz–Borysław basin signified the necessity of conceding the town and the oil fields to Poland. On the other hand, Bourdillon favoured the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the counties of Sokal, Turka and Bobrka as well as the Uzhok Pass. The rest of the Lvov province would be entrusted to Poland. This was a proposal which from the point of view of its realisation was much more favourable

²⁹Francis Bernard Bourdillon (1883–1970), graduate of Oxford University, lecturer at the University of Reading in 1908–1914, lecturer at Balliol College, Oxford, in 1914–1915, Naval Intelligence Division 1916–1919, expert in the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, member of the Upper Silesian Commission in 1920–1922, secretary of the Irish Boundary Commission in 1924–1925, secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1926–1929, staff member of the Research Department in the Foreign Office in 1943–1949.

³⁰PRO, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55.

³¹Archive of the General W. Sikorski Institute and Museum, London, A.12.49/WB/9, talks between Kulski and Bourdillon, 15 June 1944.

for Poland than the Toynbee project. The Lvov province, with an area of about 24,400 sq. km. (the whole province totalled 28,400 sq. km.) would remain in Poland. The division suggested by Toynbee also meant that the greater part of the Lvov province (22,400 sq. km.) would be kept by Poland but without the valuable Drohobycz–Borysław basin.

In the opinion of Bourdillon, his conception was favoured by the fact that the same number of Ukrainians would live in Poland as Poles in that part of Galicia which would find itself in the Soviet Union. Detailed calculations, contained in a table placed at the end of the memorandum, presented ethnic differences in the sizes of particular national groups in the eventuality that the frontier would be delineated along Line “A”, “B”, “X” (proposed by Professor Toynbee) or “Y” (delineated by Bourdillon). In contrast to Professor Toynbee, his colleague did not assume the necessity of a population exchange, which in reality denoted compulsory resettlement, although he did not reject such a possibility. Moreover, Bourdillon did not treat Line “A” as a prolongation of the Curzon Line in Galicia.

The weakest fragment of his work appears to be the one in which the author, analysing the Soviet stand upon the basis of the enigmatic statements made by Stalin and Soviet diplomats, reached the optimistic conclusion about chances for the realisation of such a conception of the frontier in 1944. Certain premises demonstrate that in December 1941 Stalin was ready to come to terms with leaving Lvov to Poland. Up to now, the report made by the Polish Prime Minister, General Władysław Sikorski, about his talks with Stalin was the sole evidence for the confirmation of this thesis³². During a meeting between the Soviet dictator and Eden (17 December 1941), the Soviet side supported the frontier along the Curzon Line with certain modifications of the latter³³. Only recently did it become known what Moscow understood precisely by this term. A protocol prepared at the time, probably by the People’s Foreign Affairs Commissariat, as a supplement to the planned British–Soviet alliance treaty, contains the following proposals made by the Kremlin about the Polish frontier: “The

³²PRO, FO 371/31077, C 794/19/55, minute from a talk between Eden and Sikorski conducted on 19 January 1942.

³³*Wizyta ministra A. Edena w Moskwie w grudniu 1941 (Visit by Minister A. Eden to Moscow in December 1941)*, prep. by B. Janicka, “Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, 1990, no. 9, p. 135.

recreation of Poland within the 1939 frontiers with the retention in the Soviet Union of the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, the exclusion of regions with a predominantly Polish population (the town of Lvov is to be left in Poland under the condition that the Soviet Union receives Białystok and Vilna, or, vice versa, Poland is to receive Vilna and Białystok, leaving Lvov to the Soviet Union), as well as the expansion of Polish territory at the cost of the western part of Eastern Prussia"³⁴. Everything points to the fact that in the face of Eden's unwillingness to discuss changes in the frontiers of a British ally, Stalin did not propose the above alterations. I did not come across any traces of this document in British archives. In their internal deliberations, British politicians and diplomats never referred to its contents. At the end of July 1944, the military and political situation, in comparison to December 1941, changed decidedly in favour of the Soviet Union.

The Bourdillon memorandum provoked a lively debate in the Foreign Office despite the fact that the time — August and September 1944, which coincided with the Warsaw Uprising — was not conducive for discussions on this detailed question. In a note of 4 August 1944, Ms. Gathouse of the Northern Department acknowledged Bourdillon's proposals to be justified both economically and ethnically. She did not foresee, however, a possibility for their presentation at a diplomatic forum in the nearest future³⁵. This was also the period of the talks held by Mikołaczyk with Stalin and representatives of the PKWN in Moscow.

Frank Roberts read the memorandum on 5 August 1944, and found it useful. In his view, Poland should be in possession of Lvov. The Head of the Central Department noted: "Although I am not unduly optimistic, I think we should be wrong to regard the Lwów question as finally settled against the Poles"³⁶.

Several weeks later, on 25 August 1944, the Central Department received the comments of Brigadier Eric Skaife of the Soviet

³⁴O. A. Rzheshchewski, *Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu v dtekabre 1941 g. Peregovori s I. V. Stalnim i V. M. Molotovim*, "Novaya i Novteyshaya Istoriya", 1994, no. 2, p. 99.

