

## MISJA „FRESTON”

Publikowany niżej dokument<sup>1</sup> dotyczy jednego z mniej znanych epizodów końcowej fazy minionej wojny. Zawiera on sprawozdanie brytyjskiej misji obserwacyjnej, zrzuconej w rejonie Radomsko—Częstochowa 26 grudnia 1944 i działającej tam do chwili wyzwolenia go przez Armię Radziecką w czasie ofensywy zimowej w styczniu 1945 r. Jest to prawdopodobnie jeden z nielicznych dokumentów tego typu, które znalazły się poza zasięgiem kontroli *Special Operations Executive* (SOE), instytucji brytyjskiej, od kilku lat coraz bardziej interesującej historyków wojny światowej<sup>2</sup>. Udostępniając czytelnikom ten dokument, drukowany w wersji oryginalnej, czujemy się w obowiązku przedstawić genezę tej misji, spróbować wyjaśnić jej zadania, a także poczynić pewne uwagi na marginesie treści sprawozdania.

Wzmianki o misji „Freston” znajdujemy tylko w dwóch wydawnictwach: w *Polskich Siłach Zbrojnych w II Wojnie Światowej (Armia Krajowa)*<sup>3</sup> oraz w *Wspomnieniach wojennych Stanisława Kopańskiego*<sup>4</sup>. Pierwsze z nich informuje krótko o staraniach polskich emigracyjnych władz politycznych i wojskowych o misję angielską, jej zadaniom i wynikom poświęcając niewiele miejsca<sup>5</sup>. Druga natomiast relacjonuje bardzo zwięźle sprawę misji w potoku innych wydarzeń, w których autor jako szef sztabu Naczelnego Wodza PSZ w określonym stopniu uczestniczył. W jakiejś mierze interesujący jest fakt, że historyk brytyjski F. W. Deakin, w latach wojny jeden z emisariuszy SOE w Jugosławii, w swym referacie na II Międzynarodowej Konferencji Historyków Ruchu Oporu

<sup>1</sup> Mikrofilm dokumentu znajduje się w dziale mikrofilmów Wojskowego Instytutu Historycznego, rol. nr 34 i 36.

<sup>2</sup> SOE utworzono w postaci załączkowej w 1938 r. z zadaniem przygotowania zasad, środków i ludzi dla prowadzenia „niedźwielmeńskiej wojny”. W roku 1940 SOE włączono do ministerstwa wojny ekonomicznej. Z czasem instytucja ta rozrosła się, posiadając poza centralą i oddziałem londyńskim (ca 7500 ludzi) sztab w Kairze (4000 ludzi) i oddział bliskowschodni (ca 1300 ludzi) oraz przydzielone jej oddziały lotnictwa. Personel SOE, którym kierował gen. C. Gubbins, rekrutował się zarówno z Brytyjczyków, jak też spośród ludzi innych narodowości, szkolonych w specjalnych ośrodkach. W 1944 r. SOE wraz z amerykańską *Office of Strategic Service* (OSS) podporządkowano operacyjnie dowództwu alianckich sił ekspedycyjnych (SHAEP), jednakże zachował on swą autonomię. Po wojnie SOE rozwiązano. Swego rodzaju biurem studiów jej doświadczeń oraz wypracowywania nowych koncepcji jest działająca w ramach uniwersytetu oksfordzkiego *St. Anthony College*. Por. E. A. Bołtin i J. Red'ko, *Uprawienije Osobych Opieracij*. „Wojenno-Istoriczeskij Żurnał” 1964, nr 9, s. 22 i nast.

<sup>3</sup> *Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej*, t. 3. *Armia Krajowa*. Londyn 1950, s. 922-3.

<sup>4</sup> S. Kopański, *Wspomnienia wojenne 1939—1946 r.* Londyn 1962, s. 345.

<sup>5</sup> Autorzy tomu *Polskie Siły Zbrojne* nie powołują się na sprawozdanie misji „Freston”, chociaż, jak należy przypuszczać, nie mogło im ono być nieznanne.

(Mediolan, marzec 1961) nie tylko pominął, ale wręcz zaprzeczył, by SOE przeprowadzało tego rodzaju operacje na terytorium Polski, z wyjątkiem jednej w 1941 r.<sup>6</sup> O misji „Freston” Deakin nie mógł przecież nie wiedzieć. Niewiele również śladów pozostawiła misja ta w archiwaliach dostępnych polskiemu badaczowi. Znacznie więcej natomiast możemy dowiedzieć się o jej genezie.

Dążenia polskiego rządu emigracyjnego do uzyskania bardziej bezpośredniego zaangażowania się aliantów na terenie Polski, m. in. w postaci skierowania do niej misji wojskowej, wystąpiły już w drugiej połowie 1943 r. Wynikały one bezpośrednio z generalnej koncepcji strategicznej obozu „londyńskiego”, zawartej w idei powstania powszechnego, sprzężonego z akcją aliancką. Jednakże, nasilając się, szybko tracą one motywację wojskową na rzecz politycznej, związanej ze stanem stosunków między polskim rządem emigracyjnym i rządem radzieckim. Istniejący między nimi konflikt powodował, że nawet ściśle wojskowe zadania, jakie miałyby wypełniać owe misje, przybierały charakter działań o charakterze politycznym. Strona polska zwracała zresztą stale uwagę, iż zależy jej nie tylko na tym, by misja ta spełniała funkcje informacyjne wobec swych władz państwowych i wojskowych, zabezpieczała zaopatrzenie w sprzęt wojenny Armii Krajowej, dostarczany przez aliantów anglosaskich drogą powietrzną, ale też, by podjęła współdziałanie polityczne z Delegaturą Rządu oraz umożliwiła „wymianę wszelkich informacji” między nimi a rządem emigracyjnym i naczelnym dowództwem Polskich Sił Zbrojnych<sup>7</sup>.

Sprawa ekspedycji misji alianckiej do Polski w 1943 r., dość daleko zaawansowana, nie zakończyła się oczekiwanym przez stronę polską rezultatem, gdyż w opinii rządów anglosaskich, po konferencji w Moskwie i Teheranie, mogła ona znaleźć się w sprzeczności z przyjętymi tam ustaleniami wojskowymi i politycznymi, bezpośrednio lub też pośrednio dotyczącymi Polski<sup>8</sup>.

W oczekiwaniu na przekroczenie przez wojska radzieckie byłej granicy w 1939 r., a zwłaszcza po tym fakcie, starania o czynne zaangażowanie się aliantów anglosaskich na terytorium Polski, a także na ziemiach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi, wokół których narastał konflikt polsko-radziecki, przybrały na sile. Stronie polskiej zależało na tym z wielu względów. Szukała ona dowodów pełnego poparcia ze strony aliantów, co miało niebagatelne znaczenie dla autorytetu rządu emigracyjnego wśród społeczeństwa w kraju. Szukała również asekuracji politycznej wobec Związku Radzieckiego. Koncepcje polskie szły zresztą w niektórych wypadkach znacznie dalej, aniżeli wysłanie misji obserwacyjno-łącznikowej. Wśród pewnych kół Komendy Głównej AK wysuwano nawet postulat okupacji anglosaskiej terytorium Polski<sup>9</sup>. Natomiast

<sup>6</sup> F. W. Deakin, *W. Brytania i europejski ruch oporu*. Wyd. WIH. *Materiały z Międzynarodowej Konferencji Historyków Ruchu Oporu*. Mediolan 1961, cz. 1, s. 201. O wspomnianej przez autora misji w 1941 brak bliższych danych. Autor niniejszych uwag polemizował w tej sprawie z Deakinem w Mediolanie.

<sup>7</sup> *Polskie Siły Zbrojne*, s. 922.

<sup>8</sup> Por. depeza „Stema” (Mikołajczyka) do „Sobola” (Jankowskiego) nr 185 z 11.VIII.1944. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 203.

<sup>9</sup> Por. nie podpisany meldunek (prawdopodobnie szefa oddziału II KG AK) z września 1943 r. oraz odpowiedź tegoż autora na uwagi wobec postawionych

w kołach londyńskich opracowywano i dyskutowano z brytyjskimi czynnikami rządowymi możliwość przerwania do kraju części rządu emigracyjnego, z jego premierem Stanisławem Mikołajczykiem na czele. Operacja ta, wykonana w okresie wyzwolenia Polski, miałyby odbyć się pod osłoną bądź to misji alianckiej, bądź też nawet wojsk anglosaskich, działających z obszaru przyczółkowego na terytorium Polski<sup>10</sup>. Występując w toku kampanii dyplomatycznej wokół stosunków polsko-radzieckich, która wywiązała się w łonie „wielkiej trójki” w pierwszych miesiącach 1944 r., z koncepcją „linii demarkacyjnej”, rząd emigracyjny domagał się skierowania na obszary położone na wschód od tej linii alianckich misji wojskowych, nadzorujących działalność administracji radzieckiej, traktowanej jako tymczasowa<sup>11</sup>. Nie mogło to, rzecz jasna, nie wywołać ostrej reakcji rządu radzieckiego, który propozycję tę uznał za naruszenie swych suwerennych praw<sup>12</sup>.

Żądanie wysłania misji alianckiej do Polski uzyskało szczególną rangę w notach do premiera Wielkiej Brytanii (21 grudnia 1944) oraz chargé d'affaires USA Schoenfelda (22 grudnia 1944). Rząd polski usilnie nalegał w nich na niezwłoczne skierowanie do Polski misji alianckich jako „łącznika między zainteresowanymi czynnikami brytyjskimi i polskim ruchem podziemnym, to znaczy Delegatem Rządu i Komendantem Armii Krajowej, w celu zapewnienia bardziej bezpośredniego i ścisłego kontaktu oraz współpracy między Wielką Brytanią (USA) i władzami podziemia polskiego we wspólnym dążeniu do pobicia Niemiec”<sup>13</sup>. W obu notach stwierdzano również, że apel o misje alianckie wyraża jednomyślny pogląd rządu i dowództwa wojskowego oraz podległych im wojskowych i cywilnych władz w kraju. I tym razem starania o misję nie przyniosły pożądanego przez stronę polską wyników. Ponowił je Mikołajczyk w swych kilkakrotnych konferencjach z Churchilllem, a także w konferencji, w której oprócz premiera Wielkiej Brytanii uczestniczył E. Stettinius, zastępca sekretarza stanu USA (9 kwietnia 1944). Jednakże negatywne stanowisko aliantów pozostawało bez zmian<sup>14</sup>. Brak jest w źródłach wyraźnego uzasadnienia odmowy. Można jednakże przypuszczać, że nadal działały tu obawy aliantów przed krokiem mogącym spowodować zarzuty radzieckie sprzeniewierzenia się uchwałom teherańskim, m. in. w odniesieniu do podziału obszarów kompetencji strategicznej Związku Radziec-

w nim też (m. in. przez „Rejenta” — szefa BIP, płk. J. Rzepeckiego). AZHP, 203/III-137, s. 13—15 oraz s. 76—78. Zachowane w materiałach Biura Prezydialnego Delegatury Rządu *Tezy w sprawie kosztów pobytu wojsk alianckich w Polsce* sformułowane są przede wszystkim w przewidywaniu, iż będą to wojska anglo-amerykańskie. Zob. AZHP, 202/I-27, s. 2 i nast.

<sup>10</sup> Por. instrukcja rządu emigracyjnego dla kraju (pkt E) z 25.X.1943. AZHP, 202/I-3, s. 73, dep. 246; rozmowa Mikołajczyka z ambasadorem USA Drexel Biddle, wg raportu tego ostatniego z 14. X.1943. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1943*, t. 3, s. 474—475; wywiad Mikołajczyka dla prasy 31.VIII.1944. „Dziennik Polski — Dziennik Żołnierza” z 1.IX.1944.

<sup>11</sup> Depesza „Stema” do Delegata Rządu, referująca treść rozmów z Churchilllem 16.II.1944, dep. nr 46 z 2.III.1944. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 46, a także *Korespondencja przewodniczącego Rady Ministrów ZSRR z W. S. Churchilllem i C. R. Attleem, lipiec 1941—listopad 1954*, t. I Warszawa 1960 (dalej *Korespondencja*), dok. 243.

<sup>12</sup> *Korespondencja*, dok. nr 249.

<sup>13</sup> Materiały rządu emigracyjnego. WIH, V/20-7, s. 70—71.

<sup>14</sup> Depesza „Stema” do Delegata Rządu nr 91 z 12.IV.1944. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 89.

kiego oraz mocarstw anglosaskich<sup>15</sup>. Zachowanie się przedstawicieli USA i Wielkiej Brytanii nie było jednakowe. Amerykanie po prostu nie reagowali na propozycje polskie. Brytyjczycy natomiast przejawiali pewne wahania. Nie godząc się na skierowanie misji do Polski, Churchill obiecywał jednak trzykrotnie zwiększyć przydział samolotów dla dostaw powietrznych dla AK<sup>16</sup>. Przedstawiciel Foreign Office F. K. Roberts w swym piśmie do ambasadora Raczyńskiego (11 kwietnia 1944) poszedł dalej, obiecując ponowne rozpatrzenie sprawy misji brytyjskiej<sup>17</sup>.

Zasługuje na uwagę fakt, że nasilenie starań o misje alianckie przypada na miesiące luty—marzec—kwiecień, a więc na okres, gdy problem polski stał się bodaj najważniejszym problemem międzynarodowym, ogniskującym zarówno działalność dyplomatyczną w łonie „wielkiej trójki”, jak też zainteresowania opinii publicznej świata, przekształcając się nawet w pewnym stopniu w problem polityki wewnętrznej Wielkiej Brytanii i USA<sup>18</sup>. Sprawa ewentualnej misji wraca ponownie na porządek dzienny pertraktacji między rządem emigracyjnym a rządami obu mocarstw zachodnich latem 1944 r., w związku z oczekiwanym podjęciem przez Armię Radziecką nowych operacji na ziemiach polskich oraz rozpoczętymi przez oddziały Armii Krajowej działaniami w akcji „Burza”, łącząc się w jakiejś mierze z zamiarami wywołania powstania w Warszawie.

Jeszcze w czasie swej czerwcowej wizyty w Stanach Zjednoczonych Mikołajczyk zwrócił się do Roosevelta o rozpatrzenie możliwości skierowania do Polski amerykańskiej misji wojskowej. Na postulat ten nie uzyskał wyraźnej odpowiedzi<sup>19</sup>. Również ponowne noty do rządów Wielkiej Brytanii (18 lipca) i Stanów Zjednoczonych (20 lipca), domagające się wysłania do Polski ich misji, pozostały bez skutku<sup>20</sup>. Strona polska wykorzystywała przy tym dla wzmocnienia swej argumentacji żądania

<sup>15</sup> Pośrednio wynika to z odpowiedzi Churchilla, udzielonej Mikołajczykowi w rozmowie 9.IV.1944. O problemie podziału stref kompetencji strategicznych wielkich mocarstw i jego wpływie na postępowanie Brytyjczyków pisze m. in. L. Mitkiewicz, *Powstanie Warszawskie*. „Zeszyty Historyczne” nr 1, Paryż 1962. Brak jest natomiast bliższych informacji odnośnie uzgodnień przyjętych w tej sprawie w Teheranie w takich pracach, jak J. Erman, *Grand Strategy, August 1945—September 1944*. London 1955, czy też M. Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943—1944*. Washington 1959. Nie wspomina o tym również W. Churchill w tomie 5 swej pracy *The Second World War*. Boston 1951.

<sup>16</sup> Depesza „Stema” do Delegata Rządu nr 35 z 10.II.1944. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 35. *Notabene* obietnica ta była sprzeczna ze stanowiskiem kół wojskowych. Kierownictwo SOE sprzeciwiało się, w oparciu o decyzje brytyjskie Szefów sztabów, dostawom dla AK, przekraczającym normy przewidziane dla ograniczonej dywersji. Por. o tym cytowane opracowanie Mitkiewicza, a także notatka gen. Tantara, omawiająca starania o pomoc dla Warszawy. AZHP, 202/I-3, s. 34.

<sup>17</sup> Notatka F. K. Roberts’a do amb. E. Raczyńskiego z 11.IV.1944. Materiały rządu emigracyjnego. WIH, V/20-7, s. 110. Warto odnotować, iż Polacy dostrzegli różnicę w podejściu do swych postulatów ze strony Churchilla i kół wojskowych oraz Edena i jego Foreign Office. Wzmiankuje o tym Mikołajczyk w depeszy do Delegata Rządu nr 77 z 26.III.1944. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 76.

<sup>18</sup> Charakterystyczne w tym względzie informacje z terenu Stanów Zjednoczonych zawiera m. in. sprawozdanie wysłannika władz emigracyjnych do USA, Roppa, z 20.III.1944. Wskazuje na to również przebieg dyskusji w Izbie Gmin w lutym i marcu 1944 r.

<sup>19</sup> Sprawozdanie z rozmów Mikołajczyka w czasie wizyty w USA (5—14.VI.1944). Materiały rządu emigracyjnego. WIH, V/20-7, s. 132.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, s. 158—159.

idące w tym kierunku zarówno centralnych, jak też terenowych ogniw sieci Delegatury Rządu i AK<sup>21</sup>. Brytyjczycy nie kryli jednak swego sceptycyzmu wobec tego rodzaju przedsięwzięcia, zwracając uwagę na ujemne następstwa, jakie mogłoby mieć ono dla stosunków brytyjsko-radzieckich<sup>22</sup>. Z niedostatecznie natomiast jasną misją polityczną został skierowany do Polski w kwietniu 1944 r. dr J. Retinger, postać niezmiernie interesująca, pozostająca w bliskich stosunkach z gen. Sikorskim i prof. Kotem, przede wszystkim zaś z wpływowymi osobistościami brytyjskimi, w tej liczbie z pierwszym ministrem wojny ekonomicznej H. Daltonem, a także szefem SOE gen. Colin Gubbinsem<sup>23</sup>. Retinger w misji swej kierował się przede wszystkim zadaniami i intencjami brytyjskich kół kierowniczych, których pełnym zaufaniem się cieszył. Do Wielkiej Brytanii powrócił tzw. trzecim mostem, w ostatnich dniach lipca 1944 r.<sup>24</sup>

W tragicznych dniach powstania warszawskiego miały miejsce co najmniej dwie poważne próby uzyskania zmiany stanowiska rządu brytyjskiego w sprawie wysłania misji do Polski. Pierwszą podjął wicepremier Kwapiński, zastępujący Mikołajczyka, prowadzącego wówczas rozmowy w Moskwie. Skierował on 4 sierpnia do rządu brytyjskiego notę, domagającą się wyraźnego uznania przez rządy alianckie praw kombatanckich żołnierzy AK oraz w rozmowie z podsekretarzem stanu w Foreign Office Orm-Sargentem podniósł kwestię misji brytyjskiej, którą ten ostatni obiecał „ponownie poddać rozpatrzeniu”<sup>25</sup>. Z drugą wystąpił Mikołajczyk 22 sierpnia w rozmowie z Edenem, któremu wręczył obszernie pismo zawierające uzasadnienie postulatów polskich w sprawie misji alianckiej. Pismo to zwracało m. in. uwagę rządu brytyjskiego na moralne i polityczne znaczenie dla rządu emigracyjnego i jego autorytetu spełnienia tych postulatów<sup>26</sup>. W obu wypadkach Brytyjczycy powstrzymali się od wiążących decyzji.