³⁵PRO, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55, minute by Gatbouse of 4 August 1944.

³⁶PRO, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55, note by Roberts of 5 July 1944.

section in the Research Department³⁷. His acute criticism of the theses proposed by Bourdillon began with undermining statistical calculations concerning the ethnic composition of the population of Lvov. Skaife showed that Bourdillon did not take into consideration the Jews, who prior to the war comprised 24% of the town's inhabitants. He also accused the Poles of discriminating the Jewish community by suggesting that in the Soviet Union Jews were treated on par with the Russians and that it was impossible to exclude the eventuality that after the war the survivors would choose the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as their place of residence instead of Poland. Further on, Skaife questioned data from a Polish population census of 1931, and mentioned the supposedly exaggerated number of Poles. Recalling the Ukrainian boycott of the 1921 census, he pointed out the probability of a similar stand in 1931.

Skaife was anxious about the economic consequences of cutting Lvov off from the Stanisławów and Tarnopol provinces which, according to the Bourdillon conception, were to become part of the Soviet Union. The peak of his pro-Soviet argumentation was the view that Polish rights to Lvov resembled those of the Russians to Warsaw, considering that the former seized Lvov in the fourteenth century and the Russians appeared in Warsaw several centuries later³⁸.

In his response of 6 September 1944, Bourdillon did not react to the last absurd suggestion but consistently toppled the remaining charges. He maintained that the number of Jewish survivors was unknown, and doubted whether they would wish to reside in the Soviet Union since the supposed Polish persecutions paled in comparison with Soviet repressions. Bourdillon disagreed with the opinion that the 1931 population census was boycotted by the Ukrainians, and declared that economic arguments were not the only which spoke in favour of keeping Lvov

³⁷ Eric Skaife was the British military attache in Moscow in 1934–1937. In the Foreign Office he was considered a Russophile. One of the few who on 22 June 1941 predicted that Hitler would not conquer the U.S.S.R.: A. G l e e s, *The Secrets of the Service. British Intelligence and Communist Subversion 1939–1951*, London 1987, p. 263.

³⁸ PRO, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55, memorandum by Brigadier Skaife of 25 August 1944. It seems worth stressing the concurrence of his arguments with statements made by Stalin who, in a polemic with Mikołajczyk's view that Galicia was not a part of Russia, said on 18 October 1944: "But Warsaw belonged to Czarist Russia", see: DOPSR, vol. II, p. 607.

in Poland. The chief conclusions of the British analyst came down to repeating the thesis that the best solution would be such a division of Galicia that the Ukrainian minority on the Polish side of the frontier would equal the number of Poles on the Ukrainian side³⁹.

Toynbee continued to cherish the hope, albeit not as strong as in February, that the solutions concerning Lvov, proposed by him and Bourdillon, could be realised. He expressed this conviction in a note of 9 September 1944, recognising that the most suitable moment would be the reorganisation of the Polish government which would guarantee Soviet trust. In such a situation, Moscow could offer the reorganised cabinet "a piece of success" in the form of Lvov⁴⁰.

The territorial affiliation of Lvov soon ceased to be the object of interest in the Central Department. The October visit paid by Churchill and Mikołajczyk to Moscow brought decisive if not outright brutal pressure exerted by the British Prime Minister upon the head of the Polish cabinet to agree to the Curzon Line without Lvov. Although on 16 October 1944, under the impact of Polish resistance and his own convictions Eden made the last British attempt at coaxing Stalin to concede, he encountered a polite but categorical refusal as regards Lvov⁴¹.

At the beginning of February 1945, during the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt suggested to Stalin that Lvov might be retained by Poland. His attempt was timidly supported by Churchill who, however, recalled that earlier Great Britain expressed its approval for the Curzon Line and the return of Lvov to the Soviet Union. Stalin refused and this topic did not reappear in the talks. The Yalta communiqué does not define the precise shape of the Curzon Line in Galicia, but it follows from the debates that the three sides agreed to Line "A"⁴².

³⁹PRO, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55, minute by Bourdillon of 6 September 1944.

⁴⁰PRO, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55, note by Prof. Toynbee of 9 September 1944.

⁴¹PRO, FO 371/39414, C 14224/8/5, Eden to the Foreign Office, 16 October 1944. Eden claimed that Lvov should be included into Poland, and was anxious that: "If I give over Lvov, shall I go down in the history books as an appeaser", see: T. Barman, *Diplomatic Correspondent*, London 1968, pp. 175–176.

⁴²*Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference at Malta and Yalta 1945*, Washington 1955, pp. 667–669, 973–974.

The Toynbee and Bourdillon memoranda can be treated as a detailed and expanded version of the theses contained in the Research Department study of 19 November 1943, in favour of Lvov belonging to Poland either together with the Drohobycz–Boryslaw basin or by itself. The British politicians, however, ignored the significant work of their scientific advisers and made decisions without becoming acquainted with it. The ensuing outcome was the far-reaching ignorance of Eden, who in comparison with Churchill was more familiar with the question of the Polish border but who at the end of November 1944 asked the Central Department about the actual nature of the Curzon Line in 1920⁴³. He did so after years of discussion, and apparently forgot about the *The Curzon Line* memorandum of 4 February 1944, made and presented to the War Cabinet upon his own request⁴⁴.