Istnieją pewne ślady wskazujące, iż w czasie walk powstańczych w Warszawie, Amerykanie, podobnie jak Brytyjczycy w przypadku Reteringera, przygotowali przerzut do Polski własnego emisariusza politycznego. Zadanie to powierzono porucznikowi lotnictwa, prawdopodobnie polskiego pochodzenia o pseudonimie „Szczepan”. Wyposażony w specjalny sprzęt łączności miał on być zrzucony w ostatnich dniach września wraz z radiotelegrafistą na teren Kampinosu pod Warszawą. W odróżnie-

<sup>21</sup> Por. m. in. depeze do Delegata Rządu informujące o wykorzystaniu tych żądań. AZHP, 202/I-4, dep. nr 79 z 31.III. oraz nr 87 z 8.IV.1944. Napływały one aż do września z rozmaitych okręgów AK, w tej liczbie z okręgu lwowskiego, krakowskiego, radomskiego (kieleckiego) i wileńskiego.

<sup>22</sup> Por. notatka radcy MSZ Zarańskiego z rozmowy z wyższym urzędnikiem Foreign Office Robertsem 19.VII.1944. Materiały rządu emigracyjnego. WIH, V/20-7, s. 160.

<sup>23</sup> H. Dalton, *The Fateful Years*. London 1957, s. 372.

<sup>24</sup> *Polskie Siły Zbrojne*, t. III, s. 704–705. W tej sprawie również depeze Mikołajczyka do Delegata Rządu nr 82 i 83 z 5.IV.1944, stwierdzające m. in., że Retinger (oznaczony w korespondencji pseudonimem „Salamander”) „cieszy się pełnym zaufaniem naszych gospodarzy (tzn. Brytyjczyków — J. Z.). Jego rychły i szczęśliwy powrót może mieć dla naszej sprawy szczególne znaczenie”. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 80, 81. Treść tych depez wskazuje m. in. na zamierzone ściągnięcie na pewien okres do W. Brytanii Delegata Rządu — Jankowskiego.

<sup>25</sup> Sprawozdanie min. Romera z akcji dyplomatycznej wokół sprawy pomocy alianckiej dla Warszawy. Materiały rządu emigracyjnego. WIH, V/20-7, s. 262–3 oraz E. Raczyński, *W sojusznicy Londynie*. Londyn 1962, s. 379.

<sup>26</sup> Sprawozdanie min. Romera, op. cit., s. 272, a także Raczyński, op. cit., s. 368.

niu od Retingera, kontaktującego się w czasie swego pobytu głównie ze zwolennikami Mikołajczyka, przełożeni „Szczepana” kierowali go do władz zwierzchnich WRN, w sieci którego winien on był wypełnić swą misję aż do wyzwolenia Polski przez Armię Radziecką, po czym ujawnić się wobec władz radzieckich i powrócić do swej bazy wyjściowej<sup>27</sup>. Brak jest jednakże jakichkolwiek wiadomości o tym, czy przedsięwzięcie to zostało zrealizowane.

\*

Po upadku powstania warszawskiego zaszła niespodziewana zmiana w stanowisku rządu brytyjskiego wobec sprawy misji. Trudno znaleźć dokładne wyjaśnienie jej motywów. Można jedynie przypuszczać, że były one związane z kompleksem zagadnień, jakie wystąpiły wówczas przed polityką brytyjską na jej polskim i radzieckim kierunku. W odniesieniu do Związku Radzieckiego zarówno w brytyjskiej, jak też amerykańskiej polityce zarysowywały się u schyłku 1944 r. coraz wyraźniej negatywne tendencje, przy czym nie bez znaczenia pozostawały tu właśnie sprawy polskie. Niepowodzenie rokowań Mikołajczyka w Moskwie w październiku 1944 r. zaogniło do ostateczności kryzys wewnętrzny w rządzie emigracyjnym, który musiał zakończyć się ustąpieniem Mikołajczyka i jego zwolenników. Z kryzysu tego wyłonił się nowy rząd pod kierunkiem przybyłego w lipcu z kraju Tomasza Arciszewskiego. Rząd ten nie posiadał już, jak to oficjalnie oświadczył Churchill w Izbie Gmin, takiego poparcia Brytyjczyków, jakiego udzielali oni Mikołajczykowi<sup>28</sup>. Perspektywa spotkania Roosevelta, Stalina i Churchilla na początku 1945 r. zmuszała rząd brytyjski do podjęcia decyzji wprowadzających politykę brytyjską w sprawie polskiej na nowy, bardziej skomplikowany tor, próbujących dostosować ją do realnego stanu rzeczy. Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego wyszedł zwycięsko z próby pierwszych miesięcy istnienia, zaś przybliżający się moment wyzwolenia reszty ziem polskich przynieść musiał dalsze wzmocnienie jego pozycji wewnętrznej i międzynarodowej. Zespół tych właśnie, a być może i innych jeszcze, nie znanych nam przyczyn sprawił, że Brytyjczycy, tak powściągliwie przyjmujący do niedawna nalegania w sprawie misji, gotowi byli obecnie wysłać ją do Polski już w listopadzie 1944 r. Tym razem sprzeciw wyszedł od delegata rządu — Jankowskiego, który być może nie chcąc przyjmować misji w chaosie popowstaniowym, usilnie nalegał na odroczenie jej przylotu co najmniej o 6 tygodni<sup>29</sup>.

Plan operacji związanej z wysłaniem do Polski misji brytyjskiej, przygotowanej przez polską komórkę SOE pod kierownictwem ppłk H. B. Perkinsa, obejmował przerzut czterech grup, oznaczonych kryptonimami — „Freston”, „Flamstead”, „Folkestone” i „Fernham”. Ppłk Perkins, zadowolony z warunków przyjęcia pierwszej misji „Freston”, wydał 1 lub 2 stycznia polecenie do bazy SOE we Włoszech, by trzy pozostałe grupy niezwłocznie wystartowały. Z nie znanych nam bliżej przyczyn

<sup>27</sup> Patrz depesza z londyńskiego kierownictwa PPS — WRN do Pużaka i Zaremby w krajowym kierownictwie WRN, nr 241 z 15.IX.1944 oraz ich odpowiedź z 26.IX.1944 w depeszy nr 141. AZHP, 202/I-4, s. 282 oraz 202/I-8, s. 108.

<sup>28</sup> Por. wystąpienie Churchilla w debacie w Izbie Gmin 15.XII.1944. „Dziennik Polski — Dziennik Żołnierza” z 16.XII.1944, s. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Depesza Delegata Rządu nr 159 z 13.XI.1944. AZHP, 202/I-8, s. 119.

nie przybyły one jednakże do Polski<sup>30</sup>. Torującą drogę grupą „Freston” kierował ppłk D. T. Hudson, ps. „Bill”. Nazwiska dowódców pozostałych grup i ich skład — nie są nam znane.

Osoba szefa pierwszej grupy nie jest bez znaczenia dla zrozumienia znaczenia, jakie kierownictwo SOE przypisywało tej misji. Hudson, z zawodu inżynier górniczy, należał do „pionierów” działalności SOE na terenie Europy. Był on pierwszym, przybyłym w listopadzie 1941 r., emisariuszem brytyjskim w Jugosławii po okupowaniu jej przez Niemców. Spędził tam blisko dwa lata, działając głównie przy sztabie Draży Michajłowicza. Raporty Hudsona o sytuacji w Jugosławii odegrały pewną rolę w cofnięciu poparcia brytyjskiego dla Michajłowicza i uznaniu ruchu narodowowyzwoleńczego kierowanego przez Komunistyczną Partię Jugosławii. Jego przeżycia uważali niewątpliwie, iż wyniósł on z Jugosławii doświadczenia szczególnie cenne w skomplikowanych warunkach polskich.

Cel misji ppłk Hudsona w Polsce wyjaśnia zwięźle depeza, skierowana przez Oddział VI Sztabu Naczelnego Wodza (krypt. „Warta”) do następcy Bora-Komorowskiego, gen. Okulickiego „Termita”, z 4 stycznia 1945. Stwierdza ona, „że ze względu na ogólną sytuację międzynarodową rządowi brytyjskiemu bardzo zależy na szybkim otrzymaniu w ł a s n e g o (podkr. J. Z.) naświetlenia obecnej sytuacji w kraju. Misja brytyjska, która obecnie przybyła na teren Jodły<sup>31</sup>, otrzymała zlecenie dostarczenia takiego sprawozdania”<sup>32</sup>. Okulicki otrzymał w tejże depezy polecenie, by ułatwić jej zebranie niezbędnych informacji przez skontaktowanie szefa misji z „władzami politycznymi w kraju”. Według tekstu sprawozdania, „Termit” spotkał się już z Hudsonem poprzedniego dnia. Nie było to zbyt trudne, w rejonie Częstochowy działała bowiem w tym czasie odbudowywana przez Okulickiego Komenda Główna AK. Rozmowy, według Hudsona, ograniczyły do monologu Okulickiego. Przebieg spotkania nie pozwolił nawet członkom misji na uzyskanie obszerniejszych odpowiedzi na przygotowaną listę pytań. Do spotkania Hudsona z Janzkowskim, ps. „Sobol”, nie doszło.

Jak wynika więc z cytowanej depezy, a także ze wstępu sprawozdania, zadaniem misji było dostarczenie rządowi brytyjskiemu dokumentu, mogącego stanowić podstawę dla własnej, nie płynącej kanałami polskiego rządu emigracyjnego, informacji o sytuacji politycznej w Polsce, niezbędnej dla podjęcia zasadniczych decyzji w odniesieniu do spraw polskich. Raport misji nie dotarł do rządu brytyjskiego dostatecznie wcześnie, by mógł być przezeń wykorzystany w omawianiu spraw polskich na konferencji jałtańskiej. Nie ulega jednak wątpliwości, że znane mu były raporty szczegółowe, nadsyłane w trakcie pobytu misji w Polsce.

\*

Omówione wyżej zadania misji stanowią główną przyczynę naszego zainteresowania publikowanym dokumentem. Stanowi on ciekawy przykład widzenia spraw polskich i sytuacji w Polsce oczyma doświadczonego,

<sup>30</sup> Pismo ppłk Perkinsa do gen. Tatara z 2.I.1945. WIH, mat. Oddz. VI Sztabu NW, mikrof. rol. 34 kl. 83.

<sup>31</sup> Kryptonim okręgu kieleckiego (radomskiego) AK.

<sup>32</sup> Dep. nr 142 z 4.I.1945. WIH, jw, kl. 100.

starszego oficera brytyjskiej *Special Operations Executive*. Struktura dokumentu mówi poza tym wiele o kierunku zainteresowań misji, ściślej — jej przełożonych. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że przy sporządzaniu swego sprawozdania ppłk Hudson posługiwał się określonym zestawem zagadnień, stosunkowo wielostronnym, obejmującym nie tylko wojskowe, i przede wszystkim polityczne aspekty ówczesnej sytuacji w Polsce, ale też i sytuację rolnictwa, metody walki z grabieżą kontyngentową ze strony okupanta itp. Dysponując dość skąpym, jak na tak szeroki krąg zainteresowań, materiałem faktycznym, Hudson był zmuszony w niektórych wypadkach formułować oceny bardzo powierzchowne lub wręcz lakoniczne, a nawet odsyłać czytelnika do uwag rozproszonych w innych punktach sprawozdania.

Sprawozdanie składa się z dwóch części. Pierwsza, najważniejsza zawiera ogólne omówienie głównych, zdaniem Hudsona, problemów sytuacji w Polsce — *Polacy i AK, Jedność społeczeństwa polskiego, Polski ruch oporu, Polacy wobec Związku Radzieckiego, Polacy i ich rząd londyński, Polacy i Brytyjczycy*. Najobszerniejszy rozdział części *Polski ruch oporu* zawiera próbę analizy tego ruchu w świetle głównych założeń działalności okupanta hitlerowskiego. Znajdujemy tam również sformułowanie własnych poglądów Hudsona na podstawowe cele i metody prowadzenia walki podziemnej przez naród okupowanego kraju. Poglądy te nie sięgają poza powierzchowne zjawiska i nie grzeszą głębią, pomijając niemal zupełnie społeczne uwarunkowania wszelkich szerokich ruchów wyzwolńczych. Interesujące są jednakże jako obraz myślenia kręgu ludzi pokroju Hudsona.

Druga część sprawozdania obejmuje obszerny dziennik podróży misji oraz różne notatki szczegółowe. Usiłują one dać zwięzłe wiadomości o AK, AL, NSZ, partyzantce radzieckiej, niektórych kierunkach propagandy skierowanej do społeczeństwa polskiego. Znajdujemy w nich dość interesujące omówienie sytuacji rolnictwa i ludności wiejskiej, sposobów sabotowania kontyngentowej grabieży przez ludność oraz zwalczania jej przez podziemie. Rozdział ten należy bodaj do najlepiej opracowanych i mających określoną wartość poznawczą nawet dziś. W pewnych miejscach można by mieć pretensję do autorów, a raczej do ich informatorów, że walkę podziemia z eksploatacją wsi sprowadzili do działań AK, pomijając GL i BCh, a także, iż przedstawili ją niemal jak schemat gry sportowej, podczas gdy w tej walce ludność chłopska płaciła krwią rozstrzelanych i dziesiątkami spalonych i wymordowanych wsi.

Na ogół bardzo powierzchowne są obserwacje dotyczące Armii Radzieckiej. W tych ostatnich znajdujemy jednak również, przynoszące zaszczyt bezstronności i spostrzegawczości autorów, uwagi o prostocie stosunków wewnętrznych i warunków życia w Armii Radzieckiej, trosce żołnierzy, kierowców radzieckich o sprzęt, dyscyplinie operacyjnej sztabów i dyscyplinie marszowej wojsk, kompetencjach wojskowych, kadry itp.

O błędach, powierzchowności i prymitywizmach, których jest w raporcie niemało, zadecydowały zarówno subiektywne możliwości widzenia i rozumienia złożonych spraw życia i walki narodu polskiego przez osoby wchodzące w skład misji, jak też warunki jej działalności, krótki okres czasu oraz społeczne i polityczne oblicze otoczenia, w jakim przebywała misja i z którego czerpała swe informacje. Opis wędrówki misji bardzo plastycznie przedstawia to środowisko, stanowiące oparcie dla działalności

organizacji AK, szczególnie zaś rolę dworów ziemiańskich. Można by zażytkować twierdzenie, że wykonując swe zadania w tych warunkach personel misji przejawiał nadspodziewany wysiłek w trosce o uchwycenie istotnego stanu rzeczy w Polsce.

Nie znajdziemy u Hudsona, choćby w przybliżeniu, rzeczywistego obrazu podziemia polskiego, mnogości organizacji, ich różnorodności politycznej. Istnieją dlań w istocie rzeczy trzy tylko siły — AK, AL i NSZ, układające się w formułę: skrajna lewica rewolucyjna — AL, centrum — AK, oraz skrajna, faszystowska prawica — NSZ. Nie wspomina np. w ogóle o Batalionach Chłopskich, chociaż trudno przypuścić, by w kontaktach misji z ludnością wiejską nie zetknęła się ona z informacjami o tak aktywnej na tych terenach organizacji. W swej analizie AK, przy wielu błędach szczegółowych i jednostronności informacji, Hudson potrafił jednakże przejawić dość daleko posunięty krytycyzm, dostrzec charakter motywów przejścia AK do działań partyzanckich, w tej liczbie wpływ GL, stwierdzić powstrzymywanie się oddziałów AK od akcji w okresie ofensywy wojsk radzieckich w styczniu itp. Tej wnikliwości zabrakło mu natomiast w partiach poświęconych AL. Dlatego też co najmniej dziwny, o ile nie wręcz świadomie wypaczony, wydaje się obraz aktywności GL i AL sprowadzony wyłącznie do politycznych, społecznych motywów, pomijający natomiast jej najistotniejszą cechę — hasło niezwłocznej, natychmiastowej i powszechnej walki zbrojnej z okupantem. Jest to tym bardziej dziwne, że gdzie indziej znajdujemy uwagi o szczególnej zaciekłości hitlerowców w prześladowaniu oddziałów AL, większej nawet, aniżeli w stosunku do oddziałów AK. Ze spostrzeżeń tych jednakże nie wyciąga się żadnych wniosków. Natomiast w sposób dość zbliżony do rzeczywistości i wskazujący na korzystanie ze źródeł AL, uchwycono w sprawozdaniu najistotniejsze cechy bardzo swoich stosunków między oddziałami AK i AL na terenach Radomskiego i Częstochowskiego, zawierających zarówno elementy współpracy, jak też czujności, a nawet nieprzyjaźni.

Zawarte w sprawozdaniu Hudsona informacje dotyczące dziejów AK i AL, dane liczbowe, daty itp. są bardzo dalekie od ścisłości. Nawet przy uwzględnieniu warunków, w jakich zbierano je oraz charakteru źródeł, zastanawiają rozmiary tych pomyłek, np. przesunięcie daty powstania AK na rok 1943, podobnie jak i GL. Nie brak w nim też i sprzeczności, jak np. podawanie w jednym miejscu, iż 70% sprzętu radzieckich wojsk jest pochodzenia alianckiego, w innym zaś miejscu stwierdzenie, że nie ma dowodów, by żołnierze radzieccy posługiwali się alianckim uzbrojeniem.

Nie powinny nas dziwić nieprzychylne uwagi o ludowym ruchu partyzanckim czy też o wojskach radzieckich. Trudno byłoby oczekiwać czegoś innego od emisariuszy SOE, wśród których znajdował się poza tym zakonspirowany oficer polskich organów wywiadowczych w Londynie, prawdopodobnie mjr P. Kemp, oraz ich informatorów. Tym bardziej godne odnotowania są takie obiektywne stwierdzenia raportu Hudsona, jak np. że w odróżnieniu od innych krajów Europy, społeczeństwo polskie było zmuszane do pracy wykorzystywanej przez gospodarke wojenną Niemiec nie środkami ekonomicznymi, lecz wyłącznie terrorem, że w Polsce nie doszło jednak do wojny domowej upragnionej przez okupanta i inicjo-

wanej przez NSZ; że społeczeństwo odnosi się krytycznie do rządu londyńskiego, traktując go niemal wyłącznie jako zagraniczną reprezentację o zadaniach dyplomatycznych i propagandowych, nie zaś jako w pełni autorytatywne kierownictwo narodu; że na ogół krytycznie ocenia inicjatorów powstania warszawskiego; że wreszcie Polacy są przyjaźnie ustosunkowani do Związku Radzieckiego i Armii Radzieckiej, której okazali wszelką możliwą pomoc swymi szczupłymi zasobami żywnościowymi i pracą. Hudson i jego koledzy nie wahają się też zupełnie wyraźnie przedstawić faszystowski charakter oddziałów NSZ i kontakty Brygady Świętokrzyskiej z Niemcami, powołując się tutaj m. in. na informacje pochodzące od Okulickiego i wyraźnie podejrzewają w słuchach o rzekomej walce Brygady Świętokrzyskiej z Niemcami, dążenie przywódców NSZ do oczyszczenia się w oczach społeczeństwa od zarzutu współpracy z Niemcami.

Być może warto odnotować ogólnie zyczliwy stosunek autorów sprawozdania do społeczeństwa polskiego, podziw dla jego męstwa i rozsądku. Podnosząc te jego cechy uciekają się oni wielokrotnie do korzystnych dla Polski porównań z innymi krajami.

Publikując sprawozdanie misji „Freston” zdajemy sobie sprawę, iż w części tylko znajdujemy w nim informacje przydatne czytelnikowi bezpośrednio. Sądzymy jednakże, że mimo wielu, dziś tak oczywistych, nieścisłości, błędów, powierzchowności sądów, a nawet tendencyjności w doborze faktów i opiniach czytelnik zapozna się z nim z zainteresowaniem, jako z dokumentem wielce oryginalnym, ciekawym świadectwem tak trudnego okresu w dziejach naszego narodu, godnym szczególnej uwagi z racji swego pochodzenia, autorów i przeznaczenia. Opatrzyliśmy go przypisami, wyjaśniającymi użyte w nim terminy i skróty wojskowe, podającymi uzupełniające informacje, niezbędne sprostowania itp.

*Jan Zamojski*

TOP SECRET

REPORT ON THE BRITISH OBSERVER MISSION  
DESPATCHED TO GERMAN OCCUPIED POLAND 26TH DECEMBER 1944

Captain A.N. Currie }  
Csm. D. Galbraith } Signals

Colonel D.T. Hudson, D.S.O.  
Officer Commanding  
Lieut.-Colonel P.R.C. Solly-Flood  
Major P. Kemp

#### CONTENTS

##### PART I

Summary of the reactions of the Poles contacted by the Party in Poland to main developments which have affected them since 1939; in particular an attempt has been made to analyse the resistance of the Underground Army to which the Party was attached and to provide a basis for judging the different attitude adopted towards it by HMG and the USSR.

## PART II

- Section A. Itinerary, giving an account of the experiences of all members of the Mission, indicating the ground covered and type of Poles encountered
- Section B. Organisation of the Polish Underground Army (AK)
- Section C. Armia Ludowa (AL)
- Section D. NSZ (Military Branch of National Democratic Party)
- Section E. Russian Partisans
- Section F. Rural conditions
- Section G. Miscellaneous Propaganda
- Section H. Notes on Red Army in Poland

TOP SECRET

## PART I

The following Summary is based on experiences of the British Mission attached to the Polish Underground Army (AK) in the Radomsko area in Poland. During the first three weeks of 1945 the Mission had many opportunities of learning the opinions of Poles who, by virtue of their education and family tradition, regarded themselves as belonging to the leading classes. The Mission had, in addition, frequent contact with the Peasantry. It did not, however, meet many industrial workers and had no appreciable contact with either the AL or NSZ organisations.

*Poles and the AK*

The AK exercised a wide appeal to Poles under German occupation. The Mission did not observe that the AK makes or attempts to make any appreciable appeal to Poles since the Germans withdrew.

The wide and essentially anti-German appeal by the AK was twofold: 1. to keep Poles united during the German occupation and to prepare them for an orderly anti-German administration during the difficult transition period between the final ousting of the occupier and the establishment of a representative government, 2. to resist, in harmony with the pressure exerted by the Allies, German exploitation of Polish resources.

*Polish Unity*

Owing largely to the complete unity of purpose achieved by the AK organisation among adherents of the four main political trends, there has been during the years of occupation and after, as far as we were in a position to judge, no misdirected effort, no attempt to establish by force the rule of the minority, by any of these parties.

When the Russians arrived, we believe they were afforded every facility by the population to continue their advance against the Germans. An ordered co-operative populace put their slender resources of foodstuff at the disposal of the Russians who in their swift advance had far outstripped their own supplies. Local labour, transport, billeting and military information were freely given.

Two political groups, unimportant in themselves, refused to accept the AK directive. The NSZ of extreme right wing orientation, and the AL directed by the PPR (Communist) Party were in armed conflict with each other. The former

received help from the Germans and certainly did not help the Russian advance. The latter and moral support, at least, from Russia, and in return helped the Russian forces as much as they could. The AK succeeded largely in avoiding conflict with either of these parties.

#### *Polish Resistance*

From all accounts the Poles have suffered heavily during the German occupation. Their casualties have been heavy, even excluding Polish Jews, the Intelligentsia who are said to have been exterminated as potential leaders of resistance and the peasants who had to provide „lebensraum”. It can hardly be maintained, therefore, that the Poles have not resisted. The methods adopted by the leaders of resistance have, however, been sharply criticized, often because they were not violent enough, sometimes because they resulted in an unnecessary sacrifice of Polish lives.

The following remarks are intended to indicate the extent to which resistance sponsored by the AK was carried out on rational principles. Except for some broad comparisons with resistance in Yugoslavia I am not attempting to estimate the extent to which Poles have contributed to the Allied war effort by the sacrifices they made during occupation.

Resistance is directed against enemy exploitation of his preliminary success in the country he has overrun<sup>1</sup>. Its aim is to help the Allies win the war by making the process of exploitation as unprofitable to the enemy as possible. The underlying principles of optimum resistance are subject to some confusion. The Russians exploit the theory that freedom is at stake and life is worth nothing without freedom. The German's argument to the countries they have occupied is that life is at stake and freedom is worth nothing without life. The occupied peoples, more concerned with practice than with theory, feel that both life and freedom are valuable; they do not, however, see why they should pay more for one in terms of the other than their Allies.

The only type of resistance about which there is no disagreement is that directed against extermination. In 1942 the extermination of some communities in Poland to provide lebensraum was a German policy. We had few first hand accounts of the damage inflicted on the enemy in this type of resistance apart from descriptions of the fighting in the winter of 1942/1943 when the Germans carried out a policy of extermination against the peasants in the forested areas of Zamość with the object of putting in Volks-deutsch from Rumania. Some of the man power escaped into the woods where they were organized and armed by AK officers. Bitter fighting was said to have taken place until the Spring of 1943 when the Germans relaxed their policy. It was during this phase that the notorious Majdanek extermination camp was set up<sup>2</sup>. Few Jews seem to have escaped into the woods for the purpose either of protection or flight<sup>3</sup>, although some fighting is said to have taken place in the ghettos.

In this type of resistance the AK seem to have been of more use to the people than the partisan organizations of Yugoslavia, where early in 1941 the Serb communities in Bosnia and the Slovenes in German-occupied Slovenia were forced to fight for their lives. Although Tito's organization did not start to

<sup>1</sup> Chodzi tu o sukces w kampanii regularnych wojsk.

<sup>2</sup> Autorzy popełniają błąd, gdyż Majdanek został założony jesienią 1941 r. w pierw jako obóz dla jeńców radzieckich, zaś od wiosny 1942 funkcjonował już jako obóz koncentracyjny i obóz zagłady.

<sup>3</sup> Być może błąd maszynowy — winno być „fight”, na co wskazywałby dalszy człon zdania.

function until Russia came into the war and did not organize the desperate groups of peasants until after the Germans had moderated their policy, he — unlike the AK — is often given the credit of leading the peoples' fight for existence.

At other times the Germans in Poland concentrated only on two kinds of exploitation: a) of man power, b) of the resources of the country, (i.e. communications, industries, etc.).

The Germans employed two methods for such exploitation: 1. Deception and or 2. Force of arms.

#### *Deception*

To counter deception and thus make the enemy use his own man power to exploit the country is the first step in resistance. Deception by the Germans takes two main forms: — 1. That the leaders of resistance menace life, 2. That they or the Allies menace political freedom<sup>4</sup>.

In Poland the Germans did not succeed in provoking civil war on either issue. Such fighting as took place between the NSZ and the AL was limited to political opportunists without following, both of whom calculated on Allied victory. The AK being in close contact with the people and representative of them had no armed opponents. Polish casualties were the result not of civil war promoted by folly or German deception but of resistance to the armed forces.

In Jugoslav resistance, on the contrary, enormous effort was wasted. Tito fought one civil war against pro-Allied elements and another against relatively pro-German elements. A lot of this was due to deception of the people with whom he was not in contact. Some was due to his own political and military ineptitude.

When one reads in Moscow newspapers that Tito having engaged 600 000 troops in Jugoslavia is partly responsible for Allied success in Italy, one wonders what could have been said with a little goodwill of Polish resistance — which at least was not occupied in cutting its own throat — in helping some stages of the Russian advance.

The widespread influence of the AK on the underground administrative side countered German deception in other minor issues as well. Those who were unable to live beyond the reach of the Germans, the mass of the Polish people, were not deceived into working more than was necessary to maintain life. Nobody we heard of worked for the paper money which the Germans promised to redeem after the war. The work done for the Germans was not the result of deception but of German force of arms. The activities of individuals working for personal gain were a minimum owing to AK influence. When the Germans wanted work done they were obliged to use their own manpower to enforce it.

#### *Force of arms*

1. Defensive armed resistance. The second step of a resistance organisation is to put as much as possible of the country's man-power in a position where it can defend itself or escape from German labour round-ups, i.e. be mobile. In view of the limited food available, the accessibility of villages to tanks and quick moving transport, and the lack of shelter in the forests during winter, it is surprising that the AK managed at times to keep 100 000<sup>5</sup> men

<sup>4</sup> Jest to dość dowolna interpretacja głównych motywów propagandy hitlerowskiej.

<sup>5</sup> Liczba niewątpliwie przesadzona przy dosłownej interpretacji, jednakże w jakiejś mierze oddaje ogólną sytuację na ziemiach polskich, będącą dziełem całego podziemia.

trained and armed to the best of their ability beyond the German reach. We had ample, even first hand evidence of German troops tied down endeavouring to round up these men for work in German industries. There were frequent clashes in the forests, heavy casualties being suffered on both sides. Accounts of British Prisoners-of-war with such detachments leave on doubt as to the extent of this resistance.

On this score alone the supply of arms to the AK was fully justified.

2. Unarmed resistance. The mass of the Poles were not able to put themselves beyond the reach of the Germans. They did, however, use, under AK direction every trick to withhold levees or obliged the Germans to use the maximum amount of their own manpower to enforce production (See Part II, Section f). Where the Germans tried to control the people by means of economic strangulation, instead of their own manpower, the black market and direct smuggling were counter-measures.

3. Limited sabotage. Despite the above resistance, the Germans derived considerable benefit from the Peasants and from the industrial communities. Largely for this reason, the organized mobile AK man-power, based on the peasants, were able to carry out limited sabotage without provoking massacres or the burning of villages.

In general, when the benefit the Germans derive from the community is off-set by its uses as a base for sabotage against them, they destroy it — provided that the effort required for so doing is not a prohibitive factor.

The AL following Moscow's policy of unrestricted violence irrespective of terrain, ignored this principle in theory rather than in practice. They were not, it seems, popular enough to be able to ignore the AK's warnings.

The policy of large scale sabotage or attacks depending for their success on the secrecy, food or shelter of unprotected villages in country where tanks can be employed, has proved impracticable in Poland, and unprofitable in Jugoslavia where it contributed to civil war. In Poland, however, unlike parts of the latter country attacks under such circumstances were not undertaken to any extent. Consequently the immobile elements were not obliged to organize themselves as a kind of police to report the presence of „irresponsible” elements to the Germans.

We heard of a number of instances where the AK had successfully taken „reprisals” against brutality, by shooting the German official responsible. The explanation of how the more vulnerable force can afford to take reprisals is that the Germans themselves sometimes realise that further brutality will not help them to exploit the country.

Apart from engaging in limited sabotage in areas where the villages could not be defended, and defending themselves in the forests or in conditions where they could fight with the Germans trying to round them up, the AK mobile manpower prepared to attack important military objectives in co-ordination with other pressure on the troops of occupation.

4. Guerilla Warfare. The object of large scale or guerilla warfare is to tie down enemy forces, in addition to those already engaged against the forms of resistance already mentioned.

When the guerillas attack communications these German troops attack the villages on which the guerillas depend. The number of villages which can be destroyed without seriously endangering the lives of the population is limited.

The guerillas must, therefore, do maximum damage or tie up a maximum number of troops for the loss of these „excess” villages. In keeping with constant pressure exerted by the Allies, the pressure exerted on the Germans by the guerillas must be so adjusted that this quota of „excess” villages is not exceeded before the end of hostilities.

In the first place guerilla activity must be confined to areas where the villages can be effectively defended, i.e. mountains or heavily forested districts without good communications, where the Germans cannot use heavy equipment and must, therefore, fight on equal terms with the Guerillas. When the Allied pressure on the German forces increases and the Germans have not enough occupational troops for effective punitive expeditions, the guerillas attack his communications, thus increasing their pressure to a point where the Germans have to bring in more troops. If despite these extra troops, the food position in the guerilla zone warrants more guerilla activity than is actually undertaken the Germans do not burn the villages of inactive peasants since this tends to increase man-power at the disposal of the guerillas. At this stage the guerillas can send open raiding parties against enemy targets outside the defensible guerilla zone.

This ability on the part of the guerillas to absorb the manpower of the villages they „plunder” — to use the German expression in such cases — is a strong form of protection that enables the other forms of resistance to flourish accordingly. When Tito proved that this could be done in Yugoslavia by concentrating on successful warfare in the guerilla zone, he proved for the first time of great value to the Allies and overcome much Yugoslav distrust caused by his advocating actions which gave the population the choice only of being victims of German reprisals or „Quislings” who took the only protection that was afforded<sup>6</sup>.

In Poland which has no terrain to compare with the great stretches of Yugoslav mountain terrain about which the peasants, houses are so scattered that a considerable proportion of them can be protected even against aircraft, there were very few villages inaccessible to tanks. The potentialities of the Holy Cross mountains to support guerilla activity are limited by their small extent and the vulnerable locations of the relatively few villages. The Beskid mountains supported some guerilla activity throughout the period of occupation but were too far away from important targets to serve as a valuable offensive base. In the wooded areas of Poland the peasants' houses are clustered in villages lying along good roads.

In Poland, owing to the lack of protection afforded to the villages by the terrain, guerilla activities or large scale sabotage against the enemy's communications could be undertaken rationally only in the absence of sufficient German troops to destroy even unprotected „surplus” villages, i.e. only in co-ordination with relief or strongest pressure from Russian forces.

In August 1944 throughout the forested areas of the General Government, there were wide-spread attacks by the AK on enemy targets. Since the Germans stabilised their front against the Russians, however, conditions for such attacks no longer existed. The AK, therefore, relaxed their attacks, and were able to avoid destruction of many villages.

5. Mass rising — Warsaw. At the same time a mass rising took place in Warsaw for the same reasons. It failed through lack of co-ordination. The casualties were extremely heavy as the only form of withdrawal was capitula-

---

<sup>6</sup> Autorzy mają tu oczywiście na myśli „ochronę” ze strony Niemców przed partyzantką.

tion. The following general account of this important event has been derived from numerous interviews with people who took part.

Everyone we met agreed that the Warsaw rising had been largely organized by the AK. But opinions differ as to whether the AK in commencing hostilities merely anticipated what would have been a spontaneous revolt on the part of the citizens or whether the AL, who are said to have started fighting two and a half hours before the AK<sup>7</sup> would not have lit the powder just as effectively. There is no doubt, however, that the population joined in the early stages with great enthusiasm.

The reasons which commended themselves to the people of Warsaw as justifying a general rising at that time have been given as follows: a) the proximity of the Russians and the belief that the latter would enter the city within twenty-four hours; b) the need to represent themselves and their rights in the most convincing way vis-a-vis the oncoming Russians; c) the need to counter the German measures for a general evacuation of the city and the consequent disorganization of the underground movement; d) the approval of the rising by the London Government, which confirmed the suitability of the date chosen by General Bor and thus implied material aid if the Russians did not relieve the city quite as early as expected.

That the Warsaw rising was widespread, extremely bitter and fought under appalling conditions is borne out on all sides. British and American help was negligible — Russian help still less<sup>8</sup>. After sixty-seven days' fighting the Poles were forced to accept German terms. The Russians entered the desolated capital six months after its citizens had risen to meet them.

The reactions of the Poles to this tragic episode are more of sorrow than of recrimination. Opinions are divided as to whether the Russians could have entered the city immediately after the rising began, i.e. whether political considerations prevented them from carrying out a feasible military operation. Most people, however, agree that their later attempts were definitely frustrated by force of arms when the Germans had been able to reorganize. General Bor and, to an extent, the London Government are generally held technically responsible for the revolt and its consequences. It is felt, however, that Russian propaganda immediately prior to the revolt was the reason underlying General Bor's failure to appreciate the true military position. Generally it was realised that Britain and America were not in a position to give more effective help, and that such help was not a primary condition of what was necessarily a short-term action.