The published documents provide interesting testimony of the characteristic manner of thinking on part of the Research Department of the Foreign Office, which consisted of an attempt at conciliating scientific thoroughness with the need to discover justifications for currently pursued policies. The consequence was the omission of the right of nations to self-determination, despite efforts to find a warrant for the proposed changes. Although the documents prepared in the Research Department were not used at the time of decision making, they play a supplementary role in research into the formulation of the British foreign policy towards the shape of Polish frontiers after the Teheran Conference. Even persons hardly sympathizing with Poland, and the staff of the Central Department and the Research Department should be recognised as such, shared a dominating conviction that Lvov ought to stay within postwar Polish frontiers. In their negotiations with Moscow, however, British politicians did not reveal sufficient determination to persuade Stalin to concede, and treated the issue as secondary. Both memoranda proved to be long delayed and the proposed division of Galicia along Line “X” or “Y” was never realised.

⁴³PRO, FO 371 /39436, C 16177/62/55, note by Eden.

⁴⁴PRO, CAB 66/46, WP (44) 84.

SOURCES:

Appendix 1. Memorandum by Professor A. Toynbee:
Possible Adjustments of the Curzon Line of 11 February 1944

Public Record Office, FO 371 139456, C 20491140155.

POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS OF THE CURZON⁴⁵ LINE

1. The Russians have offered a modification of the Russo-German demarcation line of September 1939⁴⁶ "in Poland's favour so that areas in which the Polish population forms the majority can be turned over to Poland"⁴⁷. In this case the Soviet-Polish frontier could pass approximately along the so-called Curzon Line". This Russian formula seems to leave the way open for adjustments of the Curzon Line, through probably not for adjustments which would work out, on balance, in Poland's favour.

2. The two following adjustments of the Curzon Line might be worth proposing as the two parts of an arrangement which, taken as a whole, would give the two parties advantage of comparable value.

3. (i) The Curzon Line might be adjusted in Poland's favour by the Soviet Union's conceding to Poland, to the east of the Curzon Line, a triangle of territory, containing the city of Lwow, which has its apex at the point where Line B diverges from the Curzon Line and has for its base the north bank of the Upper Dniestr and of its left-bank tributary Strwiaz, between Line B and the Curzon Line (Line A).

4. The Curzon Line might be adjusted in the Soviet Union's favour towards its northern end, where the line runs for a short stretch along the left (west) bank of the River Niemen, opposite Grodno, by Poland's conceding a sufficient strip of territory to bring the whole basin of the River Niemen within the frontiers of the Soviet Union, or at any rate to set the Russo-Polish frontier

⁴⁵The name Curzon Line comes from George Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925). Conservative politician, British Foreign Secretary in 1919-1924, whose signature is found on the telegram of 11 July 1920 to Chicherin, containing proposals of a Polish-Bolshevik truce line. In reality, Lord Curzon had nothing in common with preparing its course. Known for his consistently anti-Bolshevik stand, cf. C. Keeble, *Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917-1989*, London 1990, pp. 82, 89 and 92.

well back from the left bank of the Niemen while leaving Poland in possession of the Suwalki district, which is overwhelmingly Polish in population.

5. It is submitted (i) that the inclusion of Lwow in Poland would greatly increase the chances of the Poles becoming reconciled to a settlement made in other respects on a Curzon Line basis, and would not conflict with any major Russian interest; and (ii) that the setting back of the frontier from the left bank of the Niemen opposite Grodno would be of substantial advantage to the Soviet Union and would not conflict with any major Polish interest.

6. The major Russian interests at stake would appear to be the following:

7. (i) That the Soviet Union should obtain a stretch of Baltic Coastline from the Gulf of Finland as far south as the mouth of the Niemen (and possibly as far south as Königsberg⁴⁸ inclusive) with adequate lines of communication, inside the Soviet frontiers, between the whole of this coastline and the interior of the Union.

8. (ii) That the new western frontier of the Soviet Union should embrace in the Union all territories predominantly inhabited by White Russians⁴⁹ and Ukrainians, or at any rate should not leave outside the Soviet Union any White Russian or Ukrainian territories of sufficient extent to make them usable as bases of political operations for White Russian or Ukrainian nationalist movements hostile to the Soviet Union;

9. (iii) That the new common frontier between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia along the crest of the Carpathians should be of the maximum length (i.e. should extend as far west as possible).

10. The major Polish interests at stake would appear to be the following:

⁴⁶A frontier line delineated upon the basis of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed in Moscow on 28 September 1939, *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, series D (further as: *DGFP*), vol. VIII, Washington 1954, pp. 164-165; an exact description of the German-Soviet boundary is contained in a protocol of 4 October 1939, pp. 208-212, with a map of the division of Poland signed by Stalin and Ribbentrop at the end of the volume.

⁴⁷Toynbee had in mind the TASS communiqué of 11 January 1944, containing a declaration by the Soviet government, *Sprawa Polska*, pp. 455-456.