I agree with the Russians that the Warsaw Rising was a costly failure. Would it have taken place if General Bor had contacted the Russians? The Yugoslav analogy might suggest an answer.

In 1941 Tito raised a widespread levee-en-mass in the lowlands of Serbia to help the Russians. Partisan propaganda at the time told the people that the Russians were advancing and were even in Pančevo. The Russians arrived — three years later!<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Twierdzenie niezgodne z faktami. Być może pojawiło się jako odbicie lansowanych w tym czasie w kołach kierowniczych AK argumentów, usprawiedliwiających moment wzniesienia powstania m. in. obawą przed wyprzedzeniem w tej inicjatywie ze strony AL.

<sup>8</sup> Twierdzenie niezgodne z prawdą. Sprawozdania własne KG AK przyznają, iż tonaż zrzućców radzieckich i wojska polskiego przekraczał znacznie tonaż zrzućców z zachodu. Przewaga ilościowa w materiale zrzuconym była kilkakrotna. Poza tym jednostki 1 AWP podjęły poczynając od 15.IX, wsparcie powstania w skali taktycznej i operacyjnej.

<sup>9</sup> Analogia ta wydaje się zbyt odległa i sztuczna, pomijając kwestię ścisłości faktów,

After Warsaw the Poles did not attempt another levee-en-mass — though defensive armed activity and sabotage continued until the Russians overran the country in January. Winter conditions, the large numbers of Vlassoŕs Russians terrorising the Poles in the German rear and the swift unexpected advance of the Russians themselves were factors which we saw for ourselves, ruled out large scale activity by the AK. As the Russians overran the Radomska area we saw AK units being disbanded and sent home.

#### *Side Light on Resistance*

An interesting side light on political interpretations of resistance was given at a conversation which took place in Moscow between Col. Grauer of the NKVD and ourselves in the presence of Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, British Ambassador in Moscow.

The Colonel opened the interview by referring to British Liaison Officers in Yugoslavia who had sent home misleading reports from the Balkans. He then asked me why the Poles did not fight the Germans.

In defence of the BLO's<sup>10</sup> I pointed out how much they had done to pave the way for the Russians by putting a non-political interpretation on certain misguided tendencies of Russian propaganda, such as the theory that the peoples under occupation can engage in unrestricted violence; how much they had tried to justify that policy in a practical way by doing all they could to get in large quantities of British supplies to support it. In fact BLO's had done a great deal to pull Russian chestnuts out of the fire.

The Colonel maintained that the Germans were bent solely on a policy of extermination which rendered unrestricted violence a necessity. He mentioned as an example of this policy the bombing of Russian towns, especially Kiev. As it happens I had spent an afternoon walking about the centre of Kiev, and was under the impression that parts of London looked even worse. I felt that such an outlook was one of pure sentimentality.

The Colonel then drew my attention to the magnificent resistance put up by the Russians in that part of Russia that had been occupied by the Germans. Unfortunately I did not know much about the supplies the partisans had received from the nearby Russian Armies, nor the extent to which the German forces were over-stretched in invading that part of Russia so quickly. I had, however, been greatly discomfited both in Serbia and in Poland, by the presence of very large numbers of Vlassov, Cossacks and Ukrainians who were greatly helping the Germans by whole hearted terrorisation of the populations of those countries. I had also noticed, while hedge-hopping from Lwow to Kiev that of the many villages we passed over — not actually on the main railway lines — none bore any visible marks of destruction. I had the impression, therefore, that even the Russians could find a way to avoid „extermination”<sup>11</sup>. So I was firm with the Colonel. We held no brief for leaders like Mihailovich. We liked fair play. When His Excellency<sup>12</sup> said that of course he personally had backed Tito from the start, we wondered why. Tito started by making himself justifiably unpopular. We hope that Polish resistance is better understood.

w tym również motywów powstania ludowego w Jugosławii, wynikających przede wszystkim z faktu okupacji tego kraju przez armie niemieckie i włoskie.

<sup>10</sup> *British Liaison Officers* — brytyjscy oficerowie łącznikowi.

<sup>11</sup> Te opinie nie mogły służyć jako dowód zmysłu obserwacyjnego i analitycznego autora.

<sup>12</sup> Ambasador brytyjski.

### *Poles vis a vis the Soviet*

There is a general hatred of the Germans in Poland. Gratitude to the Russians for having driven out the Germans is, however, tempered by suspicion of Russian intentions.

The Katyn episode raised considerable misgivings among the intellectuals. While German methods of propaganda are not underrated, many Poles feel that the Soviet have not presented an altogether convincing picture even to the outside world.

Russian demands on Poland have increased with her military success. This inconsistency on the part of an Ally is very clear in the minds of Poles who would otherwise be prepared to forget that Russia in 1940 had a pact with Germany. Had Russia's attitude to Poland been defined earlier and remained unchanging, the Poles would now have more confidence in the proposition outlined at the Black Sea Conference.

The well-known brand of Russian propaganda urging unrestricted violence by the population of countries occupied by the Germans, has added considerably to suspicions regarding Russian designs. The Poles realise as much as the Balkan peoples the value to their country of violent resistance. They are not persuaded by German propaganda that all such actions are irresponsible and must invariably lead to the extermination of the local population. They realise, however, that there are conditions where violent resistance can only defeat its own ends and that other continuous methods of resistance give more valuable results.

On the whole it appears that the Soviet attitude to the Poles has been crude to a degree quite unjustified by the potential admiration of the Polish masses for the Russians.

### *Poles and their London Government*

The attitude of the London Poles is still widely respected as symbolising what Poland has fought for and deserves. The Poles, even the intellectuals, seem to feel, however, that the London Government have nothing new to say.

Personalities in the London Government do not seem to mean much to the Poles in the country. Their function seems to be regarded as in the nature of a publicity agency. It will serve a useful purpose in mobilising pro-Polish anti-Russian forces outside in the event that: 1. the Russians do not adhere to the spirit and letter of the Black Sea Conference, and/or 2. Russia comes into conflict with the Western Democracies.

### *Poles and the British*

British prestige is high among the various classes of Poles with whom we had contact. There is a general but forlorn feeling that Britain will do her best by diplomatic means to help the Poles maintain a free and independent Poland. (Some Poles lay great stress on the military strength of Britain and the USA in comparison to Russia).

In our opinion, British prestige in Poland will suffer if any attempt is made to justify on moral grounds a fait accompli of Russian domination of the country.

The classes on whom Poland must rely for the future efficient government and administration of a truly independent state do not think that Russia will allow them to lead the country, but Anglo-American prestige will at first be instrumental in influencing much of the non-leading class to co-operate with the Polish Government of National Unity as designed by the Crimea Conference. Polish co-operation will finally depend on the amount of freedom the Poles feel they are allowed by the Russians.

## PART II

## A. ITINERARY

1. The Mission consisted of: Colonel D.T. Hudson, DSO, Major P. Solly-Flood, Major P. Kemp, Captain A. Currie, interpreter and Signals Officer, and C.S.M. Galbraith, Wireless Operator.

A map showing the party's itinerary<sup>13</sup>, enemy garrisons and all important places mentioned in this report, is attached.

2. The party left Brindisi in a Liberator at about 1600 hours on Tuesday, 26th December, 1944, and dropped on the target near Zarki at approximately 2100 hours. This was our fourth flight over Poland. On previous occasions the target had not been found owing to local ground mist. All the members of the party sustained slight injuries, because of the pilot dropping them from too low an altitude on the frozen ground. The Mission was taken to a farmhouse about half a kilometre away, where they were most warmly welcomed. The Mission's equipment was all collected intact within one and a half hours of dropping, and was taken to a secret depot in the woods by the reception party. The nearest enemy garrisons were:

80 S.S. at Zloty Potok, 6 kilometres away, and

50 Gandarmerie at Zarki, 10 kilometres away.

The house where we were received was crowded with refugees from Warsaw. They appeared to be mainly intelligentsia. Many spoke French, and one or two English. Later we moved about 3 kilometres north to the village of Kacze Bloto escorted by fifteen/twenty armed men and three girl partisans. Here we spent the night.

3. Wednesday, December 27th.

Early in the morning two Russian officers, a Captain and a Lieutenant, who were living in the same village, came to see us. They were friendly, and one spoke German. They had been dropped about three months previously and told us they were on the best of terms with the local AK unit<sup>14</sup>. They advised us to wear civilian clothes like themselves. The OC<sup>15</sup> of our escort party confirmed their good relations with the AK in this area and said that they preferred to live with the AK rather than with the AL as they could get better information. The AK leader also said that his men lived on good terms with the AL. Although they did not co-operate in actions, they gave each other warnings of the presence of Germans. Later in the morning we saw British prisoners of war who had escaped from Lamsdorf, Stalag 334 in Silesia<sup>16</sup>. They had been well looked after by the Polish villagers and paid by the AK.

4. At dusk we left the village, passing over flat, well frosted country. All our kit was carried on a haycart. We went about 2 kilometres NE to a small house on the edge of a forest, where we spent two days. Our host was in the forestry service of the General Government and wore the „Deutscher Fortschutz” arm-

<sup>13</sup> Mapa ta nie zachowała się.

<sup>14</sup> Na terenie okręgu kieleckiego AK miała miejsce dość ścisła i owocna współpraca organów zwiadowczych Armii Radzieckiej i wywiadu AK.

<sup>15</sup> Dowódca.

<sup>16</sup> Obóz jeńców wojennych VIII B i F 334 w Łambinowicach, powiat Niemodlin, woj. opolskie.

band. An AK officer under the pseudonym of Lt. Roman was attached to us. We encyphered several telegrams notifying our safe arrival and giving our first impressions. It was decided to leave this area the next day, as the mobilised forces there were inadequate and the Germans, having heard our aircraft, were already making enquiries. We ourselves had heard some machine-gun fire. This turned out to be a group of Vlassov's Cossacks making a man-power round-up in a nearby village. It was decided to take us north to the Radomsko area in which more men were mobilised. Before leaving we had a talk with an AK officer who had been in command of an „offensive unit” in the North Silesian Inspectorate, attacking small German patrols and M.T.<sup>17</sup>, also doing small sabotage. He said that such actions could more easily be carried out there than in the General Government where the Germans took reprisals. This was, however, partly balanced by the hostility of the population. There was more food in that area, but it had to be taken by force. He complained bitterly against the AK command, because they had sent him no arms. He had brought his detachment back into the General Government to disband it, owing to winter conditions and lack of supplies. We also met a local battalion commandor, a Captain Timawa<sup>18</sup>, who confirmed that his relations with the local AL were not hostile, but that he had been obliged to warn them off local sabotage actions which did little damage to the Germans and only brought reprisals on the population.

#### 5. Friday, December 29th.

We left at dusk with an escort of twenty men, and two carts. We crossed much open ground as well as forest, stopping twice on route at peasant houses for refreshment and once when one of the carts broke down. Our identity was kept from the peasants — our cover story being that we were escaped prisoners of war. To this end we had removed our badges of rank, decorations and parachute wings. Before dawn we reached a group of farm houses belonging to a nearby estate. We had hoped to spend the night there, but the manager was unwilling to receive us, because Cossacks came there every morning to collect hay, also because a number of his labourers were AL. We eventually slept in a peasant house in a village about 7 kilometres further on. The house was crowded with refugees from Warsaw.

#### 6. Saturday, December 30th.

We made our first contact with London in the morning, sending them three messages. We left at dusk and arrived at Wlynice after an all-night march, at the house of Madame Rubachowa. It was a large country mansion.

#### 7. Sunday, December 31st.

At the house there were a number of young people staying all obviously upper class intelligentsia. Our young hostess, whose husband had been in an Offlag since 1939, told us that she had had several AL men in the house; she said nothing against them, except that their officers were incompetent and mostly drunkards. As a result their detachments were easily mopped up by the Germans. She had also had Russian Officers in the house. They had behaved very well: the trouble with the Russians was, she said, that their people failed to keep them well supplied with money and food — as a result, they were forced to rob. Most of them, she thought, had been liquidated by the Germans. At lunch there we met, besides Lt. Roman, who had returned from Czestochowa,

<sup>17</sup> *Military Transport.*

<sup>18</sup> Kpt. Timawa (Tymawa).

a Major Stefan<sup>19</sup>, O.C.<sup>20</sup> of the 25th Infantry Regiment. This unit had been almost entirely demobilised, but henceforward we moved with its remaining detachment. There was also present the Chief of the AK Gendarmerie of the Radońsko area. Before dusk we left and moved 4 kilometres east to the village of Katarzyna, where we stayed at a small manor house. On the way we passed through a wood where a fight had occurred previously between the AL and the AK because the AL had mistaken the AK for the NSZ. On arrival we were most comfortably lodged and fed. We had another W/T<sup>21</sup> contact with London. In the evening we joined our escort to see the New Year in. We were made very welcome, but heard remarks such as:—

„Down with the Curzon Line!”  
 „We want Wilna and Lwow!”  
 „Long live Mikolajczyk!” and  
 „To hell with the Lublin Committee!”

Among many AK songs there was one composed some months earlier which accused England of lack of support and interest. Before going to bed, we made it clear to the O.C. of the escort detachment that we relied on him for all instructions concerning the security of our equipment. He advised us to stand by from 0500 hours every morning.

#### 8. Monday, January 1st.

We did not receive any alarm until 0730 hours, when we were told that German tanks were approaching. We were only given time to seize portable W/T kit and small haversacks containing all our codes and personal papers, and escaped into the woods under fire. All our heavy equipment and all personal gear which we had not left in the depot was lost. Our escort engaged and held the tanks when they were about 200 metres from our house. This enabled us to withdraw over completely open ground to the nearest forest. The morale of our detachment of twenty-five men, who fought four tanks and sixty infantry, was excellent. Their enthusiasm, however, appeared to be somewhat greater than their tactical ability. In this action the detachment lost one man — killed. The Germans burnt two barns, made a very rapid search of our house and withdrew quickly, taking our hostess, Madame Dembowska. She was released later. At least one German had been wounded. After remaining most of the day in the woods we went on in the evening to the village of Dudki. We met the local battalion commander, an intelligent and outspoken man. His attitude towards Polish problems was:

The London Government was the only body capable of interpreting Russian policy; consequently, if they distrusted Russia there was in fact little hope of a solution in the future. He added, however, that if the London Government saw fit to sign away the territory east of the Curzon Line of its own free will, he personally would not oppose such action. He showed little interest in personalities of the London Government, but remarked that the replacement of Mikolajczyk by Arciszewski was bad sign it indicated than Russian demands could not be met.

<sup>19</sup> Mjr Stefan.

<sup>20</sup> O.C. — *Officer Commanding* — dowódca.

<sup>21</sup> Skrót oznaczający radio.

9. Tuesday, January 2nd.

At dawn we attended an official open air burial service for the man killed the previous day. No priest was present. Immediately afterwards we left for Maly Jackow, where we spent the morning in a house. At approximately mid-day there was an alarm, due to the arrival of German gendarmerie in a neighbouring village. We had to spend a number of hours in a forest, but returned to the house in the late afternoon. We were then joined by a Colonel, Commander of the Czestochowa Inspectorate. He stayed to dinner. He was extremely friendly and said he did not think the Poles felt bitter towards England, but on the contrary realised that Britain was too far away to give material aid. He was, however, emphatic in saying that the Poles would fight to the last man against any enemy in order to regain their independence, an independence to which they were entitled as a nation of 33 millions, since much smaller States such as Holland and Belgium already enjoyed it.

10. Wednesday, January 3rd. — Our meeting with the GOC Home Army.

In the afternoon we went approximately 3 kilometres to a comfortable country house, where we met the GOC<sup>22</sup> and our fiend Col. Rutkowski<sup>23</sup>, his Chief of Staff. The house was owned by a Mr. Malewski, who had been employed before the war in the Ministry of Agriculture. Several other officers and civilians, of whose functions we had no time to learn, were also present. After tea we went into conference with the GOC. The GOC appeared to us to be a man who know his own mind, to be confident and clear headed. His manner was quiet and friendly. He know many of the personalities in SOE's London Office, and claimed to have commanded the 7th Polish Division under General Anders. We did not learn his real name.

First of all he gave us his military appreciation. This was in broad terms, and covered probable Russian and German intentions. He gave us a detailed German Order of Battle in Poland. He thought that Russian military plans were at that time being governed more by their political intentions towards the rest of Europe than by their desire to defeat Germany in the shortest possible space of time. Information at his disposal showed Russian preparations for an attack, but he considered it would be limited.

Next followed his political appreciation. The Poles had a magnificent fighting record in this war. It was their most precious national asset and must be lost by any contact with collaborationist elements. After Warsaw officers of the AK had found it very difficult to explain to the people why the fight must go on: they had nevertheless largely succeeded and the crisis was past. The GOC went on to say that he would be prepared to accept into the AK those members of the NSZ who were not tainted with collaborationism. Collaborationist elements in the NSZ he defined as the mobilised units such as the Holy Cross Brigade under Bochun and Zbjk<sup>24</sup>. They amounted to some 40%. The other 60% were prepared to recognise the National Democratic Party in London, and were therefore acceptable to him.

The only objection the GOC had to Communism was its subservience to Russia. With Russian officers the AK had good relations, but he personally had little faith in the Russian word. He stated it would be tragic for Poland if Russians designs were limited to her alone, but he firmly believed that after the

<sup>22</sup> Główny Komendant — gen. Okulicki „Kobra”, „Termit”.

<sup>23</sup> Plk Bokszczanin.

<sup>24</sup> „Bohun” — Antoni Szacki, „Zbik” — Władysław Kołaciński.

defeat of Germany (a matter of a few months at most) the British and Americans would be obliged to call an emphatic halt to Russian aggression. Whatever happened the AK intended to retain their identity. The Poles did not harbour any bitter feelings towards Great Britain, but after Warsaw they realised that they could not hope for material assistance from us.

The GOC then switched to internal administrative matters. He emphasised the danger of our wireless set being DF'd<sup>25</sup> by the Germans, and offered to send daily 100 groups of our traffic over his own links. At this point he closed the meeting and we were unable to ask any of the points we had on our own agenda. He said we should have another meeting with him in three weeks, when he would put us into contact with political leaders; in the intervening period we should see various political representatives, although for security reasons we could not be allowed to learn their real names, however much they might interest London.