⁴⁸Königsberg-Królewiec, from 1946 as Kaliningrad.

⁴⁹During World War II this term was used mistakenly by the British to describe Belorussians.

11. (i) That as much as possible of predominantly Polish-inhabited territory should be embraced within the frontiers of an independent Polish State;

12. (ii) That in territories, east of the predominantly Polish-inhabited area (i.e., east of the Curzon Line), in which Polish culture has been predominant hitherto, at least one of the two historic eastern outposts of Polish culture — Lwow and Vilna — should if possible be retained within the frontiers of the new Polish State.

13. To secure to the Soviet Union adequate lines of communication, within the Soviet frontiers, between the Baltic coast and the interior of the Union, it is obviously convenient that the frontiers of the Union should embrace both banks of the Niemen, as well as both banks of the Dvina, from source to mouth. The waterway of the Niemen is of commercial value for floating White Russian timber down to the Baltic port of Memel⁵⁰. The required territorial concession on Poland's part would mean her giving up the outer fringe of predominantly Polish inhabited territory in this quarter, but it would not involve the loss of any city to set again the gain, at the other suggested point of adjustment, of the city of Lwow. It would also mean her giving up all direct access to the waterway of the Niemen; but this access would be of much less value to a Poland whose eastern frontier was in any case going to be set back to the Curzon Line than it was to the greater Poland of 1921–1939 which extended so much further eastward and included most of the upper basin of the Niemen within its frontiers.

14. The ethnographic effect of the proposed pair of adjustments of the Curzon Line, taken together, would be (i) to leave within an independent Poland all except one small fringe (adjoining the Niemen) of the predominantly Polish inhabited area; (ii) not to leave outside the Soviet Union any predominantly White Russian-inhabited territory at all or any extent of predominantly Ukrainian-inhabited territory that would be politically dangerous for the Soviet Union. The city of Lwow itself is a predominantly Polish-inhabited enclave in an Eastern Galicia which is, as a whole, predominantly Ukrainian-inhabited; and the population of the rural area of the district (powiat) of Lwow is also claimed by the Poles to be predominantly Polish-speaking, though they

⁵⁰Memel-Klaipeda.

admit that, in the rural area, Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite (the rite followed by the Poles) are not in a majority. The Ukrainian element in the triangle of the East Galician territory, including Lwow, which it is suggested that the Russians might concede to Poland could readily be exchanged with Polish elements from Tarnopol and other districts of Eastern Galicia east of Line B and south of the Upper Dniestr (and also with Polish elements from the Vilna region).

15. The Curzon Line (Line A), which runs up to the crest of the Carpathians to the west of the headwaters of the River San, actually gives the Soviet Union a longer frontier with Czechoslovakia than does the Soviet-German demarcation line of 1939, which follows the course of the San up to its sources. The differences here may be important, because the Curzon Line definitely extends the common frontier between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to include the Uzhok Pass, which carries a railway connecting Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union by alternative lines across Eastern Galicia.

16. While one of these lines runs through Lwow, the other — which branches off from the Uzhok Pass-Lwow line at Sambor and then runs eastward through Stryj and Tarnopol — would run entirely through Czechoslovak and Soviet territory whether the new Russo-Polish frontier were drawn along the Curzon Line (Line A) or were adjusted so as to include the city of Lwow in Poland, as proposed in the present paper.

17. On the other hand, this second line, as well as the first, would pass through Polish territory, between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, if, in addition to the triangle of territory including Lwow, Poland were to be given the trapezoid shaped piece of territory between Line B and the Curzon Line (Line A) south of the Upper Dniestr and its tributary the Strwiaz. Moreover this trapezoid of territory, unlike the triangle including Lwow, is inhabited almost entirely by Ukrainians. A proposal to exchange the whole of the territory between the Curzon Line (Line A) and Line B for the fringe of territory opposite Grodno would therefore be markedly to Poland's advantage, and the Russians would be unlikely to agree to it.

18. The Poles may be expected to ask for the trapezoid as well as the triangle, on the grounds (i) that the French, American and Italian representatives on the Supreme Council's Commission for

Polish Affairs⁵¹ which drew Lines A and B agreed in their report of the 17th June, 1919, — the British alone dissenting — that, if Eastern Galicia was to be completely independent of Poland, Line B and not Line A would be the right line for the frontier between Poland and the State to which Eastern Galicia was to belong (whatever this State might be)⁵²; (ii) that the trapezoid contains the Eastern Galician oil fields, and that these are of far greater value to Poland, who has no other oil-fields in her territory, than they are to the Soviet Union, which has vast oil-fields elsewhere.

19. The East Galician oil-fields, however, are not an important asset even to Poland, since their output is (i) small compared with Poland's probable future needs; (ii) already falling off and within sight of coming to an end. The question of who is to possess them, therefore, ought not to be allowed to influence the settlement of the Russo-Polish frontier appreciably.

20. It would be worth the Soviet Union's while to agree to the adjustments proposed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above because the reconciliation of Poland is a Soviet interest which the Soviet Government would be wise to estimate at quite a high value, in view of the world-wide feeling aroused by Poland's wrongs, real or unsubstantial.