#### 11. Thursday, January 4th.

Early next morning we moved about 7 kilometres further to the village of Redziny where we stayed with a peasant family in a small house. On the next day, January 5th, we were visited by a Mr. Siemienski, a prominent land-owner from Zytno, and also by several other young men and girls, all well educated, upper class. The latter included two girl couriers of the AK, and one girl who had been a nurse in Warsaw during the rising. The land-owner told us about the Uprawa, an organisation of land-owners for supporting the AK<sup>26</sup>. He also threw some light on AL methods of requisitioning, and showed us a pile of AL receipts. While we were at Redziny we had two AK liaison officers attached to us alternately. One had been an officer in the German army. He was a Pole and had used the first opportunity to desert to the AK. He was an extremely capable and lively young man. We also met a local AK intelligence officer who gave us some points about the origin and organisation of the local AL. We asked them their opinion on the personalities of the London Government, and in particular what they thought of Arciszewski's New Year speech. They evinced little interest in any of the personalities, merely remarking that in the circle in which they moved before the war Mikolajczyk was better known than Arciszewski: to our surprise they had not read or heard Arciszewski's speech, and even the news of the change in the London Government was brought to them from German controlled sources. On a number of other occasions when we asked the same questions of other Poles we noticed the same indifference to personalities, and ignorance of Arciszewski's speech.

#### 12. Saturday, January 6th.

We were visited by the same British prisoners of war whom we had met before. They brought forward plans for an escape and intelligence organisation from German prisoner-of-war camps. During our stay here we were always in a state of alert from 0500 hours until 1400 hours on account of small German foraging parties in the vicinity.

#### 13. Sunday, January 7th.

We were visited by a doctor and a nurse who gave us details of the AK

<sup>25</sup> Skrót terminu oznaczającego wykrycie radiogoniometryczne.

<sup>26</sup> Ziemiańska organizacja udzielająca AK pomocy pieniężnej, żywnościowej, kwaterunkowej, sanitarnej itp. Zob. *Polskie Siły Zbrojne*, t. III, s. 322.

medical organisation and the WSK.<sup>27</sup> (Womens' section of the AK). In the evening news arrived that there was to be a round-up in the area the following morning, so we moved 7 kilometres to Jackow, where we arrived at dawn. We stayed with a very poor family in a dirty house. Jackow, prior to the German occupation, contained a large number of Volksdeutsche: these were transferred by the Germans to richer Polish holdings near Radomsko and the dispossessed Poles were settled in Jackow.

14. Monday, January 8th.

We collected from peasants in Jackow some information about the teaching and schools carried on by the Poles despite the German ban. We also obtained details of the local AK officers. During this period we had endeavoured to get our hand generator repaired, but without success. We maintained sporadic contacts with London by means of a worn-out AK hand generator. We received some messages. Between the 7th and 9th January we gave all our encoded telegrams — about 1,000 groups in all — to the AK couriers for transmission over Polish links as previously agreed with the GOC. We urged the AK to send us as soon as possible the remainder of our own W/T equipment which we had left in the secret depot when we arrived. This we never received.

15. Tuesday, January 9th.

In the evening we went 4 kilometres to a *Liegenschaft* (a German-controlled estate run by Poles). The owner had been previously dispossessed by the Germans on account of black market activities. The mansion was large and well furnished. Responding to a toast to the British I expressed the usual hopes for a free and independent Poland, and concluded with a toast to the four great leaders, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt, M. Mikolajczyk<sup>28</sup> and Marshal Stalin. There was a loud protest against drinking to Stalin, and little enthusiasm for Mikolajczyk. Considerable anti-Soviet feeling was expressed.

On Thursday, January 12th, in the early morning, we returned to Redziny.

On the 13th we had a visit from a land-owner who had seen something of the methods of the NSZ. There we were also almost daily visited by young land-owning people. During the night of the 13th/14th we heard heavy gunfire to the East. This was our first intimation of the Russian offensive. The barrage continued throughout the night. On the 14th we had a visit from the mayor of the parish. His parish consisted of four villages, including Redziny. We had a long talk with him in which he gave us details of Polish village economy. During the next two days there was some German air activity and the AK gave us definite news that the Germans were withdrawing. We asked in vain for immediate contact with the GOC. We had previously addressed several letters to him enquiring whether our telegrams had been sent, but received no replies. The following day we received about one-third of the back, unsent, with no indication as to what had happened to the rest.

On the 15th we heard that Russian tanks were in Maluszyn, on the Pilica, and in Wloszczowa. In the afternoon a message arrived saying that we were invited that evening to Wlynica, where there would probably be some high ranking officers of the AK from whom we might expect to obtain information about

<sup>27</sup> WSK — Wojskowa Służba Kobiet.

<sup>28</sup> Premierem rządu emigracyjnego był już w tym czasie T. Arciszewski. Mikolajczyk, osoba „prywatna”, był jednak człowiekiem, z którym brytyjska polityka otwarcie wiązała swe kolejne posunięcia w kwestii polskiej.

the military situation, also the whereabouts and the plans of the GOC. We therefore started out by cart after dark. En route we were challenged by a group of AL, but we were in greater numbers than they and were not held up. On arrival at the house we found one representative of the GOC. The company consisted, as on the previous day, of young landed gentry and their refugee friends from Warsaw. We met a Major, a deputy inspector of the Czestochowa Inspectorate. He knew nothing about the whereabouts of the GOC. He had received no last-minute instructions and was acting on standing orders he had received several months previously. They were to disband and lie on the arrival of the Russians. He asked us to allow an AK envoy to accompany members of the Mission, at his own risk. We agreed, but said we could make no false statements to the Russians. From the Major I understood that no steps had been taken to mobilise the territorial units of the AK and that nothing was being done to harass the Germans<sup>29</sup>. Among the guests fears were expressed that any such rising might be premature, like Warsaw. It was even said that it was not worth while for the few mobilised units to fight the Germans at that time. From our own observations, we did not hear any accounts of AK actions during the Russian offensive. Among the Poles present many rumours were circulating about the proximity of the Russians and it was generally felt that this would be the last night of the word they had known for the last six years. Although it meant liberation from the Germans, it was also the beginning of a new uncertainty for Poland, and in particular for people of their class. Our hostess and some of the other guests decided to leave for the North immediately. It struck us forcibly that among all present there was no one who had not lost one or more close relatives fighting against the Germans, and that the Polish leading class had suffered in this war out of all proportion. We felt too that this process may yet continue. Before leaving we offered once again to assist any AK officers who wished to go over to the Russians with us, thereby possibly getting better treatment. At the same time we impressed upon them that we could give no guarantee whatever for their safety, but we would register their names on our return to England. We were unable to contact any British prisoners of war in the area to take over with us: we did, however, later warn the Russians of their presence and stressed the importance of their correct recognition and safety.

16. January 16th.

After midnight we left for Katarzyna, where we spent the night in a small peasant house. In the morning we sent off to London the bath of telegrams which had been returned to us by the Poles, who had been unable to deal with them.

There was considerable air activity by both sides and a continuous roar of transport was audible on the main road to the north also a great deal of gun and machine-gun fire. Our escort had received orders to remain with us to the last possible moment to ensure our safety, but we told them that our safety was now assured and that they should carry out their standing orders to disband regardless of us. They therefore left us that afternoon. We had already heard that the Russians were well west of our location, although there were still large groups of Germans and Vlassov's Cossacks wandering about in the vicinity. We

<sup>29</sup> Rozkazy wydane do jednostek AK przez Sztab Naczelnego Wodza w listopadzie i grudniu zalecały powstrzymanie się od wszelkich akcji zaczepnych wobec okupanta. Poza tym formalnie działał już rozkaz NW z 5.I.1945 o rozwiązaniu AK.

had a short conversation with a local AL political leader from a nearby village, who happened to come across us. As the AL would undoubtedly advise the Russians of our presence and it was also clear that we could serve no further purpose to the AK we decided to notify the Russians of our presence via the AL. Moreover, our communications had broken down owing to the disintegration of our hand generator. In the afternoon, as a last attempt, I sent the AK envoy and Captain Currie to try to contact the GOC or his Adjutant at a place a few kilometres to the South where it was rumoured one of them might be. I did this to ascertain whether the GOC himself had selected a more suitable representative whom he wished to send with us at his own risk out of the country. Major Solly-Flood accompanied them to observe Russian front line equipment. The rest of the party accepted an invitation to dinner at Madame Dembowska's house in Katarzyna. On the way we encountered a Russian patrol, and during dinner we were joined by a Russian officer who, after we had drunk toasts together to the Allies, delivered a speech — obviously a set piece learned beforehand. It brought out the following points: —

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt were frequently quoted as having agreed to the Curzon line.

In spite of this claim M. Mikolajczyk was too much of a Fascist to concur. The Poles would have compensation, including ample seaboard.

The Poles could please themselves whether they wished for collective farms or not.

Berling's army fighting round Warsaw and to the North was frequently played up.

The Poles were everywhere flocking to join such a well equipped and heroic army.

The names of Morawski and Wanda Wasilewska were often mentioned.

The Lublin Committee was represented as very popular.

The Russians would leave Poland as soon as the Germans were beaten.

The Russians had been holding 300 German divisions for most of the war, while the Allies were now only containing 67.

Western democracies had however helped with transport and there was one brigade equipped with British tanks used in the break through.

Several times during the speech the Russian officer paused to enquire of his colleagues whether he had missed anything out. I myself may have missed other points in the speech owing to my limited knowledge of Russian.

With our presence there irrevocably disclosed to the Russians there was no object in waiting for further news of the GOC. We told the Russians we would join them officially the following morning.

17. Thursday, January 16th.

Early in the morning a Dodge 15-cwt. truck arrived to transport us to the Russian Headquarters at Zytno. It contained Captain Currie, with a Russian major and escort. The former, together with Major Solly-Flood and the AL<sup>30</sup> envoy, had not succeeded the previous night in locating the GOC or his Adjutant. They, like, ourselves, ran into Russians. The Russian major refused to allow us to carry on the wireless communication we were trying to establish with London at the time. We were taken by truck to Zytno and on the way passed a continuous stream of Russian transport and tanks. On arrival we were presented to a Russian officer purporting to be a Major-General. I told him I was

<sup>30</sup> Jest to wyraźna omyłka, gdyż chodzi o oddziały ochrony AK.

i command of a British Mission working against the Germans in occupied Poland. I said that the Russian authorities in Moscow had been notified of this Mission, of its function and composition. I added that I had received confirmation of this from London over our own W/T on the previous night. I offered to show him our identity documents. He refused to look at them, saying that they could easily have been forged by the Germans. He then proceeded to shoot a string of questions at me, such as:

What was the name of the officer who controlled us from London?

On what frequencies did our W/T set work?

What was the name of our organisation?

Who were our contacts among the Poles?

I replied that I was not authorised to give such detailed information, but that our *bona fide* could be checked in Moscow. I then endeavoured to point out to him that there was a large number of British prisoners of war in the area now being overrun by the Russians, and that many of them were without uniforms and identity documents. I asked him to ensure their safe passage to the British authorities.

The General paid no attention to this, but stated arbitrarily that we would immediately hand over our arms, documents and radio equipment. I refused to consent to this and drew his attention to the British treatment of Russians in Italy, also to the general principles of courtesy between allies. He insisted and I was obliged to comply, but I told him that I did so because it was clear that he feared we should try to carry out some armed attack on the Red Army.

I would, however, protest most strongly to a higher authority against such treatment. Throughout the interview he adopted an attitude of arrogance and derision, although we are convinced he did not seriously doubt our story. After the interview we were escorted to the house of Mr. Siemienski, a large land-owner of Zytno (his estate, mostly forest, covered 2000 hectares). There we found Major Solly-Flood and the AK envoy. Major Solly-Flood had undergone a similar interrogation the night before. He was accused to his face by the General of being a liar, and his identity card and that belonging to Captain Currie were removed, and not returned until two days afterwards. A Russian major was appointed to look after us. He never let us out of his sight. An armed guard was placed round the house and outside our room.

The Russians had taken all Siemienski's livestock. He would have no means of cultivating his land in the spring. At the same time a committee had just been formed to run the property. It consisted mainly of his own estate workers; they were, however, very well disposed to Siemienski, who was a qualified agricultural expert, and they were obviously incapable of managing the estate without his advice and help. Siemienski did not yet know if he would be given the choice, as laid down in the declaration of the Lublin Committee, of a small pension or five hectares of his own land. He certainly did not expect to retain more than a part of one of the wings of his mansion. Siemienski himself had been an active member of the *Uprawa*. His daughter had been permanently employed as an AK courier. His son had been killed four months previously fighting with the AK against the Germans. Siemienski thought the new land reform would appeal to the peasants, at any rate until they found that they could not manage without the experience and equipment of the landlords.

Russian soldiers were quartered all over the house and befouled every part of it with their excreta; there were many Mongols among them. We were told that

they stole indiscriminately and broke up some of the furniture. Towards Siemiński and his family they adopted an arrogant attitude. In general, their discipline seemed negligible. In the house there were also forty refugees — mainly from Warsaw; some of them gave us first-hand accounts of the rising. While we were there we heard accounts of the recent fighting. It was generally agreed that apart from slight resistance on the Pilica the Germans had put up little fight. The advance had been so rapid that the greater part of the Germans in Radomsko, including the Gestapo, H.Q., had been trapped and wiped out to a man. In Czestochowa the Germans had put up a short rearguard action to enable the governor of Warsaw, Fischer, and his staff to escape. As our house was on the main road between Radomsko and Włoszczowa we were able surreptitiously to observe Russian transport and equipment. We noticed that about 70% of it was due to lease-lend<sup>31</sup>. We were unable to discover much about the activities of the AL since the arrival of the Russians. The mobilised AL forces had not been in evidence but it was generally admitted that throughout the whole neighbourhood peasant committees had already been set up.

18. January 21st.

We left Zytno for Radomsko in a Dodge truck with a Russian major and armed escort. On arrival we were comfortably lodged in a private house but were unable to speak to our hosts. We had dinner with a Russian Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, who made note of our protests at having been disarmed and were very civil. Toasts were drunk to the „Big Three”. The following morning we left Radomsko for Jadrzejów some 90 kilometres to the south-east. There we were handed over to another Russian major — after which the treatment accorded to us grew progressively worse. We were confined to squalid quarters without exercise, and generally treated in a contemptuous and often insolent manner, by the Major and his subordinates. Our protests and requests that we should see a senior officer were disregarded.

There were still flags to be seen in the streets, but we saw very little to indicate that the townspeople were enthusiastic about their new liberation. We were segregated from the local people.

On January 26th left for Czestochowa by truck. Accompanying us in the truck was a man in German uniform who looked like an officer and was referred to by his guards as „Vlassov”. He was about 45 and spoke Russian. Crossing the Pilica we saw few wrecked German tanks or M.T. Flags were displayed in most of the villages we passed through. On arrival at Czestochowa we were pitched suddenly into a cramped prison cell without explanation. The daylight was shut out by boards over the window. A blinded door had the usual slot through which our guards insolently stared at us and made disparaging remarks. There we stayed for twenty-four hours. Twice during this time portions of unpalatable gruel were given us in filthencrusted containers. We were not permitted to go to the lavatory when we wanted and in the morning were ordered out to wash in the prison yard at the point of tommy guns. Among a dozen Poles who were passing into the prison as our door was opened we noticed 2 AK supporters whom we had known at Włynica. After this we were removed to a less cell-like room upstairs, but our food remained the same for the next three days. We were accorded the concession of being allowed to go to the lavatory when we wanted, and of walking in the prison yard at set times. We refused to take advantage of the latter.

At all times I demanded to speak to an officer of rank equal to or higher than mine. On the 29th our treatment improved to the extent that we were allowed

<sup>31</sup> Hudson popelnia tu rażąca przesadę.

„officer's rations” and the behaviour of junior officers who visited us was more respectful. We overheard one of the latter tell his NCO<sup>32</sup> that our treatment had been scandalous. From then on our room was swept by a German 2nd Lieutenant and an NCO. As our demand to see a senior Russian officer had failed, we addressed a strongly worded protest to Marshal Konyev, who was commanding that front. This resulted in my being granted an interview on the 1st February with a Russian colonel. I expressed in no uncertain terms our indignation at the treatment accorded to us by our Russian allies. The colonel, in attempts to palliate our grievances, pleaded the speed of the Russian advance and the absence of instructions from Moscow. He promised that I should have no further reason to complain. We were removed to a comfortable private flat shared by two Russian subalterns. We were still excluded from all contact with Poles and were only permitted to take out exercise in the adjacent courtyard. It later became clear that these officers had been given instructions regarding us which the colonel had not had the courage to tell me. This culminated in my having to admonish one of them in very severe terms. He had tried to stop a British prisoner of war addressing me. Shortly afterwards I saw the colonel again and repeated my protests at the Russian methods applied to us. Incidentally, the prisoner of war told me that there were some two hundred British prisoners of war, including several RAMC<sup>33</sup> officers, from various Silesian camps, then in Czestochowa. There were also numbers of French and American prisoners about.

We managed to have a few minutes' conversation with three Polish women refugees from Warsaw. They evinced a curious regional patriotism in referring to the Czestochowa Poles as „cows” who had helped to dig German defences. It appeared that these „cows” had blamed the Warsaw Poles for starting a premature rising. The women said that if the British had dropped more supplies to Warsaw things might have turned out differently. They thought both the London Poles and the British Government had called for a rising. They clearly did not like Russian control but preferred it to that of the Germans. Living conditions were, however, most difficult: the Russians only allowed each person to exchange 500 zloty for the new currency<sup>34</sup>. There was nevertheless more liberty of movement under the Russians. Neither here nor elsewhere in this part of Poland did we see any indication of units of Berling's army. They had not taken part in the operations in this sector. A few officers were sometimes seen, but the units had not yet started to arrive from the East.

On the 11th February we left Czestochowa by a Douglas (D.C.3) aircraft: just before we left the Russians grafted on to us a young man in civilian clothes who, they said, was British and was also bound for Moscow. We had, however, little difficulty in persuading him to admit his true identity. He was an Austrian who had deserted the Germany army and had joined the Polish partisans. Apparently his aim in claiming to be British was to secure better treatment. We immediately notified the Russians, who, however, merely shrugged their shoulders. We felt the Russians even welcomed this opportunity of extending their suspicion to us, thus to justify their past treatment.