21. It would be worth Poland's while to concede territory opposite Grodno, and to forbear to make any claim to the trapezoid containing the oil-fields, in order to concentrate her efforts on obtaining the triangle containing Lwow. The retention of either Lwow or Vilna is a major Polish interest (see para. 12 above); and, while Poland evidently has at least a chance of retaining Lwow, she has no chance whatever of retaining Vilna. The retention of Vilna by Poland would have the two effects of (i) thrusting a fantastically shaped salient of Polish territory deep into the flank of a Soviet Union which included not only White Russia to the east of Vilna but also Lithuania, Memel and perhaps even Königsberg to the west of Vilna; (ii) leaving a considerable White Russian population outside the frontier of the Soviet Union. Either of these considerations by itself is enough to make it a foregone conclusion that Vilna will fall to the Soviet Union in any Russo-Polish settlement on a Curzon Line basis.

⁵¹The commission started work on 20 February 1919. It included: J. Cambon (France), I. Bowman or R. H. Lord (U. S. A.), W. Tyrrel or F. M. Kisch (Great Britain), P. Toretta (Italy) and K. Otchiai (Japan).

⁵²See ft. 13.

22. For the various reasons given above, the best hope of achieving a settlement of the Russo–Polish frontier that would be tolerable for both parties would seem to lie in accepting the Russian proposal that the Curzon Line should be taken as a basis, and then proposing the two adjustments of the Curzon Line that have been suggested in the present paper.

February 11th, 1944. Research Department, Foreign Office

Appendix 2. Memorandum by F. Bourdillon: *Lwow*,
presented to the Foreign Office on 25 July 1944

Public Record Office, FO 371/39458, C 9761/140/55.

LWOW

Geography

Lwow is a city of 300,000 inhabitants, the third in size among Polish towns⁵³. It is situated some 60 miles⁵⁴ North of the Carpathians close to the watershed between the Black Sea and the Baltic basins. It is 40 miles north of the Drohobycz oil field⁵⁵, the chief of the three Polish fields, for which it serves as the business centre. It is the chief town of the rural district and also of the province which bears its name.

History

The city was built about 1250 A. D. by the Ruthenian prince of Halicz (Galicia). It passed to Poland in 1349, and was for a time a great trading centre. In 1772 it came under Austrian rule⁵⁶, and was the capital of the Austrian “crownland” of Galicia from 1870 to 1918. In November 1918 its possession was disputed between Polish and East Galician Ukrainian forces⁵⁷ but was

⁵³In 1939 it was preceded by Warsaw (population of 1,289,000) and Łódź (population of 672,000). At the time, Lvov had a population of 318,000, see: *Mały rocznik statystyczny wrzesień 1939–czerwiec 1941 (Small Statistical Yearbook. September 1939–June 1941)*, Warszawa 1990.

⁵⁴1 mile = 1609.3 metres.

⁵⁵The Drohobycz–Borysław basin.

⁵⁶In 1772, Austria, Prussia and Russia conducted the first partition of Poland.

⁵⁷Forces of the Western Ukrainian Peoples' Republic.

soon captured by the Poles⁵⁸. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919⁵⁹ two proposals were considered for dividing Eastern Galicia by one of which ("Line A") Lwow was to be placed in an autonomous or independent Eastern Galicia; while by the other ("Line B") Lwow was to be placed in Poland⁶⁰. In the event Poland obtained recognition of her sovereignty over the city by Great Britain, France and Italy in March 1923⁶¹. In September 1939 the city was included in the area taken by the U.S.S.R. under the Ribbentrop⁶²–Molotov⁶³ Agreement⁶⁴. In 1941 it came under German occupation⁶⁵ and, with the rest of Galicia east of the river San, was included as a separate Distrikt in the General Government.

It may be noted that the reasons, for which the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 argued that Lwow should not be included in Poland, do not for the most part hold good under present conditions.

(1) The Polish population was then given as 51%: it is now to be reckoned as not less than 74%.

(2) It was then thought that the Ukraine might need Galician oil as it would probably be cut off from that of the Caucasus.

(3) It was then contemplated that Eastern Galicia would be a separate unit, which would need Lwow as its capital.

⁵⁸Ukrainian troops seized Lvov unexpectedly on 1 November 1918. Under the impact of Polish resistance they withdrew on 21 October. Not until the end of April 1919 was the military threat to Lvov posed by the Ukrainians liquidated.

⁵⁹The Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920) began on 18 January 1919 in Paris. Its outcome entailed the preparation and signing of peace treaties with the vanquished Central Powers.

⁶⁰See ft. 13.

⁶¹The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors concerning Polish frontiers, 15 March 1923; K. K u m a n i e c k i, *Odbudowa państwowości polskiej. Najważniejsze dokumenty 1912 – styczeń 1924 (The Reconstruction of Polish Statehood. Most Important Documents 1912 – January 1924)*, Warszawa 1924, pp. 676–679.

⁶²Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946), Nazi politician, German Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938–1945, sentenced to death by the Nürnberg Tribunal and executed.

⁶³Vlacheslav Molotov, real name V. Skriabin (1890–1986), Soviet politician, collaborator of Stalin, Soviet Prime Minister in 1930–1941, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1939–1949 and 1953–1957.

⁶⁴The Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the U.S.S.R. signed on 23 August 1939. The second article of the secret protocol proclaimed that the signatories' spheres of influence in Poland would be divided by the rivers Narew, Vistula and San, *DGFP*, vol. VII, pp. 245–247. After a change in the division of Poland according to the agreement of 28 September 1939, Lvov also remained in the Soviet zone.

⁶⁵The Germans captured Lvov on 30 June 1941.

Strategic

Lwow was built as a fortress for defence against the Tartars. It stood a number of invasions by the Cossacks, Turks or Swedes. Its position renders it essential to Poland if Poland is to have territorial contact with Roumania⁶⁶. On the other hand, if direct contact is to be established between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, via Eastern Galicia and Carpatho-Ruthenia, the Polish possession of Lwow and of the Drohobycz oilfield would offer no obstacle, since the direct routes from the Soviet Union to Carpatho-Ruthenia use either the "Tartar" Pass (Jablonica) or the Lawoczne Pass. Nor does the inclusion in the Ukraine of the next pass further west (the Uzok Pass) involve detachment of either Lwow or Drohobycz from Poland. It is true that to approach the Uzok Pass by rail from the north it would be necessary to pass either Lwow or Drohobycz but that pass is 500 (?) feet⁶⁷ higher than the Lawoczne pass and the railway through it is little used, and hardly suitable for heavy traffic. A shorter and easier approach from the Ukraine to Uzok would start from the railway south of Skole and follow the Stryj valley up to the Lwow Uzok railway at Turka. There is already a good road from Skole to the Uzok Pass via Zawadzko. Distances by rail via the Lawoczne and Uzok passes, i.e. on the route from Kiev to Slovakia are:

Tarnopol — Stryj — Lawoczne — <u>Čop</u>	365 km.
Tarnopol — Lwow-Lawoczne — <u>Čop</u>	415 km.
Tarnopol — Drohobycz-Uzok — <u>Čop</u>	454 km.
Tarnopol — Lwow-Uzok — <u>Čop</u>	436 km.

It may be noted that Lwow is 30 miles distant from the Tarnopol — Stryj — Lawoczne route at its nearest point.

Economic

Apart from its special connection with the Drohobycz oil industry, the economic position of Lwow according to the Polish census is typical of that of a major provincial centre. Of the population 312,231 in 1931, 93,000 were dependent on industry, the chief of which were:

Clothing	19,440	workers and dependents
Building	14,385	
Food & Drink	13,950	
Iron, metals and machinery	9,559	

⁶⁶A division of Galicia according to the Bourdillon conception would deprive Poland of a joint frontier with Rumania.

⁶⁷1 foot = 0.3048 m.

Wood	7,408
Printing etc.	4,521
Public utilities etc.	3,373

The other chief categories according to occupation were:

Trade and insurance	64,153	workers and dependents
Communications & transport (including railways 16,978)	31,153	
Domestic service	21,521	
Public service	20,689	

The area primarily served by Lwow in an economic sense was the Province of Lwow with 2,815,178 inhabitants in 1931 (not including the city), and to a somewhat smaller extent the Provinces of Tarnopol and Stanislawow. Any line, e. g. either "Line A" or "Line B", which ran through the middle of Eastern Galicia would thus cut off Lwow from somewhere between 1/3 and 1/2 of its economic region. A line which divided it from Drohobycz would cut it off from about 3/4 of its region. It should be noted that Lwow depends for its power in part on the natural gas formed in the Drohobycz area which is supplied to the city by a pipe-line. It may further be noted that the Drohobycz field produced (in 1936–1938) about 2/3 of Polish oil production; the West Galician field about 1/4; and the Stanislawow field about one tenth.

Lwow as a Polish city

The Polish population of Lwow has been the dominant element there since medieval times, and the city has a long history as a centre of Polish culture. Under Austrian rule during the latter part of the nineteenth century it became the capital of the whole of Galicia, in which both the provincial estates and the local administration were in Polish hands. Its University, wholly conducted in German in the early part of the century⁶⁸, became more and more Polonised⁶⁹; and in spite of its situation on the fringe of the Polish ethnographic area it was, up till the war of 1914–1918, the chief centre of free expression of Polish national life. The title of "semper fidelis", which it owed to its successful resistance to a number of sieges, was earned afresh by its struggle against Ukrainian occupation in November 1918, Russian occupation in 1939–41, and German occupation in 1941–1944.

⁶⁸The Austrian university in Lvov was founded in 1784.

⁶⁹The imperial patent of 4 July 1871 abolished German as the language of instruction at Lvov University, and introduced Polish and Ukrainian.

Polish sentiment about Lwow is extremely strong. While this is also true of Vilna, it seems⁷⁰ unlikely that Vilna can be restored to Poland. It may be argued that this renders it all the more necessary that Poland should if possible retain Lwow where no such historical and geographical obstacles exist.