At Mielec, which had been liberated by the Russians in August, we spent the night: we had an opportunity of speaking to Polish employees of a small co-opera-

<sup>32</sup> Skrót oznaczający podoficera.

<sup>33</sup> Skrót oznaczający Królewski Korpus Zaopatrzenia Wojsk Lądowych lub korpus medyczny.

<sup>34</sup> Władze radzieckie, rzecz jasna, nie miały nic wspólnego z wymianą banknotów okupacyjnych złotych na banknoty Narodowego Banku Polskiego.

tive shop. Although the conversation was conducted in French, and was very guarded, it was clear that these Poles disliked the Russians and were bursting to have a long talk with us. They regarded the Provisional Government as a farce. There was now a greater scarcity of everything than under the Germans. They said that they had hoped the British would come to Poland. They asked us if it was true that we were prisoners of the Russians, as the latter had told them.

Later the same evening we had a brief unobserved talk with the peasants who owned the house at which we were staying. They thought the Lublin Government had little authority in these parts and would not last. The local administration set up by Lublin was largely governed by Russian directives. There had been a number of arrests since the Russians arrived, but these were caused rather by non-cooperation and evading the military call-up than by any positive disobedience. There was no particular bitterness about these arrests. The Russian levies are however comparable to those taken by the Germans; the former are not paying even a nominal price. They gave us no specific reasons for their confidence that Poland would eventually have a free government. They were not interested in the personalities in the London Government, but referred favourably to it. They were remarkably pro-British (a sentiment possibly sharpened by their having a number of Russian officers quartered on them). They gave us clearly to understand that anything supported and guaranteed by the British would have their approval.

On February 13th we flew to Lwow. At the aerodrome there, as on the other aerodromes we had seen, the greater part of the aircraft were of American type, including fighters, bombers and transport machines. Here we spoke to some Polish servants who cleaned our room at the local barracks. They indicated that the Poles in Lwow had nothing particular to complain of under the Russians. Poles East of the Curzon Line were encouraged to move West into Poland. At present only those who had relatives on the Polish side were leaving. No pressure was exerted on those who wished to stay. For Poles and Ukrainians alike living conditions were extremely difficult. They were very friendly but broke off conversation when some Russians appeared.

This was our last contact with Poland. Next day we flew to Kiev, and thence travelled by train to Moscow, which we reached on the morning of February 17th. The Russians handed us all, including the rather stupid Austrian, over to 30 military Mission without further comment.

## B. ORGANISATION OF THE POLISH UNDERGROUND ARMY (AK)

### Sources:

Main source — AK Partisan Officers.  
Subsidiary source — Civilians.

### 1. Origins

The AK originated at the end of 1942 by the fusion of four main resistance groups — representing pre-war political parties. These resistance groups had been in existence since 1940. The name AK was not adopted till early 1943<sup>35</sup>. At its

<sup>35</sup> Wyrażne nieścisłości. Armia Krajowa została powołana rozkazem Naczelnego Wodza z 14.II.1942 jako kontynuacja Związku Walki Zbrojnej (ZWZ), nie zaś jako rezultat fuzji orga-

inception the AK was an underground conspiratorial body on a purely local territorial basis, having very few mobilised partisan units. Such partisan units as were in existence the AK took over direct from the amalgamated groups. In the first instance the direction of AK was solely military, i.e. supplied by the former officers of the Polish Army. Political machinery following a joint policy to last until the restoration of independence was agreed upon and was formed on a parallel with the military organisation. A shadow administration was set up in collaboration with the London government.

## 2. Aims


Administrative. The administrative aims appear to have been three-fold: 1. To provide a democratic framework round which a government of the country might be built after liberation; 2. To keep alive democratic party principles under occupation; 3. To protect the country's internal economy under occupation.

Military. Here there were also three main aims, one long and two short term ones: 1. The most important was to free the country from the Germans by a general mobilisation at the appropriate time; 2. To weaken the Germans during their term of occupation by active and passive small-scale sabotage; 3. To protect the lives and belongings of the population by preventing the Germans from carrying out atrocities and exploitation, also by taking counter reprisals themselves.

## 3. Territorial Organisation

Military. The whole organisation was based initially on the territorial platoon varying in numbers from thirty to one hundred men. These men remained in their homes, but training was carried on secretly. They were given arms either from stocks hidden from the Germans after October 1939, by stealing or buying from the Germans, and more recently by supplies dropped from the air. The latter eventually approximately one third of all supplies. Three platoons usually formed a company, known as a „resistance group”. A sub-area (*Podobwód*) would control as many as six or seven resistance groups. The size of the *Podobwód* was liable to vary greatly, depending on whether the region was thinly or thickly populated. On an average five sub-areas were made into an area (*Obwód*). The latter corresponded in almost every case to a pre-war Polish county. Three areas in turn formed an inspectorate, and four inspectorates a district (*Okręg*). A district is synonymous with a pre-war DOK or military area. Districts come directly under the GOC. On every level in the chain of command would be found a sabotage team, known as a „diversive unit”. They were called out for specific tasks, and on completion returned to their homes

Diagrammatically the organisation can be represented as follows:



nizacji czterech stronnictw politycznych. Hudson poplątał tu prawdopodobnie sprawę rozwoju organizacyjnego AK ze sprawą tzw. scalania.

Resis- tance group						
	Pl.		Platoon (0—100 men)		Pl.	

Auxiliary services. 1. A Women's auxiliary service existed to provide clothing and comforts for the troops, also to act as nurses; 2. A voluntary union of landowners known as Uprawa gave contributions in kind and money for the troops; 3. There was a small police service divided into two parts to maintain law and order among territorial units and among civilians; 4. On the levels of inspectorate and above there were courts capable of trying civil and criminal offences among Poles; 5. We were told that the AK had their own news services. Despite frequent applications we were unable to get any examples of their papers. In the villages there were practically no wireless receivers and AK bulletins were very rare. In our opinion interest in the personalities of the London Government seemed very slight. Many of the people with whom we talked had neither heard nor subsequently read Arciszewski's speech at the New Year. People seemed content to get the war news from the local German press. We were told that the lack of apparent bulletins was due to security reasons. They were too compromising to keep and were destroyed after being read.

Administrative. The administrative organisation ran largely parallel to the military. Its chief function was the collection and distribution of levies made by the AK on the peasants; secondly to allot the amounts to be given by each individual in making up the collective German levy. The administrative organisation also gave advice on how to evade the German levy. It is only below *Pod-obwód* group or sub-area that the administrative organisation deviates slightly from the military. Here it is sub-divided into parishes (*Gmina*) each parish controlling some six villages. On the area and inspectorate levels an administrative official would usually be appointed direct by the district commander on the recommendation of either the area of inspectorate military commander, as the case might be.

#### 4. Partisan Organisation

The first partisan units were formed in Eastern Poland in late 1942, in the summer of 1943 in central and southern Poland<sup>36</sup>. Three reasons were given for the formation of the latter units: 1. The Polish government in London demanded increased activity; 2. An increasing number of compromised people had to go into the woods for cover; 3. The Communists began to form the AL from elements wishing immediate action, thus providing an element of competition with the AK.

The natural development of partisan units during this period seems to have been one company of approximately 200 men per *Obwód*. These men were all armed, were subject to military discipline, were paid and, as far as possible, wore uniforms. The companies appear to have had two main functions: to constitute a threat which would oblige the Germans to keep larger garrisons or reduce their demands on the civil population accordingly; secondly, to increase their supplies of arms by offensive actions against the Germans. In 1943 these companies were under direct command of the area commanders. In the spring of 1944, however, the necessity arose for forming bigger units to accommodate the man-power treasured by the German round-ups. These units were then placed under inspectorates. Several such

<sup>36</sup> Hudson mówi tu naturalnie tylko o oddziałach podległych AK.

partisan units were grouped together to form a battalion at the direct disposal of the inspectorate commander.

#### 5. General mobilisation

This was decreed on the 2nd August 1944 — the day after the Warsaw rising took place. All men for whom arms were available were mobilised. The aim was to mobilise one battalion of approximately nine platoons in each area. The Czestochowa Inspectorate, for example, raised four battalions. Between the 2nd and 17th August their orders were to endeavour to get weapons by any possible means. On the 18th August, on orders from General Bor, they started to march as battalions to the relief of Warsaw. They got as far as the Warsaw district, though none got through to the city itself.

During the middle of September 1944 a second concentration and regrouping took place by inspectorates. The territorial organisation gave way to a field force one as far as the fighting troops were concerned, but it continued to provide recruiting and training cadres. Battalions were formed into regiments, and regiments into divisions. There was, however, a marked difference between the outline paper organisation and what was actually achieved. The 7th Division, for example, had a war establishment of three infantry regiments, each of two battalions. In point of fact, it was able to mobilise two regiments each of two battalions, making a grand total of some 2000 men. The limiting factor was arms. Another 4000 men could have been called up if arms had been available. There were no heavy weapons at all. The 2nd Division, in the area of the Holy Cross Mountains, on the other hand, was able to raise some 5500 men. It is believed that twenty-four divisions with a grand total of over 50 000 men, excluding the troops in Warsaw city, were under arms in September 1944. Divisions, however, except in Warsaw, never operated as tactical formations, and it is claimed that the reorganisation on a field force basis was carried out in order to facilitate administration.

A clear picture of the mobilisation in Warsaw has not been obtained. The figure of 80 000 persons engaged in the fighting has been mentioned on several occasions<sup>37</sup>.

#### 6. After Warsaw

Units remained mobilised until the approach of winter. In November 1944 each battalion was reduced to a fighting unit of 80 men. These were further cut down in some cases to 40—50 men. In the Czestochowa Inspectorate in December 1944 there were four fighting groups, each of approximately 80 men. No unit was kept permanently mobilised. The system was for each reduced unit to serve approximately fourteen days during the winter months and then to be relieved by another demobilised unit. Constant changeovers thus took place.

During the night of the 13th—14th January, 1945, the Russian offensive opened in our area. No attempt was made to remobilise. Secret orders, not to be communicated to the men, had been given to AK officers immediately after the failure of the Warsaw rising, stating the AK units were not to be overrun by the Russians. They were to disband, but retain their arms. The GOC had, however, mentioned to this Mission that in the event of a satisfactory political agreement between the London Government and the USSR, the AK would remobilise, and help the Russians by every possible means. Another officer stated that he knew that the 2nd, 7th, 22nd

<sup>37</sup> Liczby podawane przez Hudsona obrazują jedynie stan jego orientacji oraz wartość uzyskiwanych przezeń informacji. Dość znacznie przewyższają one rzeczywiste wyniki mobilizacji jednostek AK, a także liczebność uczestników walk w Warszawie.

and 23rd Divisions could be remobilised at short notice<sup>38</sup>. These, together with territorial units, would, he claimed, give a figure of some 60 000 men who could be used to fight. In view of the achievements of the summer of 1944 this figure in our opinion appears inordinately high.

#### 7. Military Intelligence System

The Mission had no opportunity to study all the information available at the GOC's headquarters and to appreciate the sources at its disposal. The following remarks are based on unchecked statements. No attempt is made to assess their value.

Within the framework of the territorial organisation each sub-area commander had to submit a weekly intelligence report to the next highest commander. This covered the location, identification, strength and evaluation of morale of all German troops in the sub-area. Reports were also made on enemy defence activity such as diggings, gun positions, also areas of targets prepared for mining or demolition. All these reports were collated as they were passed back through the various headquarters until a complete consolidated account reached the GOC. It is claimed that the AK were able to employ a certain number of German officials in both military and administrative offices who provided regular detailed intelligence information. These people were well paid by the AK.

Partisan units received warning of German concentrations through the territorial organisation. This was effective when the Germans were taking up positions prior to round-ups, but was, of course, too slow when the enemy drove in MT straight from their base to the point of attack.

#### 8. Relative Strengths of AK and Germans

Owing to lack of information no comparison could be made for the whole of German-occupied Poland. Accurate information is only available for the Radomsko area (*Obwód*). It is not claimed that this is necessarily representative.

In September 1944	AK had	—	1050	troops mobilised.
In October	„	—	850	„
In November	„	—	300	„
In December	„	—	100	„

The Germans had permanent garrison troops as follows:

Wehrmacht	... ..	approx.	3260
SS	... ..	„	650
Gendarmerie	... ..	„	760
Gestapo	... ..	„	330

In addition to actual numbers it must also be borne in mind that the Germans were extremely mobile, and in arms were far superior to the AK. The latter had no heavy weapons at all. The individual soldier carried either a rifle, m.g. or s.m.g.<sup>39</sup>, often also one of two hand grenades, home-made or of the German Stichelhand Grenate type. Weapons were extremely heterogeneous: Russian, German, Polish, British and American were all seen. Uniforms ranged from civilian clothes via old Polish kit or battle dress to a complete Hun rig out. Most common was to find elements of all on one man.

The terrain also favoured the more mobile Germans. Although comparatively

<sup>38</sup> Hudson podaje tu błędnie numerację 23 dywizji. Na terenie okręgów Radom, Kraków, Łódź dywizja taka nie istniała.

<sup>39</sup> Skróty oznaczające karabin maszynowy i pistolet maszynowy.

heavily wooded, it was flat. Forests were all of the coniferous type, providing good cover from view from a distant enemy, but little protection at ranges less than 300—400 yards. There was practically no scrub or undergrowth. The only dense cover was afforded by the young fir plantations before they were thinned. Straight rides ran through all woods and were a disadvantage to the partisans since they could be covered by machine-gun fire. There were no areas into which the enemy could not venture without warning, and partisan units were frequently located at a distance of not more than 4 kilometres from a regular enemy garrison.

### 9. Enemy Behaviour

The Mission had little chance to study enemy behaviour. The points mentioned here are based on conversation with AK officers and civilians. Two entirely separate types of punitive expeditions were carried out by the enemy forces. A direct attack on partisan units, of both AK and AL, known locally as a *Pacyfikacja* the second, a man-power round-up called a *Łapanka*. The object of the first type of attack was to destroy the local partisans as an effective guerilla force. The intensity and frequency of such attacks varied in proportion to the threat constituted by the partisans. After Warsaw we were told that the Germans were far more aggressive towards AL than to AK. The attacks, according to statements, took the form of ringing off a certain wooded area in which a partisan unit was thought to be located, of blocking all the most likely exits with either tanks or infantry or a combination of both, and then beating it through with infantry in close formation. It is said that the AK usually received enough warning to enable them to move out to another area before it was too late, and also that their superior local knowledge due to the terrain made it possible for them to slip out through the cordon at night. AL, on the other hand, were less well informed and often had heavy losses.

The second type of expedition was a round-up of man-power in towns and villages with the object of taking Poles by force to work in the Reich or for temporary labour within the General Government. If the warning was received in time, it appears the men would usually try to get away to join a partisan unit. This, however, was not possible in winter, when units were only at skeleton strength as they could provide neither food nor protection. It was, in fact, admitted that German man-power round-ups were largely successful. Cossacks and Ukrainian troops appear to have been used extensively for both types of expedition.

In intervening periods, when not on expeditions, the Germans seem to have remained in their garrisons, though they went to the small villages to make direct requisitions or enforce general food levies. During the three weeks the Mission was with the AK the enemy did not appear to fear going into the outlying villages in quite small numbers in the hours of daylight, because the four AK units that were mobilised at the time avoided all German patrols. Between late afternoon and sunrise the latter did not leave their bases.

### 10. Movement and Internal Intercommunications

Practically all movements of the partisan unit with which the Mission lived were carried out during the hours of darkness. The group moved as a small tactical unit with scouts ahead, followed by an advance section, then the main body with the carts and behind them the rearguard. As a rule everybody marched and only heavy stores were carried on the carts, though transport was obtainable for the Mission personnel if needed. When the ground was covered with snow it was at times necessary for almost the whole unit to travel on carts in order to cover up any tracks. Carts were requisitioned from the peasants. There appeared to be difficulty in getting hold of them.

Internal intercommunications appeared to be confined entirely to couriers, who moved fairly among the Germans. Women were often used. Contact was seldom direct owing to the danger of compromise and a message from the Mission to the GOC had to pass through several different channels before reaching its final destination. Replies to questions were therefore slow in arriving.

### C. ARMIA LUDOWA (AL)

Source: Supporters of the AK

#### 1. Origins

The AL, organised by the PPR, was first formed as a military force with the name of *Gwardia Ludowa* in June, 1943<sup>40</sup>. At its beginning, in the Radomsko area, it consisted of some forty men. At that time they undertook no actions against the Germans and were organised on a purely conspiratorial basis. It is alleged that there was slight Russian influence but no direct contact. The first partisan units were created later in 194<sup>41</sup> by a Russian Captain Jasko, who escaped from a prisoner-of-war camp and eventually returned to Russia<sup>42</sup>. In the early stages the AL in this area acquired their arms by stealing either from the AK or *Volksdeutsche*. We were unable to learn anything accurate about the origins and organisation of the AL in other areas.

#### 2. Aims

It appears that the AL aims were to form a cadre capable of taking over — with Russian assistance — the administration of the country after the arrival of the Red Army.

#### 3. Methods

a) To discredit all competition of more numerous movements by branding them as reactionary; b) To enlist the support of the Polish peasant and unskilled worker by the promise of sweeping land and industrial reforms (i.e. the Lublin programme of land reform); c) To enlist Russian sympathy and material support by attacking the Germans and in general following a pro-Russian policy.

#### 4. Military Organisation

We learn from AK sources that the AL military organisation in the Radomsko area (*Obwód*)<sup>43</sup> was as follows during the late summer of 1944:

<sup>40</sup> Informacja ta jest oczywiście nieścisła. Data spóźniona o przeszło rok w stosunku do rzeczywistości — maj 1942 r.

<sup>41</sup> W tekście brak ostatniej cyfry w oznaczeniu roku. Niewątpliwie chodzi o rok 1943. Błąd charakterystyczny dla maszyny, na której sporządzono tekst.