Lwow as an Ukrainian centre

Though the Ruthenian (now known as Ukrainian) population of the city has for centuries been only a small minority, Lwow as the local administrative capital was the national centre of the movement for cultural autonomy which developed in the Ruthenian population of Galicia after 1848. (see RRR XI/13 "The Ukrainians in Poland"⁷¹). Thus the Ruthenian political parties, cultural societies, and co-operative movements had their central offices in Lwow; the Austrian government established Ruthenian professorships at Lwow university⁷²; and Ruthenian books and newspapers were published there. Lwow was also the seat of the Archbishop of the Ruthenian Uniate Church, to which practically all the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia belong (see RRR XI/32 "The Uniates in Poland"⁷³). Thus in spite of the fact that the Poles could claim with justice that Lwow was ethnologically and historically a Polish city, the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia have also been able to say with some truth that it was their "national" centre. Lwow ceased to have this unique importance after the Russian revolution, when the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was set up with its centres at Kiev and Kharkov⁷⁴.

Ethnology

According to the figures of the latest census, that of 1931, the population of Lwow was 63% Polish-speaking, 24% Yiddish or Hebrew speaking, and 11% Ukrainian-speaking. According to the religious figures, which are usually accepted as a safer guide than linguistic figures, the Polish population (i.e. Roman Catholic of the Latin Rite) was 157,490; Jewish 99,595; and Ukrainian (i.e.

⁷⁰The words "history and geography make it most" were deleted.

⁷¹PRO, FO 371 /39475, C 3478/807/55, Toynbee to Allen, 16 March 1944.

⁷²See ft. 69.

⁷³PRO, FO 371/39475, C 7813/807/55, Bourdillon to Roberts, 8 June 1944.

⁷⁴On 6 January 1919, the Provisional Government of Workers and Peasants proclaimed in Kharkov the establishment of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.

Uniate) 49,747. Leaving out of account the Jews, owing to uncertainty as to their present numbers and allegiance, the Polish (i.e. Roman Catholic) inhabitants formed 74% of the city's non-Jewish population, and the Ukrainian (i.e. Uniates) 23%.

Relations to General Ethnological Position as between Poles and Ukrainians

Eastern Galicia, i.e. the three South-eastern provinces of Poland, is a mixed area, where (apart from the 12 western districts of Lwow province) the Poles and Ukrainians are in a relationship of one to two, according to the religious statistics. There is also an Ukrainian minority (3%) in Cracow province and a Polish minority (15%) in Volhynia. Supposing it were desired to divide Eastern Galicia between Poland and the Ukraine by a line separating the continuous block of country where the rural areas were predominantly Ukrainian from the continuous block of country where the rural areas were Polish, disregarding towns and other ethnographic "islands", however large and important these may be, the frontier would be approximately on the river San, i.e. in the neighbourhood of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. This was also the primary basis of "Line A", which runs somewhat further East than the San. Either of these lines, however, would place very large Polish minority in the Ukraine including important places like Lwow itself, where the majority is overwhelmingly Polish, while leaving a very much smaller Ukrainian minority in Poland (see appended Table). A much more equitable principle would seem to be a division which would leave approximately equal minorities on each side of the frontier, thus permitting any degree of exchange of the two minority populations that might be desired. Such a line would necessarily involve the retention of Lwow by Poland. If the whole of Southern Poland were taken into account, i.e. including the respective minorities in Cracow province and Volhynia, the frontier would also include the Drohobycz oil field in Poland and would leave the whole of Lwow province in Poland except the districts of Turka, and Bobrka, and part of that of Sokal. The Uzok Pass would thus be included in the Ukraine, and the frontier would have to be adjusted so that the course of the river Stryj would lie wholly in Ukrainian territory. The frontier would thus run considerably east of "Line A" but somewhat further west than "Line B".

This may be considered as the minimum concession to Poland in Eastern Galicia that would make allowance for the Polish minority residence there. It gives Poland considerably less territory than would fall to her if the language figures were taken as a basis of division. It takes no account of the fact that the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia being Uniates, i.e. a part of the Roman Catholic Church, have more affinities with the Poles than those of any other Ukrainian area. Nor does it allow for the fact that however general may be the desire among Eastern Galician Ukrainians for attachment to a Great Ukraine, this desire may be outweighed in practise in some sections of the Eastern Galicians by a reluctance to submit to the communist regime or the incorporation of the Ukraine in the U.S.S.R. This also applies to the Eastern Galician Jews.

Soviet Attitude

The Russian attitude has always tended to be less definite about Lwów than about the territories which Russia acquired at the time of the Partitions of 1772–1795. Alexander I⁷⁵ allowed Austria to keep Galicia in 1815⁷⁶. In the war of 1914–18⁷⁷ though Russian army leaders made Panslav proclamations the results were disappointing⁷⁸. In 1920 the Soviet plenipotentiary⁷⁹ at Riga did, it is true, twice demand a plebiscite in Eastern Galicia, but he finally

⁷⁵Alexander I (1777–1825), Emperor of Russia from 1801, King of Poland from 1815.