<sup>42</sup> Prawdopodobnie chodzi o „Jaskkę” (kpt. Jakow Salnikow), którego oddział, utworzony z byłych jeńców radzieckich, działał na terenie pow. włoszczowskiego i we wrześniu 1943 r. wszedł w skład oddziału GL im. gen. J. Bema (d-ca Cz. Kubik „Paweł”, później ppor. W. Matuszewski „Józek”). Kpt. Salnikow zginął 30.VII.1944 w obronie pierwszego posiedzenia Wojewódzkiej Rady Narodowej woj. łódzkiego. Jego oddział był jednym z wielu operujących na tych terenach oddziałów GL i AL.

<sup>43</sup> Chodzi o okręg „radomsko-częstochowski AL. Błąd wynika z różnic w nazewnictwie jednostek terytorialnych AK i AL, których Hudson nie był widocznie w stanie uchwycić.

The 33rd<sup>44</sup> AL Brigade, under a Pole called Hanicz, consisted of four groups.

150 Poles were forming a battalion, under a Pole with the pseudonym of Pawel. It is said that this man was by trade a butcher, and had formerly been a corporal in the Polish Army. 400 Russians were dropped to this group.

There were 100 Poles under a certain Kruk.

250 Ukrainian and Russians formed a group under a former German gendarmerie NCO called Kurz.

There were 130 Poles under a man called Kowal.

Material help from the Russians started at the end of June, 1944. Arms, ammunition and propaganda material were dropped. Several officers from Berling's army arrived to train AL personnel. With this brigade were several Russian officers from German prison camps. Relations between Russians dropped by parachute and the AL are discussed in Part II, Section E.

It is said that the AL had direct W/T communication with the Red Army, but not with the Lublin Committee. The Russians with the AK pretended to despise the AL for their bad organisation, but we know in reality the AL received their orders from the Russians. The AL wore a plain white and red armband on the left upper arm, and retained the emblem of the Polish Eagle, but without the crown. They did not wear a red star. During our period in the country it appeared that the AL, like the AK, were largely demobilised and only came to the surface after the arrival of the Russians.

### 5. Military Activity

Under Russian leadership it seems that this took the form of frequent blowing up of the Radomsko—Czestochowa railway, of attacking German MT on roads, and gendarmerie posts. It is said that these actions were unskilful. The AL suffered heavy losses themselves and brought down severe reprisals on the civilian population. The AL had no funds and were obliged to loot in order to live. The AK put pressure on AL commanders to stop this, but the latter were unable to restrain their own troops. We do not know if the AL carried out any successful actions during the Russian advance in January, 1945.

### 6. AL Levies

A prominent AK supporter stated that the AL imposed food levies on land owners. The land owners had to contribute against a receipt or they were plundered. We saw one pile of AL receipts for goods taken to the value of 3000 zlotys, signed by the local AL commander, and sometimes stamped. AL adherents came frequently to collect their levies and the land owners know them by sight. The AL also demanded money, and in addition to levies came to collect food whenever they wanted it. At the time of the Warsaw rising the local land owners approached the AL in an attempt to induce them to make their levies more systematic, but the AL commander replied that as the land owners had helped the AK, the AL would also take whatever they wanted. It is said that the AL often took the best

<sup>44</sup> Błąd, być może maszynowy, chodzi o 3 Brygadę AL im. gen. Bema (dowódca mjr Hanicz „Boruta”). Składa się ona z 3 batalionów oraz oddziałów — zwiadowczego i dywersyjnego. Dowódcy batalionów: 1 — kpt. Cz. Kubik „Pawel”; 2 — kpt. J. Stelak „Kruk” i 3 — por. Stachowski-Riazanow „Kwiatek”, Por. Koczenasz „Kurz był zastępcą d-cy 3 batalionu, złożonego głównie z byłych jeńców radzieckich. Wymieniany przez Hudsona oddział „Kowala” nie jest znany na tym terenie. Liczebność ogólna brygady ca 540 ludzi, a więc niższa, niż podaje Hudson. 4 batalion, który powstał po reorganizacji brygady w drugiej połowie września 1944 r., złożony z byłych jeńców radzieckich i byłych własowców, istniał zaledwie miesiąc. Jego dowódca, por. Stachowski, zginął w zasadzce zorganizowanej przez NSZ (por. J. Garas, *Oddziały GL i AL, 1942—1945*. Warszawa 1962, s. 253—256).

horses, leaving the peasants without the means to plough their land, with the result that famine might threaten in the spring of 1945. Indiscriminate looting took place, mostly in winter, when the AL were demobilised and did not keep a close control of their demobilised members, as did the AK.

#### 7. *AL Propaganda*

We were told that the AL, to make up for their lack of numbers, issued five times as much propaganda as the AK. We did not, however, see any examples of it. We were told that the AL published a weekly paper called „Szaniec”<sup>45</sup> which attacked the Germans but said nothing against either the AK or the NSZ.

#### 8. *Attitude of AL to the London Government*

The attitude of the AL was in every respect synonymous with the attitude of the Lublin Committee.

#### 9. *Attitude of AL to the Curzon Line*

The AL openly advocated surrender to Russia of all territory east of this Line.

#### 10. *Relations of the AL with the AK*

Despite political competition, they gave each other warnings of the presence of Germans and information about impending round-ups. They also had common passwords when passing through each other's areas. No fighting occurred between them, and there was no particular tension in mixed villages. The AL, however, criticised the AK on the following grounds:

The AK were said to be reactionary — „an army of gentry” — and anti-Russian. The AL never accused the AK direct of being Quislings, but they accused them of indirect collaboration with the Germans on the grounds that the AK suffered very few casualties in round-ups.

The AK, on the other hand, said that the AL were in effect agents of Russia.

There was one attempt at fusion between the AL and AK in this area. That was in November, 1943. This attempt failed because the AL refused to take the AK each of loyalty to the Polish Commander-in-Chief in the United Kingdom and because the AK refused to confirm all the rapid promotions which the AL had accorded to their officers. The AK seldom promoted their own officers<sup>46</sup>.

#### 11. *Relations between AL and NSZ*

Violent hostility existed between them. They fought each other whenever they met, and shot each other's prisoners.

#### 12. *AL in Warsaw*

According to eye-witnesses' accounts the AL started their revolt two and half hours before the time agreed with the AK. The AL were never under the command of the AK, but certain sectors of the city were regarded as being their responsibility. The Russians knew of these sectors and dropped supplies marked specifically for the AL. They also dropped Russian liaison officers and Poles from Berling's army to the AL. The Russians supplied the AK in Warsaw, but sent them no officers. It is said that the AL fought extremely well at the outset, but in the later stages endeavoured to cross the Vistula and reach the Russians at Praga. Many succeeded;

<sup>45</sup> Pismo „Szaniec” było organem skrajnych grup nacjonalistycznego podziemia wywodzących się z ONR. Hudson został tu wyraźnie i być może świadomie wprowadzony w błąd.

<sup>46</sup> Informacja o rozmowach trudna do ustalenia, najprawdopodobniej błędna. Mówi o okresie, w którym kierownictwo PPR, po niepowodzeniu rozmów z KG AK i DR z początku 1943 r., zdecydowanie zmierzało ku samodzielnym rozwiązaniom politycznym i wojskowym.

those unable to get across attacked the AK in order to get their papers, since they knew that they would receive no quarter from the Germans as members of the AL<sup>47</sup>. The AL in the Radomsko area made no effort to go to the relief of Warsaw.

#### D. THE NSZ (MILITARY BRANCH OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY)

Source: Supporters of AK

##### 1. Origins

The NSZ after 1939 became the military element of the pre-war ONR (Radical National Camp), an extreme right wing split from the National Democratic Party. Of the many political groups which had armed representatives in Poland shortly after the German occupation. The NSZ was the largest apart from the AL, which did not amalgamate with the AK.

##### 2. Activity

The permanently mobilised element consisted mainly of the Holy Cross Brigade — 1200 men — operating since the Warsaw rising in the Holy Cross Mountains. It was commanded by a Lt.-Colonel Bochun. The political leader seems to have been a man called Żbik: hence the alternative name for NSZ of „Żbikowcy”. The NSZ outlook appears to have been that Germany was no longer the main enemy, being already almost beaten, and that the main threat to Polish independence lay with Russia. We heard nothing of the military activity of the NSZ prior to the summer of 1944. Immediately before the Warsaw rising the NSZ withdrew their adherents from the city. The since they did not wish to have any contact with the Russians or to be openly engaged in fighting, on the Russian side. They did, however leave a force of 1000 men as a token of their willingness to fight against the occupier. It is said that this force fought extremely well in the rising.

We were informed by the GOC Home Army that the NSZ collaboration with the Germans was confined to the higher levels and that in most cases the rank and file knew nothing of it. Generally it appeared that the Germans did not consider the NSZ as a menace, but we heard a story, which we were unable to confirm, that a few days before the Russian offensive the Germans. Germans mopped up the Holy Cross Brigade, killing Bochun and severely wounding Żbik. Two suppositions were given as to the reason for this. Firstly, that Bochun and Żbik had refused a German demand to form a Polish Legion for the Eastern front. Alternatively, there were many AK sympathisers among the NSZ. The deliberately provoked this German attack to clear the NSZ from charges of collaboration. The AK were willing to accept in their ranks all members of the NSZ who were untainted by collaboration with the Germans, on the condition that they came entirely under the AK for military purposes. It is said that during the second half of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 a number of detachments of NSZ passed over to the AK<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>47</sup> Podane w tej części sprawozdania informacje stanowią prawdopodobnie odbicie rozłamu, jaki nastąpił w łonie NSZ w związku z podporządkowaniem się jego części zwierzchnictwu AK. Wspomniane starcie między Brygadą Świętokrzyską a Niemcami dotyczy zapewne wydarzenia, które miało miejsce 16.I.1945 pod Żarnowcem i zostało szybko zażegnane przez parlamentarzyków wysłanych przez „Bohuna”.

<sup>48</sup> Informacje dotyczące udziału AL w powstaniu warszawskim — błędne. Oddziały AL, jak wiadomo, były zaskoczone wybuchem powstania. Uznały one taktyczne zwierzchnictwo

### 3. NSZ Propaganda

We were unable to learn enough of the relations between NSZ and the Germans to say whether the latter did not deliberately associate themselves with this right wing party without its consent and without necessarily getting its full co-operation. We saw very little indisputable NSZ propaganda. One example was a regimental news sheet. It gave purely objective war news. The bias of this news sheet was pro-Allied and there was only a slight anti-Communist trend.

## E. RUSSIAN PARTISANS

Source: AK supporters

### 1. Origins

In the country West of the Vistula the first groups of Russian partisans appeared in the spring of 1944. At that time and in the early summer Russian' planes dropped: number of small parties of four to eight men well equipped with arms and wireless sets. They had civilian clothes and German documents for the General Government and most of them spoke Polish. These parties were dropped at night without any previous arrangements with the local organisations. In consequence they were an easy prey for the Germans, and in a short time were either mopped up and shot or lost their equipment and ceased to be useful. It is noteworthy that none of these groups ever endeavoured to establish contact with any local resistance groups. It seems that the fate of these men convinced the Russian Command that such small patrols do not serve their purpose, and in the beginning of August, in the Radomsko area the first drop of a larger party took place. This was a party of 80 men dropped in two groups under the command of Major Gora<sup>49</sup>. During August and September the Russians dropped further parties and supplies for them almost every night, so that at the end of September Major Gora had as many as 400 men under his command. In the course of September also in the area of Włoszczowa and Jedrzejow a similar party of about 250 men under the Command of Captain Fedorov<sup>50</sup> was dropped. Soon after being dropped this party also appeared in the Radomsko area.

### 2. Organisation

Major Gora's party was organised as a battalion. The number of officers and NCOs in this battalion was unusually great as compared with the number of private soldiers. They were all very well trained and they wore uniforms with badges with badges of rank and decorations. They were well armed, mostly with automatic weapons, light machine-guns and automatic pistols. Major Gora's battalion had also five light mortars and Captain Fedorov's detachment had three. They had no

dowództwa powstańczego AK. Przybyli do Warszawy łącznicy radzieccy zostali skierowani do dowództwa powstańczego AK, nie zaś AL. Dążenie oddziałów AL do przejścia za Wisłę było zrozumiałe w obliczu kapitulacji powstania. Z propozycjami o udzieleniu żołnierzom AL dokumentów AK wystąpiły z własnej inicjatywy dowództwa jednostek AK. Por. J. Małecki „Sęk”, *Armia Ludowa w powstaniu warszawskim — Wspomnienia*. Warszawa 1962.

<sup>49</sup> Brygada mjr. M. Głumowa „Góry” została przerzucona przez front drogą lądową, nie zaś powietrzną (F. Zbiniewicz, *Działania zgrupowania partyzanckiego „Czarnego”*. „Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny” 1959, nr 3).

<sup>50</sup> Nazwisko kpt. Fiedorowa nie jest pewne.

anti-tanks weapons. Frequent droppings kept them well supplied with ammunition, but no food was sent. Both detachments had wireless transmitters with Russian girls as W/T operators. They lived from the country and did not pay for requisitioned goods.

### 3. Activity

These groups were mainly concerned with railway demolition on the Warsaw—Cracow and Kielce—Czestochowa lines. They all collected military intelligence. Captain Fedorov's detachment moved about in the areas of Radomsko, Czestochowa, Piotrkow and Wloszczowa. Towards the end of October he received orders to move to the East. Whether his aim was further activity close to the front line or whether he intended to join the main Russian forces is not known. Major Gora's battalion was surrounded by the Germans on the 18th of October in the vicinity of Jackow in the Radomsko area. The battle lasted from 9 o'clock in the morning till 7 in the evening; afterwards the Germans withdrew. On the German side some 5000 troops of the *Wehrmacht*, Gendarmerie and Ukrainians with three light tanks and two planes of the „Storch” type took part. Losses on both sides were heavy: Major Gora lost 96 men and all the equipment, mainly warm clothing received from the recent droppings. The next day the Germans appeared again and, not having found Gora's detachment, burned a part of the village. In the course of October Major Gora reduced his detachment to 150 men, having sent the rest away to the East. For his 150 men Major Gora had then 60 LMGs, 3 light mortars and automatic pistols (Soviet PPS and PPSH types), as individual weapons for each man. In the last days of October Major Gora moved with this force to the West into the areas incorporated into the Reich (Łask, Zdunska Wola, Sieradz, Kalisz). He returned from this expedition towards the end of November with his force reduced to 60 men, exhausted and in rags. After a few Days' rest he finally moved away to the East.

### 4. Relations with the AK and AL

At first Major Gora maintained distant though correct relations with both the AK and AL, but did not seek collaboration with either of them. Soon, however, he realised that without the help of local organisations he would not be able to get the intelligence about the Germans which was his chief aim and that he would risk considerable losses or annihilation without a swift warning system which only local elements were in the position to provide. For this he established close liaison with the AK, treating the AL apparently with little respect. The basic understanding was that the AK provided information which Gora needed and received arms from him in return. Captain Fedorov seems to have been in closer relations with the AL and did not seek contact with the AK. It is possible that both commanders among themselves tried to find out the relative strength of both organisations. Both parties had passwords agreed with the AK and AL and helped each other in danger. Before his expedition into the Reich Major Gora received from the AK a number of contact addresses<sup>51</sup>.

### 5. The Attitude Towards the Population

The Russian officers had a set piece of propaganda prepared which they repeated invariably at all contacts with the Polish population. It ran: We Russians did

<sup>51</sup> Informacje o lojalnych stosunkach między partyzantami radzieckimi a oddziałami AK odpowiadają rzeczywistości. Natomiast rzekoma ich rezerwa wobec oddziałów AL stanowi czystej wody spekulację, pozbawioną podstaw. Oddział mjr. „Góry” ściśle współpracował z 3 Brygadą AL im. gen. Bema, aż do momentu (16.XI.1944), gdy zgodnie z rozkazami odłączył się od niej w celu przekroczenia frontu.

not come to you to occupy your country. We do not care what kind of non-Fascist regime you choose. We came only to beat the Germans and then go home. However, they were not liked by the few villages on whom the full burden of their requisition fell. They paid nothing and their receipts were mere scraps of paper which could easily be forged.

## F. RURAL CONDITIONS

The following picture of village life was given us by the Mayor of Zytno. In general, his statements were confirmed by other sources. He promised us further information to complete the picture, but we did not receive it owing to the Russian advance.

### 1. Health

There was a certain amount of exhaustion due to under nourishment. In 1944 there had been an epidemic of typhus in the parish of Zytno. It is believed that this was brought from a German penal camp. The standard of health was much lower than before the war. This was due in part to the number of evacuees and consequent overcrowding. The parish, which normally had 4000 inhabitants, had received 650 evacuees from Warsaw and 100 from the eastern provinces. The medical personnel available were the same as before the war, but there was a great lack of medical supplies. On the other hand, we did not hear from other sources any talk of general malnutrition or serious epidemics, and we saw no evidence of this ourselves.

### 2. Education

Before the war there were six schools in this parish, but during the last year only the smallest one was open. It provided for 80 children. During the first four years of the war it appears that most of the children went to school. No history or geography were allowed to be taught. The curriculum was confined to reading, writing and arithmetic. Originally German was to be the primary language but the Germans found it impossible to maintain this. The AK ran small secret schools to make up for the defective and tendentious German syllabus.

### 3. Losses due to German Action

In the parish about thirty male civilians had been killed by the Germans, mostly in the autumn of 1943 when the Germans were conducting a terror campaign directed against the co-operation of the villagers were constrained by armed force to feed the AK.

### 4. Man-power Levies

For Germany. Twenty-five per cent of the labour of this parish was working in Germany. The Germans had estimated the number required to work each hectare of land, counting men and women as equal labour units. The surplus was taken for work in Germany. By far the greater number were taken forcibly in round-ups, the rest being obliged to go to Germany owing to economic conditions. If families went voluntarily they were allowed to remain together, but were separated if taken by force. The AK accommodated as many potential workers as possible but this was very difficult in winter.

Local Labour. Prior to the approach of the Red Army the Germans appealed to local man-power for road work in the winter when the peasants had little to do. These appeals were unsuccessful. By August 1944, however, the Germans demanded that ten per cent of the entire population should be constantly engaged in digging defences on the Pilica. They had periodical drives (*łapanki*) to enforce this. About fifty per cent of those required always had to be rounded up: sixty per cent of the horses and carts were also requisitioned.

##### 5. Agricultural Levies

We did not see any of the German decrees indicating what proportion of the total produce they demanded. We were told that the demands increased each year. The Germans were content if they received 80—90% of their demands, since this left the peasants scarcely enough to maintain themselves. German controlled prices, black market prices, the coupon system in practice, and other economic details are too numerous to be included in this report. In general it can be said that barter and the black market flourished and enables much surplus local produces to benefit Poles rather than Germans.

##### 6. Local Resistance against Agricultural Exploitation

The following picture was given us by a prominent land owner who was a leading member of the AK:

(A) Measures taken by the farmers.

(B) Measures taken by the AK

A. As the actual levy taken by the Germans was bound to be in some reasonable proportion with the crop, one of the most effective means was a decrease in production. This, however, was difficult and dangerous. Bad management and consequent low production was considered by the Germans as sabotage; the owner was taken into a concentration camp (*Oświęcim*) and the farm was taken over by the State as a *Liegenschaft*. Moreover, bad management carried out on purpose invariably results in a catastrophic decrease of the productive capacity of the soil for a number of years. This the average farmer certainly did not want, as his intention was to switch over to a maximum production immediately after the end of the war. In actual practice the farmer arrived at a compromise, producing the minimum necessary to avoid a dangerous decrease of the productive capacity of his land. In order to lower this minimum further still in the eyes of the Germans he used not to manure at all the outer circumstances of his field, thus giving an impression of a crop worse, than it was in actual fact. This method of deception was called „apron-management”.

In the course of delivering his levy to the Germans the farmer resorted to a variety of deceptive means by which he succeeded in lowering his final delivery to a considerable extent. In order to make these methods better understood, a brief account of the German system of control must be given. As early as the Autumn of 1939 the Germans compiled a detailed description of all farms showing the amount of arable land, pastures, woods, *et cetera* in each farm. In the Autumn of each year each farmer had to fill in a questionnaire showing what had been sown on all parts of his arable land. In the spring a commission arrived and estimated the expected crop, per hectare and on this basis the amount of levy to be delivered was assessed. This levy was to be given up by the 1st November each year. Usually no more than about 5% was delivered in time. Then an extension of two weeks was allowed and the farmer was threatened with severe reprisals should the levy not be delivered in time. Now another 5% came in, together with a number of appli-

cations for a lower assessment allegedly justified by a bad crop. As a result the assessment was slightly reduced and a new two weeks' term was set up together with a threat of a punitive expedition. As the amount given up was again negligible the punitive expeditions actually arrived, searched the whole village and threshed all the crop found on the spot.

The following are details of measures adopted by the farmer: 1. In the autumn questionnaire the farmer indicated a smaller amount of land growing cereal crops than there was in actual fact, the rest of the land being used for pasture crops, which the Germans did not requisition: e.g. instead of 2.5 hectares of cereal crops only 2 hectares area shown in the questionnaire; 2. Thanks to the „apron management” the Commission in the spring estimated the expected crop to be lower than in actual fact:

e.g. Real crop expected	— 10 quintals per hectare	
Official estimate	— 7	„
Levy demanded, 70%	— 5	„
Levy for 2 hectares shown	— 10	„

3. By delaying the delivery and complaining of a bad crop due to chronic lack of manure *et cetera* and applying for a reduction of the levy, the levy is still further reduced:

e.g. From 10 to 8 quintals:

The amount given up in three terms = 20% of this, i.e. 2 quintals; 4. Superficial threshing of the undelivered part of the crop allows the farmer to hide or sell on the black market a certain amount of grain. The thinned out part of the crop remaining provides a proof for the German punitive expedition that the harvest was really poor:

e.g. The threshing expedition found 1 quintals of grain; 5. The farmer takes use of the German law allowing him to keep 1.5 quintals per person as living ration; as a result the punitive expedition... away only 4 quintals out of the 7 found in his barn:

e.g. Total levy delivered is now 4 quintals plus 2 quintals given up before = 6 quintals.

Thus the farmer gets a certificate stating that he delivered 75% of the reduced levy of 8 quintals imposed; 6. The peasant applies for sowing grain 1.5 quintals per hectars:

e.g. For his 2 hectares he gets 3 quintals, thus effectively reducing his delivery from 6 quintals to 3 quintals.

Summing up the above:

Amount which should have been demanded	= 70% of 25 q'tals.
	= 17.5 quintals.
Amount actually yielded to Germans	= 3 quintals.

This is of course an ideal case, based on the supposition that all methods of deception succeed.

In many cases the Germans were well aware that they were being deceived, but they were unable to take countermeasures because direct State control yielded results still worse. The few Germans which could be employed as *Liegenschaft* managers lacked suitable training and adequate knowledge of local conditions. In consequence Poles had to be employed. These, however, embarked on a policy of deceit with much less restraint than the owners themselves because they did not risk the loss of property.

B. Counter-action of the AK. This again may be considered under two headings: 1. Cleandestine counter-action; 2. Armed resistance.

1. This consisted chiefly of propaganda, either distributed in the form of posters and leaflets, or diffused verbally among the peasants by specially appointed men. Another method adopted by the AK was the infiltration of their own men among the German agricultural committees which decided the amount of the levies due from the farmers. The Germans were so short of agricultural experts that they had no employ a large number of roles in these committees. In addition, all the lower clerical posts in agriculture were occupied by Poles, and a large proportion of these were members of the AK.

2. The armed resistance against the agricultural exploitation of the country took the form of:

- a periodical destruction of agricultural records;
- destroying threshing machines and subsidiary equipment;
- attacks on German punitive expeditions;
- death sentences on Germans;

raiding the levies on roads when being delivered; attacks on German country depots and capturing the levies depot. Owing to the German transport difficulties the levies finally delivered or taken forcibly by punitive expeditions were kept for a time in the county depots. Thus attacks on the depots allowed the AK to regain a part of the crop which was already in German hands.

Below are some figures showing the extent to which the above actions were carried out. They apply to the Radomsko area during 1943 and 1944:

	1943	1944
Percentage of threshing machines destroyed	87%	92%
Death sentences carried out	6	11
Floggings carried out	14	8
Percentage of levy regained from Germans by raids		5%

#### G. MISCELLANEOUS PROPAGANDA

NSZ, AK and AL propaganda have already been mentioned and are not included here.

##### 1. German

Newspapers. Apart from the purely German outlook of the regular daily press in Polish, there were several newspapers issued by the Germans purporting to be edited by patriotic Poles. These papers pretended to be clandestine, but were in reality sold openly. They never gave the names of their contributors. They included: „Straznica”, „Gazeta Narodowa” and „Głos Polski”. In general their chief feature was violent anti-Soviet propaganda, and they adopted a severely critical attitude to Great Britain. They upheld the legality of the Polish Government in London but criticised it for being a tool of the allies. Mikolajczyk received more stringent criticism than Arciszewski. The periodical „Przełom” differed from the

above in that it did not pretend to be clandestine and published the names of its contributors, such as: J.E. Skiwski and a certain Burdecki. It openly advocated collaboration with the Germans as the only course possible in view of the Russian attitude.

Posters, leaflets, placards. The Germans made extensive use of these. Examples are: 1. The Warsaw poster. This accused the Russians of having fomented and then maliciously abandoned the Warsaw rising; 2. A poster emphasising German generosity towards AK after Warsaw. It stressed the lack of British support as an example of English perfidy; 3. A number of leaflets stressed Russian disarmament and liquidation of AK units. Some even covertly recognised the strength of the AK by calling on them to fight the Russians and concentrate less upon the Germans, who had become a purely secondary enemy; 4. Other leaflets were addressed to the civilian population only. They attempted to minimise the hardships of the German occupation and to justify them as inevitable results of a lost war, while emphasising that a Soviet occupation would be much worse; 5. Others appealed to the religious sentiments of the population by quoting extracts from the famous anti-Communist encyclical of Pope Pius XI.

#### *2. Lublin Committees and Russian Propaganda*

Since the Russian advance we obtained examples of Lublin propaganda. The most important is the manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation dated July, 22nd, 1944. Its main points are: 1. The decree on the formation and composition of the Committee; 2. The Polish Home Council and its executive the Polish Committee of National Liberation is by popular sanction the only legal government of the country; 3. The Polish nation and army at home and abroad will fight the Germans side by side with the Red Army; 4. The London government's claims are invalid, being based on the „illegal” constitution of 1935. The London government is accused of being a brake on the resistance to the Germans; 5. Polish territorial claims comprised: „Old Polish Pomerania”; Oppeln; East Prussia; assuring to Poland wide access to the sea; and a Polish frontier on the Oder; 6. The eastern frontier should be settled according to the principle „Polish lands to Poland; Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian to the USSR”; 7. A lasting alliance is advocated between Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia as the basic principle of Polish foreign policy; 8. An alliance with Great Britain, the United States of America and France to be strengthened; 9. The country will be temporarily administered by local councils which will form a „citizens' militia” to keep order; 10. A solemn declaration is made that the following rights will be preserved: equality for all; freedom of political and professional organisations, of the press and of conscience, excepting „Fascist” organisations; 11. German estates will be confiscated; all large enterprises now in German hands will be temporarily administered by the State pending restitution to the rightful owners; 12. Land Reform. A fund is to be formed from the confiscated estates, and other estates of over 50 hectares in the General Government and over 100 hectares in the German incorporated areas. The former owners of such large estates will either receive the standard unit holding of 5 hectares or a State pension of the 6th category. (If further details of projected land reform are required, see attached decree in Polish); 13. German levies will be replaced by much smaller levies in accordance with Polish law until the war ends; 14. There is a promise to raise workers' wages in accordance with the cost of living; 15. A comprehensive social insurance scheme will be instituted on democratic principles; 16. Co-operatives, free trade and private enterprise will be encouraged;

17. Free schooling will be ensured on all levels and will be compulsory; 18. The return of exiled Poles will be facilitated excepting „Hitlerite agents” and those who „betrayed” Poland in September 1939.

#### H. NOTED ON THE RED ARMY IN POLAND

##### Scope:

These notes are based on limited and spasmodic observation by the Mission without Russian permission.

They are of a general nature, are not intended to provide any completely novel information, and have not been compiled by officers with expert knowledge of the Red Army. They should, however, provide some first hand account of Soviet equipment and methods during a part of the pursuit through Poland.

##### 1. Equipment

a) Tanks. The only type of tank seen — and they were seen in large numbers — was the oil-burning T. 34, all mounting a 7.62 cm. long barrel gun without muzzle brake. None were sandbagged and only a few carried spare lengths of track on the front as additional protection. Some had long wooden poles strapped along the sides of the hull: the purpose of these is not known<sup>52</sup>;

b) Self-propelled guns. 1. A medium Howitzer, of what would appear to be 15 cm. calibre, was seen in large numbers mounted on a tank chassis. The chassis appeared to be in every way similar in size and shape to the T. 34, except that the return rollers for the tracks were at the top of the hull instead of near the bogeys as on T. 34. There was no turret on this chassis. The protective armour for gun and crew on the superstructure seemed comparatively thin. Traverse for the gun was limited; 2. One specimen of an American tank destroyer — 75 mm. gun without muzzle brake, mounted on a half-track carrier — was seen. The track suspension was of the „Sherman” type.

c) Guns. Large numbers of 7.62 cm. guns, most with muzzle brake and mounted on carriages with pneumatic types, were seen being towed behind trucks. A few gun/howitzers of approximately 10 cm. calibre were seen being drawn by trucks. A battery of medium to heavy guns (possible 17 cm. calibre) was seen attached to tracked tractors. A very heavy howitzer on solid types (over 20 cm.) was seen being drawn by tracked tractors. The only type of AA gun seen, other than AAMGs<sup>53</sup>, was the light Bofors. There was generally little evidence of British and/or American weapons being used.

d) Rocket firing weapons. A large number of multiple rocket weapons — the Katushka — were seen mounted on Studebaker trucks. They were closely guarded. Attempts at close inspection were thwarted.

e) Motor transport. 1. British and American. Separate counts of vehicles over a period of three days showed that more than 70% of all vehicles were of American and Empire origin — of this 70% most were American. The preponderant type of truck was: Studebaker, Ford Chevrolet and Dodge were also

<sup>52</sup> Słupy te używane były przy przekraczaniu rowów i innych przeszkód.

<sup>53</sup> Skrótly oznaczające przeciwlotnicze działa i karabiny maszynowe.

in evidence. All seemed to be loaded well above their respective prescribed carrying capacities. In spite of this, only a few were seen on tow, and none were seen abandoned. Large quantities of Jeeps and one Duck<sup>54</sup> was seen. A wooden superstructure had been mounted on many of the Jeeps to give protection against the weather; 2. Russian. Carrying capacity of Russian trucks seemed in general to be far less than that of the American. Practically all the Russian vehicles seen were 4-cylinder, and most Model M. Ford type. Few heavy-tread all-weather types were seen on vehicles except in cases where Anglo-American supplied trucks had clearly been cannibalised. Russian MT was very over-loaded, appeared to be badly maintained and generally in very poor condition. One got the impression that if the Russians had to rely on their own internal MT resources, the mobility of the Red Army would be reduced in far greater proportion than the loss of our supplies would at first sight appear to warrant.

The present high degree of motorisation seems to be entirely due to lend-lease. A few ordinary civilian passenger vehicles without military markings or camouflage seemed to fulfil the functions of staff cars.

### 3. Captured Axis transport

*Volkswagen*, small Opel 4-seaters, Ford Eiffel, Mercedes and Horch staff cars: light Mercedes trucks, 5-ton Opel *Blitz*, were being widely used. A few 5-ton Diesel Fiats were a reminder that the Italians had at one time been on the Eastern front. Captured transport appeared on the whole to be in little better condition than Russian.

**Movement.** What from its composition may have been an armoured division column or that of a larger formation was seen on the move during the pursuit. It was mixed up with various miscellaneous supply and administrative vehicles, also horse transport. Although there was still a possibility of enemy air activity, and shelling was not ruled out, no apparent attempts were made at dispersion. Vehicles moved nose to tail and at varying speeds. In all, as many as four columns were seen at one time trying to use the same axis of advance, three going West and one smaller and less intense one moving back East. The road itself could not accommodate more than two columns, moving either together or in opposite directions, at any one time. The hard frozen ground and the flat nature of the country, however, allowed even labouring, two-wheel drive vehicles to move along fields parallel to the road when and where necessary. As a result there was very little congestion, and the aggregate speed of this heterogeneous transport was, in spite of the obvious lack of march discipline, surprisingly high. At points such as road junctions, where serious blockages might occur, traffic police — sometimes officers — seemed to take effective control. Roads in the forward area were quickly and clearly signposted in Cyrillic characters. In the rear girls were used for traffic control.

### 4. Headquarters

One headquarters — possibly a Corps HQ — was visited for approximately thirty minutes. It occupied two small rooms of a peasant's cottage. In the outer room guards and orderlies were located: in the inner room was a Lt.-General and his staff. The commander had a 1/300 000 map covering a very extensive area of the front — the sheets stuck together — on his table. It was clearly printed in Cyrillic and was coloured to show vegetation. A similar map was hung on the wall. A staff officer was taking down reports from a field telephone (of American origin) and marking them with coloured pencils straight on to the map. He passed each report

<sup>54</sup> Samochód — amfibia.

verbally direct to the Commander. The latter commented and sometimes issued what were probably orders, which were sent out on L/T<sup>55</sup> by a staff officer. Nothing was written down, and no log book was being kept. There seemed to be very little paper work. No wireless set was seen.

#### 5. Clothing

This seemed serviceable and practical with the main function of providing warmth. The troops all wore fur and many high fur-lined boots. OR's<sup>56</sup> mostly had thickly passes drill jackets and breeches. Overcoats were thick but not lined, and often the hems were unstitched, therefore very shoddy in appearance. Officers were much the same as the men, except that instead of drill jackets and breeches they had cloth ones (quite smart). Officers' clothing was all of better cut and finish. All wore badges of rank. Neither officers nor men seemed to wear woolen socks. They used a varying number of bandages in lieu.

#### 6 Rations

The army was clearly trying to live off the country and the forward troops were well ahead of supply bases. Livestock, grain, and fodder were taken wholesale from the civilian population without compensation. The troops did, however, have their own bread — a very coarse rye variety — tea, biscuits (both Russian and Anglo-American), sugar in large quantities which was frequently bartered for vodka, tinned meat and fish (only Anglo-American varieties seen) and heavily salted bacon (Russian).

#### 7. Discipline and bearing

Off duty regimental officers appeared to eat with their men on equal terms. Precedence of rank was not observed and no outward respect was shown for officers. Orders regarding personal demeanour, cleanliness or safeguarding of property were either ignored or openly disobeyed with apparent impunity. From limited observation it seems that the Russian soldier felt himself entitled to pilfer any articles he needed for his comfort from the civilian population. He showed little respect for private property, and had a remarkable facility for turning any quarters he occupied into the foulest pig-stye in a very few hours.

On duty saluting was adhered to and we were told that discipline affecting purely operational matters was very strict. We had, however, no chance to confirm this at first hand. Technically it appeared that officers in their own particular arm had achieved a fair standard of efficiency and confidence. General knowledge was very slight and was clearly not required of them. Set propaganda pieces sometimes tried to fill the gaps.

#### 8. General Remarks

Those notes are related purely to the pursuit phase of the Russian advance in one area. They cover the area of the main road between Jedrzejow, Wloszczowa and Czestochowa. During it, Russian losses were extremely slight, since very little knocked-out equipment was seen. There were few German prisoners of war. Only two columns — in all approximately 100 men — were seen. The Germans appeared to have got away largely intact, except on the river Pilica, where a short delaying action had been attempted. Some German transport had been destroyed there. On crossing the Pilica near Wloszczowa about ten abandoned guns seen were spiked

<sup>55</sup> Skrót trudny do ustalenia, obecnie nie używany, prawdopodobnie *light transport*, np. motocykl.

<sup>56</sup> Skrót oznaczający podoficerów i szeregowców (*other ranks*).

and were unserviceable. The bridge on the main road had been destroyed. Defences on the Pilica were not formidable and had no depth. They amounted only to the river obstacle itself (completely frozen over), a small minefield, anti-tank ditch and single trench system. One notable feature was the absence of scattered mines compared to other fronts. The Germans did not appear to have used this method of delaying the enemy. The Russians admitted this. Only one Russian mine-clearing party was seen. It worked with long wooden poles on the ends of which were steel spikes, and had specially trained Alsatian dogs to assist detecting.