⁷⁶The territory in question was the Tarnopol district (eastern part of Galicia), captured from Austria by Napoleon I in 1809, and in 1809 presented to the Russian Emperor Alexander I. In 1815, after a final victory over Napoleon, Russia returned this short-lived gain to Austria.

⁷⁷The Russians occupied Lvov from 3 September 1914 to 22 June 1915.

⁷⁸This is the proclamation issued on 14 August 1914 by Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, and addressed to the Poles, see: K. Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości*, pp. 26–27. Panslav elements are present also in the proclamation issued by Grand Duke Nicholas in August 1914 to the peoples of Austro-Hungary, see: *Odezwy i rozporządzenia z czasów okupacji rosyjskiej Lwowa 1914–1915 (Proclamations and Decrees from the Time of the Russian Occupation of Lvov 1914–1915)*, Lwów 1916, p. 19.

⁷⁹The head of the Soviet delegation during the peace negotiations in Riga was Adolf Joffe (1883–1927), Bolshevik diplomat and supporter of Trotsky (committed suicide).

said the U.S.S.R. disinterested itself in it⁸⁰. Lwow was included in the Western Ukraine by the Ribbentrop–Molotov agreement of 1939; but Stalin⁸¹ is reported to have told General Sikorski⁸² in 1941 that he would not insist on recovering it⁸³; and in conversation with Professor Lange⁸⁴ in May 1944 he again gave the impression that if the Curzon Line was accepted as a basis of negotiation he would be prepared to be accommodating in regard to Lwow⁸⁵. Indeed if the basis of negotiation is the Curzon Line in the form in which the French⁸⁶ Italian⁸⁷ and Polish⁸⁸ Prime Ministers agreed to it at the Spa Conference⁸⁹ it leaves the question of Lwow completely open.

⁸⁰On 24 and 28 September 1920, during the talks in Riga, Joffe proposed in the name of Bolshevik Russia that a plebiscite be held in Eastern Galicia. This suggestion was made in case Poland would announce a project of a federation with Ukraine. The absence of such an initiative inclined Joffe to assume that the Poles did not intend to discuss the Galician issue (1 October 1920); see: J. Dębski, *Pokój ryski (The Riga Peace Treaty)*, Warszawa 1931, pp. 80, 92–93, 105. According to the preliminaries of the peace and the armistice convention between Poland and Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, signed on 12 October 1920 in Riga, the whole of Galicia to the river Zbrucz remained within Polish frontiers. The Treaty of Riga of 18 March 1921 confirmed this solution, see: K. Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości*, pp. 422–426, 525–528.

⁸¹Joseph Stalin, real name Iosif Dzhugashvili (1879–1953), Soviet dictator, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries, then Prime Minister (1941–1953), Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armed forces 1941–1945.

⁸²Władysław Sikorski (1881–1943), general, Prime Minister of Poland in the years 1922–1923 and 1939–1943.

⁸³It does not follow unambiguously from Polish stenographs of talks conducted by Sikorski in the Kremlin on 3 December 1941 that Stalin agreed to the Polish possession of Lvov but said only that the Poles would have to discuss this subject over with the Ukrainians, *DOPSR*, vol. I: 1939–1943, London 1961, pp. 244–245; on 19 January 1942, Sikorski informed Eden that Stalin opted for leaving Lvov in Poland, PRO, FO 371/31077, C794/19/55, minute from the Eden–Sikorski talk of 19 January 1942.

⁸⁴Oskar Lange (1904–1965), economist, professor at University of Chicago in 1938–1945, at the end of the war supporter of the communists.

⁸⁵On 17 May 1944, Lange asked Stalin about possible adjustments of the Curzon Line, indicating strong Polish attachment to Lvov. Stalin referred to Ukrainian feelings but did not exclude a future discussion on the subject, *DOPSR*, vol. II, pp. 238–239.

⁸⁶Alexandre Millerand (1859–1943), French politician, first socialist minister in the French government in 1898–1902, Prime Minister in 1920, President in 1920–1924.

⁸⁷Italy was represented in Spa by Carlo Sforza (1872–1923), Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1920–1921, and not by Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti.

⁸⁸Władysław Grabski (1874–1938), Prime Minister of Poland in June–July 1920 and 1923–1925.

⁸⁹See ft. 11.

Ethnological Effect of Various Lines, according to Figures for Religion⁹⁰

	Differences	Polish Minority left in the Ukraine	Ukrainian Minority left in Poland
Line "A"	1,210,000	1,681,000	471,000
"Line X" (proposed in Prof. Toynbee's memo of 12.2.44, leaving Lwow in Poland but Drohobycz and the Uzok Pass in the Ukraine)	427,000	1,338,000	911,000
"Line B" (leaving Lwow, Drohobycz and the Uzok Pass in Poland)	218,000	1,160,000	1,378,000
"Line Y" (proposed in this Note, leaving Lwow and Drohobycz in Poland but the Uzok Pass in the Ukraine)	nil	1,196,000	1,196,000

⁹⁰These data do not take into consideration Soviet resettlements in the region in question in 1939-1941 and other imposed migration movements, including the tide of Polish refugees fleeing the massacres initiated by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943.